Trevilian Station

1SGDan

Major
Joined
Dec 13, 2009
Location
New Hampshire
Trevilian Station
Following the disaster at Cold Harbor Grant came under pressure from Washington to make progress against the Confederates. The enormous casualty list of the Overland Campaign created concern in the administration that the Northern population would continue to sour on the war effort. With the election only a few months away they wanted a victory. Grant obliged the politicians by devising a daring plan to disengage from the Army of Northern Virginia and move south across the James River to invest Petersburg, the rail hub that was key to Richmond. To prevent being caught on the move, a dangerous proposition for any army, Grant again turned to General Sheridan. The movement of 100,000 men could not be accomplished stealthily under the watchful eyes of the Confederate cavalry. They needed to be occupied so his newest move to the left could go undetected. Shrugging off the rather disappointing results of his recently completed raid on Richmond, Grant proposed another large scale cavalry movement, this time to the north. The object of the raid would be the Virginia Central Railroad around Gordonsville and Charlottesville. Unlike the previous adventure, however, Grant established three clear cut objectives for his horseman.

Sheridan was to:
1. Draw away the Confederate cavalry to mask the larger move.
2. Disrupt Lee's supply line by attacking the rail system that fed his army.
3. Link up with Major General Hunter moving east from the Shenandoah Valley to threaten the Army of Northern Virginia and Petersburg from the west.

It was an ambitious plan that readily appealed to Sheridan's self-absorbed notion of what cavalry operations should be. He hastily organized two divisions, under Torbert and Gregg, and struck out from Cold Harbor. They headed north with about 9,000 troopers, making no effort to disguise their move. He traveled considerably heavier this time than his previous raid. Four batteries of horse artillery and 125 wagons accompanied the column. They intended to present themselves as a threat and catch the attention of Robert E. Lee.

The march began on 7 June in intense early summer heat. Horses almost immediately began to give out. Those that succumbed were left to be put down by the rear guard. The move continued on at a tedious yet determined pace. It was Sheridan’s “intention to march along the north bank of the North Anna, cross it at Carpenter’s Ford, strike the railroad at Trevilian Station and destroy it to Louisa Court House, march past Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham Station, and destroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded.” They remained unmolested until they had completed passage of the river.

Robert E. Lee learned of the movement almost immediately after it began and ordered a pursuit on 9 June. Lee understood that the Union force represented a serious threat to his fragile supply line. He ordered General Wade Hampton to protect the vulnerable line from the Union raiders. Hampton assessed the situation and determined that “Sheridan with a heavy force of cavalry and artillery” was headed for Trevilian Station and decided to “take one division in addition to my own and follow him”. Hampton moved his division out at once while “directing Major General Fitzhugh Lee to follow as speedily as possible.” He hoped “to interpose my command between him” and the railroad lifeline. By 10 June they had made camp at Green Spring Valley, 3 miles from Trevilian Station. Fitzhugh Lee’s men established camp at Louisa Court House.
 
Robert E. Lee was acting just as Grant had wanted. He had committed the bulk of his cavalry, 6,000 troopers, to counter his initiative. By taking the more available direct route Hampton arrived well in advance of Sheridan. Hampton had ample time to develop a plan for blocking the Union advance. He carefully studied the situation and decided to leave his force split to cover the two roads that entered the area from the anticipated avenues of approach. Both were narrow affairs constricted by heavy woods on both sides. Perfect for the plan of action he had in mind. The terrain would negate much of the Union manpower advantage by focusing them into a small area. He dispatched scouting parties and learned that the Union troopers had gone into bivouac at Clayton’s Store. He became “determined to attack them.”

The skirmishing created between the scouts and the Federal pickets made one thing perfectly clear to Sheridan. As he indicated in his OR, “during the night of the 10th the boldness of the enemy’s scouting parties…indicated the presence of a strong force.” He had been beaten to his objective. His choice was to fight or avoid contact. He had no intention of opting for the latter. His enemy was deciding on the same course.

On the morning of the 11th an aide asked Hampton about his plans. He replied,

I propose to fight.”

Hampton’s proposed fight was to be aggressive, as was his nature. Rather than assuming the defensive, he planned on launching a pair of spoiling attacks up the two roads to their convergence and then joining forces and attacking the Union encampment at Clayton’s Store.

Sheridan was also determined to take to the offensive. He planned on sending both his divisions southward on the Fredericksburg Road in an all out drive to Trevilian Station. The plans for both sides were set and the pieces in place for the largest cavalry battle of the war.


In accordance with the old Army axiom Hampton's and Sheridan's plans evaporated almost as soon as the action began. The simultaneous attacks became a meeting engagement when Hampton's men, Butler and Wright's brigades, ran into the van of Sheridan's attack. The early fighting favored the Confederates. As Hampton described it; "Butler was immediately advanced" and drove the Union troopers back "handsomely". Hampton, himself, joined one charge on his favorite warhorse, "Butler". He led the men into the Yankee ranks yelling, "Charge them, my brave boys, charge them!" The Federals quickly rebounded by reinforcing Torbert and pushed back. The Confederates were now heavily outnumbered and took a strong "position behind works". Torbert's report tells us that "the men fought desperately, but it was hard to drive the enemy from his cover".
 
When the Union advance stalled, Custer was ordered to take "a wood road found on our left" in order to get to Trevilian Station or "at least in the rear of the enemy." He worked his brigade out to Kent Mill's Road and turned southwest. Near the intersection with the Gordonsville Road he ran into Lee's advancing column. Inexplicably, Lee fell back and granted him free access to Hampton's rear. Custer was only too happy to ride unmolested into Trevilian Station where he captured Hampton's supply train. There he captured 800 horses, three caissons, ambulances, wagons, and a stand of colors.

When Hampton realized that he was compromised he ordered an attack. He released Rosser's brigade, who had been holding a blocking position in the west, and they crashed into Custer's men. Rosser's powerful assault surprised Custer who was "obliged to relinquish their captures" and fall back into Lee. When Lee joined in the attack Custer was forced into a defensive position "near the station." His Official Report states that "from the nature of the ground and the character of the attacks that were made upon me, our lines very nearly resembled a circle." Custer was surrounded, completely cut-off by Lee's belated aggressiveness. Custer became worried that his position would be over run by the Confederates. To protect his colors from being captured he tore them from their staff and stuffed them into his shirt.


Despite his predicament Custer skillfully manipulated his available artillery. By moving the pieces to the trouble spots when they were needed the most he avoided complete disaster. He fully understood the importance of these pieces to his survival and made every effort to secure them. When one gun was threatened he ordered the 7th Michigan into a desperate charge. Majors Brewer and Walker defeated attempts to seize the gun with repeated charges. Still the issue remained very much in doubt. Custer was being attacked "on my front, right, left, and rear." Union artillery was particularly effective because "the entire ground was in range of the enemy's guns." Alger's 5th Michigan was cut off and continued to pursue the retreating supply train. Their separation from the remainder of the brigade would cause some very anxious moments for some of its members. Custer was in big trouble and he knew it. He needed help and he needed it immediately.
 
Sheridan realized Custer's predicament from the sounds of fighting coming from the area around the station. He initiated a full scale assault on Hampton's position between them and their embattled comrades. Torbert's dismounted brigades were joined by the Reserve brigade and overwhelmed the badly outnumbered Confederate defenders. They were forced to abandon their works and retreat. Torbert reported that he drove them "panic stricken" down the road. Merritt wrote of the attack "the enemy's retreat became a rout, led horses, mounted men, and artillery all fled together in the wildest confusion."

The flood of retreating men drained off Custer's tormenters. The trapped Michiganders were saved and Custer's first "Last Stand" is over. With the pressure relieved Custer resumed the offensive. He wrote in his Official Report that "after the enemy was driven from this place" he "started after the trains" and recaptured 2 caissons, 3 ambulances, and several wagons. The short pursuit ended when he decided that the risk was not worth the reward and pulled back stating "the enemy's force being so much greater than mine retired to join the other brigades in the division." On his return to Sheridan's headquarters he is asked by the general if he has lost his colors. Custer pulled them from his shirt with a flourish and announced triumphantly;

"Not by a dammed site."

For Alger's 5th Michigan the escape was not as easy. They were forced to find their way back "the best way they could." In a marvelous story from his Official Report, Alger related the tale of a group of officers and men that had a harrowing trip out of the trap.

Captain Magoffin, with a small group of fellow officers and 40 enlisted men, sought shelter in a small stand of trees. When a group of Confederate troopers passed by an officer in the group called into the trees;

"What command are you from?"

A quick thinking officer in blue, Captain Judson, replied

"Hampton's."

The Confederate officer, unable distinguished the truth in the growing darkness called back;

"All right."

As the remainder of the column passed the Union riders fell in at the tail end. They were eventually discovered when they attempted to veer away in an effort to return to friendly lines. They were attacked by their recent march partners. Twenty-eight men were left behind in the resulting action. They gave up their horses and scurried into the forest on foot. They hid out there for two days before they began a series of night movements that eventually lead them back into Union control. They emerged from the trees a week later tired, hungry, and with a grand story to tell.
 
Was Hampton overanxious this day? Seems he had a perfect trap ready to spring on Sheridan and threw it away when he became determined to attack them.” It looks like his initial defensive plan would likely have cost him less and paid higher dividends then the quick decision to attack. Hampton essentially negated his own advantage by attacking. The defensive plan would pay dividends later in this engagement and change the outcome from day one.
 
CW3O
I agree that the plan that the defensive plan would have served Hampton better, but we have to remember that the Confederate cavalry was aggressive by nature and it had served them well up to this point.
Dan
 
Excellent, Dan! For anyone not already familiar with Trevillian Station, check out the Civil War Preservation Trust website at http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/trevilian-station.html. There are excellent historic maps as well as the CWPT's usual terrific and easy-to-read battle maps, photos, links and articles on the battles, including photos of the major players....a good addition to Dan's riveting story (again, history is much more interesting than fiction!)
 
The days fight was over. With the exception of Custer's battered command the Union forces have had a successful day. Hampton has been pushed, after bitter fighting, west of the rail line leaving it susceptible to the damage the Union cavalry came to inflict. Hampton, however, is not willing to concede the field and prepared for the next days fighting. First he allowed his units to rest, regroup, while he finalized his plan.

Hampton reversed his design for the opening of the day two battle. Instead of seeking out the Union forces and creating contact, he adopted a defensive plan. He assumed a position along the rail line headed southeast. At about the half way point in the line it turned violently west and followed the contours of the land in a gradual turn to the southwest. The crooked line took every advantage of the defensible terrain and presented a formable obstacle to anyone that chose to attack it. Hampton's well entrenched men had excellent fields of fire and he hoped that from this position he could hold off the expected Union attacks while Fitzhugh Lee disengaged and completed a circuitous march to the west to join him from Louisa Court House.

Sheridan began the day by destroying about five miles of track before he turned his attention to Hampton. He ordered a series of dismounted attacks on the Confederate line. Each effort wilted under the combined pounding of Hampton's troopers and artillery. A particularly stubborn portion of the line, the sharp turn to the west was named the "Bloody Angle" by the Union troopers, who were learning the same lesson about charging an entrenched enemy as their infantry comrades at Spotsylvania Court House. Butler's Carolinians exacted a terrible toll from the attackers. Custer's depleted command was repulsed handily by the well situated defense. He stated in his report;

"...we found the enemy in a very strong position."

After failing to dent the line the usually recklessly aggressive Custer was forced to concede the impossibility of the task by noting;

"... his position proving too formable I deemed it best to withdraw."




The only real threat to the Rebel defense came internally. The condition of his trains after the incident with Custer interrupted the normal flow of ammunition and his defenders ran dangerously low. By late afternoon, however, the logistical problems had been solved. Hampton was free to deal with a small group of sharpshooters that occupied a barn in his front. The Federals were finally forced to flee when the barn was set ablaze by his gunners.

The Union troops became exhausted and discouraged by the failed assaults. Hampton sensed that the time was right for him to make his move.
 
By this time Lee had arrived and had Wickham moving into position to reinforce Butler on the extreme Confederate left. Lomax, meanwhile, continued to the northeast and crossed the Gordonsville Road above the right of the Union line. At about 1700 he turned his men south and struck the right flank of the Union position after their most recent repulse at the main Confederate line. The result of the surprise attack was better than Hampton could have anticipated. He wrote after:

"This movement was successful, and the enemy, who had been heavily punished in front, when attacked on his flank, fell back in confusion."

The fury of the attack was momentarily blunted by a counter attack by the 2nd U.S. Cavalry. As the units became scattered Wickham's men joined the attack. Swinging down like a huge hammer blow from the Confederate left they drove Devin and then Merritt from the field. Although his forces had been routed Sheridan later glossed over his defeat, stating in his report the battle was;

"...by far the most brilliant one of the present campaign."

Hampton's units continued to pursue but finally were forced to give in to darkness at 2200. The fighting had not only thoroughly defeated Sheridan but it had also denied him his desired escape route at Mallory's Crossing. He was forced to find another way back to the Army of the Potomac.

With his primary option denied, Sheridan elected to retrace his steps and crossed the river at Carpenter's Ford. The route added time and distance to his journey and Hampton had no intention of allowing him to escape unscathed. He began his pursuit immediately. For the next twelve days the two men engaged in a series of hit and run delaying actions and harassing attacks.

The minor skirmishes added 73 men to the Union casualty list. The 6th NY suffered the most in these minor clashes, losing 6 killed, 13 wounded, and 5 missing. Two larger and more significant contests were conducted at White House on 21 June and St. Mary's Church on 24 June.

Fitzhugh Lee attempted to attack the Federal supply depot at White House Landing on 20 June. Sheridan, ordered there to escort wagons from the closing facilities found "the enemy holding the bluffs surrounding the White House Farm." On the morning of the 21st two divisions, Gregg's dismounted and Torbert's mounted, crossed the Pamunkey and attacked. Lee was forced to give up his ground "after a sharp engagement". The 1st PA bore the brunt of the casualty list. Of 83 reported killed, wounded, or missing, they accounted for 53.

The final engagement of the chase occurred at St. Mary's Church, where Sheridan ordered the burdensome trains, which he asserted "should have never been left for the cavalry", parked and confronted the Confederates. While Torbert's division accompanied the train across the river Gregg was put into a blocking position to shield the passage. Two divisions of Confederate troops attacked Gregg's position in intense heat. Gregg remarked that the weather

"...prostrated many of our men and produced some deaths."

A frontal assault masked the flank march of the newly arrived Confederate brigades of Chambliss and Gary. Gregg described the action this way in his OR;

"...between 3 and 4 P.M. the enemy made an attack in great force on the 2nd brigade."

"...for about two hours the contest was so heroically maintained by our men..."

Finally the inevitable happened as;

"The contest (proved) too unequal to maintain any longer."

In fact they were routed from their works. Even Sheridan, no stranger to flowery camouflage in his reports, had to admit that the retreat was conducted

"... in some disorder."

He did, however call Gregg's defense "credible" and it probably was responsible for saving the train. The small victory was won at a terrible price. The Union force suffered 339 total casualties. The veteran 1st Maine lead the casualty report with 9 killed, 46 wounded, and 11 missing.

Phillip's Legion and the Jeff Davis Legion took up the pursuit of the fleeing enemy. With the help of Robin's Battalion and the 12th VA they drove the enemy "3 miles in confusion."
 
Robert E. Lee canceled any further chase by calling back his horsemen to deal with issues in another part of Virginia. The saga of Trevilian Station was over.

Contrary to General Wilson’s contention that the Union cavalry had surpassed their Confederate counterpart as the best mounted branch, the Union troopers still found an extremely game adversary at Trevilian Station. The Rebel troopers were aggressive, wily veterans who, most importantly, were well led. Hampton was magnificent here. He displayed tenacity without foolishly wasting his soldiers, determination without fatal stubbornness, a wonderful adaptability, and a superior tactical aptitude. His defensive stand turned into a decisive counter-attack was brilliantly conceived and extremely well executed. He effectively managed every aspect of the battle from logistics to placement of artillery.

In contrast, Sheridan displayed a rigidity of thought. His headlong frontal assaults into the teeth of a stout defense indicated a complete lack of tactical imagination. Furthermore, the wasteful assaults did little more than make him vulnerable to the counter-attack he should have anticipated. He allowed Lee’s disappearance from the field to go unnoticed for about 16 hours. When Lomax and Wickham finally reappeared it was on his woefully unprepared right flank. His failures led directly to his defeat here.

When judged against the objectives set out for the movement, this has to be assessed as a complete failure for Sheridan. Approximately 60% of the established goals went unfulfilled. Reviewing the results of the campaign against the commander’s intent:

1. Draw the enemy’s cavalry away from the Army of the Potomac main body.
This was an unqualified success. Minus his “eyes” Robert E. Lee lost track of Grant’s movements. Grant appeared before Petersburg virtually undetected. Only hesitation by Grant’s own commanders saved the city, and possibly Richmond as well, from immediate capitulation.

2. Destruction of Lee’s supply line.
The damage done to the Virginia Central RR was entirely repaired within two weeks. There was no significant impact on Lee’s logistics.

3. Unite with Hunter and threaten the ANV from the west.
Sheridan canceled this portion of the mission after the fighting on 11 June. He was scared off by a report that Confederate infantry was arriving nearby. His cancellation of that part of the mission was irrelevant after the fighting on the 12th.

Additionally, Sheridan suffered a major battlefield defeat. The entire episode is probably summed up best by ten words from General Rosser.

“Hampton whipped him…defeated his purposes and turned him back.”
 
Bibliography

OR’s
Volume XXXVI, Chapter LVIII
G. Custer pg 815-820 R. E. Lee pg 1028-1035
H. Davies pg 857 J. McIntosh pg 885-886
T. Devin pg 833-836 G. Meade pg 188
D. Gregg pg 852 W. Merritt pg 811& 849
J Gregg pg 862 W Pendleton pg 1036
W. Hampton pg 1095 P. Sheridan pg 778-785 & 787
J. Kester pg 860 A. Torbert pg 803
A. Walker pg 832


The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, Volume II, Stephen Z. Starr
The Sword of Lincoln, Jeffery Wert
The Longest Night, David Eicher
http://www.trevilianstation.org/players.htm
http://www.trevilianstation.org/battle.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Trevilian_Station
http://www.nps.gov/archive/frsp/trev.htm
Other On-line Resources
 
CW3O
I agree that the plan that the defensive plan would have served Hampton better, but we have to remember that the Confederate cavalry was aggressive by nature and it had served them well up to this point.
Dan

No doubt about the Confederate Cavalry's aggressive nature or its general history of success, but this sounds to me suspiciously like an excuse for a bad military command decision for which the troops paid a high price on day 1. The success of Hampton's defensive posture utilized during day 2 seems to back this up.
 
CW3O
Depite the possibility of a bad early tactical decision Hampton still controlled the field. Remeber too that this was in the period when Sheridan claimed that the Union cavalry was on the ascendency and would sweep the Confederates from the field. Didn't quite work out that way as the Confederate troopers still proved every bit their match.
Dan
 
Remeber too that this was in the period when Sheridan claimed that the Union cavalry was on the ascendency and would sweep the Confederates from the field.
simpsons_nelson_haha.jpg
 
Trevilian Station
Following the disaster at Cold Harbor Grant came under pressure from Washington to make progress against the Confederates. The enormous casualty list of the Overland Campaign created concern in the administration that the Northern population would continue to sour on the war effort. With the election only a few months away they wanted a victory. Grant obliged the politicians by devising a daring plan to disengage from the Army of Northern Virginia and move south across the James River to invest Petersburg, the rail hub that was key to Richmond. To prevent being caught on the move, a dangerous proposition for any army, Grant again turned to General Sheridan. The movement of 100,000 men could not be accomplished stealthily under the watchful eyes of the Confederate cavalry. They needed to be occupied so his newest move to the left could go undetected. Shrugging off the rather disappointing results of his recently completed raid on Richmond, Grant proposed another large scale cavalry movement, this time to the north. The object of the raid would be the Virginia Central Railroad around Gordonsville and Charlottesville. Unlike the previous adventure, however, Grant established three clear cut objectives for his horseman.

Sheridan was to:
1. Draw away the Confederate cavalry to mask the larger move.
2. Disrupt Lee's supply line by attacking the rail system that fed his army.
3. Link up with Major General Hunter moving east from the Shenandoah Valley to threaten the Army of Northern Virginia and Petersburg from the west.


It was an ambitious plan that readily appealed to Sheridan's self-absorbed notion of what cavalry operations should be. He hastily organized two divisions, under Torbert and Gregg, and struck out from Cold Harbor. They headed north with about 9,000 troopers, making no effort to disguise their move. He traveled considerably heavier this time than his previous raid. Four batteries of horse artillery and 125 wagons accompanied the column. They intended to present themselves as a threat and catch the attention of Robert E. Lee.

The march began on 7 June in intense early summer heat. Horses almost immediately began to give out. Those that succumbed were left to be put down by the rear guard. The move continued on at a tedious yet determined pace. It was Sheridan’s “intention to march along the north bank of the North Anna, cross it at Carpenter’s Ford, strike the railroad at Trevilian Station and destroy it to Louisa Court House, march past Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham Station, and destroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded.” They remained unmolested until they had completed passage of the river.

Robert E. Lee learned of the movement almost immediately after it began and ordered a pursuit on 9 June. Lee understood that the Union force represented a serious threat to his fragile supply line. He ordered General Wade Hampton to protect the vulnerable line from the Union raiders. Hampton assessed the situation and determined that “Sheridan with a heavy force of cavalry and artillery” was headed for Trevilian Station and decided to “take one division in addition to my own and follow him”. Hampton moved his division out at once while “directing Major General Fitzhugh Lee to follow as speedily as possible.” He hoped “to interpose my command between him” and the railroad lifeline. By 10 June they had made camp at Green Spring Valley, 3 miles from Trevilian Station. Fitzhugh Lee’s men established camp at Louisa Court House.
We're going to visit Trevilian Station next week. Can't wait.
 
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