They Didn't Like Each Other Much: Johnston and Pemberton after Vicksburg

Just to be fair to Johnston, Grant ran him out of Jackson and, when Pemberton surrendered, ran him out again.

Johnston (typically, I suppose) wanted Pemberton to take his army and beat it. Davis ordered Pemberton to "defend to the death."
This is just my weird way of thinking, but if Johnston was asking Pemberton what he should do, the notion that he had a plan seems, to me at least, to be pretty far fetched (not impossible mind you, just IMO, highly unlikely).
Again, to be fair to Johnston, maybe he was just asking about the best way to get there?

The situation at the time can be most politely called a Keystone Kops fire drill. Those of you familiar with profanity know what I'm talking about.
 
This is a great dissection of the commands of both men and the events surrounding Vicksburg. There seems to be plenty of blame to go around for the loss of the city.
Very interesting points raised by this article! The theme of "plenty of blame to go around" does seem to be a common one...
Yes, there was plenty of blame to be passed around the table . . .

And IMO, Jefferson Davis shares in the blame for more than a few reasons, but that would be a topic for a separate thread.
 
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[QUOTE="And IMO, Jefferson Davis shares in the blame for more than a few reasons, but that would be a topic for a separate thread.[/QUOTE]


Absolutely!

This may be a little off the subject, but how do you think Van Dorn would have faired if he hadn't got himself shot? Do you think he would have put up more of a fuss to keep his assigned cavalry?
 
This may be a little off the subject, but how do you think Van Dorn would have faired if he hadn't got himself shot? Do you think he would have put up more of a fuss to keep his assigned cavalry?

Good question.

I've also thought about the "What if Van Dorn" scenario.
I don't have any idea about how that may have worked out, but I would believe more cavalry would have been available.

My gut feeling tells me that Van Dorn probably would not have been a good choice for overall command.

Pemberton was a very capable administrator & actually improved many situations that had existed within the Department of Mississippi & East Louisiana. However, IMO Pemberton didn't have the necessary experience for the assignment.
 
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[QUOTE="And IMO, Jefferson Davis shares in the blame for more than a few reasons, but that would be a topic for a separate thread.


Absolutely!

This may be a little off the subject, but how do you think Van Dorn would have faired if he hadn't got himself shot? Do you think he would have put up more of a fuss to keep his assigned cavalry?[/QUOTE]
Van Dorn, in my opinion, wasn't as bad as a lot of Confederate commanders. Had he not got himself shot for some indescretions, he might have been. Much like A.S. Johnston who didn't get himself shot for the same reason. Lot's of what if's in here.
 
Van Dorn would have a been a real pain in the Union butt as a cavalry operations commander, IMO. Though of course Forrest didn't do too badly. :wink:

Back to Johnston and something ole said:

Just to be fair to Johnston, Grant ran him out of Jackson and, when Pemberton surrendered, ran him out again.

When Johnston was first run out he only had about 6,000 men. And when he was run out again, the bulk of the Federal army was free to overpower his 31,000. The only real window (I suppose) would be the last half of June to coordinate something while there is still an army in Vicksburg.
Pemberton wants to hold the city, in accordance with Davis' wishes. Davis wants Johnston to raise the siege. Johnston knows, or at least believes, he cannot do this without a simultaneous break-out attempt. Which Pemberton is reluctant to do if it means losing the city...

The situation at the time can be most politely called a Keystone Kops fire drill. Those of you familiar with profanity know what I'm talking about.

I had to look up 'Keystone Cops' but I think I know what you mean... :laugh:
 
Just to be fair to Johnston, Grant ran him out of Jackson and, when Pemberton surrendered, ran him out again.
I'm not quite sure Grant ran him out of Jackson . . . either time.
I would argue Johnston never stayed long enough to be ran out.

As @TinCan pointed out in the thread, http://civilwartalk.com/threads/two-battles-for-jackson-mississippi.112862/

On the night of 13 May, General Joseph E. Johnston, Commander of the Department of Tennessee and Mississippi, arrived in Jackson. He had been sent by Confederate President Jefferson Davis to personally coordinate the efforts to defeat General Grant, and as such was General Pemberton's immediate superior.

Bad news followed soon after Johnston's arrival. He was told there were only 6,000 troops to defend the city and McPherson's force had already been spotted advancing on Jackson from the east. As of yet Johnston was still unaware of Sherman's forces closing in from the southwest. Even with this incomplete information Johnston decided that Jackson must be evacuated as quickly as possible. To allow time for a safe withdrawal, Johnston ordered Brigadier General John Gregg to remain behind and fight a delaying action that would slow the Union advance.

It's my feeling Johnston hopped off the train, looked around for about five minutes and decided to withdraw before he had a full understanding of the situation.

I'm not specifically bashing Johnston, but his actions makes one wonder if the criticism of his Vicksburg performance is justified.
 
I'm not quite sure Grant ran him out of Jackson . . . either time.
I would argue Johnston never stayed long enough to be ran out.

As @TinCan pointed out in the thread, http://civilwartalk.com/threads/two-battles-for-jackson-mississippi.112862/



It's my feeling Johnston hopped off the train, looked around for about five minutes and decided to withdraw before he had a full understanding of the situation.

I'm not specifically bashing Johnston, but his actions makes one wonder if the criticism of his Vicksburg performance is justified.

You may be right 7th, Johnston's critics would point out that this would be in his style of action at this time, or never squander a good opportunity for a retreat.
 
Overall, Johnston does seem to have consistently played "by the book". When possessed of superior numbers, attack. When outnumbered, dig in. When outflanked, retreat. He knew how to take care of his men, but it doesn't look like he was the most imaginative of strategists.

Hehehe. When I first joined this forum, I was a bit of a Johnston fanboy.
 
Thought the article made it clear that Pemberton was sending daily messages and not getting replies. And I thought one of them from Pemberton outlined a plan for Johnston to come by a certain road that Pemberton thought was best for Johnston to attack and for his units to counter from the other side.

That same set of events is outlined in Shaara's book Chain of Thunder. And I have read the same thing in other places. For all Pemberton's faults, Johnston was out to save only himself.
Was there any Confederate general who would rank say from the bottom to the middle of the barrrel,in the West theather.This was a proving ground for Grant and Sherman.Like the first two years were for Lee.Thing is that Lee did not have the material or man power that they did.For those with more knowledge ,how would Lee have held up if Davis would have sent him to theWest,in fact I will give him Jackson and Longstreet,who already had knowledge of the western front?
 
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