The Overland Campaign

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wausaubob

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Grant had an advantage in the Merrimack was not a factor during the Overland Campaign. Also, Grant was much more attuned to keeping his water borne logistics within the navigable range of the US squadron. Lee never wanted to fight in the zone in which the gunboats could operate.
Two things about the Overland Operation: Grant was moving towards reinforcements, and Grant knew from McClellan's experience, how the rivers could sustain US logistics.
 

wausaubob

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While Lee stymied Grant's attempt to capture Richmond, nonetheless the Army finally detached a force sufficient to support Farragut. By late July, S. Phillips Lee created the three tiered blockade of Wilmington, and Farragut's attack squadron closed Mobile Bay in the first week of August. Grant maximized his pressure on the fading railroad system of the Confederacy and gradually drained the Confederate ability to forage its horses and mules in Virginia.
Thus the evidence supports the conclusion that Grant preferred to go back to basics and closed the smuggler's ports and go back to breaking up the Confederate RR system, one branch at a time.
 
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Wausaubob
One should not dismiss the Confederate Ironclad Fleet of several vessels at Richmond plus a few gunboats and torpedo boats. Grant was certainly concern enough before crossing over the James that he ordered Butler to construct a mass river obstruction, in the James, near upper end of Bermuda Hundred fortress. It was covered by heavy rifled artillery emplacements and several powerful river monitors. Butler had a brown water Army of James fleet and there was the US Naval fleet in the James River. They worked well together to keep the water supply line open. They worried over the threat the Confederates may move a torpedo boat(s) overland to a stream to launch down it into the James River downstream. A torpedo boat night attack could be deadly and difficult to stop. They worried about a massive breakout by the Confederate Ironclad Fleet which later was attempted by the Confederates.

Another point I wish to make is how much Ben Butler/Army of the James assisted Grant/Meade in the area of “logistical control” and “power of mobility”. While Lee believed he had Grant/Meade confined in a limited area at and near the time of Cold Harbor, Grant simply turned the table, by accepting the Army of James supply depot at City Point, on the James River, which was already constructed with depot/dock and defensive works, completed by Ben Butler/Army of James. In a grand engineering feat, Ben Butler/Army of James caused a massive pontoon bridge to appear in hours, which allowed Grant/Meade to cross over the James River, without any molestation from an enemy force. Lastly, the Bermuda Hundred fortress and related river forces, allowed the protection for Grant/Meade to safety deploy and recover south of the James, from the heavy rate of attrition suffered in the grinding Overland Campaign. What wonderful gifts all provided by Ben Butler/Army of James.
 
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leftyhunter

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Not to sidetrack the discussion with this, but since the Union strategy involved more than just the Overland Campaign as noted, I thought I would respectfully "pick a nit" with respect to the implication of Grant directing Sherman against Atlanta specifically.
With Grant having been named General-in-Chief of all the Federal armies and Sherman assuming command in the west, the plan for the 1864 campaign was that all Federal armies move simultaneously against the forces of the Confederacy, as previously discussed. While Grant engaged Lee in Virginia, his instructions to Sherman in a letter dated April 4, 1864 reads in part:

"You I propose to move against Johnston’s army [the Army of Tennessee], to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources."

"I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations."

In his reply to Grant on April 10, Sherman affirmed his mission as being “to knock Jos. Johnston, and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible.” Although this seems in accordance with Grant’s instructions, we find, in examining the specifics of what Sherman proposed to do, that he actually violated the spirit, if not the letter, of Grant’s directives. Sherman, instead of striving to “knock” Johnston and break up his army, would merely try to maneuver him into retreating south of the Chattahoochee River, at which point, as he also tells Grant in his April 10 letter, he will send cavalry to cut the railroad between Atlanta and Montgomery and then “feign to the right, but pass to the left and act against Atlanta or its eastern communications, according to developed facts.” Thus it is clear that Sherman’s primary objective was, contrary to the clear meaning of Grant’s instructions, not Johnston’s army, but Atlanta.

This subtle shift in priorities probably reflected, at least in part, Sherman’s dislike of battles, which he tended to regard as dangerously unpredictable in outcome. However, the main reason was his belief that Grant’s Virginia offensive would be the “principal” one, and that his own campaign would be “secondary.” Thus Sherman saw his top-priority task as preventing Johnston from reinforcing Lee, not necessarily defeating Johnston’s army in pitched battle.
In 20/20 hindsight wasn't Sherman correct? After the heavy loss's at Shiloh one could argue that Sherman wished to avoid head on battles if at all possible.
Leftyhunter
 

James N.

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In 20/20 hindsight wasn't Sherman correct? After the heavy loss's at Shiloh one could argue that Sherman wished to avoid head on battles if at all possible.
Leftyhunter
Too bad for his men he didn't stick to that idea at Kennesaw Mountain! (Also, Pickett's Mill and Dallas too.)
 
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jackt62

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Too bad for his men he didn't stick to that idea at Kennesaw Mountain! (Also, Pickett's Mill and Dallas too.)
Except Sherman, like Grant at Cold Harbor, was running out of time and space to continue with flanking movements around the enemy force. Both commanders ordered direct assaults as a desperation move in the hope that a successful assault would indeed vanquish the enemy. Of course, this did not happen.
 
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