jameswoods
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- Jul 29, 2015
In a previous post it was proposed that Barnes’ two brigades (Sweitzer’s and Tilton’s) did not go into position in the northern part of Rose woods until after an unsuccessful attack by Anderson’s left wing regiments on the two deTrobriand’s and one Burling regiment (110th Pa., 5th Mi., 8th NJ) positioned at the base of Stony Hill.
I don’t agree, I think the preponderance of evidence indicates the two Fifth Corps brigades were in place before Anderson’s brigade entered Rose’s woods.
As noted in a previous post, and in Jorgensen’s “Gettysburg’s Bloody Wheatfield”, one of the problems with the former view is that it requires one to believe Vincent’s brigade (which led Barnes’ Division to the left) could get to Little Round Top and deploy into a defensive position before 4:45 PM while Sweitzer and Tilton could not move over level terrain a lesser distance to get into position before Anderson’s left wing regiments were first repulsed (between 5:10 Pm and 5:25 PM). What stopped them for that half hour? No good answer
Equally curious is the role the 40th New York played, or more to the point did not play, in repelling Anderson’s attack.
General Barnes noted that as his command, “...entered the wood, they passed over a line of troops, understood to be a portion of a brigade of the Third Corps; they were lying down upon the ground.” Though not identified by Barnes, these troops were members of the 40th New York, De Trobriand’s brigade as confirmed by Colonel Thomas Egan, who reported, “...At about 4 o’clock were relieved by a portion of the Fifth Corps, when I was ordered by Major-General Birney to move by the left flank through the woods across a field of wheat,…”
The unanswered question is: why would not the 40th New York have been pressed into service if their comrades a few hundred yards to the south were fighting for their lives? The obvious answer is: the fighting had not yet begun. And, by the time it did begin, the 40th New York had been relieved.
Additionally, it is pretty well established that Law’s brigade stepped off at about 4:00 PM and Robertson’s brigade a few minutes later. Benning’s brigade moved forward in support about twenty minutes after that and Anderson’s brigade, repeating the interval, stepped off at 4:40 PM.
By 5:00 PM Anderson’s brigade would have just entered Rose’s woods, driving the 5th Michigan skirmishers back toward the main line. By 5:05 PM the opposing sides would have been fully engaged.
I believe Tilton’s and Sweitzer’s brigades had entered the wood no later than 4:45 PM and were in position by 4:55 PM, ten minutes before coming under fire by Anderson’s command.
Ira C. Abbott, Colonel of the 1st Michigan, Tilton’s brigade, one of the regiments on the receiving end of the Confederate fire, recalled, “...Getting into position I ordered my men to lie down but was not allowed to remain long before the enemy appeared in our front...The enemy advanced in two lines of Battle and commenced firing at 40 rods. [From Abbott’s perspective, those two lines were the 9th and 8th Georgia, the 11th Georgia apparently too far away to his left front to be observed] They were replied to by each regt. except my own which I kept down to the ground until some of my officers thought I was losing time but the volleys passed over us and when they were within close range I ordered them to their feet and to fire by files which made dreadful confusion in their ranks and caused them to fall.”
A soldier in the 118th Pennsylvania on the right of the 1st Michigan recalled. “…The Rebs came down the hill in front of us in droves and we opened fire on them very lively. I loaded and fired 15 times. They were so thick that you could shut your eyes and fire and could hit them, and they jumped behind every tree and stump for cover and halted at the edge of the woods.”
On lower ground Colonel de Trobriand’s regiments, the 110th Pennsylvania and 5th Michigan, confronted the 9th and 8th Georgia. De Trobriand later wrote of his two regiments, “...When their assailants descended into the ravine and crossed the creek they were received, at a distance of twenty yards, with a deadly volley, every shot of which was effective. The assault broken, those who were on the opposite slope began a rapid fire at a range still very short.”
Burling’s hijacked regiment, the 8th New Jersey, received the attention of the left companies of the 11th Georgia. Though evenly matched in the number of muskets, the ferocity of the attack launched against a poorly positioned and no doubt demoralized 8th New Jersey quickly resulted in their withdrawal.
Historian Samuel Toombs described the fight between the 8th New Jersey and their rebel adversaries as a, “...sharp, severe and bloody struggle.” Toombs’ reference to a “sharp” engagement suggests that it was over rather quickly. In any case, according to Toombs, the 8th’s, “...ranks were rapidly thinned, and as they fell slowly back, their colors became entangled in a tree. The remnant of brave fellows rallied around them with cheers and re-formed to meet the advancing foe. At this point the Eighth was subjected to a severe musketry fire and sustained heavy losses. Colonel Ramsey was wounded, and the command devolved upon Captain John Langston, of Company K. A brigade of the Fifth Corps came into line and the Eighth was relieved.”
The 5th Corps troops referred to were the men of the 32nd Massachusetts, 62nd Pennsylvania and 4th Michigan who occupied the higher ground immediately above and behind the 8th New Jersey. It’s not surprising that Captain Langston thought the 5th Corps had just arrived, Colonel De Trobriand (to whom the 8th NJ had been lent) was unaware of their presence right up to the time they began their withdrawal at the time of Kershaw’s advance.
Captain Hillyer, commanding the 9th Georgia, reported that his left was exposed, “…to the fire of a flanking party of the enemy who were prompt to take advantage of the exposed condition of the flank. To meet this flanking party, I changed the front of the three companies....” Was this “flanking party” just the harassing fire of 3rd Michigan skirmishers or the more substantial fire of the 1st Michigan and 22nd Massachusetts (Tilton’s brigade) on the right of the 32nd Massachusetts and above and behind the 110th Pennsylvania? I incline toward the latter explanation.
Initially, only the 32nd Massachusetts of Sweitzer’s brigade was in position to participate (the 62nd Pennsylvania and 4th Michigan still facing west). The 32nd Massachusetts’ historian noted, “...We were hardly established in our position, such as it was, before the attack came, the enemy piling down in great numbers from the opposite slope and covering themselves partially under the hither bank of the little stream. They were received by a galling fire from the division....”
However, this state of affairs was soon rectified, Colonel Sweitzer, commanding brigade, reporting that, “...as there was no appearance of the enemy in front of the line formed by the Sixty-second Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan, I directed them to change front to the left, and form lines in rear of the Thirty-second Massachusetts. During the execution of this order, the attack continued....”
This movement was noted by Lt. Reid of the 8th Georgia, “…On the left of our regiment, the bog turned to the left and along it was ranged the 9th Georgia, who were firing obliquely to their right with great effect at the men in our front... I chanced to look to the left. In the thin woods a reinforcing line of blue was marching. I could see only two colors, but I saw that the line reached far beyond each one of these. At about 70 yards their muskets were leveled, and the gleamed in the sun. I shall never forget how I was tied to gaze. A scythe of fire leaped forth, and the air all around me turned to hissing lead…”
Note the reference to the strength of the two regiments coming into line, more descriptive of the 62nd Pennsylvania and 4th Michigan than the relatively small 115th Pennsylvania and 8th New Jersey as has been suggested by some.
General Anderson had already instructed Captain Hillyer to refuse the 9th Georgia’s three left companies but quickly realized the potential danger if those reinforcing regiments decided to move against his left flank and immediately ordered the brigade to fall back. As reported by Colonel White, filing the brigade report, “…General [George T.] Anderson changed the front of the left wing of the Ninth Georgia Regiment…but soon found they could not hold the enemy in check. He then ordered the brigade to retire to the crest of the hill, in the edge of the timber, where the charge commenced. But a short time elapsed [my italics] before McLaws’ division came up on our left, when General Anderson ordered another advance, which was executed with spirit and loss to the enemy. In this charge, General Anderson was wounded....”
Captain Hillyer, 9th Georgia, recalled that, “...After McLaws Division came up on our left, our line thus reinforced, moved some distance to the front and down a declivity into a strip of meadow land, where a little brook ran parallel to our position. This little brook made a natural ditch some two or three feet deep, and in its meanderings with its grassy banks, made a fine natural rifle pit. We were quick to take advantage of the opportunity and occupied it.” The strip of meadow land probably refers to the grassy area in the sw corner of the Wheatfield previously fought over by the 11th Georgia against the 17th Maine…”.
This second charge, in support of Kershaw’s brigade (McLaws’ Division), was also noted by Maj. McDaniel, 11th Georgia, whose regiment had been actively engaged with the 17th Maine until Anderson had personally ordered him to join in the brigade’s retreat.
According to Maj. McDaniel, the initial, “… advance was made in good order, and, upon reaching the belt of woods in front, a vigorous fire was opened on the enemy, followed up by a vigorous charge, which dislodged them from the woods, the ravine, and a stone fence running diagonally with the line of battle. This formidable position was occupied by the Eleventh Georgia, and a galling fire opened upon the enemy’s front and flank, causing his line to recoil in confusion. At this juncture, Brigadier- General Anderson came in person…and ordered Colonel Little to withdraw the regiment to the crest of the hill, on account of a movement of the enemy in force upon the left flank of the brigade.”
To interpret the foregoing, I think the troops dislodged from the ravine were the 8th NJ and the troops he saw recoiling from the fence (running at an angle to his approach) were the left companies of the 17th Maine being refused to meet his attack. Also, the movement of the enemy in force upon the left flank of the brigade mentioned by Anderson could hardly have been anything other than a reference to the firepower of Tilton’s and Sweitzer’s brigades.
McDaniel, echoing Colonel White reported, “…After a short interval, a second advance was made to the stone fence [coincident no doubt with the arrival of Kershaw’s brigade on Stony Hill] but, after a furious conflict [with Caldwell’s 2nd Corp brigades], the failure of support on the right forced the brigade back a distance of 100 yards.”
Finally, according to McDaniel, the third advance, “…was made in connection with the entire line on that part of the field.…”
The start of this third advance involving the entire line was the one precipitated by Wofford’s brigade’s advance and occurred at approximately 6:55 PM.
So with all the documentation presenting a fairly cut and dried case for the second attack only occurring with the arrival of Kershaw’s brigade, why a second attack by Anderson’s brigade prior to the arrival of Kershaw’ brigade?
While not agreeing with the proposition, Jorgensen writes,”…The timing of the arrival of Barnes’ two brigades on Stony Hill has been difficult to determine because of the paucity of battle accounts dealing with their involvement in the first phase of the Wheatfield fight. They were in place either before or after Anderson’s first assault in the Wheatfield fight. The fact that there are no accounts from any of de Trobriand’s or Burling’s regiments that mention Tilton’s or Sweitzer’s men being present support the notion that they were not present during the opening action.”
In a prior post Tom Elmore made the same point, “…the left of the 32nd Massachusetts as first positioned would have been nearly upon the 110th Pennsylvania and 5th Michigan as I understand those two regiments to have been placed, and yet neither side mentions the presence of the other”.
Another point questions how Fifth Corp skirmishers could have been sent into the woods (presumably before becoming engaged) and not encounter any of Anderson’s troops unless, of course, the Georgians had already retreated 200 yards after fighting de Trobriand’s troops and been thrown back.
Major Rogers, 110th Pennsylvania, reported, “...The battle continued with a determination on both sides to conquer or die until 6 p.m., when the enemy in our front fell back, and the order to cease fire was given. This being done, I was ordered by a staff officer to fall back and give place to fresh troops, which was done....” These fresh troops were, of course, the men of Tilton’s brigade, 5th Corps and so answers the claim that they were unaware of the others presence. Also, as noted earlier, when the 8th New Jersey fell back, “…A brigade of the Fifth Corps came into line and the Eighth was relieved.”
But what if these fresh troops had just arrived and not taken part in the battle just concluded? An answer to that question may be found in a look at the number of effective muskets on each side and a comparison of losses inflicted. Could the 110th Pennsylvania, 5th Michigan and 8th New Jersey prevail over Anderson’s Georgians without the assistance of Tilton and Sweitzer?
Available muskets at start
and estimated losses
110th Pa. 136/45
5th Mi. 202/45
8th NJ 159/30
497/120
9th Ga.* 261/181
8th Ga. 276/100
11th Ga.** 138/ 65
675/346
* I estimate the 9th Georgia took about 45 casualties from artillery before getting to the woods and have reduced the 306 effectives at the start accordingly.
**As stated earlier, I believe the 11th Georgia (or at least the left wing of the 11th Georgia) was also involved in this combat but sustained most of its casualties fighting the 17th Maine. The 11th had 277 muskets at the start of the battle and probably lost no more than 65 of their 200 total loss fighting the 8th NJ. So, in line with my understanding of the 11th Georgia’s position vis-a-vis the 8th NJ, and for the purpose of this comparison, I have halved the strength of the 11th Georgia, i.e., to 138.
If, at the start of the contest the 9th, 8th and 11th Georgia had 675 muskets in line, it’s hard to see how the three federal regiments with 497 muskets were not only able to able resist their attack but in doing so inflict three times as many casualties.
(Some have suggested that the 115th Pennsylvania (140/30) may have been moved out of Wheatfield to participate with the 8th New Jersey in this fight. This idea is attractive because it tends to help explain the apparent Federal success in defending the Stony Hill without the assistance of 5th Corp troops. Of course, there is no documentation whatever to support this idea and plenty to discredit it as demonstrated in earlier posts.)
I have included as attachments troop position maps to illustrate activity in Rose’s Woods and on Stony hill during the times discussed.
Jim
I don’t agree, I think the preponderance of evidence indicates the two Fifth Corps brigades were in place before Anderson’s brigade entered Rose’s woods.
As noted in a previous post, and in Jorgensen’s “Gettysburg’s Bloody Wheatfield”, one of the problems with the former view is that it requires one to believe Vincent’s brigade (which led Barnes’ Division to the left) could get to Little Round Top and deploy into a defensive position before 4:45 PM while Sweitzer and Tilton could not move over level terrain a lesser distance to get into position before Anderson’s left wing regiments were first repulsed (between 5:10 Pm and 5:25 PM). What stopped them for that half hour? No good answer
Equally curious is the role the 40th New York played, or more to the point did not play, in repelling Anderson’s attack.
General Barnes noted that as his command, “...entered the wood, they passed over a line of troops, understood to be a portion of a brigade of the Third Corps; they were lying down upon the ground.” Though not identified by Barnes, these troops were members of the 40th New York, De Trobriand’s brigade as confirmed by Colonel Thomas Egan, who reported, “...At about 4 o’clock were relieved by a portion of the Fifth Corps, when I was ordered by Major-General Birney to move by the left flank through the woods across a field of wheat,…”
The unanswered question is: why would not the 40th New York have been pressed into service if their comrades a few hundred yards to the south were fighting for their lives? The obvious answer is: the fighting had not yet begun. And, by the time it did begin, the 40th New York had been relieved.
Additionally, it is pretty well established that Law’s brigade stepped off at about 4:00 PM and Robertson’s brigade a few minutes later. Benning’s brigade moved forward in support about twenty minutes after that and Anderson’s brigade, repeating the interval, stepped off at 4:40 PM.
By 5:00 PM Anderson’s brigade would have just entered Rose’s woods, driving the 5th Michigan skirmishers back toward the main line. By 5:05 PM the opposing sides would have been fully engaged.
I believe Tilton’s and Sweitzer’s brigades had entered the wood no later than 4:45 PM and were in position by 4:55 PM, ten minutes before coming under fire by Anderson’s command.
Ira C. Abbott, Colonel of the 1st Michigan, Tilton’s brigade, one of the regiments on the receiving end of the Confederate fire, recalled, “...Getting into position I ordered my men to lie down but was not allowed to remain long before the enemy appeared in our front...The enemy advanced in two lines of Battle and commenced firing at 40 rods. [From Abbott’s perspective, those two lines were the 9th and 8th Georgia, the 11th Georgia apparently too far away to his left front to be observed] They were replied to by each regt. except my own which I kept down to the ground until some of my officers thought I was losing time but the volleys passed over us and when they were within close range I ordered them to their feet and to fire by files which made dreadful confusion in their ranks and caused them to fall.”
A soldier in the 118th Pennsylvania on the right of the 1st Michigan recalled. “…The Rebs came down the hill in front of us in droves and we opened fire on them very lively. I loaded and fired 15 times. They were so thick that you could shut your eyes and fire and could hit them, and they jumped behind every tree and stump for cover and halted at the edge of the woods.”
On lower ground Colonel de Trobriand’s regiments, the 110th Pennsylvania and 5th Michigan, confronted the 9th and 8th Georgia. De Trobriand later wrote of his two regiments, “...When their assailants descended into the ravine and crossed the creek they were received, at a distance of twenty yards, with a deadly volley, every shot of which was effective. The assault broken, those who were on the opposite slope began a rapid fire at a range still very short.”
Burling’s hijacked regiment, the 8th New Jersey, received the attention of the left companies of the 11th Georgia. Though evenly matched in the number of muskets, the ferocity of the attack launched against a poorly positioned and no doubt demoralized 8th New Jersey quickly resulted in their withdrawal.
Historian Samuel Toombs described the fight between the 8th New Jersey and their rebel adversaries as a, “...sharp, severe and bloody struggle.” Toombs’ reference to a “sharp” engagement suggests that it was over rather quickly. In any case, according to Toombs, the 8th’s, “...ranks were rapidly thinned, and as they fell slowly back, their colors became entangled in a tree. The remnant of brave fellows rallied around them with cheers and re-formed to meet the advancing foe. At this point the Eighth was subjected to a severe musketry fire and sustained heavy losses. Colonel Ramsey was wounded, and the command devolved upon Captain John Langston, of Company K. A brigade of the Fifth Corps came into line and the Eighth was relieved.”
The 5th Corps troops referred to were the men of the 32nd Massachusetts, 62nd Pennsylvania and 4th Michigan who occupied the higher ground immediately above and behind the 8th New Jersey. It’s not surprising that Captain Langston thought the 5th Corps had just arrived, Colonel De Trobriand (to whom the 8th NJ had been lent) was unaware of their presence right up to the time they began their withdrawal at the time of Kershaw’s advance.
Captain Hillyer, commanding the 9th Georgia, reported that his left was exposed, “…to the fire of a flanking party of the enemy who were prompt to take advantage of the exposed condition of the flank. To meet this flanking party, I changed the front of the three companies....” Was this “flanking party” just the harassing fire of 3rd Michigan skirmishers or the more substantial fire of the 1st Michigan and 22nd Massachusetts (Tilton’s brigade) on the right of the 32nd Massachusetts and above and behind the 110th Pennsylvania? I incline toward the latter explanation.
Initially, only the 32nd Massachusetts of Sweitzer’s brigade was in position to participate (the 62nd Pennsylvania and 4th Michigan still facing west). The 32nd Massachusetts’ historian noted, “...We were hardly established in our position, such as it was, before the attack came, the enemy piling down in great numbers from the opposite slope and covering themselves partially under the hither bank of the little stream. They were received by a galling fire from the division....”
However, this state of affairs was soon rectified, Colonel Sweitzer, commanding brigade, reporting that, “...as there was no appearance of the enemy in front of the line formed by the Sixty-second Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan, I directed them to change front to the left, and form lines in rear of the Thirty-second Massachusetts. During the execution of this order, the attack continued....”
This movement was noted by Lt. Reid of the 8th Georgia, “…On the left of our regiment, the bog turned to the left and along it was ranged the 9th Georgia, who were firing obliquely to their right with great effect at the men in our front... I chanced to look to the left. In the thin woods a reinforcing line of blue was marching. I could see only two colors, but I saw that the line reached far beyond each one of these. At about 70 yards their muskets were leveled, and the gleamed in the sun. I shall never forget how I was tied to gaze. A scythe of fire leaped forth, and the air all around me turned to hissing lead…”
Note the reference to the strength of the two regiments coming into line, more descriptive of the 62nd Pennsylvania and 4th Michigan than the relatively small 115th Pennsylvania and 8th New Jersey as has been suggested by some.
General Anderson had already instructed Captain Hillyer to refuse the 9th Georgia’s three left companies but quickly realized the potential danger if those reinforcing regiments decided to move against his left flank and immediately ordered the brigade to fall back. As reported by Colonel White, filing the brigade report, “…General [George T.] Anderson changed the front of the left wing of the Ninth Georgia Regiment…but soon found they could not hold the enemy in check. He then ordered the brigade to retire to the crest of the hill, in the edge of the timber, where the charge commenced. But a short time elapsed [my italics] before McLaws’ division came up on our left, when General Anderson ordered another advance, which was executed with spirit and loss to the enemy. In this charge, General Anderson was wounded....”
Captain Hillyer, 9th Georgia, recalled that, “...After McLaws Division came up on our left, our line thus reinforced, moved some distance to the front and down a declivity into a strip of meadow land, where a little brook ran parallel to our position. This little brook made a natural ditch some two or three feet deep, and in its meanderings with its grassy banks, made a fine natural rifle pit. We were quick to take advantage of the opportunity and occupied it.” The strip of meadow land probably refers to the grassy area in the sw corner of the Wheatfield previously fought over by the 11th Georgia against the 17th Maine…”.
This second charge, in support of Kershaw’s brigade (McLaws’ Division), was also noted by Maj. McDaniel, 11th Georgia, whose regiment had been actively engaged with the 17th Maine until Anderson had personally ordered him to join in the brigade’s retreat.
According to Maj. McDaniel, the initial, “… advance was made in good order, and, upon reaching the belt of woods in front, a vigorous fire was opened on the enemy, followed up by a vigorous charge, which dislodged them from the woods, the ravine, and a stone fence running diagonally with the line of battle. This formidable position was occupied by the Eleventh Georgia, and a galling fire opened upon the enemy’s front and flank, causing his line to recoil in confusion. At this juncture, Brigadier- General Anderson came in person…and ordered Colonel Little to withdraw the regiment to the crest of the hill, on account of a movement of the enemy in force upon the left flank of the brigade.”
To interpret the foregoing, I think the troops dislodged from the ravine were the 8th NJ and the troops he saw recoiling from the fence (running at an angle to his approach) were the left companies of the 17th Maine being refused to meet his attack. Also, the movement of the enemy in force upon the left flank of the brigade mentioned by Anderson could hardly have been anything other than a reference to the firepower of Tilton’s and Sweitzer’s brigades.
McDaniel, echoing Colonel White reported, “…After a short interval, a second advance was made to the stone fence [coincident no doubt with the arrival of Kershaw’s brigade on Stony Hill] but, after a furious conflict [with Caldwell’s 2nd Corp brigades], the failure of support on the right forced the brigade back a distance of 100 yards.”
Finally, according to McDaniel, the third advance, “…was made in connection with the entire line on that part of the field.…”
The start of this third advance involving the entire line was the one precipitated by Wofford’s brigade’s advance and occurred at approximately 6:55 PM.
So with all the documentation presenting a fairly cut and dried case for the second attack only occurring with the arrival of Kershaw’s brigade, why a second attack by Anderson’s brigade prior to the arrival of Kershaw’ brigade?
While not agreeing with the proposition, Jorgensen writes,”…The timing of the arrival of Barnes’ two brigades on Stony Hill has been difficult to determine because of the paucity of battle accounts dealing with their involvement in the first phase of the Wheatfield fight. They were in place either before or after Anderson’s first assault in the Wheatfield fight. The fact that there are no accounts from any of de Trobriand’s or Burling’s regiments that mention Tilton’s or Sweitzer’s men being present support the notion that they were not present during the opening action.”
In a prior post Tom Elmore made the same point, “…the left of the 32nd Massachusetts as first positioned would have been nearly upon the 110th Pennsylvania and 5th Michigan as I understand those two regiments to have been placed, and yet neither side mentions the presence of the other”.
Another point questions how Fifth Corp skirmishers could have been sent into the woods (presumably before becoming engaged) and not encounter any of Anderson’s troops unless, of course, the Georgians had already retreated 200 yards after fighting de Trobriand’s troops and been thrown back.
Major Rogers, 110th Pennsylvania, reported, “...The battle continued with a determination on both sides to conquer or die until 6 p.m., when the enemy in our front fell back, and the order to cease fire was given. This being done, I was ordered by a staff officer to fall back and give place to fresh troops, which was done....” These fresh troops were, of course, the men of Tilton’s brigade, 5th Corps and so answers the claim that they were unaware of the others presence. Also, as noted earlier, when the 8th New Jersey fell back, “…A brigade of the Fifth Corps came into line and the Eighth was relieved.”
But what if these fresh troops had just arrived and not taken part in the battle just concluded? An answer to that question may be found in a look at the number of effective muskets on each side and a comparison of losses inflicted. Could the 110th Pennsylvania, 5th Michigan and 8th New Jersey prevail over Anderson’s Georgians without the assistance of Tilton and Sweitzer?
Available muskets at start
and estimated losses
110th Pa. 136/45
5th Mi. 202/45
8th NJ 159/30
497/120
9th Ga.* 261/181
8th Ga. 276/100
11th Ga.** 138/ 65
675/346
* I estimate the 9th Georgia took about 45 casualties from artillery before getting to the woods and have reduced the 306 effectives at the start accordingly.
**As stated earlier, I believe the 11th Georgia (or at least the left wing of the 11th Georgia) was also involved in this combat but sustained most of its casualties fighting the 17th Maine. The 11th had 277 muskets at the start of the battle and probably lost no more than 65 of their 200 total loss fighting the 8th NJ. So, in line with my understanding of the 11th Georgia’s position vis-a-vis the 8th NJ, and for the purpose of this comparison, I have halved the strength of the 11th Georgia, i.e., to 138.
If, at the start of the contest the 9th, 8th and 11th Georgia had 675 muskets in line, it’s hard to see how the three federal regiments with 497 muskets were not only able to able resist their attack but in doing so inflict three times as many casualties.
(Some have suggested that the 115th Pennsylvania (140/30) may have been moved out of Wheatfield to participate with the 8th New Jersey in this fight. This idea is attractive because it tends to help explain the apparent Federal success in defending the Stony Hill without the assistance of 5th Corp troops. Of course, there is no documentation whatever to support this idea and plenty to discredit it as demonstrated in earlier posts.)
I have included as attachments troop position maps to illustrate activity in Rose’s Woods and on Stony hill during the times discussed.
Jim