The Slave States Seceded to Protect Slavery--The Rest is Baloney


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unionblue

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If the south "dominated" the government, how did we end up with the Tariff crisis in 1832? Surely they could just "dominate" the voting and ensure such a tariff never happened.
What "tariff crisis?" You mean that temper tantrum thrown by South Carolina? The "crisis" that received no support at all from any other Southern state? The one Calhoun said that the real crisis was actually slavery?

A reading of the book, The Road To Disunion: Secessionists at Bay 1776-1854, by William W. Freehling, beginning at page 257, will give more information on your above concerns.

The book, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860, by Leonard L. Richards, will give more evidence in support of my post#2,658.
 
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What "tariff crisis?" You mean that temper tantrum thrown by South Carolina? The "crisis" that received no support at all from any other Southern state? The one Calhoun said that the real crisis was actually slavery?
Not an accurate picture of the voting in Congress and who supported who. I'm not sure what "temper tantrum" you're inventing, but the tariff of 1832 was passed because the Southern delegation attempted to use some parliamentary maneuvers to stop it, which did not work out as intended. A good biography of John C. Calhoun will give you the details of how he attempted to stop the tariff and could not. Surely an odd thing to have happen given the "southern dominance" you insist existed for seven decades.

The truth of the matter is that the South never dominated the government. They always had a smaller population, with the possible exception of around 1800, and the gap grew larger as the decades rolled by. The only thing that kept them in the game was parity of numbers in the Senate. They struggled to defend their interests, they did not "dominate" the government at all.
 
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cash

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If the south "dominated" the government, how did we end up with the Tariff crisis in 1832? Surely they could just "dominate" the voting and ensure such a tariff never happened.
"The Tariff of 1828 was the law of the land, and South Carolinians were the authors of its worst abominations."

https://books.google.com/books?id=FPZOEitjDFwC&pg=PA137&dq=The+tariff+of+1828+was+the+law+of+the+land,+and+South+Carolinians+were+the+authors&hl=en&sa=X&ei=KUcWT82LI-nb0QHl8bHKAg&sqi=2&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=South Carolinians were the authors&f=false
 

cash

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Not an accurate picture of the voting in Congress and who supported who. I'm not sure what "temper tantrum" you're inventing, but the tariff of 1832 was passed because the Southern delegation attempted to use some parliamentary maneuvers to stop it, which did not work out as intended. A good biography of John C. Calhoun will give you the details of how he attempted to stop the tariff and could not. Surely an odd thing to have happen given the "southern dominance" you insist existed for seven decades.

The truth of the matter is that the South never dominated the government. They always had a smaller population, with the possible exception of around 1800, and the gap grew larger as the decades rolled by. The only thing that kept them in the game was parity of numbers in the Senate. They struggled to defend their interests, they did not "dominate" the government at all.
False in all aspects.

"The following year the friends of protection introduced a general tariff measure into Congress. The opposition, remembering that they had accomplished nothing by arguments in 1820, 1824, and 1827, now adopted a set of tactics which they may have learned from the history of the Woolens Bill. They offered amendments that were deliberately designed to make the bill highly objectionable. New England, whose opinion on previous tariffs had been divided, was the point of attack. Higher duties were placed on molasses, thereby injuring New England rum makers and those who imported molasses from the West Indies. Likewise, New England shippers, who preferred to outfit their vessels with Russian rather than with Kentucky hemp, were harmed by an increase in the duties on hemp. While piling these and other injuries upon New England, the relief asked by its woolen manufacturers was withheld." [Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848, pp. 186-187]

As Prof. Freehling tells us, "By keeping duties on raw wool at high levels, for example, southerners hoped to make the tariff obnoxious to woolen manufacturers. By maintaining high rates on foreign molasses, Carolinians hoped to force New England rum distillers to oppose the bill. Thus the South would vote with protection-minded producers of raw materials to keep high rates on nonindustrial products. Southerners would then vote with New England manufacturers to defeat the entire Bill of Abominations." [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, p. 137]

The South Carolinians planned to keep the rates high and they defeated most amendments that sought to lower the rates.

"Again and again, southern representatives voted against amendments to lower rates on raw materials. But enough northern Jacksonians, including such Van Burenites as Silas Wright, voted to lower enough of the duties so that industrialists managed to swallow the entire unseemly concoction. The tariff of 1828 was the law of the land, and South Carolinians were the authors of its worst abominations." [Ibid.]

Calhoun played a central, though behind the scenes role in the Nullification Crisis, beginning with the drafting of the Tariff of 1828.

"The natural pressure of public opinion on public men had exercised its effect in previous years, and had had its share in bringing about the tariff act of 1824 and the woolens bill of 1827. But the gradual crystallization of two parties, the [John Quincy] Adams and [Andrew] Jackson parties,—Whigs and Democrats, as they soon came to be called—put a new face on the political situation, and had an unexpected effect on tariff legislation. The contest between them had begun in earnest before the Harrisburg convention met, and some of the Jackson men alleged that the convention was no more than a demonstration got up by the Adams men as a means of bringing the protective movement to bear in their aid; but this was denied, and such evidence as we have seems to support the denial. Yet the Adams men were undoubtedly helped by the protective movement. Although there was not then, nor for a number of years after, a clear-cut division on party lines between protectionists and so-called free traders, the Adams men were more firmly and unitedly in favor of protection than their opponents. Adams was a protectionist, though not an extreme one; Clay, the leader and spokesman of the party, was more than any other public man identified with the American system. They were at least willing that the protective question should be brought into the foreground of the political contest.

"The position of the Jackson men, on the other hand, was a very difficult one. Their party had at this time no settled policy in regard to the questions which were to be the subjects of the political struggles of the next twenty years. They were united on only one point, a determination to oust the other side. On the tariff, as well as on the bank and internal improvements, the various elements of the party held very different opinions. The Southern members, who were almost to a man supporters of Jackson, were opposed unconditionally not only to an increase of duties, but to the high range which the tariff had already reached. They were convinced, and in the main justly convinced, that the taxes levied by the tariff fell with peculiar weight on the slave States, and their opposition was already tinged with the bitterness which made possible, a few years later, the attempt at nullification of the tariff of 1832. On the other hand, the protective policy was popular throughout the North, more especially in the very States whose votes were essential to Jackson, in New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. The Jackson men needed the votes of these States, and were not so confident of getting them as they might reasonably have been. They failed, as completely as their opponents, to gauge the strength of the enthusiasm of the masses for their candidate, and they did not venture to give the Adams men a chance of posing as the only true friends of domestic industry.

"The twentieth Congress met for its first session in December, 1827. The elections of 1826, at which its members were chosen, had not been fortunate for the administration. When Congress met there was some doubt as to the political complexion of the House; but this was set at rest by the election to the speakership of the Democratic candidate, Stephenson of Virginia. The new Speaker, in the formation of the committees, assumed for his party the direction of the measures of the House. On the committee on manufactures, from which the tariff report and the tariff bill were to come, he appointed five supporters of Jackson and two supporters of Adams. The chairmanship, however, was given to one of the latter, Mallary, of Vermont, who, it will be remembered, had been a member of the Harrisburg convention.

"Much doubt was entertained as to the line of action the committee would follow. The Adams men feared at first that it would adopt a policy of simple delay and inaction. This fear was confirmed when, a few weeks after the beginning of the session, the committee asked for power to send for persons and papers in order to obtain more information on the tariff,—a request which was opposed by Mallary, their chairman, on the ground that it was made only as a pretext for delay. The Adams men, who formed the bulk of the ardent protectionists, voted with him against granting the desired power. But the Southern members united with the Jackson men from the North, and between them they secured the passage of the resolution asked by the committee. The debate and vote on the resolution sounded the key-note of the events of the session. They showed that the Jackson men from the South and the North, though opposed to each other on the tariff question, were yet united as against the Adams men.

"But the policy of delay, if such in fact had been entertained by the opposition, was abandoned. On January 31st, the committee presented a report and a draft of a tariff bill, which showed that they had determined on a new plan, and an ingenious one. What that plan was, Calhoun explained very frankly nine years later, in a speech reviewing the events of 1828 and defending the course taken by himself and his Southern fellow members. A high-tariff bill was to be laid before the House. It was to contain not only a high general range of duties, but duties especially high on those raw materials on which New England wanted the duties to be low. It was to satisfy the protective demands of the Western and Middle States, and at the same time to be obnoxious to the New England members. The Jackson men of all shades, the protectionists from the North and the free-traders from the South, were to unite in preventing any amendments; that bill, and no other, was to be voted on. When the final vote came, the Southern men were to turn around and vote against their own measure. The New England men, and the Adams men in general, would be unable to swallow it, and would also vote against it. Combined, they would prevent its passage, even though the Jackson men from the North voted for it. The result expected was that no tariff bill at all would be passed during the session, which was the object of the Southern wing of the opposition. On the other hand, the obloquy of defeating it would be cast on the Adams party, which was the object of the Jacksonians of the North. The tariff bill would be defeated, and yet the Jackson men would be able to parade as the true 'friends of domestic industry.'

"The bill by which this ingenious solution of the difficulties of the opposition was to be reached, was reported to the House on January 31st by the committee on manufactures.79 To the surprise of its authors, it was eventually passed both by House and Senate, and became, with a few unessential changes, the tariff act of 1828." [F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, pp. 84-89]

"The Southern members openly said that they meant to make the tariff so bitter a pill that no New England member would be able to swallow it. When the final vote on the bill came, the groups of members split up in the way expected by the Democrats. The Southern members, practically without exception, voted against it. Those from the Middle and Western States voted almost unanimously for it. The Jackson men voted for their own measure for consistency’s sake; the Adams men from these States joined them, partly for political reasons, mainly because the bill, even with the obnoxious provisions, was acceptable to their constituents. Of the New England members, a majority, 23 out of 39, voted in the negative. The affirmative votes from New England, however, were sufficient, when added to those from the West and the Middle States, to ensure its passage. The bill accordingly passed the House.

"This result had not been entirely unexpected. The real struggle, it was felt, would come in the Senate, where the South and New England had a proportionately large representation. In previous years the Senate had maintained, in its action on the tariff bills of 1820 and 1824, a much more conservative position than the House. But in 1828 the course of events in the Senate was in the main similar to that in the House." [F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, pp. 97-98]

"Again and again, southern representatives voted against amendments to lower rates on raw materials. But enough northern Jacksonians, including such Van Burenites as Silas Wright, voted to lower enough of the duties so that industrialists managed to swallow the entire unseemly concoction. The tariff of 1828 was the law of the land, and South Carolinians were the authors of its worst abominations.

"Calhounites later claimed that Van Buren was in on their conspiracy and had betrayed them. Van Buren always denied the accusation and Calhoun never proved it; the debacle was probably a southern plot which backfired rather than a sabotaged Jacksonian stratagem." [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, pp. 137-138]

"The protest against the so-called Tariff of Abominations grew particularly strong in South Carolina, and in response to a request from the state legislature, Calhoun secretly wrote an essay titled 'South Carolina Exposition and Protest.' In it, he asserted that states had a constitutional right to nullify any federal government actions they considered unconstitutional. Calhoun had become the chosen mouthpiece for Southern rights." [Ethan S. Rafuse, "He Started the Civil War," Civil War Times, Vol XLI, No. 5, October, 2002, pp. 26-27]

The reason they manufactured the Nullification Crisis was to protect slavery.

"Many clauses of the Constitution, if interpreted with the slightest latitude, gave Congress at least the power to debate slavery. If Congress can appropriate money for anything it deems in the general welfare, William Smith liked to ask, why can't a northern majority appropriate funds to abolish slavery?" [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina 1816-1836, p. 111]

"In 1827 the American Colonization Society dispatched a petition to Congress which inaugurated its campaign for a federal appropriation. . . . to tidewater aristocrats, the colonization petition seemed the fatal 'entering wedge' which, if not met at the 'threshold,' would clear the way for abolition. A colonization appropriation would set the vital constitutional precedent, for if Congress could promote the general welfare by colonizing free Negroes, it could also promote the general welfare by freeing Negro slaves. 'The only safety of the Southern States,' Hayne argued, 'is to be found in the want of power on the part of the Federal Government to touch the subject at all.' " [Ibid., p. 122]

"If the majority could use 'the right of laying duties, not only to raise revenue, but to regulate the industry of the country,' warned Calhoun, taxes could be employed to further 'any purpose that the majority may think to be for the general welfare.' Encouragement could be offered 'to the Colonization Society, as well as to cotton and woolen manufacturers.' Indeed, the constitutional precedent set by the tariff of 1828 might lend authority to a direct assault on slavery itself." [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, p. 139]

The nullifiers, Calhoun included, then, had decided "to fight the abolitionists indirectly by contending against the tariff." [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, p. 257]

"President Jackson also recognized slavery as the real issue. Following the settlement of the nullification controversy he wrote to a friend that 'the tariff was only the pretext, and disunion and a southern confederacy the real object. The next pretext will be the negro or slavery question.'" [Herman V. Ames, "John C. Calhoun and the Secession Movement of 1850," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, New Series, Vol 28, Part 1, April, 1918, p. 20]

Robert J. Turnbull, a South Carolina low country planter and pamphleteer, wrote a series of essays called The Crisis. Turnbull believed tariffs and internal improvements were dangerous because "acquiescence in these measures, on the part of the State sovereignties, sanctions . . . the constitutional right to legislate on the local concerns of the States." ". . . these words 'general welfare' are becoming every day more and more important to the folks, who are now so peacably raising their cotton and rice, between the Little Pedee and the Savannah. The question, it must be recollected, is not simply, whether we are to have a foreign commerce. It is not whether we are to have splendid national works, in which we have no interest, executed chiefly at our cost. . . . It is not whether we are to be taxed without end. . . . But the still more interesting question is, whether the institutions of our forefathers . . . are to be preserved . . . free from the rude hands of innovators and enthusiasts, and from the molestation or interference of any legislative power on earth but our own?" [Robert J. Turnbull, "The Crisis," pp. 12-14, 64, 139 quoted in William J. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, p. 127]

The attack on the tariff was in reality, then, an indirect defense of the institution of slavery.

Calhoun himself discounted the tariff as the real cause of the Nullification Crisis:

"I consider the Tariff, but as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of things. The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar domestick [sic] institutions of the Southern States, and the consequent direction which that and her soil and climate have given to her industry, has placed them in regard to taxation and appropriation in opposite relation to the majority of the Union; against the danger of which, if there be no protective power in the reserved rights of the states, they must in the end be forced to rebel, or submit to have . . . their domestick [sic] institutions exhausted by Colonization and other schemes, and themselves & children reduced to wretchedness." [John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, 11 Sep 1830]

The Nullification Controversy was more about protecting slavery than anything else:

"The same doctrines 'of the general welfare' which enable the general government to tax our industry for the benefit of the industries of other sections of this Union, and to appropriate the common treasure to make roads and canals for them, would authorize the federal government to erect the peaceful standard of servile revolt, by establishing colonization offices in our State, to give the bounties for emancipation here, and transportation to Liberia afterwards. The last question follows our giving up the battle on the other two, as inevitably as light flows from the sun." [James Hamilton to John Taylor, 14 Sep 1830]
 
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And you did read why, right? They hoped to make the tariff bad enough that other sections would vote to reject it. It was strategy to defeat it, not support. Again, where was the "dominance" of government by the South? Why did they have to resort to these desperate measures if they were in control?

Let's look at the a few pages of context, to correct the impression you're trying to convey.

"...South Carolina congressmen clutched at desperate remedies to save themselves from higher duties."
JYaAA1Q.jpg
 

cash

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And you did read why, right? They hoped to make the tariff bad enough that other sections would vote to reject it. It was strategy to defeat it, not support. Again, where was the "dominance" of government by the South? Why did they have to resort to these desperate measures if they were in control?

Let's look at the a few pages of context, to correct the impression you're trying to convey.
View attachment 270980

You are confusing South Carolina with the South as a whole. The South did dominate the Federal government, but South Carolina was only one state in the South, not the entire South.

I realize that might be distressing for a South Carolinian to hear, though. :wink:
 

cash

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You are confusing South Carolina with the South as a whole. The South did dominate the Federal government, but South Carolina was only one state in the South, not the entire South.

I realize that might be distressing for a South Carolinian to hear, though. :wink:
Additionally, Calhoun was using this as a vehicle to develop a tool to use in case slavery was ever threatened due to demographic changes at some point in the future that would make it possible for free states to threaten slavery in Congress.
 

WJC

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From the South Carolina secession documents:
"the cities of the South [are] provincial. Their growth is paralyzed; they are mere suburbs of Northern cities. The agricultural productions of the South are the basis of the foreign commerce of the United States; yet Southern cities do not carry it on. Our foreign trade, is almost annihilated."

Charleston Mercury, August 8, 1861:
"The North is fighting for money. It is fighting for its supremacy to rule and levy tribute upon us. Its all is based upon its connection with us--commerce, manufactures, industry and wealth of all sorts. The people of the North know it. Financial ruin for all times stares them in the face. They are staking all--life, blood, political liberty--all upon the hazard. They must have money."
Part of the 'sales job' to justify secession.
 

unionblue

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Not an accurate picture of the voting in Congress and who supported who.

Source please.

I'm not sure what "temper tantrum" you're inventing, but the tariff of 1832 was passed because the Southern delegation attempted to use some parliamentary maneuvers to stop it, which did not work out as intended.

No, it didn't go at all how the Southern delegation had planned it.

A good biography of John C. Calhoun will give you the details of how he attempted to stop the tariff and could not.

And a good telling of all the secret maneuvering of Calhoun during nullification and the tariff debate is in the book, The Road To Disunion, Part I, as I mentioned in my previous post and @cash has provided a major part from the book in his previous post.

Surely an odd thing to have happen given the "southern dominance" you insist existed for seven decades.

I don't "insist" such, @Andersonh1 , I merely report on the history of the time. I know it would make a more sympathetic story if the South was helpless and at the mercy of an evil North, but such was not the case and Southerners in government knew it.

The truth of the matter is that the South never dominated the government.

Flat out wrong. From the founding until the election of 1860, the South dominated the federal government.

"Who sat in the White House? The Speaker's chair? On the Supreme Court? The answer was that slavemasters had far more power than their numbers warranted. In the sixty-two years between Washington's election and the Compromise of 1850, for example, slaveholders controlled the presidency for fifty years, The Speaker's chair for forty-one years, and the chairmanship of House Ways and Means for forty-two years. The only men reelected president--Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Jackson--were all slaveholders. The men who sat in the Speaker's chair the longest--Henry Clay, Andrew Stevenson, and Nathaniel Macon--were slaveholders. Eighteen out of thirty-one Supreme Court justices were slaveholders."

Source: The Slave Power, pg. 9.

They always had a smaller population, with the possible exception of around 1800, and the gap grew larger as the decades rolled by.

As the above book, The Slave Power, will show, population was not the driving force behind the power held by the South in the federal government. Add in all of the appointments made by Southerners in government to cabinet positions, judgeships, postmasters, etc., and the reach of the South was quite extensive.

The only thing that kept them in the game was parity of numbers in the Senate.

Again, not true. The political power was far more spread and extensive than you propose.

They struggled to defend their interests, they did not "dominate" the government at all.
"Privately, however, James Henry Hammond dismissed as wishful thinking William H. Seward's prediction that the North would take the government and end the rule of the South. He also dismissed the notion that Lincoln's election meant the end of southern dominance. Lincoln's election was just a setback. The North, as Hammond saw it, lacked staying power, and thus the South, if united, would continue to dictate national policy. The notion that the South had only two choices--either to secede or accept an inferior position in the national government--was nonsense."

Source: the book, The Slave Power, chapter 8, pg. 214.

Unionblue
 

jgoodguy

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False in all aspects.

"The following year the friends of protection introduced a general tariff measure into Congress. The opposition, remembering that they had accomplished nothing by arguments in 1820, 1824, and 1827, now adopted a set of tactics which they may have learned from the history of the Woolens Bill. They offered amendments that were deliberately designed to make the bill highly objectionable. New England, whose opinion on previous tariffs had been divided, was the point of attack. Higher duties were placed on molasses, thereby injuring New England rum makers and those who imported molasses from the West Indies. Likewise, New England shippers, who preferred to outfit their vessels with Russian rather than with Kentucky hemp, were harmed by an increase in the duties on hemp. While piling these and other injuries upon New England, the relief asked by its woolen manufacturers was withheld." [Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848, pp. 186-187]

As Prof. Freehling tells us, "By keeping duties on raw wool at high levels, for example, southerners hoped to make the tariff obnoxious to woolen manufacturers. By maintaining high rates on foreign molasses, Carolinians hoped to force New England rum distillers to oppose the bill. Thus the South would vote with protection-minded producers of raw materials to keep high rates on nonindustrial products. Southerners would then vote with New England manufacturers to defeat the entire Bill of Abominations." [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, p. 137]

The South Carolinians planned to keep the rates high and they defeated most amendments that sought to lower the rates.

"Again and again, southern representatives voted against amendments to lower rates on raw materials. But enough northern Jacksonians, including such Van Burenites as Silas Wright, voted to lower enough of the duties so that industrialists managed to swallow the entire unseemly concoction. The tariff of 1828 was the law of the land, and South Carolinians were the authors of its worst abominations." [Ibid.]

Calhoun played a central, though behind the scenes role in the Nullification Crisis, beginning with the drafting of the Tariff of 1828.

"The natural pressure of public opinion on public men had exercised its effect in previous years, and had had its share in bringing about the tariff act of 1824 and the woolens bill of 1827. But the gradual crystallization of two parties, the [John Quincy] Adams and [Andrew] Jackson parties,—Whigs and Democrats, as they soon came to be called—put a new face on the political situation, and had an unexpected effect on tariff legislation. The contest between them had begun in earnest before the Harrisburg convention met, and some of the Jackson men alleged that the convention was no more than a demonstration got up by the Adams men as a means of bringing the protective movement to bear in their aid; but this was denied, and such evidence as we have seems to support the denial. Yet the Adams men were undoubtedly helped by the protective movement. Although there was not then, nor for a number of years after, a clear-cut division on party lines between protectionists and so-called free traders, the Adams men were more firmly and unitedly in favor of protection than their opponents. Adams was a protectionist, though not an extreme one; Clay, the leader and spokesman of the party, was more than any other public man identified with the American system. They were at least willing that the protective question should be brought into the foreground of the political contest.

"The position of the Jackson men, on the other hand, was a very difficult one. Their party had at this time no settled policy in regard to the questions which were to be the subjects of the political struggles of the next twenty years. They were united on only one point, a determination to oust the other side. On the tariff, as well as on the bank and internal improvements, the various elements of the party held very different opinions. The Southern members, who were almost to a man supporters of Jackson, were opposed unconditionally not only to an increase of duties, but to the high range which the tariff had already reached. They were convinced, and in the main justly convinced, that the taxes levied by the tariff fell with peculiar weight on the slave States, and their opposition was already tinged with the bitterness which made possible, a few years later, the attempt at nullification of the tariff of 1832. On the other hand, the protective policy was popular throughout the North, more especially in the very States whose votes were essential to Jackson, in New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. The Jackson men needed the votes of these States, and were not so confident of getting them as they might reasonably have been. They failed, as completely as their opponents, to gauge the strength of the enthusiasm of the masses for their candidate, and they did not venture to give the Adams men a chance of posing as the only true friends of domestic industry.

"The twentieth Congress met for its first session in December, 1827. The elections of 1826, at which its members were chosen, had not been fortunate for the administration. When Congress met there was some doubt as to the political complexion of the House; but this was set at rest by the election to the speakership of the Democratic candidate, Stephenson of Virginia. The new Speaker, in the formation of the committees, assumed for his party the direction of the measures of the House. On the committee on manufactures, from which the tariff report and the tariff bill were to come, he appointed five supporters of Jackson and two supporters of Adams. The chairmanship, however, was given to one of the latter, Mallary, of Vermont, who, it will be remembered, had been a member of the Harrisburg convention.

"Much doubt was entertained as to the line of action the committee would follow. The Adams men feared at first that it would adopt a policy of simple delay and inaction. This fear was confirmed when, a few weeks after the beginning of the session, the committee asked for power to send for persons and papers in order to obtain more information on the tariff,—a request which was opposed by Mallary, their chairman, on the ground that it was made only as a pretext for delay. The Adams men, who formed the bulk of the ardent protectionists, voted with him against granting the desired power. But the Southern members united with the Jackson men from the North, and between them they secured the passage of the resolution asked by the committee. The debate and vote on the resolution sounded the key-note of the events of the session. They showed that the Jackson men from the South and the North, though opposed to each other on the tariff question, were yet united as against the Adams men.

"But the policy of delay, if such in fact had been entertained by the opposition, was abandoned. On January 31st, the committee presented a report and a draft of a tariff bill, which showed that they had determined on a new plan, and an ingenious one. What that plan was, Calhoun explained very frankly nine years later, in a speech reviewing the events of 1828 and defending the course taken by himself and his Southern fellow members. A high-tariff bill was to be laid before the House. It was to contain not only a high general range of duties, but duties especially high on those raw materials on which New England wanted the duties to be low. It was to satisfy the protective demands of the Western and Middle States, and at the same time to be obnoxious to the New England members. The Jackson men of all shades, the protectionists from the North and the free-traders from the South, were to unite in preventing any amendments; that bill, and no other, was to be voted on. When the final vote came, the Southern men were to turn around and vote against their own measure. The New England men, and the Adams men in general, would be unable to swallow it, and would also vote against it. Combined, they would prevent its passage, even though the Jackson men from the North voted for it. The result expected was that no tariff bill at all would be passed during the session, which was the object of the Southern wing of the opposition. On the other hand, the obloquy of defeating it would be cast on the Adams party, which was the object of the Jacksonians of the North. The tariff bill would be defeated, and yet the Jackson men would be able to parade as the true 'friends of domestic industry.'

"The bill by which this ingenious solution of the difficulties of the opposition was to be reached, was reported to the House on January 31st by the committee on manufactures.79 To the surprise of its authors, it was eventually passed both by House and Senate, and became, with a few unessential changes, the tariff act of 1828." [F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, pp. 84-89]

"The Southern members openly said that they meant to make the tariff so bitter a pill that no New England member would be able to swallow it. When the final vote on the bill came, the groups of members split up in the way expected by the Democrats. The Southern members, practically without exception, voted against it. Those from the Middle and Western States voted almost unanimously for it. The Jackson men voted for their own measure for consistency’s sake; the Adams men from these States joined them, partly for political reasons, mainly because the bill, even with the obnoxious provisions, was acceptable to their constituents. Of the New England members, a majority, 23 out of 39, voted in the negative. The affirmative votes from New England, however, were sufficient, when added to those from the West and the Middle States, to ensure its passage. The bill accordingly passed the House.

"This result had not been entirely unexpected. The real struggle, it was felt, would come in the Senate, where the South and New England had a proportionately large representation. In previous years the Senate had maintained, in its action on the tariff bills of 1820 and 1824, a much more conservative position than the House. But in 1828 the course of events in the Senate was in the main similar to that in the House." [F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, pp. 97-98]

"Again and again, southern representatives voted against amendments to lower rates on raw materials. But enough northern Jacksonians, including such Van Burenites as Silas Wright, voted to lower enough of the duties so that industrialists managed to swallow the entire unseemly concoction. The tariff of 1828 was the law of the land, and South Carolinians were the authors of its worst abominations.

"Calhounites later claimed that Van Buren was in on their conspiracy and had betrayed them. Van Buren always denied the accusation and Calhoun never proved it; the debacle was probably a southern plot which backfired rather than a sabotaged Jacksonian stratagem." [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, pp. 137-138]

"The protest against the so-called Tariff of Abominations grew particularly strong in South Carolina, and in response to a request from the state legislature, Calhoun secretly wrote an essay titled 'South Carolina Exposition and Protest.' In it, he asserted that states had a constitutional right to nullify any federal government actions they considered unconstitutional. Calhoun had become the chosen mouthpiece for Southern rights." [Ethan S. Rafuse, "He Started the Civil War," Civil War Times, Vol XLI, No. 5, October, 2002, pp. 26-27]

The reason they manufactured the Nullification Crisis was to protect slavery.

"Many clauses of the Constitution, if interpreted with the slightest latitude, gave Congress at least the power to debate slavery. If Congress can appropriate money for anything it deems in the general welfare, William Smith liked to ask, why can't a northern majority appropriate funds to abolish slavery?" [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina 1816-1836, p. 111]

"In 1827 the American Colonization Society dispatched a petition to Congress which inaugurated its campaign for a federal appropriation. . . . to tidewater aristocrats, the colonization petition seemed the fatal 'entering wedge' which, if not met at the 'threshold,' would clear the way for abolition. A colonization appropriation would set the vital constitutional precedent, for if Congress could promote the general welfare by colonizing free Negroes, it could also promote the general welfare by freeing Negro slaves. 'The only safety of the Southern States,' Hayne argued, 'is to be found in the want of power on the part of the Federal Government to touch the subject at all.' " [Ibid., p. 122]

"If the majority could use 'the right of laying duties, not only to raise revenue, but to regulate the industry of the country,' warned Calhoun, taxes could be employed to further 'any purpose that the majority may think to be for the general welfare.' Encouragement could be offered 'to the Colonization Society, as well as to cotton and woolen manufacturers.' Indeed, the constitutional precedent set by the tariff of 1828 might lend authority to a direct assault on slavery itself." [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, p. 139]

The nullifiers, Calhoun included, then, had decided "to fight the abolitionists indirectly by contending against the tariff." [William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, p. 257]

"President Jackson also recognized slavery as the real issue. Following the settlement of the nullification controversy he wrote to a friend that 'the tariff was only the pretext, and disunion and a southern confederacy the real object. The next pretext will be the negro or slavery question.'" [Herman V. Ames, "John C. Calhoun and the Secession Movement of 1850," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, New Series, Vol 28, Part 1, April, 1918, p. 20]

Robert J. Turnbull, a South Carolina low country planter and pamphleteer, wrote a series of essays called The Crisis. Turnbull believed tariffs and internal improvements were dangerous because "acquiescence in these measures, on the part of the State sovereignties, sanctions . . . the constitutional right to legislate on the local concerns of the States." ". . . these words 'general welfare' are becoming every day more and more important to the folks, who are now so peacably raising their cotton and rice, between the Little Pedee and the Savannah. The question, it must be recollected, is not simply, whether we are to have a foreign commerce. It is not whether we are to have splendid national works, in which we have no interest, executed chiefly at our cost. . . . It is not whether we are to be taxed without end. . . . But the still more interesting question is, whether the institutions of our forefathers . . . are to be preserved . . . free from the rude hands of innovators and enthusiasts, and from the molestation or interference of any legislative power on earth but our own?" [Robert J. Turnbull, "The Crisis," pp. 12-14, 64, 139 quoted in William J. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, p. 127]

The attack on the tariff was in reality, then, an indirect defense of the institution of slavery.

Calhoun himself discounted the tariff as the real cause of the Nullification Crisis:

"I consider the Tariff, but as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of things. The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar domestick [sic] institutions of the Southern States, and the consequent direction which that and her soil and climate have given to her industry, has placed them in regard to taxation and appropriation in opposite relation to the majority of the Union; against the danger of which, if there be no protective power in the reserved rights of the states, they must in the end be forced to rebel, or submit to have . . . their domestick [sic] institutions exhausted by Colonization and other schemes, and themselves & children reduced to wretchedness." [John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, 11 Sep 1830]

The Nullification Controversy was more about protecting slavery than anything else:

"The same doctrines 'of the general welfare' which enable the general government to tax our industry for the benefit of the industries of other sections of this Union, and to appropriate the common treasure to make roads and canals for them, would authorize the federal government to erect the peaceful standard of servile revolt, by establishing colonization offices in our State, to give the bounties for emancipation here, and transportation to Liberia afterwards. The last question follows our giving up the battle on the other two, as inevitably as light flows from the sun." [James Hamilton to John Taylor, 14 Sep 1830]
Lots of good information!
 

jgoodguy

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OpnCoronet

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If the south "dominated" the government, how did we end up with the Tariff crisis in 1832? Surely they could just "dominate" the voting and ensure such a tariff never happened.


The South was dominant, only in ref. to the protection of slavery in Congress. On other issues the South was no more united on political, social and economic issues than North, i.e.c, the were willing to negotiate and compromise over them, across sectional lines.

Would there have been a Constitution without undemocratic compromises in it demanded by SC and other southern states? Why were slaves counted as property, yet be counted as being more than half a whiteman in determining state delegates to Congress, Why was the country sectionalized in 1820, Why were citizen's in free states subject to arbitrary arrest or, even kidnapping and transported across state lines according to the laws of another state in 1850, why was Texas being brought into the Union as a Slave State, considered by John C. Calhoun as his greatest achievement of his public service?
 



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