Trent war - possible timeline of events, battles, and outcome

As she was decommissioned in 1864 she wouldn't have had any ordnance on board in 1866. She was lyingstripped in the Hamoaze awaiting sale.

She was in 3rd class steam reserve at Devonport in 1866. They didn't typically remove the armament when a ship was paid off out of commission. In 1866, after her reduction to a 66, she was still on the effective list.
 
To me that sounds rather like McKean is being hung out to dry by his superiors. If he withdraws ships and war doesn't occur he can be accused of reducing the blockade without good cause while if he doesn't and the ships are largely captured/destroyed by the RN he's likely to be blamed.

What he's proposing sounds like a decent compromise, if it works. The weaker ships are sacrificed to allow the more capable ones to escape and try and cause as many problems as possible for Britain. At the same time if war doesn't occur [which is something he's got to consider] the blockade may have a few more ships sneak through but won't be openly breached and I doubt the south has the strength to challenge it. However of course if that concentration of the core units run into a powerful RN squadron it could still all go pear-shaped for them.

McKean might ask himself, how valuable is the blockade right now, right here? How many ships have attempted/run the blockade in the Gulf in the last month? Perhaps leave one ship at Head of Passes, one at Mobile and perhaps one at Galveston and concentrate the rest. He can say he did not raise the blockade and he has the potential to save a many ships as his orders will allow. The outcome, of course, is little changed, but this is an alternative open to him.

He could just leave the old sail sloops and other converted merchantmen behind, while concentrating his best steamships to either fight or flee in case of war. That way the blockade is technically maintained, but he still has a shot to break away from a major engagement and save as much of his squadron as physically possible. If he concentrated at Key West he could conceivably save as much of the garrison and supplies as possible as well.

Still... his odds in a stand up fight aren't great, and in a squadron action he would be out of his depth since most of the men under his command are thinking in terms of nabbing blockaders and maybe chasing a Confederate raider, and I imagine morale would be flimsy after the debacle at the Head of the Passes back in October...
 
McKean might ask himself, how valuable is the blockade right now, right here? How many ships have attempted/run the blockade in the Gulf in the last month?
Eleven ships I could find were captured by the GBS in December 1861. Given that in 1862 the Union blockade only caught one runner in eight (and fewer in 1861) then we can estimate that his command saw roughly three successful blockade runners a day.


He could just leave the old sail sloops and other converted merchantmen behind, while concentrating his best steamships to either fight or flee in case of war. That way the blockade is technically maintained, but he still has a shot to break away from a major engagement and save as much of his squadron as physically possible. If he concentrated at Key West he could conceivably save as much of the garrison and supplies as possible as well.


Essentially I'm assuming he does concentrate his best steam ships somewhere central. He might send the Potomac (his heaviest sail ship) to add some punch to the blockade at the head of passes which he's using to free up more steam ships.

The basic problem McKean has is that he's been ordered to not simply abandon the blockade. What he's doing here, in my estimation, is a fairly canny plan which keeps the blockade in existence and even somewhat effective while also concentrating most of his actual firepower in case things go to pot.
 
Eleven ships I could find were captured by the GBS in December 1861. Given that in 1862 the Union blockade only caught one runner in eight (and fewer in 1861) then we can estimate that his command saw roughly three successful blockade runners a day.
Wise only shows 3 steam vessels running the Gulf blockade in Dec. 61 and a 4th captured, so unless you have other details, I'd suspect your Gulf captures are schooners and not worth risking the fleet to stop.
 
Wise only shows 3 steam vessels running the Gulf blockade in Dec. 61 and a 4th captured, so unless you have other details, I'd suspect your Gulf captures are schooners and not worth risking the fleet to stop.

Schooners and sloops can carry cargo just as much as steamers can, indeed the colliers and supply vessels for the Gulf Blockading Squadron are actually sailing ships - as is a substantial chunk of 'the fleet', the blockade includes about 20 sail combat ships. Since the capture rate in 1861 was worse than that in 1862, I don't think it's unreasonable that the Gulf saw as much activity by (successful) blockade runners as the overall average.

The captures I found by the GBS or in the GBS area, in my chosen sample month, were:

Dec 1 Advocate
Dec 3 Santiago de Cuba
Dec 9 Delight, Express, Osceola
Dec 11 Sarah, Caroline
Dec 26 Venus
Dec 28 Gipsy
Dec 30 Garonne
Dec 31 Captain Spedden


But that's not especially relevant when the point is whether Washington would tell McKean to abandon the blockade. The view I've taken of the US reaction - before the news of the declaration of war hits - is that they're worried enough to warn their commanders that something might happen but not worried enough to order them to ditch the blockade.
 
The alternate scenario presented below is one I feel might be the more likely, which is that the British attack Portland to secure the Grand Trunk rail road into Canada - both to deny it to their enemy and to use it themselves to move troops down. This operation was one seriously considered, historically, and for the purposes of this analysis I assume a landing takes place just east of Saco, Maine (where there is a good beach and which cuts the rail line to Portland) with eight British battalions and four of Maritimes militia/volunteers, plus artillery.

My assumption is further that the force would depart on the 15th February, that it would take several of the possible troop ships (thus reducing the arrival rate in Canada) and that it would be successful enough to allow troops to begin passing down it some time in March. With this in place functionally the only troops needed to be kept in the Maritimes and Maine are those actively involved in combat operations, and so by the same 31 March date as listed in the previous post:
I have a few issues with this. Firstly, although the operation was mooted, it doesn't seem to be one that anybody was particularly enthusiastic about at the time. If the British preparations in Canada were further along, I could see them taking this kind of an aggressive step. However, the way things stood, I think their main focus would be getting troops into Canada via routes they already controlled. Sending troops to Portland may offer the prospect of subsequently putting troops into Canada, but for the time being it's diverting troops which could be going down the sledge route.

Secondly, I don't think it'd actually let you pass that many troops into Canada. You don't have to just protect Portland, you have to protect over a hundred miles of railway line that passes through enemy territory. If there's any break anywhere along that line, you lose the ability to send reinforcements down it until it's fixed. Moreover, what do you do if the American drivers and stokers refuse to work- threaten to shoot them? What about sabotage of the engines or the points? On the other hand, even if the Union holds the railway line, it doesn't particularly help them. Their schwerpunkt needs to be directed against Montreal: the GTR helps them move against Sherbrooke, but basically does nothing to help them win the war.

The other problem is the militia. I don't know the details of the Maritimes militia legislation, but the Canadian militia can only be 'marched... to any place without the Province but conterminous therewith... from which an attack on this Province may be apprehended'. Does sailing count as marching? Is Portland 'conterminous' with the Maritimes? Do they apprehend an attack from there? How much will this matter to the militiamen? If it matters to some but not others, how much effort will it take to form and organise composite battalions of those who are prepared to go? Can all this be done within a couple of weeks of the news that war has been declared? I think the British are capable of putting together a force of Volunteers and militia in the Maritimes capable of dissuading Union aggression, but invading Maine seems a little beyond them.

I don't entirely disagree with your premises, but I think they'd be slower and separate. For a start, the idea of cutting the railway on the Saco River. There are 7,500 marines left even after you've manned your blockade squadrons and ships for the Lakes, so a brigade may well go to Halifax fairly soon in the year. If they need practice in amphibious operations, then cutting the railway somewhere undefended with a battalion or less, or attacking Biddeford with a brigade and leaving in haste, may be a worthwhile exercise.

Secondly, the idea of capturing Portland. I think that the British will do what they did at Sebastopol, and feel their way to it rather than going headlong. However, there are almost no guns at Portland: as of the Trent Affair, thirteen in Fort Preble and none in the other forts. If the railway is cut, and the coasting trade is also cut off, it'll be pretty difficult to get more guns there. If the British are feeling their way at Portland, using gunboats to explore the channels to the north, it'll become clear fairly quickly that they aren't being fired at anywhere near as much as they should. As a result, they may well end up capturing Portland by default and have to throw together an occupation force to keep it.
 
However, the way things stood, I think their main focus would be getting troops into Canada via routes they already controlled. Sending troops to Portland may offer the prospect of subsequently putting troops into Canada, but for the time being it's diverting troops which could be going down the sledge route.
While I think your points in general are well-found, this is actually something I wanted to bring up. My estimate of the troops arriving in the Maritimes was that they were arriving there faster by quite a way than they could be sent down the sledge route, so the troops I'd assigned to the operation were ones who wouldn't have gone through to Canada for some weeks yet.

Can all this be done within a couple of weeks of the news that war has been declared?
The difference isn't a couple of weeks, it's actually more like seven - the interval between the historical news of the climbdown and the departure of the prospective Portland attack in this timeline is 30 Dec -> 15 Feb (which is 47 days). That's enough time to do at least a moderate amount of prep, though perhaps not enough - I mainly wanted to highlight the timescale.

Secondly, the idea of capturing Portland. I think that the British will do what they did at Sebastopol, and feel their way to it rather than going headlong.
I assume this means before landing, as if they do land at Saco there's basically less than a day's march distance to Portland itself. If the operations sequence is:

1) Amphibious landing somewhere to cut the rail line
2) Naval poking around Portland discovers the missing defences
3) Oops we accidentally captured a Portland

Then that's definitely "feeling the way", but once it's feet-dry near the objective my understanding is that they move pretty fast.

Of course, there's a total of three benefits to a Portland operation:

1) It raises the possibility of using the rail line to get troops to Canada.
2) It shortens the Union coast for the purposes of blockade.
3) It diverts Union attention from Canada.



Ultimately, one of the things driving the idea of the Portland attack is actually story based, as it's a good way to get some early land action in. But if it's really considered unlikely, then I'll be willing to rework it - that's the point of this, after all.
 
Of course, there's a total of three benefits to a Portland operation:

1) It raises the possibility of using the rail line to get troops to Canada.
2) It shortens the Union coast for the purposes of blockade.
3) It diverts Union attention from Canada.



Ultimately, one of the things driving the idea of the Portland attack is actually story based, as it's a good way to get some early land action in. But if it's really considered unlikely, then I'll be willing to rework it - that's the point of this, after all.
Amphibious doctrine promotes amphibious operations for many reasons. Two significant ones are present here and, I think, would have been favorably impressed on the UK forces: 1. The ability to hit the enemy where he is not, forcing him to defend more than he wants to and 2. The ability to force the enemy to contend with a threat that was not part of his plan.

Your Portland move fits very well with amphibious doctrine. I think you should keep it, if possible.
 
My estimate of the troops arriving in the Maritimes was that they were arriving there faster by quite a way than they could be sent down the sledge route,
Faster than they could be sent down the sledge route historically, with the build-up that lost its main purpose on 30 December. Boosting capacity on the railway from Riviere-du-Loup, or adding a second leg of sledge route down the St Lawrence to Quebec so that the additional troops can go by sledge rather than rail (or even march), seems a lot more achievable than capturing and holding Portland and 140 miles of railway through hostile territory.

The difference isn't a couple of weeks, it's actually more like seven - the interval between the historical news of the climbdown and the departure of the prospective Portland attack in this timeline is 30 Dec -> 15 Feb (which is 47 days). That's enough time to do at least a moderate amount of prep, though perhaps not enough - I mainly wanted to highlight the timescale.
The problem with doing preliminary work before the declaration of war is:
a) The author knows that there's going to be a war, but the characters don't. For instance, for an amphibious assault you'll need more than just the standard transports (which are of course hired by the London government and will require approval from them to do anything other than running the Halifax-Britain route). Inspecting and hiring Maritimes ships for an amphibious assault costs money, and takes the time of experienced naval officers. Any time and money you spend on this will be completely wasted if, on 26 January, the news arrives that the government are actually willing to give arbitration a go after all.
b) News travels. Until war has broken out, there are still telegraph messages being sent from the Maritimes to the Union; there are reporters, businessmen, and other travellers who can see what is happening there. If reports come back that the British are asking militia to volunteer for an invasion of Maine and inspecting transport vessels, the Union are going to figure out that something amphibious is coming. If you leave the preparations until after war has broken out, it becomes much easier to maintain opsec.

47 days is not actually that long. Consider that the British militia got between 35 and 48 days training before they were fit for inspection, with an experienced cadre of officers, sergeants and even private soldiers in which to fit the raw recruits, in spring or summer when almost every day could be used for drill or musketry. Expecting four full battalions of Maritimes militia or Volunteers to be capable of participating in active service in enemy territory at a similar stage seems quite ambitious.

If the operations sequence is:

1) Amphibious landing somewhere to cut the rail line
2) Naval poking around Portland discovers the missing defences
3) Oops we accidentally captured a Portland
With the naval reinforcements arriving in early February, including the gunboats, I presume the British would start feeling things out at that stage. That would include gunboats probing and sounding places like Penobscot Bay and the upper reaches of Portland's harbour. When the railway line would be cut would depend on where you cut it: a full-on attack on Biddeford would require a full brigade and probably a mid-February date, but a small-scale landing to cut the bridge over the Nonesuch river only needs a couple of companies at most and could be done fairly shortly after war broke out.

When Portland initially falls, the Royal Navy would presumably occupy the fortifications in the harbour or slight them so that they can sail in and out with impunity. But there's no getting round the fact that you need a lot of battalions to hold that peninsula, and those are battalions that could be protecting Welland or Montreal instead.

Of course, there's a total of three benefits to a Portland operation:

1) It raises the possibility of using the rail line to get troops to Canada.
2) It shortens the Union coast for the purposes of blockade.
3) It diverts Union attention from Canada.
1) It raises the possibility, yes- but as we've seen, that isn't necessarily a realistic possibility, and there may be better ways of getting troops to Canada.
2) It shortens the Union coast to an extent, but it also shortens the Union line of attack. Previously, the Union railhead ended at Bangor and if they wanted to attack a concentration of British troops they had to advance 140 miles overland to Saint John. Even if the British cut the railway line at Saco, they've now put twelve battalions of troops (including 5% of all their regular infantry battalions worldwide) within fifteen miles of a Union railhead, with their only means of resupply being via sea. There are no existing fortifications capable of protecting such a large deployment of troops: the best thing they can do is try and construct entrenchments on the Western Promenade and hold the Portland peninsula. However, this would also allow the Union to cut the rail line to Canada which was the main reason for making the landing in the first place.
3) You could also divert Union attention by throwing your troops ashore on Long Island, but it isn't necessarily a good thing to do if you don't want to lose those troops. With British troops isolated at Portland, it would be very, very tempting for the Union to divert a volunteer division and some militia (with most of New England being within 300 miles of Portland) and try to force a second Yorktown. Even relatively light guns would make it very difficult to land supplies at the wharves, and mortars would render the entrenchments pretty unpleasant.

Portland is too big a prize to reject if it falls into British hands. However, it seems too ambitious a prize for them to attempt to take, when Canada's still so vulnerable.
 
Saproneth,

As promised references on BNA canals:-

1) Synge, Millington, Lieut-Colonel, RE, The Lakes and Canals of Canada , Royal United Service Institution, Journal, 10 (1867) p.183
2) Kingsford, Wm, The Canadian Canals, Toronto Published Rollo and Adam, 1865 (Google Books)

A Clown cannot get up the Ottawa river to the Rideau canal in the first place ref 2 pp30 - stopped by the rapids at Grenville canal where smallest three locks are of between 106.75 ft to 108.5 ft long x 19.5 ft wide. Going down the rapids a Gunboat MIGHT be able to run them.
 
Best to err on the side of caution for those two, then.

That being said, I might redo my calculations for how fast troops can get to Canada under the assumption that a second sled route is set up along the south bank of the St. Lawrence with the same capacity as the original one, coming into operation on Feb 1, and treat that as 'canonical'.


As for bringing gunboats up, the thaw fully opened the St Lawrence on the 5th of May (that's when the first ships came up past Kingston - it thawed in from the sea so gunboats would be following the thaw), and the Rideau would only be relevant if at that point the US already had sufficient force to block the river. As far as I can tell (my most immediate source being an 1862 map showing proposed Union routes to get gunboats on the Lakes) there are two canals south of Montreal to go around the rapids, with the one closer to Montreal, Beauharnois, being the one on the "US" side of the river (though still well into Canada). This seems like a clear place to post British troops to defend until the gunboats and lakes-ironclads are past.
The second one, Cornwall, is less under threat though would still need a garrison.

Then the other possible trouble spot is Ogdensburg, where the river is about half a mile wide - it's directly opposite Prescott, which in the defence scheme was expected to host a field division, and I expect this is where the gunboat flotilla would have to run past some batteries - or outshoot them, of course - and this becomes much easier if there's ironclads on tap.
 
That being said, I might redo my calculations for how fast troops can get to Canada under the assumption that a second sled route is set up along the south bank of the St. Lawrence with the same capacity as the original one, coming into operation on Feb 1, and treat that as 'canonical'.
It might be easier to work out how many men need to go down the sledge route/railway to clear the backlog, and what kind of upgrades that would require. They seem to have only used one train per day to take troops from Riviere du Loup, a decision I presume was inspired by the fact that Mason and Slidell were being handed over:

‘Arrangements have been made by the military authorities with the Managers of the Grand Trunk Railway, to have in readiness a daily express train, at Riviere du Loup, for the purpose of forwarding the troops on their arrival there, to any part of Canada on their line. Future divisions will be daily progressing from one part to another from St John’s New Brunswick to Riviere du Loup, so that when one division leaves a station, another will arrive at it, and in like manner will all the troops required in Canada be brought overland from Halifax or St John, New Brunswick.’ (Quebec Mercury, 16 January 1862 p.2)
‘The first division of the 62nd Regiment, amounting to about one hundred and sixty men, rank and file, arrived at Riviere du Loup, yesterday morning, at about ten o’clock, from Halifax, and passed up on their way to Montreal, this morning, where they will receive orders for their future destination. A second division of the same regiment arrived at Riviere du Loup, this morning early. This division will leave Riviere du Loup for Montreal, at about three o’clock this afternoon, by an Express train.’ (Quebec Mercury, 16 January 1862 p.2)
‘A division of the fifth battery of the 7th brigade of Royal Artillery, consisting of about seventy-five men and four officers, arrived at Riviere du Loup this morning from Halifax, taking about twenty-three days. They will, probably, not leave their quarters at Riviere du Loup before tomorrow morning, when they will then leave in the regular morning train for Quebec, which may be looked for here at about five o’clock, PM.’ (Quebec Mercury, 23 January 1862 p.2)
‘The troops conveyed up from River du Loup, yesterday, by special train, were seven officers and one hundred and sixty one men of the rifle Brigade. To-day, 7 officers and 167 men of the Rifle Brigade and 2 officers of the 62nd Regiment, are on the way up, and would arrive at the Chaudiere, about three PM.’ (Quebec Mercury, 28 January 1862 p.2)
‘Grenadier Guards- the first detachment of the Guards is expected from Riviere Du Loup this evening, from Halifax overland. Troops passing westward- Yesterday’s train conveyed 8 officers 165 men, Rifle Brigade, Major General Lord Poulet [sic] and staff, Captains Gordon and Seymour. Today, 1 officer, 16 men, artillery for Quebec; 4 officers and 149 men, Military train, and 1 man, 62nd Regiment, for Montreal, are en route.’ (Quebec Mercury, 30 January 1862 p.2)
‘Troops passing westward- Today’s train left Riviere du Loup at nine o’clock, am, with six officers and one hundred and sixty eight men of the Grenadier Guards, all for Montreal. Yesterday’s uptrain from Riviere du Loup conveyed 11 officers 156 men of the Grenadier Guards and 7 men of the Rifle Brigade all bound for Montreal.’ (Quebec Mercury, 1 February 1862 p.2)

It seems that normally there was just the one train per day:
‘Grand Trunk Railway. On or after Monday, January 6, 1862. Trains will leave Point Levi… For River du Loup daily, at 10:00AM. Trains will arrive at Point Levi… from River du Loup daily, at 3:20 PM’ (Quebec Mercury, 23 January 1862 p.3)

I don't know a great deal about the route, for instance whether it's double or single tracked. As such, I'm not really in a position to say whether three trains per day (one normal, two military) are feasible- let alone more. However, it seems easier to get more out of the existing routes than to extend a new one, particularly when you consider that the railway is far quicker than sledges in the first place.

the other possible trouble spot is Ogdensburg, where the river is about half a mile wide - it's directly opposite Prescott, which in the defence scheme was expected to host a field division, and I expect this is where the gunboat flotilla would have to run past some batteries - or outshoot them, of course
Judging by the Official Record, they were planning several forts which they now don't have time to install. If they emplace batteries, though, they're going to have to be big ones: even without ironclads, the British have got the best part of forty gunboats coming down the river to shoot back. And the Union is pretty short of artillery as things stand.
 
It might be easier to work out how many men need to go down the sledge route/railway to clear the backlog, and what kind of upgrades that would require.
My estimate is that there'd be about one battalion per two days arriving in the Maritimes and one battalion per five or six days leaving along the sledge route. So you'd roughly have to triple the capacity of the route to avoid a backlog building up, which is why I was conjecturing a second route (along the St. Lawrence south bank?) to get people to R. de L.


I don't know a great deal about the route, for instance whether it's double or single tracked. As such, I'm not really in a position to say whether three trains per day (one normal, two military) are feasible- let alone more. However, it seems easier to get more out of the existing routes than to extend a new one, particularly when you consider that the railway is far quicker than sledges in the first place.
It looks like it was single track, yes, and that double-tracking didn't start historically until the 1880s.

That being said, it looks like it's about 200 km from one end to the other along the rail line (at least of the critical section).

‘Grand Trunk Railway. On or after Monday, January 6, 1862. Trains will leave Point Levi… For River du Loup daily, at 10:00AM. Trains will arrive at Point Levi… from River du Loup daily, at 3:20 PM’ (Quebec Mercury, 23 January 1862 p.3)
Assuming that it's a single track line without passing places (i.e. the pessimistic option) and that this is all the one vehicle, this suggests a round trip time of 5 hours 20 minutes (to go from Point Levi, get to Riviere du Loup, and come back). Given the above, that would imply a sustained speed of 50 miles per hour or more (400 km is 250 miles), which is pretty high - suggesting that passing was possible and that there were at least two trains on the move on the same line at the same time, passing at some point or other.


Without knowing the times at the other end we can't be sure, but mathematically speaking, EVEN IF there is only one crossing point on the whole rail line, so long as it's less than four hours' travel from either end it's still possible - if you can have the trains cross over every eight hours, you can keep the system rotationally symmetric every eight hours, and just have it so that (for the longer section of the line) as soon as train 1 reaches the station train 2 sets off to cross train 3. (Eight hours later train 3 reaches the station and train 1 sets off to cross train 2.)

This does require one of the stations to have two platforms, though, or at least one platform and a siding, but that seems reasonably plausible.
 
This does require one of the stations to have two platforms, though, or at least one platform and a siding, but that seems reasonably plausible.
EVERY Southern station, even the smallest with the lowest traffic, had a siding of 700 to 1200 feet in length. I would think that, since there are no exceptions (that I know of -- and I'm pretty sure of my statement), this would have to be viewed as American (and also Canadian?) normal. So, I think you are entirely reasonable to expect a siding at every station on your route.
 
EVERY Southern station, even the smallest with the lowest traffic, had a siding of 700 to 1200 feet in length. I would think that, since there are no exceptions (that I know of -- and I'm pretty sure of my statement), this would have to be viewed as American (and also Canadian?) normal. So, I think you are entirely reasonable to expect a siding at every station on your route.
That seems sensible, then. (I'm more used to trains from a much higher-density country, i.e. southern England.)

As a matter of interest, so long as the two-way round trip and turnaround (at both ends) is less than sixteen hours, it's possible for two trains to keep up a three-departures-per-day sequence so long as they can pass one another. Essentially train 1 leaves station A at 0, station B at +8 hours, station A at +16 hours and so on, while train B mirrors it.

Of course, this may be too ambitious with the supplies of wood and water at the individual stations. (Canadian trains at this time did not use coal.)
 
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you'd roughly have to triple the capacity of the route to avoid a backlog building up, which is why I was conjecturing a second route (along the St. Lawrence south bank?) to get people to R. de L.
You see, I thought you were aiming primarily to get people from Riviere du Loup to Quebec along the south bank of the St Lawrence. If you're focusing on getting them from Halifax/St John's to Riviere du Loup, then your options are either to expand the existing sledge route or to find an alternative.

On expanding the route, that memoir I posted earlier suggests that there was at least some scope for expansion, as 'in the square before the hotel at Woodstock, every morning, many more sleighs came to be hired than were needed, particularly early in the season, before the weak teams were knocked up'. There's also the problem of accommodation, where it might be possible to expand somewhat. Nevertheless, I'm not convinced that it was possible to triple the capacity of the route.

Should note at this stage that if you can't triple its sledge capacity, it's possible to march (with snowshoes) rather than ride. It'd halve the speed of passage, and because you can only march c.10-15 miles a day it would require a big investment in additional accommodation. However, marching in larger units might be preferable if there's any risk of ambush on the road (which there probably isn't, given the Union manpower problems, but the British don't know that)

If you need to open a new route, I think your main option is the Matapedia road, which runs from Shediac to Campbellton and Metis. I don't know what state it's in, but it was examined and discarded historically. However, it might be possible to open it if absolutely necessary. That would allow you two sledge routes to Riviere du Loup, which makes the limiting factor the rail capacity there.

That being said, it looks like it's about 200 km from one end to the other along the rail line (at least of the critical section).
126 miles in total, so good guess.

suggesting that passing was possible and that there were at least two trains on the move on the same line at the same time, passing at some point or other.
In 1860 there was a mixed train leaving Quebec at 1:30PM and arriving at St Pascal (no station at Riviere du Loup at that point) at 7:15PM, and a mixed train making the return journey between 11:30AM and 5:45PM. So yes, there must have been at least one passing place.

I can't find timetables close to the relevant point, but in July 1864 there was a mail train leaving Quebec at 1:05PM and arriving at Riviere du Loup at 8:30PM, and a mail train making the return journey between 5AM and 1PM. In May 1865 there was an express leaving Quebec at 12:30PM and arriving at Riviere du Loup at 8:23PM, and an express leaving Riviere du Loup at 5AM and arriving at 1:15PM. By September 1865 there were two trains each way. The express service left Quebec at 8:00AM and arrived at 2.05PM, and left Riviere du Loup at 3PM to arrive at Quebec at 8:45PM. The mixed service was the same as the May 1865 express service- 'express' presumably being a relative term here.

If you gave the line completely over to military use and ran it to breaking point, you might just about get three trains down to Quebec each day. I think it's likely that they had sufficient rolling stock to put on that many trains: historically they must have had a special train for the troops, plus the two ordinary services. It must have been awkward getting new rolling stock onto the line, though. Presumably they had to be brought across the St Lawrence, and I can't see them managing that in winter. As such, if one of the engines breaks then you're out of luck.

In terms of ensuring balance, presumably this route shouldn't be carrying more than the rail lines in upper New York, which had a comparable quantity of peacetime traffic.
 
In terms of ensuring balance, presumably this route shouldn't be carrying more than the rail lines in upper New York, which had a comparable quantity of peacetime traffic.
Yes, that's also in my mind - the great advantage the Canadian line has is that it's taking men from a place on the edge to a place with lots of supplies (i.e. some cities) while the NY lines are essentially building up a major camp from which to launch an offensive at a near-empty railhead.

The difference doesn't affect the number of trains the line can run per day (which is controlled primarily by factors of speed and length) but it does mean the US rail line has an increasing amount of capacity taken up by supplies like food and fodder. In that situation the most efficient use of rail space is to:

1) Build up supplies until the supplies equal AxBx0.5, where A is the daily supplies the projected army will require (i.e. the capacity of the rail line per day) and B is the time it will take them to pass up the rail system. This means it will take B/2 days.
2) Move troops. This takes B days.
3) Resume supply movements.

This is the ideal-world case, of course, but it's useful to consider.
 
...
The three large field commands of the US army, Jan 1862 (PFD strengths as of Dec 31 1861)

Department of the Potomac (183,000)
HQ
Banks (already in New England)
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A correction for you: Butler was the one in New England; at the time Banks was commanding a division in western Maryland.
 
A correction for you: Butler was the one in New England; at the time Banks was commanding a division in western Maryland.
Ah, yes, my mistake!
It looks like I was correct on the enumeration of individual divisions for where they'd go for my timeline, though, where I describe Banks being transferred to Boston.
 
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