U.S. Civil War cannons compared to European cannons.

Fair point. As for the Hood, if I recall correctly that was probably due to armor penetration snd the magazine being hit. Not my area, though. The loss of Beatty's battle cruisers at Jutland was pretty clearly due to careless storage - they had cordite laying around all over the place. I don't know if that was a result of any long-standing practices of the RN, however..
You are quite right about Hood, a very technical and exhaustive article was written about her loss in Warship International", which I think is now available on line. The practice of storing ready use ammunition in the BCs was well known but officially forbidden. Admiral Evan-Thomas wouldn't permit it in his Queen Elizabeth class BBs, despite being under Beatty's command. Just as well in view of the role they played in getting the latter out of trouble.
 
You are quite right about Hood, a very technical and exhaustive article was written about her loss in Warship International", which I think is now available on line. The practice of storing ready use ammunition in the BCs was well known but officially forbidden. Admiral Evan-Thomas wouldn't permit it in his Queen Elizabeth class BBs, despite being under Beatty's command. Just as well in view of the role they played in getting the latter out of trouble.
That's my understanding as well - the loss of the BCs at Jutland was functionally a doctrinal error, not one with the ship design itself.
There's only so much you can do when knowledgeable and inventive individuals honestly believe subverting safety procedures is the best thing to do.



Hood OTOH was just tragic. IIRC the magazine that got hit was slated for removal in her refit, but the refit kept being pushed back.
 
That's my understanding as well - the loss of the BCs at Jutland was functionally a doctrinal error, not one with the ship design itself.
There's only so much you can do when knowledgeable and inventive individuals honestly believe subverting safety procedures is the best thing to do.



Hood OTOH was just tragic. IIRC the magazine that got hit was slated for removal in her refit, but the refit kept being pushed back.
I think the original theory about the BC's was failure to close off paths to the munitions. But 10 years ago or so (IIRC), it was pretty conclusively determined, based in part on the wrecks, that they had cordite stashed everywhere.
 
I think the original theory about the BC's was failure to close off paths to the munitions. But 10 years ago or so (IIRC), it was pretty conclusively determined, based in part on the wrecks, that they had cordite stashed everywhere.
Either way it's the same impetus (the obsession with faster firing).

I think that can only be a doctrinal-training problem with correctly understanding the nature of director-controlled firing, because you should only be firing salvos as often as you can correct for them. (i.e. you shouldn't under any circumstances have more than two salvos in the air, and two is only okay if one is spread for bearing with the other for range, but that idea had not yet been invented).



In the "ammunition explosion" light, it may be interesting to know that British and US warships as early as the 1840s (e.g. USS Missouri) and possibly earlier have seacocks allowing them to drown the magazines in the event of a risk of fire. This was very much a warship-only thing by the looks of it, and it didn't apply to (even purpose-built) gunboats and possibly some other lighter vessels.
 
Either way it's the same impetus (the obsession with faster firing).

I think that can only be a doctrinal-training problem with correctly understanding the nature of director-controlled firing, because you should only be firing salvos as often as you can correct for them. (i.e. you shouldn't under any circumstances have more than two salvos in the air, and two is only okay if one is spread for bearing with the other for range, but that idea had not yet been invented).



In the "ammunition explosion" light, it may be interesting to know that British and US warships as early as the 1840s (e.g. USS Missouri) and possibly earlier have seacocks allowing them to drown the magazines in the event of a risk of fire. This was very much a warship-only thing by the looks of it, and it didn't apply to (even purpose-built) gunboats and possibly some other lighter vessels.
Agree on the purpose. I'm wondering whether the rapid "dreadnought" arms race led to some sloppiness in terms of adjusting doctrinal training and its offshoots. Beatty also has never struck me as a guy who would have been a stickler for methodical/disciplined practices.
 
@Belfoured In your post #16 above you stated the RN had a history of inferior gunnery and then you mention U.S. gunnery in the war of 1812. It has always been my impression that gunnery was the Royal Navy's strongpoint, at least in the age of sail. In fact that they consistently outgunned their opponents. However, and to be embarrassingly honest, my only knowledge of naval warfare in the age of sail comes from reading the Hornblower and Bolitho books.

Would you care to comment further in that regard?

Thanks, John
 
@Belfoured In your post #16 above you stated the RN had a history of inferior gunnery and then you mention U.S. gunnery in the war of 1812. It has always been my impression that gunnery was the Royal Navy's strongpoint, at least in the age of sail. In fact that they consistently outgunned their opponents. However, and to be embarrassingly honest, my only knowledge of naval warfare in the age of sail comes from reading the Hornblower and Bolitho books.

Would you care to comment further in that regard?

Thanks, John
@Cavalier: First, my knowledge is limited to the War of 1812 and the comparison between the RN and the US (primarily the Humphreys "heavy frigates" such as the USS Constitution). So I cannot comment on the RN vs. the French Navy in the Napoleonic wars. The consensus of historians who have looked into this is that the US ships placed a higher emphasis on gunnery drill and in the ship-to-ship duels accuracy and damage inflicted generally was greater for the American ships. Close review of these duels shows a relatively high number of US shots striking the critical masts and wheels of British vessels. As I indicated the gap may have gotten smaller by 1815. I haven't seen a similar analysis for the war on the Lakes but my guess is that it would be harder even to assess given the wide variety in types of vessels, ordnance, crews, etc involved in those fights. One thing to keep in mind is that gunnery was probably more important for the US because its tiny size barred it from ever engaging in a fleet action, whereas the RN was well-equipped for that type of combat. My guess is that accuracy might be less important there but critical in isolated ship-to-ship duels, which is where the US dominated. One ship-to-ship duel the RN won was the Shannon defeating the Chesapeake in 1813. The Shannon's Captain. Philip Broke, was unusual because he actually departed from RN practice and had hammered gunnery training on his ship. In contrast, the Chesapeake had a largely inexperienced and new set of officers when the battle took place.
 
First, my knowledge is limited to the War of 1812 and the comparison between the RN and the US (primarily the Humphreys "heavy frigates" such as the USS Constitution).

There were 5 frigate vs frigate combats. Where the US vessel had a 30% or greater advantage in firepower they won (n=3), where the US advantage narrowed to below 20%, they lost (n=2).

Constitution vs Guerriere (754 lbs vs 528 lbs = 43% US advantage)
United States vs Macedonian (824 lbs vs 528 lbs = 56% US advantage)
Chesapeake vs Shannon (572 lbs vs 508 lbs = 13% US advantage)
Constitution vs Java (754 lbs vs 554 lbs = 36% US advantage)
President vs Endymion (804 lbs vs 632 lbs = 17% US advantage)

The US frigates were simply bigger and more powerful ships, being 4th rates in the British rating system. As Shannon and Endymion showed, they would likely lose a "fair fight" between equal units or even moderately less powerful ones.

The big frigates were built to be comparable to the razees Magnamine, Anson and Indefatigable and the purpose built heavy frigates Endymion and Cambrian. Once the British realised what they were fighting they went far beyond the US, razeeing three ships to 32 pounder frigates (Goliath, Saturn and Majestic), building five repeats of Endymion (Severn, Liverpool, Liffey, Glasgow and Forth) and taking the plunge to the 50 gun 24 pdr frigate (Leander and Newcastle).
 
There were 5 frigate vs frigate combats. Where the US vessel had a 30% or greater advantage in firepower they won (n=3), where the US advantage narrowed to below 20%, they lost (n=2).

Constitution vs Guerriere (754 lbs vs 528 lbs = 43% US advantage)
United States vs Macedonian (824 lbs vs 528 lbs = 56% US advantage)
Chesapeake vs Shannon (572 lbs vs 508 lbs = 13% US advantage)
Constitution vs Java (754 lbs vs 554 lbs = 36% US advantage)
President vs Endymion (804 lbs vs 632 lbs = 17% US advantage)

The US frigates were simply bigger and more powerful ships, being 4th rates in the British rating system. As Shannon and Endymion showed, they would likely lose a "fair fight" between equal units or even moderately less powerful ones.

The big frigates were built to be comparable to the razees Magnamine, Anson and Indefatigable and the purpose built heavy frigates Endymion and Cambrian. Once the British realised what they were fighting they went far beyond the US, razeeing three ships to 32 pounder frigates (Goliath, Saturn and Majestic), building five repeats of Endymion (Severn, Liverpool, Liffey, Glasgow and Forth) and taking the plunge to the 50 gun 24 pdr frigate (Leander and Newcastle).
The US gunnery was more accurate, as well. Shannon's captain departed from the failure to ensure rigorous gunnery drill and the results showed.
 
The US gunnery was more accurate, as well. Shannon's captain departed from the failure to ensure rigorous gunnery drill and the results showed.

Well, that's not what the data says. The US simply brought more and heavier guns (24 pdrs vs 18 pdrs) to the fights they won. Both times they fought an enemy with the same weight of projectile (24 pdrs) they lost.
 
Well, that's not what the data says. The US simply brought more and heavier guns (24 pdrs vs 18 pdrs) to the fights they won. Both times they fought an enemy with the same weight of projectile (24 pdrs) they lost.
Well, that's what no less than Roosevelt and Black - a century and more apart - have said. It's what Bibbings has laid out in his excellent essay on Broke , "A Gunnery Zealot", showing in detail how Broke departed from his RN peers in emphasizing gunnery drill and training. And it's why in his "Standing Orders on the North American Station" Sir John Warren had to direct his captains to spend far more time and effort on gunnery drill. Your "data" is limited to weight of iron/broadside - show me "data" on shots fired, hits, and location of hits.
 
There were 5 frigate vs frigate combats. Where the US vessel had a 30% or greater advantage in firepower they won (n=3), where the US advantage narrowed to below 20%, they lost (n=2).

Constitution vs Guerriere (754 lbs vs 528 lbs = 43% US advantage)
United States vs Macedonian (824 lbs vs 528 lbs = 56% US advantage)
Chesapeake vs Shannon (572 lbs vs 508 lbs = 13% US advantage)
Constitution vs Java (754 lbs vs 554 lbs = 36% US advantage)
President vs Endymion (804 lbs vs 632 lbs = 17% US advantage)

The US frigates were simply bigger and more powerful ships, being 4th rates in the British rating system. As Shannon and Endymion showed, they would likely lose a "fair fight" between equal units or even moderately less powerful ones.

The big frigates were built to be comparable to the razees Magnamine, Anson and Indefatigable and the purpose built heavy frigates Endymion and Cambrian. Once the British realised what they were fighting they went far beyond the US, razeeing three ships to 32 pounder frigates (Goliath, Saturn and Majestic), building five repeats of Endymion (Severn, Liverpool, Liffey, Glasgow and Forth) and taking the plunge to the 50 gun 24 pdr frigate (Leander and Newcastle).
Numbers don't tell the story.

The President had suffered damage in a grounding, and was trying to escape the rest of the British squadron at the same time she was engaged with Endymion. Decatur was maneuvering to escape more than he was maneuvering to fight. If it had been just the two ships, it may have been a different outcome.
 
Numbers don't tell the story.

The President had suffered damage in a grounding, and was trying to escape the rest of the British squadron at the same time she was engaged with Endymion. Decatur was maneuvering to escape more than he was maneuvering to fight. If it had been just the two ships, it may have been a different outcome.
Good points. And while I said in a post above that I've seen less about the gunnery issue in the war on the Lakes, it may have played a role there, as well. For example, the two squadrons at Lake Erie had a significant difference in training - Barclay's crews did not use powder while Perry's did.
 
Well, that's what no less than Roosevelt and Black - a century and more apart - have said. It's what Bibbings has laid out in his excellent essay on Broke , "A Gunnery Zealot", showing in detail how Broke departed from his RN peers in emphasizing gunnery drill and training. And it's why in his "Standing Orders on the North American Station" Sir John Warren had to direct his captains to spend far more time and effort on gunnery drill. Your "data" is limited to weight of iron/broadside - show me "data" on shots fired, hits, and location of hits.

Broke did a lot of gunnery drill, but that was the norm. In all the other cases the RN showed very good gunnery too, but when a thick hulled 24 pdr armed ship goes up against a very thin hulled (especially Guerriere and Java, both of which were prizes) ship with 18 pdrs, the result is pretty inevitable.

Guerriere shredded Constitution' s upperworks and masts with her extremely effective fire, getting 50% more hits per gun than the American ships. However, her 18 pdrs simply couldn't match the 24 pounders. Already rotten and in need of docking, Guerriere was simply getting hit harder despite having far better gunners. Java's gunners also completely outshot Constitution, but despite Java getting a raking shot in at close range, the 18 pdrs simply didn't penetrate the hull. Hence Constitution gaining the "Ironsides" moniker because the 18 pdrs didn't pierce. Again, the weight difference mattered, Java's guns could not penetrate Constitution's hull. Constitution's guns easily penetrated Java's hull.

The Macedonian was the only British-built frigate lost . Hence she had a stronger hull (and it shows because unlike the Guerriere and Java, she was still seaworthy after the fight). Whilst this is the greatest firepower disparity was the highest of all the fights, the British captain made things worse for himself by holding the range open because he misidentified the enemy as the carronade armed Essex. This was also the American Captains plan. The United States' 24 pdrs were hence in effective range, but the Macedonian's 18 pdrs were out of range. Hence again it was the weight of the guns that was decisive.

Then there are the two combats against 24 pdr armed RN frigates, both of which the US lost, despite in both cases having the larger, more heavily armed ships. Excuses of course are made, but I note no excuses are made for the rotten hull of the Guerriere or other RN disadvantages.

By summer 1813 there was 11 24 pdr armed RN frigates on the American station. All US victories had been against much weaker ships, and now the US captains would have to face nearly equal ships. The gig was up.
 
Broke did a lot of gunnery drill, but that was the norm. In all the other cases the RN showed very good gunnery too, but when a thick hulled 24 pdr armed ship goes up against a very thin hulled (especially Guerriere and Java, both of which were prizes) ship with 18 pdrs, the result is pretty inevitable.

Guerriere shredded Constitution' s upperworks and masts with her extremely effective fire, getting 50% more hits per gun than the American ships. However, her 18 pdrs simply couldn't match the 24 pounders. Already rotten and in need of docking, Guerriere was simply getting hit harder despite having far better gunners. Java's gunners also completely outshot Constitution, but despite Java getting a raking shot in at close range, the 18 pdrs simply didn't penetrate the hull. Hence Constitution gaining the "Ironsides" moniker because the 18 pdrs didn't pierce. Again, the weight difference mattered, Java's guns could not penetrate Constitution's hull. Constitution's guns easily penetrated Java's hull.

The Macedonian was the only British-built frigate lost . Hence she had a stronger hull (and it shows because unlike the Guerriere and Java, she was still seaworthy after the fight). Whilst this is the greatest firepower disparity was the highest of all the fights, the British captain made things worse for himself by holding the range open because he misidentified the enemy as the carronade armed Essex. This was also the American Captains plan. The United States' 24 pdrs were hence in effective range, but the Macedonian's 18 pdrs were out of range. Hence again it was the weight of the guns that was decisive.

Then there are the two combats against 24 pdr armed RN frigates, both of which the US lost, despite in both cases having the larger, more heavily armed ships. Excuses of course are made, but I note no excuses are made for the rotten hull of the Guerriere or other RN disadvantages.

By summer 1813 there was 11 24 pdr armed RN frigates on the American station. All US victories had been against much weaker ships, and now the US captains would have to face nearly equal ships. The gig was up.
It was not the "norm" - that's why Warren had to issue his Standing Order. Have you read it? Have you read Roosevelt, Black, or Bibbings? Or is it simply a case of you just knowing more than they do - again.
 
It was not the "norm" - that's why Warren had to issue his Standing Order.

Yes, it was the norm. However, that does not mean it was universal. Warren reiterated his captains obligation to carry out regular gunnery practice after the loss of the brig Peacock (two weeks earlier, see the cause and effect?). In this case her captain was genuinely neglecting gunnery drill, as is well known.

However, you're trying to build a case out of a single isolated incident, rather than the norm.
 
Yes, it was the norm. However, that does not mean it was universal. Warren reiterated his captains obligation to carry out regular gunnery practice after the loss of the brig Peacock (two weeks earlier, see the cause and effect?). In this case her captain was genuinely neglecting gunnery drill, as is well known.

However, you're trying to build a case out of a single isolated incident, rather than the norm.
In other words, you haven't read the sources I've referenced. Warren didn't need to "reiterate" an obligation to all of his captains who, save one according to you, were already following the "norm". He issued the order to the entire North American Station precisely because it wasn't the norm and he was catching flack from the Admiralty for its general violation and the results. That's why, as Bibbings points out, Broke's practice stood out. I'm not "building a case", by the way. I'm simply referring to multiple well-regarded sources and not to a pet theory that I've cooked up on my own by making assumptions to fit my conclusion.
 
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