The South Wins---What Next

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So actually the smuggling you mentioned earlier was minor in impact. As I said however this would be more of a problem for the south than the north. [Especially if due to corruption it might end up as less than minor].

The statement could be read that way as well true.

Some strongmen may have occasionally displayed what could be said as interest in leaving Mexico. IIRC the person you mentioned before reversed their position within a short period of time. However the viewpoint of the bulk of the population, especially with the poor treatment of the Mexicans in the US and the threat seen by slavery, is probably likely to be less friendly.

You mentioned one comment by a pro-southern former governor but comnents in papers often relate more to personal desires and beliefs rather than actual hard facts. For instance a bit further down it mentions. Also that link also mentions that while divided on the issue of the secession of the other states New Jersey fully supported the war.



Also a bit above this of the large crowds that welcomed Lincoln even before this. Similarly the presence of a large pro-abolition movement in the state and of a sizeable number of blacks, either freed under the states emancipation policy passed in 1804 or who had settled there having escaped from the south.
The smuggling was not minor and the statements are not in contradiction to each other; Southern authorities allowed the trade at that time for the very obvious reason they needed supplies and gold to fund the war effort. Sending Cotton to the North in exchange for repeaters in the South in 1862 is a deal Richmond would see as necessary but allowing unsanctioned peace time trade that undermines both Confederate foreign policy as well as the economy is not. The strategic situation from 1862 to, say, 1868 would thus be very different resulting in different policies.

With regards to Vidaurri, he never changed his position and in fact it was Jefferson Davis who declined the offer. The reasoning behind this was because Davis wished to keep Vidaurri's ports open for Confederate trade with Europe, since the Union could not legally blockade them and this enabled the importation of goods from Europe and elsewhere unmolested; if Vidaurri joined the Confederacy in 1861, this would clearly change and enable the Union Navy to cut off this trade. Here again, we see what I was just talking about in terms of individuals responding to the situations at hand. With regards to the issue of Slavery, as already shown by quoting Noel Maurer, this was not an issue in Northern Mexico.

With regards to the issue of New Jersey and the economic blow of a successful Confederacy, support for the war is not a good metric nor is free blacks or an abolitionist movement. As already shown, an illicit trade in cotton was carried out and the war-time economy created artificial conditions that, once demobilization came, would cease to exist. As the former Governor noted, most of New Jersey's production went to the South and said South, in the event of a C.S. victory, would be behind a new tariff wall making European or domestically produced Confederate goods better options to Southern consumers. Whether or not many New Jersey men served in the Union Army doesn't invalidate the very simple calculus that Southerners not buying their goods would damage their economy in the long run; indeed, that could be the reason New Jersey supplied so many men in the first place, to prevent such from happening.
 

steve59p

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The smuggling was not minor and the statements are not in contradiction to each other; Southern authorities allowed the trade at that time for the very obvious reason they needed supplies and gold to fund the war effort. Sending Cotton to the North in exchange for repeaters in the South in 1862 is a deal Richmond would see as necessary but allowing unsanctioned peace time trade that undermines both Confederate foreign policy as well as the economy is not. The strategic situation from 1862 to, say, 1868 would thus be very different resulting in different policies.

With regards to Vidaurri, he never changed his position and in fact it was Jefferson Davis who declined the offer. The reasoning behind this was because Davis wished to keep Vidaurri's ports open for Confederate trade with Europe, since the Union could not legally blockade them and this enabled the importation of goods from Europe and elsewhere unmolested; if Vidaurri joined the Confederacy in 1861, this would clearly change and enable the Union Navy to cut off this trade. Here again, we see what I was just talking about in terms of individuals responding to the situations at hand. With regards to the issue of Slavery, as already shown by quoting Noel Maurer, this was not an issue in Northern Mexico.

With regards to the issue of New Jersey and the economic blow of a successful Confederacy, support for the war is not a good metric nor is free blacks or an abolitionist movement. As already shown, an illicit trade in cotton was carried out and the war-time economy created artificial conditions that, once demobilization came, would cease to exist. As the former Governor noted, most of New Jersey's production went to the South and said South, in the event of a C.S. victory, would be behind a new tariff wall making European or domestically produced Confederate goods better options to Southern consumers. Whether or not many New Jersey men served in the Union Army doesn't invalidate the very simple calculus that Southerners not buying their goods would damage their economy in the long run; indeed, that could be the reason New Jersey supplied so many men in the first place, to prevent such from happening.

If it was not minor then it also involved a lot of people who benefited from it. As such its far from certain that, assuming serious tariff barriers between the two nations it may not recur and continue.

Not to mention of course that is beside the point. Tariffs are to restrict/prevent imports you don't want [and as a backhand way of raising revenue] not to restrict your own exports. If the south became independent and imposed high tariffs, which is far from certain, that doesn't mean it would seek to strangle its own exports to the north, from which it benefited. Actually the issue as I understand it is less that the south would impose high tariffs than that being outside the union's own high tariffs northern manufacturers would be at a disadvantage against cheaper and sometime higher quality European goods. In that basis the issue of exports to the south being affected would be in the north's own hands and they would have no legal basis for seeking to ban imports of southern cotton - which would be a deeply unpopular move as far as their own manufacturers are concerned - and the south has no reason not to sell to the north.

Not sure what statements your referring to?

Can't remember whether it was Vidaurri or not but do recall that at one stage one of the strongmen you mentioned was in favour of being annexed by the US and another he was against it. That was what I was referring to. As I pointed out his views aren't necessarily the same as those he ruled and there was a strong identity that was also aware of how badly former Mexican citizens had been treated in Texas after it broke away. One of the incentives for which was that the Texans repeatedly broke their own agreement not to bring slaves into the region in defiance of Mexican laws.

So the personal opinion of a single figure is more important than the actions of tens of thousands? I have pointed out above that the issue is not a southern tarriff but the northern one that existed before the war. It would be that the south was outside that which would cause problems for some people. They would have to adjust, whether by finding new markets or becoming more efficient or reducing their output. That's how economics work. It doesn't change the fact the state overwhelmingly supported the north in the war. You can argue that as a result after the war some in the state might consider seceding themselves but I suspect that would be unlikely.
 

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If it was not minor then it also involved a lot of people who benefited from it. As such its far from certain that, assuming serious tariff barriers between the two nations it may not recur and continue.

Not to mention of course that is beside the point. Tariffs are to restrict/prevent imports you don't want [and as a backhand way of raising revenue] not to restrict your own exports. If the south became independent and imposed high tariffs, which is far from certain, that doesn't mean it would seek to strangle its own exports to the north, from which it benefited. Actually the issue as I understand it is less that the south would impose high tariffs than that being outside the union's own high tariffs northern manufacturers would be at a disadvantage against cheaper and sometime higher quality European goods. In that basis the issue of exports to the south being affected would be in the north's own hands and they would have no legal basis for seeking to ban imports of southern cotton - which would be a deeply unpopular move as far as their own manufacturers are concerned - and the south has no reason not to sell to the north.

Not sure what statements your referring to?

Can't remember whether it was Vidaurri or not but do recall that at one stage one of the strongmen you mentioned was in favour of being annexed by the US and another he was against it. That was what I was referring to. As I pointed out his views aren't necessarily the same as those he ruled and there was a strong identity that was also aware of how badly former Mexican citizens had been treated in Texas after it broke away. One of the incentives for which was that the Texans repeatedly broke their own agreement not to bring slaves into the region in defiance of Mexican laws.

So the personal opinion of a single figure is more important than the actions of tens of thousands? I have pointed out above that the issue is not a southern tarriff but the northern one that existed before the war. It would be that the south was outside that which would cause problems for some people. They would have to adjust, whether by finding new markets or becoming more efficient or reducing their output. That's how economics work. It doesn't change the fact the state overwhelmingly supported the north in the war. You can argue that as a result after the war some in the state might consider seceding themselves but I suspect that would be unlikely.
I have no doubt a legal trade in Cotton would resume after the war, given the South supplied the cotton to New England textile mills. If the Confederacy did, however, use cotton as a tool of economic warfare-and they were well aware of this being a possibility-then I see no ability on the part of a major illicit trade to continue. The North required millions of bales of cotton and such a trade would've been impossible to hide again, given the sheer logistics of it; the Confederate Government would also have no reason to overlook it and thus could shut it down. Would some still get through? Probably, but nowhere near enough to sustain the North and thus would cause an economic collapse. Unlike during the War, the blockade would be gone and thus the Confederates would also find happy and willing buyers in Europe.

Now then, first of all the Confederacy actually did have an export tax on Cotton, which in 1861 rates was 1/8th a Cent per pound. Leaving that aside, we also don't have to speculate on whether they would adopt high tariffs because they did so historically. Modernizing a Slave Economy: The Economic Vision of the Confederate Nation by John Majewski, Chapter REDEFINING FREE TRADE TO MODERNIZE THE SOUTH:

The Confederacy, of course, never really had a chance to collect its tariff. If the seceding states had been allowed to leave without war, however, the Confederate tariff would have had a significant fiscal impact. According to economist Thomas F. Huertas, the South imported $200 million worth of northern goods in 1860 (see Table 5). With an independent Confederacy, northern goods would have been transformed into dutiable foreign trade. Under Confederate tariff schedules passed in May 1861, imported manufactured goods from the North and Europe would have yielded the Confederate treasury almost $34 million. The percentage of collected duties to the value of total imports would have been 14.3 percent, which was only slightly lower than the ratio of 16 percent for the entire United States in 1860. In per capita terms, every free person in the Confederacy would have paid $6.07 in duties. By way of comparison, the entire United States (both North and South) collected duties worth $53 million, or $1.94 per free resident in 1860. If the North had allowed the South to peaceably leave the Union, the Confederacy would still have increased the tax burden on its own citizens—an ironic result for a nation supposedly committed to free trade and limited government.​
The high rate of per capita taxation suggests the complex relationship between trade and Confederate nationalism. In some respects, the traditional southern commitment to free trade remained strong. In 1861, for example, South Carolinian G. N. Reynolds wrote in a letter to William Porcher Miles (a South Carolina delegate to the Confederate constitutional convention) that Switzerland was a model of free trade: ‘‘The result is that capital and industry flow solely in the most productive channels. So let it be with us.’’ Other secessionists thought in nationalistic terms and conceptualized trade not as a free-flowing river but as a weapon for punishing enemies. Referring to the North, Texas senator and former South Carolinian Louis Wigfall boasted, ‘‘Not one pound of cotton shall ever go from the South to their accursed cities; not one ounce of their steel or their manufactures shall ever cross our border.’’ A moderate revenue tariff that lowered duties on European goods while raising duties on northern goods synthesized these two potentially contradictory messages of free trade and Confederate nationalism. In the minds of many secessionists, free trade offered the Confederacy a means of escaping northern economic domination and solidifying international alliances. At the same time, secessionists could tout the ability of their government to penalize northern goods and protect southern manufacturers.​
In fusing free trade and protectionist impulses, secessionists spoke and wrote in a Hamiltonian idiom of economic modernization and economic nationalism. Just as Hamilton had imagined the United States becoming a world economic power, secessionists envisioned the Confederacy as a vehicle for promoting economic modernization. Confederate duties closely resembled (and sometimes exceeded) the 10 to 15 percent tariff rate proposed by Hamilton in his famous Report on Manufacturers (1791). The similarity in rates reflected shared goals of simultaneously promoting nation building and economic development. Hamilton wanted to make his new nation economically independent while simultaneously encouraging enough international trade to pay for his ambitious fiscal plans. His moderate tariff encouraged domestic manufacturing while generating enough revenue to finance the Revolutionary War debt. Confederates wanted tariffs high enough to penalize northern goods—thus encouraging economic independence—but still low enough to allow for a vibrant trade with Europe.

With regards to Vidaurri, that was, again, already addressed earlier in this very thread. Not sure who else you're referring to so I can't really respond to that.

Finally, with regards to New Jersey, you misrepresent the argument as it was never claimed that one man was more important than the rest of the State. The issue is not New Jersey's Unionism or that it would secede but in terms of the economic impact such a Northern defeat would entail. The amount of enlistments, Abolitionists, etc is irrelevant to the simple fact New Jersey was dependent on the South being it's customer, and said South would now be behind a tariff wall that made European or Confederate goods more profitable to Southern consumers than New Jersey's. "Reducing output" means a depressed economy and mass unemployment, while finding new markets is easy to say but much harder to actually carry out; Asian markets, for example, are not open and Europe is already producing its own goods behind tariff walls.

Finally, I close off by citing Phil Leigh:

Large numbers of men are seldom motivated to enlist as soldiers merely to fight a war for monetary compensation. A higher calling is required to justify leaving their homes and risking their lives in a fight requiring them to kill strangers who normally have done them no harm. In the spring of 1861 the concept of “Union” became sufficiently noble to qualify as such a calling in the North. Southerners simply rallied to the equally high-sounding notion of “independence.” Both terms were facades. The North wanted an intact Union in order to sustain its emerging economic supremacy whereas the South wanted independence with slavery.​
Without the South’s raw materials and favorable export trade balance, northern businessmen justifiably worried that the economies of the states remaining in the Union after southern secession might collapse. As Lincoln said in his first inaugural address, “Physically speaking we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections…[The two sides] cannot but remain face-to-face and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must remain between them.” Its unlikely that Lincoln realized just how prophetic his conclusion would become as trade continued – and sometimes even flourished – during four years of bitter warfare between the two regions.​
World cotton market characteristics at the start of the Civil War explain how a bisected Union bereft of between-the-lines trading could lead to economic collapse in the North. Cotton textile manufacturing was the World’s biggest industry and it was largely dependent upon the South for raw material. Southern cotton alone accounted for about two-thirds of all United States exports. A truncated USA composed solely of northern states could not hope to maintain a favorable international balance-of-payments. The situation would be exacerbated if the South ceased to be a market for northern manufactured goods, which would be likely given the Confederacy’s lower import tariffs.
 

steve59p

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Right on your 1st point I see two problems.
a) Your now talking about an independent CSA deciding to screw up trade with one of its most important markets simply for the sake of it. That makes no sense at all.
b) As the article you link to makes clear trade between the two sides was not greatly blocked during the war because elements on both sides benefited from it. This is going to continue to be the case after the war ended. How is the south going to enforce such a ban on exports to the north given both widespread corruption and their lack of any ability to control cotton exports once their on a ship. In the latter case a ship owner can simply sail north either directly to the union or if they want additional cover to Canada and as in the wartime 'Canadian' cotton is imported into the union.

I notice you comment from Mr Leigh speech excludes the paragraph immediately following what you post.

However, the South also had intersectional dependencies. Its focus on cash crops, such as cotton and tobacco, left it with a resultant need to buy wheat, corn, and pork from states northwest of the Ohio River. Similarly the South was dependent upon outside sources for nearly all manufactured articles. While such goods could be imported from Europe, American protective tariffs often made domestically produced alternatives from the North more economical. Initially the South required provender from the Northwest more than the North needed cotton. That changed quickly as New England’s cotton inventories dwindled and Lincoln discovered he could sell cotton to Europeans for gold thereby curtailing the outflow of bullion from the Treasury.

This will continue to be an issue for the south after the war ends, especially since the US is by far the largest and most regularly available source of agricultural imports.

The comments of one man is less important than the actions of tens of thousands of people. On that I stand by my previous statement. Yes if the south won independence that would certainly reduce somewhat commerce between the two nations but how much would depend on the details. I think the south deciding on some sort of bitter trade war with the north, which would hurt both sides hard highly unlikely however.

In terms of tariffs in the south post war yes there would be an impact on trade with the north in that European goods are often cheaper at this point. Although this may not be too significant for inland states, especially those close to the border as transport costs might do much to reduce that competitive advantage.

A lot would depend on what the tariff levels were, as you yourself reference different people saying different things. Also the proposed tariff you mention, from May 1861, which would be very expensive for the free population of the south - as you say

In per capita terms, every free person in the Confederacy would have paid $6.07 in duties. By way of comparison, the entire United States (both North and South) collected duties worth $53 million, or $1.94 per free resident in 1860. If the North had allowed the South to peaceably leave the Union, the Confederacy would still have increased the tax burden on its own citizens—an ironic result for a nation supposedly committed to free trade and limited government.

That is a considerable increase on the levels of tax on the southern population and is unlikely to be popular once the war is over. I suspect that there would be limited will to maintain it once the war is over.

There is always a balance with tariffs. Is the purpose to protect industries or to raise funds for the government as the two are contradictory to some degree. A very high tariff to largely stop imports totally will protect the industries - at a high cost to the home consumer - but since it will choke off imports will raise little money. A low one will raise more money but give relatively little tax revenue. Like you I have seen differing suggests on what levels of tariffs an independent CSA would apply but the general impression I have seen was that of their stated desire for lower tariffs to reduce the cost of imported good.

Also given the relatively limited scale of southern industry before the war would they be able to maintain a high general tariff on imported industrial goods without crippling their economy? The customer needs to be able to afford to buy the product and if the CSA insisted on a tariff wall as high as some of those suggestions then either they have to pay a high price to make it profitable for the foreign importer or they have to go without as the home producers can't, at least for a couple of years while new plants are built supply the home market.

 

Generic Username

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Right on your 1st point I see two problems.
a) Your now talking about an independent CSA deciding to screw up trade with one of its most important markets simply for the sake of it. That makes no sense at all.
b) As the article you link to makes clear trade between the two sides was not greatly blocked during the war because elements on both sides benefited from it. This is going to continue to be the case after the war ended. How is the south going to enforce such a ban on exports to the north given both widespread corruption and their lack of any ability to control cotton exports once their on a ship. In the latter case a ship owner can simply sail north either directly to the union or if they want additional cover to Canada and as in the wartime 'Canadian' cotton is imported into the union.

I notice you comment from Mr Leigh speech excludes the paragraph immediately following what you post.



This will continue to be an issue for the south after the war ends, especially since the US is by far the largest and most regularly available source of agricultural imports.

The comments of one man is less important than the actions of tens of thousands of people. On that I stand by my previous statement. Yes if the south won independence that would certainly reduce somewhat commerce between the two nations but how much would depend on the details. I think the south deciding on some sort of bitter trade war with the north, which would hurt both sides hard highly unlikely however.

In terms of tariffs in the south post war yes there would be an impact on trade with the north in that European goods are often cheaper at this point. Although this may not be too significant for inland states, especially those close to the border as transport costs might do much to reduce that competitive advantage.

A lot would depend on what the tariff levels were, as you yourself reference different people saying different things. Also the proposed tariff you mention, from May 1861, which would be very expensive for the free population of the south - as you say



That is a considerable increase on the levels of tax on the southern population and is unlikely to be popular once the war is over. I suspect that there would be limited will to maintain it once the war is over.

There is always a balance with tariffs. Is the purpose to protect industries or to raise funds for the government as the two are contradictory to some degree. A very high tariff to largely stop imports totally will protect the industries - at a high cost to the home consumer - but since it will choke off imports will raise little money. A low one will raise more money but give relatively little tax revenue. Like you I have seen differing suggests on what levels of tariffs an independent CSA would apply but the general impression I have seen was that of their stated desire for lower tariffs to reduce the cost of imported good.

Also given the relatively limited scale of southern industry before the war would they be able to maintain a high general tariff on imported industrial goods without crippling their economy? The customer needs to be able to afford to buy the product and if the CSA insisted on a tariff wall as high as some of those suggestions then either they have to pay a high price to make it profitable for the foreign importer or they have to go without as the home producers can't, at least for a couple of years while new plants are built supply the home market.
The point was made originally because you suggested that in an eventual peace treaty, the North would seek to bisect the Confederacy via retaining control over the Mississippi; in such an eventuality, the C.S.A. would have every reason to conduct economic warfare as such borders would undermine it's entire existence. If the North does not do such, I see no reason for such economic warfare but such is the point: it depends on what the North does. Given that in 1870, 60% of the South's cotton was exported to foreign markets anyway, it must be pointed out the North was not their main market, but Europe itself was.

The situation of the war era would not continue into the Post-War given the war itself was what engendered the situation. President Davis and the C.S. Government allowed the trade because it brought gold and weapons into the C.S.A. and thus helped to address in part their industrial imbalance in war goods with the North; why exactly would the C.S. continue to overlook such a trade given they have no need for arms now with peace? As already pointed out the C.S. had a more centralized and effective bureaucracy than the North with more Government agents too, so they have the ability to suppress any illegal trade. Further in this regard, I'm not sure where the idea of corruption comes from, given we know how the C.S. conducted their tax regime and it was very effective. Given it's much easier to hide money and financial assets than loads of cotton that must be stored and transported, why exactly would the C.S. Bureaucracy fail in this specific instance?

Finally, as already pointed out multiple times now, the North was importing 40% of the South's production which equates to over 4 million bales of Cotton; such would be impossible to hide as it would require hundreds of ships, the full use of the C.S.A.'s railway network and quite literally tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of people to keep it quiet. This is simply not possible to hide and very quickly any scheme would be broken up by the Confederate Secret Service, which already had quite a few agents in the North IOTL.

With regards to Mr. Leigh's comments, I did not include them because that specific one is in error. The main crop in the South wasn't cotton, it was corn:

corn.png

The Pre-Civil War South's Leading Crop, Corn by Donald L. Kemmerer, Agricultural History, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1949), pp. 236-239:

As can be seen from Table 1 the South produced more corn than the North in all three of these census years. On a per capita basis Southern supremacy in corn production was even more marked, for the North was the more populous region. The North's population was double that of the South in 1859. Nor should the fact be overlooked that corn was the leading grain crop of the Nation, being twice as important as wheat, rye, oats, barley, and buckwheat combined. When analyzed, the corn production figures for 1839, 1849, and 1859 all tell about the same story.​
For the purposes at hand, therefore, it will suffice to examine one set. The middle year, 1849, has been selected because the figures are more complete than for 1839, and the year is not at the very end of the period under investigation, as 1859 is. Table 2 reveals that in 1849 the 15 Southern States and the District of Columbia produced about 60 percent of the Nation's corn crop. Of the 16 leading corn-producing States in the Nation, North and South, 11 were in the South. True, the leading corn States were in the North but so were most of the States with little corn production. The upper South more than the western North deserved to be called the Corn Belt. In 1839 the three leading corn States were Tennessee, Kentucky, and Virginia, and as a region the upper South always led the Midwest in corn production.
Table 3 shows that corn excelled cotton in the South not only in weight, which was to be expected, but also in acreage cultivated and in value, neither of which is usually realized. Whether the modest figure of 200 pounds of cotton to the acre is taken- that was the average in North Carolina and Alabama about 1905-or the more generous estimate of 530 pounds to the acre for the South by J. D. B. DeBow in 1852, corn acreage was several times greater than cotton acreage. Even if the worst possible yield for cotton per acre is compared to the best possible yield for corn, corn acreage exceeded that of cotton. The truth must be that the great fields of cotton made more impression on everyone than the numerous fields and plots of corn. The situation resembled that prevailing in the cattle industry after the Civil War when the Great Plains States were famous for their vast herds but actually had fewer cattle in the aggregate than all the Eastern farms. The Great Plains States did a smaller business on a grand scale whereas the many farms of the East conducted a larger business on a small scale.​

With regards to New Jersey, again, to claim such is to make an apples to oranges comparison. Every man in New Jersey could've been a diehard abolitionist serving in the Union Army but that does not invalidate the specific point made, in that New Jersey (As an example) was dependent on the South for purchasing its manufactured goods. Nothing about the political concept of Unionism detracts from the point the Governor made, in that all of New Jersey's production going South must now pass through a tariff barrier and compete with European goods and Confederate goods on disfavorable rates. As you yourself noted, this means reduced output and the need to find new markets, which means mass unemployment and ruined State finances.

With regards to the tariff rates, again, this is not a matter of speculation as these were the rates actually passed and maintained throughout the entire existence of the Confederate States. They were very popular politically and attempts to repeal them were continuously defeated in Congress, and after early 1862 no other efforts were made to revoke them according to Confederate Finance by Robert Cecil Todd. I therefore see no reason to assume any adjustments or revocations of them, given the lack of any evidence of broad political support for such. The reasoning behind this is quite simple; the per capita burden obscures that most of the tax burden fell on the upper classes, which could afford such costs.

Now then, with regards to the issue of the level of the tariff, as already cited, these were the same rates the United States itself was under in the 1840s and 1850s. Given that did not undermine the industrialization of the North nor did it strangle international commerce, why exactly would it do so here to the Confederacy? As Robert C. Todd points out, in it's early days the Confederates were using exactly the same rates as the U.S. as a whole had been from 1857 until 1861. It seems incredulous to suggest it would not work for the South when it worked for the nation as a whole before. With regards to the issue of the tariff and internal transportation, please see this map:

Birmingham.png


This is taken from The Iron and Steel Industry of the Birmingham, Alabama, District by Langdon White (Economic Geography, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct., 1928), pp. 349-365). As the description notes, it specifically concerns the profitability of industrial goods from Alabama vs those from Pittsburgh and Chicago, i.e. the main steel centers of both respective sections of the nation. As noted by the map, Birmingham was more competitive than both in the overwhelming majority of the South. For those portions not covered, unlike in the historical 1920s, they would be behind a protective tariff barrier and thus we can safely assume that Birmingham too would have the advantage in such an eventuality. Why I bring this up is because the example is equally applicable to the issue of imports from Europe.

Finally, as already pointed out the U.S. prospered under the same tariff rates as the C.S.A. would be under but here too we find a Confederate advantage the U.S. as a whole didn't have in its own development. Unlike the Federal Government, the C.S. Government was very State Capitalist and willing to make large investments to meet its economic and geopolitical needs. To quote again from John Majewski, this time from the Chapter ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND THE GROWTH OF THE CONFEDERATE STATE:

Confederate railroad policy, in fact, provides a microcosm for understanding how secessionists crossed the thin line separating antebellum state activism and a powerful, dynamic Confederate state. On the face of it, most Confederate leaders seemingly opposed national railroads. During the Confederate constitutional convention, South Carolina’s Robert Barnwell Rhett and other secessionists sought to prohibit the central government from funding internal improvements. The Confederacy, they argued, should never allow internal improvements (at least on the national level) to generate the evils of logrolling, budget deficits, and higher taxes. Rhett won an important victory when the Confederate constitution specifically prohibited Congress from appropriating ‘‘money for any internal improvement intended to facilitate commerce.’’ The constitution allowed the Confederate Congress to appropriate money to aid coastal navigation, improve harbors, or clear rivers, but only if it taxed the commerce that benefited from such improvements. ‘‘Internal improvements, by appropriations from the treasury of the Confederate States,’’ Rhett’s Charleston Mercury cheered, ‘‘is therefore rooted out of the system of Government the Constitution establishes.’’​
States’ rights ideology, though, eventually lost to a more expansive vision of the Confederate central state. As Table 6 shows, the Confederate government chartered and subsidized four important lines to improve the movement of troops and supplies. Loans and appropriations for these lines amounted to almost $3.5 million, a significant sum given that a severe shortage of iron and other supplies necessarily limited southern railroad building. Jefferson Davis, who strongly backed these national projects, argued that military necessity rather than commercial ambition motivated national investment in these lines. The constitutional prohibition of funding internal improvements ‘‘for commercial purposes’’ was thus irrelevant. That Davis took this position during the Civil War followed naturally from his position on national railroads in the antebellum era. Like Wigfall, he believed that military necessity justified national railroad investment. As a U.S. senator, Davis told his colleagues in 1859 that a Pacific railroad ‘‘is to be absolutely necessary in time of war, and hence within the Constitutional power of the General Government.’’ Davis was more right than he realized. When the Republican-controlled Congress heavily subsidized the nation’s first transcontinental railroad in 1862, military considerations constituted a key justification. Even after the Civil War, the military considered the transcontinental railroad as an essential tool for subjugating the Sioux and other Native Americans resisting western settlement.​
When the Confederate Congress endorsed Davis’s position on railroads, outraged supporters of states’ rights strongly objected. Their petition against national railroads—inserted into the official record of the Confederate Congress—argued that the railroads in question might well have military value, ‘‘but the same may be said of any other road within our limits, great or small.’’ The constitutional prohibition against national internal improvements, the petition recognized, was essentially worthless if the ‘‘military value’’ argument carried the day. Essentially giving the Confederate government a means of avoiding almost any constitutional restrictions, the ‘‘military value’’ doctrine threatened to become the Confederacy’s version of the ‘‘general welfare’’ clause that had done so much to justify the growth of government in the old Union. The elastic nature of ‘‘military value,’’ however, hardly bothered the vast majority of representatives in the Confederate Congress. The bills for the railroad lines passed overwhelmingly in 1862 and 1863. As political scientist Richard Franklin Bensel has argued, the constitutional limitations on the Confederate central government ‘‘turned out to be little more than cosmetic adornments.’’
Like Louis Wigfall’s rambling interview with William Howard Russell, the ‘‘cosmetic adornments’’ in the Confederate constitution allowed secessionists to articulate republican principles without actually having to follow them. If Confederate delegates in Montgomery really wanted to stop all national improvements, they could have simply prohibited the Confederate Congress from appropriating ‘‘money for any internal improvements’’ rather than insert the qualifying phrase ‘‘intended to facilitate commerce.’’ It is hard to believe that the inclusion of the ‘‘commerce’’ qualification was accidental. Having spent much of their careers debating the old federal Constitution, the delegates at Montgomery carefully considered the implications of every phrase they wrote.∞∂ The delegates surely knew that men such as Wigfall and Davis had used the national defense argument to justify federal spending on internal improvements. As it was, the delegates ritualistically invoked states’ rights without having to worry about the consequences. Historian Don E. Fehrenbacher has argued that the Confederate constitution was written ‘‘by men committed to the principle of states’ rights but addicted, in many instances, to the exercise of national power.’'Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Confederates were committed to the language of states’ rights in a way that rarely prevented the growth of national power.​
The decision to subsidize railroads, while ideologically important, was only a small part of the overall growth of the Confederate state. Other elements of Confederate state building, in fact, proved less controversial. When a shortage of pig iron threatened ordnance production, Davis told Congress in early 1862 that the ‘‘exigency is believed to be such as to require the aid of the Government.’ In April 1862 the Confederate Congress passed legislation that offered no-interest loans to iron masters who expanded their forges. The loans would only pay half the cost of the additional investment, but the Confederate government also covered to make advances up to one-third the value of contracts. To help forges secure additional raw materials, the Confederate Congress set up the Niter Bureau in 1862, which quickly became involved in exploration for new sources of iron. The Confederacy sometimes used private firms to produce ordnance—the famous Tredegar Iron Works is a good example— but the Confederacy’s Ordnance Bureau also built and operated its own arsenals, mills, and factories throughout the South. The arsenal at Selma, Alabama, for example, employed 3,000 civilians, while the Ordnance Bureau’s powder factory in Augusta, Georgia, was the second largest in the world. Whereas the North tended to rely on government contracts with private firms to meet the needs of wartime production, the Confederacy, with surprisingly little opposition, produced much of the military supplies consumed by its armies.​
The story of the Quartermaster Department is similar to the Ordnance Bureau. Historian Harold S. Wilson describes Confederate e√orts to outfit soldiers with uniforms, shoes, blankets, and tents as the ‘‘brink of military socialism.’’ The Quartermaster Department of the Confederacy operated its own factories and workshops, employing some 50,000 workers (many of them seamstresses). To obtain cloth for these factories and workshops, the Quartermaster Department exerted immense control over privately owned textile mills. Mills that refused to submit to Confederate controls on prices and profits faced the prospect of having their workers conscripted into the Confederate army. When wool supplies ran short—largely because Union forces captured most of the major woolproducing areas early in the war—the Confederate Congress authorized quartermasters to impress whatever supplies they could find. The Confederate Congress also allowed the Quartermaster Department (under the auspices of the Bureau of Foreign Supplies) to regulate and control most blockade runners. In early 1864 the Confederate government prohibited private shipments of cotton, tobacco, and other staple crops; required that private blockade runners devote half of all cargo space to the war department; and prohibited luxuries from entering the South. The Confederacy had essentially nationalized much of its foreign commerce.​
 

steve59p

Sergeant
Joined
Oct 21, 2016
GU

I think your confusing me with other posters who have suggested that the union won't give up territory it holds at any cease-fire, which from the end 1862 onward means most of the Mississippi. That's a possibility but I was quite willing to accept, especially given an early end to the war the union withdrawing from seceding states with the exception of W Virginia I would except.

If they don't and the north continues to hold a lot of southern lands then the south does have a motive for such an economic war but has less resources to do so. As such it might be able to exert pressure on the north or might fail but I wasn't assuming this - continuing to see large parts of the deep south occupied - would be occurring.

Similarly I never said, in the unlikely event of the south deciding to impose a cotton embargo on the north that its central government wouldn't support such a move as that would be stupid. [Although some of the state governments might disagree here]. What I pointed out was the problems with enforcing such a systems. Both because there are already routes to bypass such restrictions in place - such as exporting Texan cotton via Mexico for instance and because they have no real control over cotton supplies once they leave the country.

What is the definition of the 6 border states in that table, which contain the vast bulk of the southern produced corn? I think it includes areas such as Virginia and Tennessee but does it included any areas which didn't secede? - Ah see three of them are Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky, the last of which would be included in the north after the war. Are the other three in the southern area that would be leaving the union as well? I do take your argument that, if those figures are more accurate than the other source there is substantial corn production in the south.

I repeat my previous statement that actions in a wartime crisis will not necessarily continue in a period of peace. The link you post to the Confederate finance source is rather contradictory as it refers to copying union tariffs but also to banning a protective tariff, which the US procedure was. I also see that further down there was pressure for lowering tariffs and even moving towards free trade with twice bills being passed in the lower house but blocked by the Senate before the tightening blockade made the issue largely irrelevant. This could emerge post-war especially since people, already strained by a couple of years of war might well be unwilling to pay further indirect taxes in the form of a protective tariff over a wide range of goods.

The basis for such a tariff causing problems, at least in the short term is whether the south, if isolating itself from northern and European industrial imports would be able to meet all its needs for such goods. If not then either they have to pay more for such imports or they have to go without. The CSA doesn't have the same capacity, at least until there is a build up of such capacity, both in tonnage and in type/capability as the north so its likely to suffer shortfalls unless and until it can obtain such facilities. I mention capacities rather than just tonnage as that list of production of iron is basic raw material in bars or sheets so converting that into finished goods is another matter which may need further development. Its noted that the US as a whole did suffer additional costs because of its import tariffs until its industry expanded to fill in the gaps so its unlikely that an independent south would escape such an issue.

As you say the south basically broke its own rules in allowing centralised spending on infrastructure construction, which caused complaints. Again would this be allowed to continue after peace was established. Operations in wartime, especially when its seen as an issue of survival are often vastly different from those that apply when peace comes.
 

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
GU

I think your confusing me with other posters who have suggested that the union won't give up territory it holds at any cease-fire, which from the end 1862 onward means most of the Mississippi. That's a possibility but I was quite willing to accept, especially given an early end to the war the union withdrawing from seceding states with the exception of W Virginia I would except.

If they don't and the north continues to hold a lot of southern lands then the south does have a motive for such an economic war but has less resources to do so. As such it might be able to exert pressure on the north or might fail but I wasn't assuming this - continuing to see large parts of the deep south occupied - would be occurring.

Similarly I never said, in the unlikely event of the south deciding to impose a cotton embargo on the north that its central government wouldn't support such a move as that would be stupid. [Although some of the state governments might disagree here]. What I pointed out was the problems with enforcing such a systems. Both because there are already routes to bypass such restrictions in place - such as exporting Texan cotton via Mexico for instance and because they have no real control over cotton supplies once they leave the country.

What is the definition of the 6 border states in that table, which contain the vast bulk of the southern produced corn? I think it includes areas such as Virginia and Tennessee but does it included any areas which didn't secede? - Ah see three of them are Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky, the last of which would be included in the north after the war. Are the other three in the southern area that would be leaving the union as well? I do take your argument that, if those figures are more accurate than the other source there is substantial corn production in the south.

I repeat my previous statement that actions in a wartime crisis will not necessarily continue in a period of peace. The link you post to the Confederate finance source is rather contradictory as it refers to copying union tariffs but also to banning a protective tariff, which the US procedure was. I also see that further down there was pressure for lowering tariffs and even moving towards free trade with twice bills being passed in the lower house but blocked by the Senate before the tightening blockade made the issue largely irrelevant. This could emerge post-war especially since people, already strained by a couple of years of war might well be unwilling to pay further indirect taxes in the form of a protective tariff over a wide range of goods.

The basis for such a tariff causing problems, at least in the short term is whether the south, if isolating itself from northern and European industrial imports would be able to meet all its needs for such goods. If not then either they have to pay more for such imports or they have to go without. The CSA doesn't have the same capacity, at least until there is a build up of such capacity, both in tonnage and in type/capability as the north so its likely to suffer shortfalls unless and until it can obtain such facilities. I mention capacities rather than just tonnage as that list of production of iron is basic raw material in bars or sheets so converting that into finished goods is another matter which may need further development. Its noted that the US as a whole did suffer additional costs because of its import tariffs until its industry expanded to fill in the gaps so its unlikely that an independent south would escape such an issue.

As you say the south basically broke its own rules in allowing centralised spending on infrastructure construction, which caused complaints. Again would this be allowed to continue after peace was established. Operations in wartime, especially when its seen as an issue of survival are often vastly different from those that apply when peace comes.
My argument was in response to this post, where you suggested the North would seek to hold onto Vicksburg and other occupied areas:
This is assuming that the south has Vicksburg and associated areas. Unless its a fairly early victory the north could decide to hold onto at least some of the rebel areas it has occupied and the south is likely to have little power to change this.

Ditto with the assumption that an independent CSA. especially one weakened by a long war of independence, will have the capacity and will to seek to expand into N Mexico, especially since this is likely to face opposition from several sources, not just the union. If it doesn't get a large chunk of N Mexico to give access to the Pacific then a rail link to western Texas, still thinly populated and of little economic value is going to be of little commercial profit.
As I've already pointed out, the Confederacy had a larger bureaucracy in a centralized system so efficient it was able to effectively collect taxes up until the collapse of the Confederacy itself; as I've already asked you, how exactly does it fail to prevent this? You cite Mexico but at the time there is no railway network to support such in Texas. You cite ships, but to move the four million bales of cotton required by Northern textile mills would quite literally require hundreds of ships and thus tens of thousands of sailors keeping it quiet alone. Nevermind that to get on those ships, it must pass through C.S. ports where C.S. officials looking for such illicit trade would be watching after coming from planters who must also be quiet. It is quite literally a conspiracy that would require hundreds of thousands of complicit individuals to keep quiet and for the C.S. government to not notice millions of bales of cotton moving along the railways and through its ports.

Finally, there's the matter of end destination. If this massive conspiracy somehow does function, it will be rapidly noticed by the Confederate embassies and consulates in Europe that the ships aren't arriving in Europe as claimed while their counterparts in the United States are noticing cotton ships arriving that aren't from Egypt or India and, perhaps more importantly, being crewed by Whites speaking in a Southern accent. If all else fails, at this point said conspiracy collapses because all it takes is for C.S. officials to put two and two together. When ships get back to port, they can demand to see their logbooks and then compare them with what their officials recorded in other countries and the conspiracy is exposed; i.e. "Your logbook claims you put into Liverpool on Day X, but we have our Consulate logbooks that show otherwise."

There's absolutely no reason for the C.S. Government to tolerate such a trade and any efforts to get around it beyond minor numbers will fail on the logistics of such a scheme on its own. As far as resources, most of the cotton belt is in their control in this scenario and thus the North would still be in dire need of imports.

Moving onto the matter of the tariffs, there is not contradiction. As stated previously and shown by the sources, the Tariff Rates of 1857 were adopted before the rates of May of 1861 were, with said efforts to repeal them, as I stated, blocked. As you note, the Confederate Constitution formally invalidated protective tariffs but the Majewski citation gives context to that; it was window dressing that rapidly gave away to a nationalistic desires of nation building. To requote Majewski on the matter:

When the Confederate Congress endorsed Davis’s position on railroads, outraged supporters of states’ rights strongly objected. Their petition against national railroads—inserted into the official record of the Confederate Congress—argued that the railroads in question might well have military value, ‘‘but the same may be said of any other road within our limits, great or small.’’ The constitutional prohibition against national internal improvements, the petition recognized, was essentially worthless if the ‘‘military value’’ argument carried the day. Essentially giving the Confederate government a means of avoiding almost any constitutional restrictions, the ‘‘military value’’ doctrine threatened to become the Confederacy’s version of the ‘‘general welfare’’ clause that had done so much to justify the growth of government in the old Union. The elastic nature of ‘‘military value,’’ however, hardly bothered the vast majority of representatives in the Confederate Congress. The bills for the railroad lines passed overwhelmingly in 1862 and 1863. As political scientist Richard Franklin Bensel has argued, the constitutional limitations on the Confederate central government ‘‘turned out to be little more than cosmetic adornments.’’
With regards to issues in the Confederacy with goods:

In fusing free trade and protectionist impulses, secessionists spoke and wrote in a Hamiltonian idiom of economic modernization and economic nationalism. Just as Hamilton had imagined the United States becoming a world economic power, secessionists envisioned the Confederacy as a vehicle for promoting economic modernization. Confederate duties closely resembled (and sometimes exceeded) the 10 to 15 percent tariff rate proposed by Hamilton in his famous Report on Manufacturers (1791). The similarity in rates reflected shared goals of simultaneously promoting nation building and economic development. Hamilton wanted to make his new nation economically independent while simultaneously encouraging enough international trade to pay for his ambitious fiscal plans. His moderate tariff encouraged domestic manufacturing while generating enough revenue to finance the Revolutionary War debt. Confederates wanted tariffs high enough to penalize northern goods—thus encouraging economic independence—but still low enough to allow for a vibrant trade with Europe.
The rates were set at such a level as to allow for the flow of commerce with Europe while still providing a protective barrier to encourage Southern industry. This was also not some development of wartime but, as Majewski strenuously argues, the end result of Antebellum political thought in the South. Southern governments collectively spent more than $128 million on railroads in the antebellum period, mostly in the 1850s, when railroad mileage in seven key southern states nearly quadrupled. To put that into context, that is both more in nominal terms and in per capita than the Northern States as a whole; the State Capitalist ideal of the C.S.A. was not a random development of the war, but actually the intended goal of Southerners all along. As Majewski notes, the "free trade" and "protectionist" groups had been fused together as evidenced by their strategic goal laid out in the last cited paragraph from Majewski's book.
 

steve59p

Sergeant
Joined
Oct 21, 2016
GU

I had forgotten about that but its something a lot of other people have commented on and is a distinct possibility in a longer war. In that case apart from anything else the north will have control of a lot of the cotton producing areas or their ability to export cotton. In the event of a shorter war where the north mainly holds small pockets of rebel states then that's far less likely in which case there is no incentive for such actions by the south. The problem is that so many different possibilities have been considered so what applies to one won't apply to another. In a long war after which the north decides to maintain control of a lot of occupied territories - some of which had substantial unionist support it should be remembered so there might be a political basis for this - then the south has an incentive for such action but may have limited potential for carrying it out, coupled with the political costs.

In terms of getting around a southern embargo I mentioned Texas sending cotton via Mexico simply because that happened OTL, as a source you initially supplied mentioned.

The south had a large bureaucracy during the war but that doesn't automatically mean it was either efficient or would continue to be that large and active after the war ended. Not to mention once a pattern of corruption is established it can be difficult to stamp out, especially when so many people have a benefit from maintaining it. Why for instance should a plantation owner expose to government officials a trade he's making good money from? Or a bribed custom official declare his criminality? As such its going to take some effort to keep track of where cotton exported goes, especially since ships can change names, owners, flags etc fairly easily in those time. Or simply, albeit a bit more expensive for them, northern mill owners [more likely their agents] buy cotton when it reaches merchants in Europe.

However as I repeated above I think this entire situation is unlikely to occur in a short war in which the north makes no/few permemnat annexations, excepting probably W Virginia.

Moving onto the matter of the tariffs, there is not contradiction. As stated previously and shown by the sources, the Tariff Rates of 1857 were adopted before the rates of May of 1861 were, with said efforts to repeal them, as I stated, blocked. As you note, the Confederate Constitution formally invalidated protective tariffs but the Majewski citation gives context to that; it was window dressing that rapidly gave away to a nationalistic desires of nation building. To requote Majewski on the matter:

That sound's distinctly contradictory to me. They said one thing then did another. Which they may continue to do in peacetime or may come under pressure to change.

As you say they may continue with prohibative tariffs of the sort argued for by Hamilton and seek to largely exclude imports of manufacturing goods from anywhere. This will come at a considerable cost to the ordinary person in the south. A more moderate tariffs will raise money and in the shorter term anyway exclude most northern goods as they would be unable to compete in many cases against more efficient European manufacturers. It would provide more money to the government but would make it more difficult for the southern industrial base to take off. Its a question of what assorted elements in the south want and who wins in the resulting power struggle. Allowing of course that at different times different groups will 'win' and 'lose' and frequently there will be compromises.
 

Generic Username

Corporal
Joined
May 12, 2019
Location
Yes
GU

I had forgotten about that but its something a lot of other people have commented on and is a distinct possibility in a longer war. In that case apart from anything else the north will have control of a lot of the cotton producing areas or their ability to export cotton. In the event of a shorter war where the north mainly holds small pockets of rebel states then that's far less likely in which case there is no incentive for such actions by the south. The problem is that so many different possibilities have been considered so what applies to one won't apply to another. In a long war after which the north decides to maintain control of a lot of occupied territories - some of which had substantial unionist support it should be remembered so there might be a political basis for this - then the south has an incentive for such action but may have limited potential for carrying it out, coupled with the political costs.

In terms of getting around a southern embargo I mentioned Texas sending cotton via Mexico simply because that happened OTL, as a source you initially supplied mentioned.

The south had a large bureaucracy during the war but that doesn't automatically mean it was either efficient or would continue to be that large and active after the war ended. Not to mention once a pattern of corruption is established it can be difficult to stamp out, especially when so many people have a benefit from maintaining it. Why for instance should a plantation owner expose to government officials a trade he's making good money from? Or a bribed custom official declare his criminality? As such its going to take some effort to keep track of where cotton exported goes, especially since ships can change names, owners, flags etc fairly easily in those time. Or simply, albeit a bit more expensive for them, northern mill owners [more likely their agents] buy cotton when it reaches merchants in Europe.

However as I repeated above I think this entire situation is unlikely to occur in a short war in which the north makes no/few permemnat annexations, excepting probably W Virginia.



That sound's distinctly contradictory to me. They said one thing then did another. Which they may continue to do in peacetime or may come under pressure to change.

As you say they may continue with prohibative tariffs of the sort argued for by Hamilton and seek to largely exclude imports of manufacturing goods from anywhere. This will come at a considerable cost to the ordinary person in the south. A more moderate tariffs will raise money and in the shorter term anyway exclude most northern goods as they would be unable to compete in many cases against more efficient European manufacturers. It would provide more money to the government but would make it more difficult for the southern industrial base to take off. Its a question of what assorted elements in the south want and who wins in the resulting power struggle. Allowing of course that at different times different groups will 'win' and 'lose' and frequently there will be compromises.
I understand other people have stated the same argument and I've argued against it with them too, that's why I'm responding to you as well. I agree with the underlying logic of the North seeking to retain as much as they can, as that's good and rational politics. On the flipside, however, is that a cotton embargo is a good counter to such. As Majewski has pointed out, there is no political cost to such and many were advocating for it in 1861 anyway. I also disagree with the assertion the Southern ability to do such would somehow be limited; East Tennessee, for example, wasn't growing much Cotton.

Now then, as for such an embargo, I'm well aware of the Mexican route but you have not addressed the points I've raised on that one for example. Texas had limited cotton production and lacks the railways in the 1860s to support a trade of the caliber needed for Northern textile needs. How about the efficiency of the bureaucracy? I've already provided citations on the matter that show it was very effective and efficient. Corruption? I have not yet seen any examples of that being a major issue nor have you provided any so that remains to be seen. Basically, the counter argument you present requires foundations that you have yet to prove exist and thus without said foundations, the argument does not carry much merit.

Yes, one can probably find individual examples; the problem is that we are talking about hundreds of thousands of individuals, at a minimum. The whole reason Law Enforcement conducts investigations is because most people will not expose their misdeeds on their own, hence the need to do said investigations. I'm sure corrupt Southerners could supply a few thousand bales of Cotton to the North but to get the millions upon millions they need would be impossible as you could not hide that amount of trade. One planter or one ship captain might be quiet but how about tens of thousands of railway workers and dockmen, or tens of thousand of sailors? How about the Confederate consulate in, say, New York City noticing dozens of ships with Southern-accented sailors carrying cotton? They would quite obviously not be Egyptians or Indians. Get one sailor drunk, and the entire scheme is exposed right then and there, nevermind all the aforementioned individuals. That's why massive conspiracies like this don't work.

Now, with regards to the tariffs and internal improvements, yes it is contradictory but that's politics for you. That's the whole reason why we have the Supreme Court in the American system is to interpret the law and how said interpretations change. As for whether or not such would change after the war, the problem is Majewski notes it was politically popular and overwhelming majorities rebuffed efforts to change it. One could argue, as you do, that this might change in peace time but as pointed out by Majewski, these political trends pre-dated the Civil War. Thus, there is no reason to assume it was the war rather than the socio-political culture of the South at that itself.

Finally, again, they did not seek to exclude all foreign goods:

In fusing free trade and protectionist impulses, secessionists spoke and wrote in a Hamiltonian idiom of economic modernization and economic nationalism. Just as Hamilton had imagined the United States becoming a world economic power, secessionists envisioned the Confederacy as a vehicle for promoting economic modernization. Confederate duties closely resembled (and sometimes exceeded) the 10 to 15 percent tariff rate proposed by Hamilton in his famous Report on Manufacturers (1791). The similarity in rates reflected shared goals of simultaneously promoting nation building and economic development. Hamilton wanted to make his new nation economically independent while simultaneously encouraging enough international trade to pay for his ambitious fiscal plans. His moderate tariff encouraged domestic manufacturing while generating enough revenue to finance the Revolutionary War debt. Confederates wanted tariffs high enough to penalize northern goods—thus encouraging economic independence—but still low enough to allow for a vibrant trade with Europe.
 

steve59p

Sergeant
Joined
Oct 21, 2016
GU

We're going in circles so I will be quick.
a) Yes a possible trade war might occur if in a long war the union decides to hold onto southern land it controls. In which case I would consider it justified but the south might find it too costly. If the US controls the entire Mississippi valley, as they did from mid-63 then they have access to a fair amount of cotton producing land and also control trade routes for more.

b) I mentioned Texas exporting via Mexico because as I said you initially raised the issue, although at the time you seemed to think it was Mexican home production, which didn't actually take off until a couple of decades later. Its just one example of what could happen. [Another might even be, especially if the north accepts secession but controls the Mississippi valley, that Texas decides to go its own way although I have seen others argue it recognised it didn't have the resources to do that at this period. Despite it being a rather popular meme among some Texans.:wink: ]

c) As you pointed out yourself illegal sales of cotton occurred during the war which is an obvious case of officials bending the rules when it suits them. There is an incentive to continue that after central government changes its stance. After all a plantation owner is unlikely to be happy with reducing the market value of his crop and a customs official who has previous accepted such trade could well be happy to continue it if its made financially rewarding. Especially after a long war which has weakened acceptance of the rule of law and with the economy in a bad way as it would be then. It would only need a few officials in the right locations, not hundreds of thousands. The average railway worker or sailor will not have any real say on the issue or probably care that much as long as they have a job. Especially if those sailors are not from the south which is likely to be the case. Plus the idea that the south will have officials in every major northern port keeping track of every ship that comes in and what it unloads in this time period is rather dubious.

d) You didn't answer my point that once the cotton leaves the south and even more so after it reaches a market in Europe the south has no say on what happens to it.

e) As that text we discussed also pointed out there was also considerable popular support for lower/no import tariffs. Whether in a post war situation the senate will continue to be able to insist on what is an heavy tax on consumers is a matter of opinion and considering all the variables that would be involved there's no clear way of knowing.

f) You have made differing statements on the issue of import tariffs of which the one you quote is one example. Its a sliding scale depending on what priority various interest groups have and how much power and organisation they have to get their preferences implemented. As I think I've said already significantly reducing imports from the union doesn't require tariffs on their goods. Just exemption from northern tariffs as at this point European industrial products are generally cheaper. Whether the aim is a fairly punative tariff such as the US imposed at some times during its 1st ~150 years or a more limited one to raise revenue is largely beside the point there.
 
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