To the James

1SGDan

Major
Joined
Dec 13, 2009
Location
New Hampshire
Part 1 – Introduction and Background

The Overland Campaign featured some of the most dramatic and deadly combat of the Civil War. Stories of the bravery and sacrifice of the Union and Confederate soldiers during this time has filled countless volumes. Historians have largely concentrated their efforts, rightfully so, on these blood soaked episodes when writing about this campaign. Often lost in their efforts is the planning and skill required to move these large bodies of men and supplies under difficult circumstances. This short series of posts will examine one of the most successful efforts of this kind; the movement of the Army of the Potomac to the James River in the summer of 1864.

The failure of the Union assault on the Confederate works at Cold Harbor on June 3rd, 1864 started a period of relative quiet after weeks of nearly constant combat. Despite the inconvenience and filth of living in the trenches both sides had the opportunity to rest and restore order to their shattered ranks. The lull in the fighting also supplied the Union command time to plan a new move. U.S. Grant saw the futility of any further action at Cold Harbor and determined to shift the entire Army of the Potomac across the James River to capture the important railroad and logistical center at Petersburg. It would be no simple task to disengage his army from close contact with the enemy and move without detection.

The first order of business was to put some of his troops in position to maneuver. The ground hog like stalemate had pinned his troops to the trenches of their assigned sectors. The removal of troops from any area of the line might persuade the enemy to attack the apparent weakness. Further complicating matters was the proposed route to the James. Grant planned to cross the Chickahominy with the bulk of his forces at Long Bridge and Jones Bridge at the southern end of his line. Not wanting to prematurely presage activity in this area he decided to shorten the northern end of his line. Consequently, Warren’s 5th Corps troops were ordered to abandon their portion of the line and assemble near the Leary residence well behind the center of the Union line. On the night of June 5th Warren’s four divisions stole from their works and MG Ambrose Burnside’s 9th Corps extended their line north to help disguise their absence. He also refused the end of the new line with BG Robert Potter’s division of mostly New England regiments to secure the Union right against any Confederate foray.

Despite these efforts, as the sun rose on June 6th Confederates at the northern end of their line discovered empty trenches across no man’s land. Lee, eager to break the stale mate and hoping to catch the Federals on the move, immediately sensed an opportunity to attack. LTG Jubal Early, 2nd Corps commander, was ordered to investigate. Early tested the new Union position unsuccessfully on the afternoon of June 6th. Dissatisfied with the result, Lee ordered a stronger effort. Early and a portion of R.H. Anderson’s 1st Corps began an assault shortly after sunrise on June 7th but artillery from Fletcher’s Redoubt foiled the poorly coordinated effort. Convinced that no success could be had in this quarter troops were returned to their positions and efforts turned to organizing a truce to recover wounded men between the lines.
 
Part 2 Setting the Stage

While Early poked at the northern end of the Union line significant movements were being made in the Union rear. At the Leary farm, Warren was ordered to hold two of his divisions in readiness to support Burnside if necessary. The other two divisions, under BG Lysander Cutler and BG Charles Griffin, moved south. At the southern end of the Federal line Griffin’s men extended the Federal line linking with the skirmishers of MG David Birney’s division of Hancock’s 2nd Corps. The new line ran along the Chickahominy River with Griffin’s men covering Sumner’s Lower Bridge and Cutler covering the Richmond and York River Railroad Bridge and Bottom’s Bridge. Col George Chapman’s cavalry pickets extended the line southward beyond Long Bridge to Windsor Shades.

The new arrangements scarcely made an impression on the Confederates, who were only too happy to continue the unspoken truce at the river which included mutual fishing rights. Only minor skirmishing at the railroad bridge unsettled the unofficial calm at the river. As a result a few extra pieces of Confederate artillery were brought up to cover their side of the bridge.

At Confederate headquarters the Union move had a deeper meaning. The sudden appearance of 5th Corps troops here indicated a possible crossing effort exposing a direct line to Richmond. Indeed crossing the river was exactly what Grant was planning but a dash on the Confederate capital was not part of the plan. Lee’s uncertainty about this would play an important part in the coming events.
 
Part 3 Crossing the Chickahominy

The move began on the night of the 10th as Hancock’s 2nd Corps shifted slightly south. Wright’s 6th Corps troops did the same moving into the evacuated 2nd Corps positions. Anticipating the final movement and to provide additional routes for a rapid withdrawal from the front a new four mile road was cut through the trees. The 50th New York Engineers worked throughout the day “felling trees as we advanced.” By 8:30 p.m. a road passable for artillery was complete.

At 6 p.m. on June 12th the remaining divisions of Warren’s 5th Corps (Ayers and Crawford) began moving south behind the Federal line with Ayers and his artillery in the lead. Crawford followed with the remaining artillery. Their route took them southeast toward Long Bridge. Meanwhile Cutler and Griffin abandoned their positions and marched to join them at the crossing site. Slated to use this bridge were 5th and 2nd Corps. Burnside’s 9th Corp and Wright’s 6th Corps were assigned a crossing further downstream at Jones Bridge. The massive wagon train and cattle herd would travel farther to the east escorted by Ferrero’s USCT units to cross the river at Cole’s Ferry. The remaining troops, Smith’s 18th Corps, would march to White House Landing and board water transportation to Bermuda Hundred.

With the planning and the preliminary moves complete the grand move was under way. At daybreak the cavalry brigade of Colonel George Chapman led the way to Long Bridge. Being closest to the enemy line the crossing here was also the gateway for the screening forces of the Army of the Potomac. The original bridge at Long Bridge had long since been destroyed so Maj Ford’s 50th New York Engineers were on hand to build a pontoon bridge. The far bank, however was occupied by pickets from Colonel Rufus Barringer’s North Carolina cavalry making the construction of the bridge impossible. After squabbling between Wilson and Warren the cavalry commander agreed to drive the enemy away.

Moving downstream Major Edmund Pope and his 8th New York cavalry troopers dismounted at Pollard’s Ford and crossed the river on fallen trees. After a brief skirmish they managed to successfully chase the Confederate pickets away and began their march upstream to the crossing site. Impatient to begin, brigade commander Chapman ordered the 22nd New York Cavalry to force a crossing at Long Bridge. Under fire the New York troopers waded the stream while two pontoon loads of 3rd Indiana cavalry were rowed across by the engineers.* After a brief struggle the mixed unit of skirmishers managed to push the North Carolinians away.

The removal of the enemy did not solve all of the engineer’s problems. They soon discovered that the river was made up of two individual streams divided by an island. Debris from the original bridge filled the stream and the old abutments had to be cut down. The midnight deadline for completion of the bridge was impossible. It was after 1 a.m. before the bridging operation was complete. As soon as the bridge was complete the remaining troopers of Chapman’s command crossed accompanied by batteries C and E of the 4th US Artillery. The cavalry was followed closely by 5th Corps. Once across the river Warren detached BG Samuel Crawford’s division to support the screening effort. The objective of this combined effort was two critical points located on White Oak Bridge Road and Long Bridge Road. These two areas represented major choke points on the primary avenue of approach for any Confederate forces that might attempt to catch the Union forces on the move. Control of them was an important security concern. It was a tall order.

  • The only casualty of this operation was one engineer soldier killed.
 
I assume you are aware of Gordon Rhea's newly released "On To Petersburg" which covers exactly these days (June 4-15, 1864)
 
Part 4 White Oak Bridge Act 1

After driving the Confederate pickets from the Chickahominy bridgehead the Union troopers rode west along Long Bridge Road. Occasional skirmishing and some barricades slowed the advance but an hour after crossing the river they had reached the intersection of White Oak Bridge Road. Turning north the Federal troopers headed for White Oak Bridge. Colonel Rufus Barringer’s Tar Heel cavalry, however arrived first. An abandoned fort just north of the bridge, left over from the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, was quickly occupied by a battery of Virginia horse artillery, under Captain William McGregor. The position commanded the approaches to the bridge.

Arriving at the bridge dismounted troopers from the 3rd Indiana Cavalry managed to drive in Barringer’s skirmishers but this opened the field for McGregor’s guns. The Hoosiers were pushed back by the weight of their barrage. The 8th New York Cavalry stiffened the line and allowed the Federal artillery to plant its guns. The standoff at the bridge fell into an artillery duel. Hearing the sound of the growing fight at the bridge Crawford marched his 2nd Brigade, under Colonel James Bates, to support. The lead elements, the 12th Massachusetts and 94th New York, formed a skirmish line. They found the enemy “strongly posted” covering the bridge and came under heavy fire. An additional two batteries of Union artillery, Battery C 1st New York Light and the 15th New York Light Artillery, arrived on the scene as the remainder of the infantry brigade swung into position.

The growing Union strength at the bridge was matched as Lee reacted to the new circumstances. Troops from MG Henry Heth’s division of the Army of Northern Virginia’s 3rd Corps arrived to fortify the Confederate position. With neither side capable of advancing, the fight evolved into a “mutual halt, each army again throwing up entrenchments and preparing for an attack.” One Massachusetts soldier remarked that the stalemate became a fight against the other residents of the swamp. The Bay Stater recalled “some of the largest black snakes I ever saw” co-occupied their position. “We killed four or five of these” and saw dozens more. Despite these disagreeable cohabitants the bridge was effectively sealed and Lee was forced to continue pondering exactly what the intent of the Union move was.
 
"Occasional skirmishing and some barricades slowed the advance..."
"...Barringer’s Tar Heel cavalry, however arrived first."


Basic military tactics at work! The very reason for pickets. skirmishers and barricades is to delay the enemy while you manuever your own forces into a desirable position. Seems to have worked out well for the Confederates in this case, allowing them to win the race to White Oak Bridge.
 
Part 5 Riddell’s Shop Act One

With the situation at White Oak Bridge stabilized by the infantry Chapman pulled his troopers away. Returning to the intersection of Long Bridge Road the cavalrymen turned west. Again Barringer’s hard pressed riders contested the Union advance. Also arriving, after a mad gallop, was BG Martin Gary’s cavalry brigade. Gary arranged a dismounted line of troopers in a wood line near the hamlet of Riddell’s Shop. The 7th South Carolina Cavalry on the left and the Hampton Legion on the right. The 24th Virginia cavalry remained mounted and pushed east along Long Bridge Road in reconnaissance. Riding west on Long Bridge Road Chapman’s troopers collided with the Virginians. The 3RD Indiana and 8th New York were dismounted and formed into a line across the road. A mounted charge by the Virginians was crushed and many of the horses disabled by Union artillery deliberately aiming low. The Federals continued forward on foot. Colonel Chapman described the scene:

“Proceeding about a mile my advance came upon the enemy strongly posted in a belt of timber in front of Riddell’s Shop. After some skirmishing, finding enemy disposed to contest the position with obstinacy, I directed Third Indiana and Eighth New York to prepare to fight on foot, and forming them in line of battle advanced into the woods at a double quick. A brigade of rebel cavalry, dismounted and armed mainly with rifled muskets, held the position, but they soon gave way before the impetuosity of my men, leaving many of their dead and wounded on the field.

Despite the “rattling fight” Gary soon found himself outmanned and outgunned. When the Union advance threatened to flank him on both sides he moved his line back through Riddell’s Shop and established a new position a quarter mile to the west. Gary’s retreat uncovered the critical intersection of Charles City Road, Willis Church Road and Long Bridge Road. To maintain control of this intersection Chapman deployed his troopers in two lines. The first contained the 1st Vermont, 3rd Indiana, and 8th New York. The 1st New Hampshire and 22nd New York formed the supporting line with Fitzhugh’s artillery. Patrolling and construction of a “slight breastwork” consumed the next three hours. With control of their two main objectives the Union Cavalry commander BG James Wilson was able to report to headquarters that a single corps could hold the position “against almost any force.” With the remainder of Warren’s 5th Corps stationed nearby to supply assistance or repel any Confederate attack the Union screen was in place. Hancock’s 2nd Corps followed Warren over Long Bridge while 6th Corps and 9th Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom’s bridge unmolested.
 
Cavalry fights are always interesting. The speed they maneuver makes for rolicking kind of battles. Seems the Union artillery, presumably horse artillery, was able to keep up and be in the right place at the right time in this case and turned the fight into one sided one.
 
Cavalry fights are always interesting. The speed they maneuver makes for rolicking kind of battles. Seems the Union artillery, presumably horse artillery, was able to keep up and be in the right place at the right time in this case and turned the fight into one sided one.

The mobility of the Federal artillery allowed the screening forces to gain and hold the critical choke points long enough for the supporting infantry to arrive. The arrival of infantry not only stabilized these blocking positions but created doubt about the actual intentions of the Union move. Lee was forced to consider the possibility of a direction move toward Richmond.
 
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Part 6 Riddell’s Shop Act Two

The sound of the fights at White Oak Bridge and Riddell’s Shop gave Lee all the evidence he needed to know that something big was happening with the enemy forces. He was still undecided exactly what course of action Grant intended on taking. He could either advance directly west on the direct route to Richmond or turn south toward the James River. What was certain was that Chapman and Crawford’s troops were battling for possession of the roads that led directly to the Confederate capital.

Reacting to that information that he had Lee ordered A.P. Hill’s corps to march immediately to Riddell’s Shop. Being closest the division of MG Cadmus Wilcox led the way at a blistering pace. Crossing the Chickahominy at Alexander’s Bridge Wilcox marched for Savage Station. There he received a messenger from BG Gary explaining that he had been driven out of Riddell’s Shop. The pace quickened even more still and by 2 o’clock the division arrived at Gary’s position west of Riddell’s Shop. Sharpshooters and a company of the 14th South Carolina ventured out on the Charles City Road to locate the Federal position. Chapman’s pickets were easily driven in and seeing the approach of enemy infantry he declared “my ammunition being nearly exhausted and the enemy showing vastly superior numbers I deemed it prudent to retire.”

Hearing of the approach of enemy infantry Crawford threw his remaining brigades into the fight. The 3rd Brigade, two regiments of Pennsylvanians under Colonel James Carle marched for Riddell’s Shop. When Carle’s troops arrived at Riddell’s Shop the 190th Pennsylvania rushed up to support the hard pressed troopers of Chapman’s command, while the 191st formed a reserve line south of Long Bridge Road. Near nightfall the Confederates had arrayed the main body of troops for an attack. When they struck the cavalry men were ordered back when Chapman thought the infantry on his right were about to collapse. The incident created a quarrel about who was responsible for the ensuing confusion. Chapman claimed the infantry broke causing him to retreat while Carle claimed that retreating troopers ran their horses through his line disrupting his defense. As the Confederates pressed forward the 190th Pennsylvania joined the fray and Fitzhugh’s artillery roared to life. The barrage of canister swept the Confederates attack back. As darkness closed in both sides began entrenching. Federal control over the important intersection was maintained. By midnight when the movement of the Union Corps behind them was complete Chapman and Carle’s men were marching to rejoin 5th Corps at Samaria Church.
 
You originally called Crawford's efforts here "screening" effort designed to screen the Corps sized movement behind them. Clearly this is a traditional cavalry mission. Was there any indication that Grant also intended it, based upon re-enforcement of infantry, to be a feint to deceive Lee. Or was the infantry re enforcement only a local command effort ,necessary to prevent a Confederate breakthrough into the flanks of the Corps on the move?
 
You originally called Crawford's efforts here "screening" effort designed to screen the Corps sized movement behind them. Clearly this is a traditional cavalry mission. Was there any indication that Grant also intended it, based upon re-enforcement of infantry, to be a feint to deceive Lee. Or was the infantry re enforcement only a local command effort ,necessary to prevent a Confederate breakthrough into the flanks of the Corps on the move?

I believe it was an unintended, but happy, consequence. The 5th Corps troops were added to the mission to support the cavalry in the case of any breakthrough toward the movements behind them. There was never actually enough power behind their move to successfully accomplish a breakthrough toward Richmond but Lee was forced by the circumstances to consider it a possibility and react to counter what he the believed to be the most immediate threat.

You must remember that the bulk of the cavalry on both sides were off combating each other in a raid on the railroads north of Richmond. Lee was short on eyes as his remaining cavalry battled Chapman.
 
Part 7 White Oak Bridge Act 2

To reinforce Bates at the White Oak Bridge Crawford dispatched his last remaining brigade. Colonel Peter Lyle’s 1st Brigade march up the White Oak Bridge Road but became slightly disrupted when they came under artillery fire. The column dispersed just as Heth’s Confederates attacked. Bates 107th Pennsylvania became dangerously uncovered and were close to collapsing. Meanwhile Lyle managed to reorganize his men and rushed the 13th and 39th Massachusetts to the danger area. The combined strength of the new line managed to repulse the Confederate attack. The Confederates fell back, regrouped, and tried again. The 13th Massachusetts recalled the day’s events this way:

“The cavalry becoming engaged, our division advanced to their support. The place where they were fighting was White Oak Swamp, the same ground on which McClellan fought the battle of that name in 1862. The debris of the old battle still remained scattered about the field.

It was not intended to bring on a battle at this point, but only to cover and protect the roads. The skirmishers of our division suffered severely, though we escaped with the loss of one man who was wounded.

Once more the Federal line held and the Confederates retreated. As darkness grew each side entrenched and the battle died out. While control of the bridge had been maintained the growing number of enemy forces placed Bates and Lyle in a very precarious position. Heth had linked with Wilcox and the line had been further extended by the arrival of BG William Mahome’s division. Nearly surrounded Lyle had a very narrow avenue of escape. A plan was hatched and related by the 39th Massachusetts:

“Shortly after dark, somewhere between 8 and 9 p. m., all of the officers of the brigade were ordered up to Colonel Lyle's (the Brigade's) headquarters. The Colonel told us of the position which we were in, stating that we were nearly surrounded, and that an attempt would be made at about midnight to get out. He also told us to tell our men of our position, also that no orders above a whisper should be given, and, that if we heard so much as a tin dipper jingling upon a man's haversack, to cut it off. We were told to get what rest we could between then and midnight. At about midnight the line fell in, seemingly without orders, faced to the left, and marched through a field where some tall grain was growing, and the men, knowing our position and being anxious to get out, kept increasing their pace and rattling the grain, so that it was necessary to halt them and to start them again from time to time until we had cleared the grain field. The night was very dark and the darkness favored our escape.”

Ultimately, no enemy came near the movements across the Chickahominy. The Federal screening operation had been a complete success.
 
Movement of such large bodies of men as being described here take a lot of planning and execution. Nice to see a screening operation described in detail. Normally such activities, vital as they are, get little attention. This seems to have been well planned and executed with plenty of good decisions on the part of local commanders as well.
 
Movement of such large bodies of men as being described here take a lot of planning and execution. Nice to see a screening operation described in detail. Normally such activities, vital as they are, get little attention. This seems to have been well planned and executed with plenty of good decisions on the part of local commanders as well.

I have a hard time thinking of another movement of this type that was executed as well in any war I have read about. The closenees of the two armies makes this even more remarkable. In some locations the opposing trenches were only 40 yards apart. As you know disengaging under these circumstances is very difficult and exceedingly dangerous to those moving.
 
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