The United States was going to win Civil War.

I think having Albert Sidney Johnston survive Shiloh might have given a commander good enough in the West for the either the Army of Tennessee or the Army of Mississippi perhaps just as good as Robert E. Lee in the East to at least get the likes of Braxton Bragg, P.G.T. Beauregard, William J. Hard, Leonidas Polk etc. coordinated now ASJ wasn't all perfect but he did bring a lot of experience to the table for the Confederate Army given his decades worth of service in the Texan and United States Armies in the Texas Revolution and Mexican-American War.

I wonder about that sometimes. I find A. S. Johnston is hard to actually form a hard and fast opinion about. He might have turned out to be very good, but there really isn't enough of a record to determine if he was.

He did a good job on some things and a bad job on others.
  • Polk and Beauregard messed up the Kentucky situation for him by invading without authorization when the he needed time more than anything else. That led to losing Paducah and the mouth of the Tennessee River, which led to losing Henry & Donelson and Nashville and the upper Mississippi.
  • Henry & Donelson is probably an indication of a bad choice by Johnston, but he had to make one among ugly choices He was too weak to hold what he needed across a wide front. In hindsight, he should have gone in person to Henry & Donelson to straighten that position out. Buckner might have been OK, but Pillow and Floyd surely were not. Johnston making a visit or taking command might have prevented disaster or made it less bad.
  • Faced with the collapse of his defense after Donelson fell, Johnston had the sense to concentrate and strike back.
  • At Shiloh, Johnston does start to look a lot like Bobby Lee. The sense of strong character and battlefield presence is clear. His death chops it all off before we can see what Johnston would have become if he had lived.
 
But the how did the war end?
In August of 1864 there was a combined arms operation to close a Confederate port.
Then the United States army severed a logistical link into Richmond, and the Confederates had difficulty maintaining the logistics of the capital.
Then the United States army in Georgia maintained its railroad and claimed the last of the railroads into the city of Atlanta.
Then a United States army headed by a young officer from West Point who might have been one of the few Irish/American West Pointers, used overwhelming force to overwhelm the Confederates repeatedly.
Naval superiority, railroad superiority and numerical superiority: all roughly reflective of what was shown in 1862.
 
I think having Albert Sidney Johnston survive Shiloh might have given a commander good enough in the West for the either the Army of Tennessee or the Army of Mississippi perhaps just as good as Robert E. Lee in the East to at least get the likes of Braxton Bragg, P.G.T. Beauregard, William J. Hard, Leonidas Polk etc. coordinated now ASJ wasn't all perfect but he did bring a lot of experience to the table for the Confederate Army given his decades worth of service in the Texan and United States Armies in the Texas Revolution and Mexican-American War.

Sidney Johnston is a myth built upon unfulfilled potential.

He entered the war one of the most celebrated officers in the US Army and was considered by Confederate President Jefferson Davis to be the best General in the Confederacy but, if one were being generous, he didn't really get the chance to prove it, as he was dead within a year of the war starting.

He attempted to bluff and hold a cordon line into Kentucky which he not have the strenght to maintain at any point and it collapsed in due course - the worse point the loss of a whole army at Fort Donelson, a position which Sindey had failed pay close attention to and given to the command of a man with no military experaince in John B Floyd.

He did very well in building a new army to replace the one he lost and did well to take the initiative and get the drop on Grant at Shiloh, but he then abdicated his responsibility as commander of the army by riding around the front and personally leading charges, removing himself from rear and center of the army where he could have better organized the deployment of his men.

In the cold hard light of facts his record is poor - he lost Kentucky, lost an Army at Fort Donelson, lost middle-Tennessee, lost control of the battle at Shiloh and lost his life. There's not really much to suggest that he would have been any more successful had he survived for the duration than Bragg, Beauregard, Joe Johnston or Hood were - I dont discount the possibility altogether, but I have serious doubts
 
Sidney Johnston is a myth built upon unfulfilled potential.

He entered the war one of the most celebrated officers in the US Army and was considered by Confederate President Jefferson Davis to be the best General in the Confederacy but, if one were being generous, he didn't really get the chance to prove it, as he was dead within a year of the war starting.

He attempted to bluff and hold a cordon line into Kentucky which he not have the strenght to maintain at any point and it collapsed in due course - the worse point the loss of a whole army at Fort Donelson, a position which Sindey had failed pay close attention to and given to the command of a man with no military experaince in John B Floyd.

He did very well in building a new army to replace the one he lost and did well to take the initiative and get the drop on Grant at Shiloh, but he then abdicated his responsibility as commander of the army by riding around the front and personally leading charges, removing himself from rear and center of the army where he could have better organized the deployment of his men.

In the cold hard light of facts his record is poor - he lost Kentucky, lost an Army at Fort Donelson, lost middle-Tennessee, lost control of the battle at Shiloh and lost his life. There's not really much to suggest that he would have been any more successful had he survived for the duration than Bragg, Beauregard, Joe Johnston or Hood were - I dont discount the possibility altogether, but I have serious doubts
I said might in the sense it could happen as in he might prove to be a better commander and I know not everything he did was perfect it depends on what he would do next if he survived.
 
Why do you say this? Lee having been an officer in the U.S. Army had to know what he was up against.

I think he did think he could force a treaty... But thought like Washington in the Rev war, he didn't have to win, just not lose. Washington lost a lot more battles than he won, just never was forced into a situation he had to surrender his army and finally wore Britain down where they quit sending more support. If his army was taking heavy casualties he retreated and fought another day and traded land for more time. Then picked where he'd attack often choosing situations that strongly favored his armies.

I think Lee/Jefferson Davis wanted that, but since Southern states weren't willing to lose their lands, they forced political pressure to fight for every inch and engage in massive battles. Washington could lose NYC, Boston, or Philly and keep his army alive. Lee was forced into some devastating fights because Confederate senators and governors wouldn't let him allow their states to fall without fighting for every inch of it.
 
I think he did think he could force a treaty... But thought like Washington in the Rev war, he didn't have to win, just not lose. Washington lost a lot more battles than he won, just never was forced into a situation he had to surrender his army and finally wore Britain down where they quit sending more support. If his army was taking heavy casualties he retreated and fought another day and traded land for more time. Then picked where he'd attack often choosing situations that strongly favored his armies.

I think Lee/Jefferson Davis wanted that, but since Southern states weren't willing to lose their lands, they forced political pressure to fight for every inch and engage in massive battles. Washington could lose NYC, Boston, or Philly and keep his army alive. Lee was forced into some devastating fights because Confederate senators and governors wouldn't let him allow their states to fall without fighting for every inch of it.
Interesting, thanks for sharing.
 
To my mind the only situation where "one X can whip three/five/ten Y" applies is where "X" is trained regular soldiers and Y isn't. Only a few years later a German force of regulars would beat five times their own number of hastily raised French troops.

Are you basing this off the fact Confederates supposedly had an early advantage due to raised pre-war militias in slave states from post-Nat Turner hysteria (training) and the overall more militaristic culture that led them to be disproportionately involved in the U.S. Army, or just that they had this false sense of confidence? I'm interested to know why you're comparing this.
 
Are you basing this off the fact Southerners supposedly had an early advantage due to raised pre-war militias from post-Nat Turner hysteria (training) and the overall more militaristic culture that led them to be disproportionately involved in the U.S. Army, or just that they had this false sense of confidence?
Neither. I'm noting that in this period it was quite possible for a high quality force to fight successfully at 3:1 odds against an equivalent-weapons low-quality force; the South, however, did not have that quality edge.

This does feed a little into my comparison to the German concept of "short and sharp" wars - those were aided by greater training and skill for the German soldiers, which made it easier to win victories dramatic enough to result in a peace before the weight of population and materiel became the dominant factors.

Essentially the view I'm trending towards is that the CSA recognized what they needed to be to win independence, but were less able to recognize a path to becoming that.
 
Neither. I'm noting that in this period it was quite possible for a high quality force to fight successfully at 3:1 odds against an equivalent-weapons low-quality force; the South, however, did not have that quality edge.

This does feed a little into my comparison to the German concept of "short and sharp" wars - those were aided by greater training and skill for the German soldiers, which made it easier to win victories dramatic enough to result in a peace before the weight of population and materiel became the dominant factors.

Were the Germans actually better trained than the French during the Franco-Prussian war? Obviously the Garde Mobile can't compare to regular troops but from my understanding the French regular forces lost due to poor flexibility in its leaders and adapting (taking orders too strictly and following them without change), while the Prussians relied more on initiative. Then of course you had a French advantage in small arms such as the Chassepot, while the Prussians had the much better Krupp breach loading artillery. I could be wrong, that's just what I thought.
 
Were the Germans actually better trained than the French during the Franco-Prussian war?
Not at the start of the war, you're absolutely correct there and it's why the example battle is much later in the fighting. Beaune-la-Rolande is basically a battle between c. 10,000 Prussian regulars and c.40,000-50,000 French troops largely composed of conscripts from the Garde Mobile; with only a few months of unit training they lost heavily even with a significant numerical advantage.

Then of course you had a French advantage in small arms such as the Chassepot, while the Prussians had the much better Krupp breach loading artillery.
This is an interesting comparison which could be explored in much greater depth, but I'll simply note that the key point here is that the French regulars didn't just have a better rifle but were trained to use it as well (a long range rifle without the attendant good accuracy training is at best a short range weapon and at worse an ammunition sink) but that their tactical system emphasized entrenchment and digging in to too great a degree to deal with the superior Prussian artillery (which was somewhat longer ranged and more accurate and which had a system of use for that range; it's that more than the breech loading vice muzzle loading which had a good effect.)

The French regular system could have dealt with most armies in the world at that time, but the Prussian system could have been purpose built to cause their regulars problems.
 
However there was much less excuse for Confederate excessive optimism than has been created in the historical account.
The United States had created a combined armed operations to land at Veracruz and conquer Mexico City. There was a good reason for people to be wary of the United States military.
In addition, the facts of population growth in the Midwest were not secret, and were simply tabulated as time went on, in 1862 and 1864.
 
The other problem was willfully interpreting support for Stephen A. Douglas as support for separation. A substantial part of the Northern Democrats were just as nationalistic as the Republicans. Aggregating the Republican vote with that portion of the northern Democratic vote should have given an indication of the imbalance.
 
Why do you say this? Lee having been an officer in the U.S. Army had to know what he was up against.
I must remind you that even in the 1862 letter I just mentioned while Robert E. Lee did note deficincies in his army as far as supplies go (then again even the Union Army sometimes faced the same problem) however even he said that he did not doubt success in the Maryland Campaign.
 
Were the Germans actually better trained than the French during the Franco-Prussian war? Obviously the Garde Mobile can't compare to regular troops but from my understanding the French regular forces lost due to poor flexibility in its leaders and adapting (taking orders too strictly and following them without change), while the Prussians relied more on initiative. Then of course you had a French advantage in small arms such as the Chassepot, while the Prussians had the much better Krupp breach loading artillery. I could be wrong, that's just what I thought.

Over the years I have seen it claimed that if you looked at a French infantry regiment against a Prussian infantry regiment, even-up, the French would win (ADDED LATER: this refers to the start of the war). The Prussians made up for the deficiency (Chassepot v. "Needle Gun" as well as training/professionalism) at higher levels with aggressive leadership and quick-firing Krupp guns.
 
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Over the years I have seen it claimed that if you looked at a French infantry regiment against a Prussian infantry regiment, even-up, the French would win. The Prussians made up for the deficiency (Chassepot v. "Needle Gun" as well as training/professionalism) at higher levels with aggressive leadership and quick-firing Krupp guns.

I would've thought that. It has always been my impression that the French had the best infantry in continental Europe at the time, which is why many ACW units mimicked the elite Zouave uniforms:

Zouaves de la Garde (1859)

Zouaves_de_la_Garde_pendant_la_campagne_d%27Italie.jpg
 
If a student had closely studied the Mexican/American war and the Crimean war they probably would have had an informed opinion about the strategies and tactics of the Civil War.
The facts would have demonstrated that sea power created even greater advantages in the steam era.
It probably would have demonstrated that large land armies created disease problems, especially if the armies were recruited from a dispersed rural population.
Shooting ranges had probably increased by the Crimean war. The impact was probably not fully realized even by observers.
And in the US, the impact of improved weapons only demonstrated itself slowly as both sides distributed better weapons and soldiers became more experienced.
 
Definitely the USA was going to win the war. Contrary to popular belief I do not believe the rebels would have won, not even from the get-go. Not even from the first secessionist documents.

CAPACITY. That’s one key. As the opening comments of this tread point out, areas in the USA other than the secessionist’s, far outstripped them in all types of nation-building capacity.

If you look at civil wars in world history one trend pops out. The rebellion is started with some sort of flashpoint. Fighting and bloodshed first then the rebels attempt organization and command.

The Confederates did it the opposite. First nice documents of secession, etc. Then mimicking the USA in every way without understanding - one iota - of the nation-building capacity mentioned above.

The Confederacy was destroyed because of MIMICRY. Eventually, point for point the USA suckered the rebels into getting whipped. Rebels, as rebels go in such situations, turned suicidal. Lee and his banzai tactics are nothing new in history.
 
Definitely the USA was going to win the war.

ISOLATION. Very important. Mention has been made of how our colonies managed to break away from GB. The Confederacy hoped to do the same. It would never happen. The USA was blessed to develop without much interference from the world. We were able to cover our mistakes – make it right – without someone over our shoulders.

The same with the CW. The Confederacy was isolated and the USA, which devised a workable PLAN, took advantage of that. Drop the ACW into 19th c. Balkans, or Alsace-Lorraine, or the Kashmir region, etc. and it would be a totally different story. The rebels probably would have won. Some country, somewhere, somehow, someway would use the rebel cause as a reason to physically interfere in the USA. But instead there was ISOLATION.
 
Definitely the USA was going to win the war.

The PEOPLE. Simply put the Americans were endowed with a healthy dose of common sense. It wasn’t the land of the aristocratic intelligentsia. By mid-century many were immigrants. Americans pretty much knew that it doesn’t get any better than here. They knew theit political views counted for something. They knew it was something the rest of the world could only dream about and they were going to make sure a section of the country was not going to cause havoc and a possible loss of that privledge.
 
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