1SGDan
Major
- Joined
- Dec 13, 2009
- Location
- New Hampshire
Part 1 – Introduction and Background
The Overland Campaign featured some of the most dramatic and deadly combat of the Civil War. Stories of the bravery and sacrifice of the Union and Confederate soldiers during this time has filled countless volumes. Historians have largely concentrated their efforts, rightfully so, on these blood soaked episodes when writing about this campaign. Often lost in their efforts is the planning and skill required to move these large bodies of men and supplies under difficult circumstances. This short series of posts will examine one of the most successful efforts of this kind; the movement of the Army of the Potomac to the James River in the summer of 1864.
The failure of the Union assault on the Confederate works at Cold Harbor on June 3rd, 1864 started a period of relative quiet after weeks of nearly constant combat. Despite the inconvenience and filth of living in the trenches both sides had the opportunity to rest and restore order to their shattered ranks. The lull in the fighting also supplied the Union command time to plan a new move. U.S. Grant saw the futility of any further action at Cold Harbor and determined to shift the entire Army of the Potomac across the James River to capture the important railroad and logistical center at Petersburg. It would be no simple task to disengage his army from close contact with the enemy and move without detection.
The first order of business was to put some of his troops in position to maneuver. The ground hog like stalemate had pinned his troops to the trenches of their assigned sectors. The removal of troops from any area of the line might persuade the enemy to attack the apparent weakness. Further complicating matters was the proposed route to the James. Grant planned to cross the Chickahominy with the bulk of his forces at Long Bridge and Jones Bridge at the southern end of his line. Not wanting to prematurely presage activity in this area he decided to shorten the northern end of his line. Consequently, Warren’s 5th Corps troops were ordered to abandon their portion of the line and assemble near the Leary residence well behind the center of the Union line. On the night of June 5th Warren’s four divisions stole from their works and MG Ambrose Burnside’s 9th Corps extended their line north to help disguise their absence. He also refused the end of the new line with BG Robert Potter’s division of mostly New England regiments to secure the Union right against any Confederate foray.
Despite these efforts, as the sun rose on June 6th Confederates at the northern end of their line discovered empty trenches across no man’s land. Lee, eager to break the stale mate and hoping to catch the Federals on the move, immediately sensed an opportunity to attack. LTG Jubal Early, 2nd Corps commander, was ordered to investigate. Early tested the new Union position unsuccessfully on the afternoon of June 6th. Dissatisfied with the result, Lee ordered a stronger effort. Early and a portion of R.H. Anderson’s 1st Corps began an assault shortly after sunrise on June 7th but artillery from Fletcher’s Redoubt foiled the poorly coordinated effort. Convinced that no success could be had in this quarter troops were returned to their positions and efforts turned to organizing a truce to recover wounded men between the lines.
The Overland Campaign featured some of the most dramatic and deadly combat of the Civil War. Stories of the bravery and sacrifice of the Union and Confederate soldiers during this time has filled countless volumes. Historians have largely concentrated their efforts, rightfully so, on these blood soaked episodes when writing about this campaign. Often lost in their efforts is the planning and skill required to move these large bodies of men and supplies under difficult circumstances. This short series of posts will examine one of the most successful efforts of this kind; the movement of the Army of the Potomac to the James River in the summer of 1864.
The failure of the Union assault on the Confederate works at Cold Harbor on June 3rd, 1864 started a period of relative quiet after weeks of nearly constant combat. Despite the inconvenience and filth of living in the trenches both sides had the opportunity to rest and restore order to their shattered ranks. The lull in the fighting also supplied the Union command time to plan a new move. U.S. Grant saw the futility of any further action at Cold Harbor and determined to shift the entire Army of the Potomac across the James River to capture the important railroad and logistical center at Petersburg. It would be no simple task to disengage his army from close contact with the enemy and move without detection.
The first order of business was to put some of his troops in position to maneuver. The ground hog like stalemate had pinned his troops to the trenches of their assigned sectors. The removal of troops from any area of the line might persuade the enemy to attack the apparent weakness. Further complicating matters was the proposed route to the James. Grant planned to cross the Chickahominy with the bulk of his forces at Long Bridge and Jones Bridge at the southern end of his line. Not wanting to prematurely presage activity in this area he decided to shorten the northern end of his line. Consequently, Warren’s 5th Corps troops were ordered to abandon their portion of the line and assemble near the Leary residence well behind the center of the Union line. On the night of June 5th Warren’s four divisions stole from their works and MG Ambrose Burnside’s 9th Corps extended their line north to help disguise their absence. He also refused the end of the new line with BG Robert Potter’s division of mostly New England regiments to secure the Union right against any Confederate foray.
Despite these efforts, as the sun rose on June 6th Confederates at the northern end of their line discovered empty trenches across no man’s land. Lee, eager to break the stale mate and hoping to catch the Federals on the move, immediately sensed an opportunity to attack. LTG Jubal Early, 2nd Corps commander, was ordered to investigate. Early tested the new Union position unsuccessfully on the afternoon of June 6th. Dissatisfied with the result, Lee ordered a stronger effort. Early and a portion of R.H. Anderson’s 1st Corps began an assault shortly after sunrise on June 7th but artillery from Fletcher’s Redoubt foiled the poorly coordinated effort. Convinced that no success could be had in this quarter troops were returned to their positions and efforts turned to organizing a truce to recover wounded men between the lines.