alan polk
1st Lieutenant
- Joined
- Jun 11, 2012
(Since it is 158 years ago this year that Grant struggled to come to terms with Vicksburg, I’ve written a rough draft of his experiences in the early months. It is a broad brush and some things are obviously left out, but I thought some might enjoy it. Due to length, I’ve divided it into several parts - W. Alan Polk)
I.
Winter of Discontent
By January 1863, Grant’s luster had begun to fade. His Mississippi Central Campaign, launched in November of 1862, had ended in retreat, while Sherman, his most trusted general, had been badly mauled at Chickasaw Bayou. These failures left Grant’s army separated, with a portion stationed around Memphis, and the other stalled hundreds of miles down the Mississippi River — setbacks which would eventually open the doors to accusations of incompetency.
Not surprising, the whispering campaign began to make its rounds about Grant’s drinking, undoubtedly initiated by rivals eager to see his command wings clipped. These rumors wiggled up the grapevine into political circles where officials in Washington began to take notice. But, as it turned out, the carpeting did not end there. Even on the bottom rungs of the ladder, where reputation often counts most, Grant’s stock was slipping. Many of his own soldiers were describing him in less than desirable terms, questioning whether he was capable of leading them to success.
The timing could not have been worse for the Ohio general, as the political atmosphere was primed for scapegoating. The Republican Party had made a less than splendid showing in the November midterm elections, allowing Democrats to gain ground in both state and national races. Then came the colossal defeat at Fredericksburg and the indecisive slaughter at Stones River, further strengthening the opposition to Lincoln’s war machine. Union casualties from the month of December alone were horrific, prompting citizens all over the North to scrutinize the balance sheet of war.
Although Grant’s distance from Washington may have shielded him from some of the attention, his withdrawal from North Mississippi, coupled with Sherman’s disaster at Chickasaw Bayou, did not go unnoticed, and certainly played a part in stoking anti-war sentiments. It was only natural, then, that heads were about to be sacrificed on the altar of politics, and there was no reason to think Grant was not on that short list.
General Grant, however, was politically savvy, and he rightly suspected that any movement by Sherman’s force back up the river to Memphis, though perhaps militarily sound, would be perceived by the press and war-weary populace as another defeat. Eager to keep his head off the political chopping block, Grant ordered Sherman’s force (now commanded by McClernand) to occupy the swamps on the Louisiana side of the Mississippi River. It was not the most hospitable place to position an army — it was more suited for alligators than humans — but it could not be deemed a retreat by the press or by any of Grant’s rivals. More importantly, it was directly opposite one of the main objectives of the Lincoln Administration: the hilltop citadel of Vicksburg.
I.
Winter of Discontent
By January 1863, Grant’s luster had begun to fade. His Mississippi Central Campaign, launched in November of 1862, had ended in retreat, while Sherman, his most trusted general, had been badly mauled at Chickasaw Bayou. These failures left Grant’s army separated, with a portion stationed around Memphis, and the other stalled hundreds of miles down the Mississippi River — setbacks which would eventually open the doors to accusations of incompetency.
Not surprising, the whispering campaign began to make its rounds about Grant’s drinking, undoubtedly initiated by rivals eager to see his command wings clipped. These rumors wiggled up the grapevine into political circles where officials in Washington began to take notice. But, as it turned out, the carpeting did not end there. Even on the bottom rungs of the ladder, where reputation often counts most, Grant’s stock was slipping. Many of his own soldiers were describing him in less than desirable terms, questioning whether he was capable of leading them to success.
The timing could not have been worse for the Ohio general, as the political atmosphere was primed for scapegoating. The Republican Party had made a less than splendid showing in the November midterm elections, allowing Democrats to gain ground in both state and national races. Then came the colossal defeat at Fredericksburg and the indecisive slaughter at Stones River, further strengthening the opposition to Lincoln’s war machine. Union casualties from the month of December alone were horrific, prompting citizens all over the North to scrutinize the balance sheet of war.
Although Grant’s distance from Washington may have shielded him from some of the attention, his withdrawal from North Mississippi, coupled with Sherman’s disaster at Chickasaw Bayou, did not go unnoticed, and certainly played a part in stoking anti-war sentiments. It was only natural, then, that heads were about to be sacrificed on the altar of politics, and there was no reason to think Grant was not on that short list.
General Grant, however, was politically savvy, and he rightly suspected that any movement by Sherman’s force back up the river to Memphis, though perhaps militarily sound, would be perceived by the press and war-weary populace as another defeat. Eager to keep his head off the political chopping block, Grant ordered Sherman’s force (now commanded by McClernand) to occupy the swamps on the Louisiana side of the Mississippi River. It was not the most hospitable place to position an army — it was more suited for alligators than humans — but it could not be deemed a retreat by the press or by any of Grant’s rivals. More importantly, it was directly opposite one of the main objectives of the Lincoln Administration: the hilltop citadel of Vicksburg.
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