The most important action at Gettysburg?

Oh, brother. Seriously? This myth is still around? What Spencer rifles?

I have personally reviewed the ordnance returns of the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps for June 30, 1863, and of the 92% of Buford's companies that reported, there was not one single Spencer rifle reported. Not one. The vast majority of his troopers were armed with Sharps single-shot carbines. The rest were armed with similar weapons, such as the Burnside, Ballard, Starr and Gallagher single-shot carbines.

The only Spencer rifles in the entire Army of the Potomac were all of the 5th Michigan Cavalry and four companies of the 6th Michigan Cavalry of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade, and they were nowhere near Gettysburg on July 1.

The steadfast refusal of this obnoxious myth to die drives me nuts. Absolutely insane.

And yes, it is the same Hill.
I wonder where the whole "Buford's brigades were armed with Spencer's" rumor got started. Was there a specific historian who erroneously documented that statement, and it just stuck? And apparently that false rumor is still floating around out there...
 
Meade on the night of the first held council with his commanders ,did they suggest that the army retreat or did they suggest that the army remain as was?Question; If Reynolds was not facing the forces he was ,would Meade have sought a different field of battle? I give credit to Meade not leaving the field to Lee,and to Buford for the actions he did as to setting the battle into play.


Meade's Pipe Creek Circular, does not suggest a general retreat or advance. It merely concentrates the Army of the Potomac into an easily defensible position, to await further developments

The Circular was obsolete even before most of his corps commanders had received it.

The only retreat available to Meade was to withdraw Reynolds and his 3 corps from the vicinity of Vicksburg
 
I wonder where the whole "Buford's brigades were armed with Spencer's" rumor got started. Was there a specific historian who erroneously documented that statement, and it just stuck? And apparently that false rumor is still floating around out there...

Unfortunately, Shelby Foote says it. So does Ed Longacre.
 
Given that there is a vast amount of information on Gettysburg, how about adding your impressions to a Brit's understanding of the battle? I've read loads on the battle recently and I'd be interested to hear your views on the most important single element to the battle. Chamberlain's defence? Failure to co-ordinate attacks around Pickett's charge? The actions at East Cavalry Field? Buford's determined stand? I'd love to hear your views!

I just finished reading a small paperback - published in Britain and part of a series called Battleground America Guides - which I reviewed here last week https://civilwartalk.com/threads/mcphersons-ridge-by-steven-h-newton.137371/ . In it the author makes a good case that the most important event was likely the successive but agreeing decision and determination by the original three Union commanders Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday to fight at Gettysburg in the first place.
 
I just finished reading a small paperback - published in Britain and part of a series called Battleground America Guides - which I reviewed here last week https://civilwartalk.com/threads/mcphersons-ridge-by-steven-h-newton.137371/ . In it the author makes a good case that the most important event was likely the successive but agreeing decision and determination by the original three Union commanders Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday to fight at Gettysburg in the first place.

This is an interesting view, which I share, but in a bit different manner: It takes two to tango. And if Lee did not decide to fight at Gettysburg, after the Federals got the best positions, but moved west to the better position of the South Mountain to fight a defensive battle, Gettysburg would had not happened. So I think that Lee's decision to fight there an offensive battle while the opponent had the better ground was more critical...
 
Given that there is a vast amount of information on Gettysburg, how about adding your impressions to a Brit's understanding of the battle? I've read loads on the battle recently and I'd be interested to hear your views on the most important single element to the battle. Chamberlain's defence? Failure to co-ordinate attacks around Pickett's charge? The actions at East Cavalry Field? Buford's determined stand? I'd love to hear your views!
Hancocks report to mead via messenger to mead that Gettysburg was a place to fight a battle. Regardless of any of Bufford or Reynolds actions, doubleday,Howard, etc. The report Hancock sent to mead based on his assessment, not only of the results of the fighting, but also of the nature of the ground being favorable to the federal forces determined in the end to make up meads mind to concentrate there. Regardless of what happened prior, a negative report from Hancock reinforces meads decision to retire to pipe creek
 
The best action was Oliver Otis Howard taking command of the field on July 1st..If the Confederates had not soundly thrashed his a**, I think they wouldn't have been so complacent about pushing what was left of the XI and I Corps off the high ground. Afterall, A.P. Hill had a whole uncommitted division he could have probably sealed the deal with after the Union rout through the town, but he was satisfied with the success thus far achieved for the day and decided to stand down.
 
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I'm going to add one more "moment" -- on July 1st -- which is the moment Hancock and the first parts of II Corp arrives, taking over battlefield control and correctly finishing what Buford had started and Howard was busy losing, that is the defense of the high grounds east and south of Gettysburg (underlining mine): His after-action report states, "... Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh Corps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position. They pushed forward a line of battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery... (from http://www.civilwarhome.com/hancockgettysburg.html)" He then describes setting up much of the defense used during the remainder of the day and evening that held for the next two days despite many other difficulties and blunders by other Union commanders.
 
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This is an interesting view, which I share, but in a bit different manner: It takes two to tango. And if Lee did not decide to fight at Gettysburg, after the Federals got the best positions, but moved west to the better position of the South Mountain to fight a defensive battle, Gettysburg would had not happened. So I think that Lee's decision to fight there an offensive battle while the opponent had the better ground was more critical...
Excellent point my friend!
 
Rather old thread but imo the single most important element of the battle was Cemetery hill. Cemetery hill is overshadowed nowadays due to movies like Gettysburg and the focus on Little Round Top and the 20th Maine, but Cemetery hill was the centerpiece of the battle. Cemetery hill is what controls the field and was the reason Lee wanted Ewell to capture it and the reason the Union defended it so fiercely.
 
Rather old thread but imo the single most important element of the battle was Cemetery hill. Cemetery hill is overshadowed nowadays due to movies like Gettysburg and the focus on Little Round Top and the 20th Maine, but Cemetery hill was the centerpiece of the battle. Cemetery hill is what controls the field and was the reason Lee wanted Ewell to capture it and the reason the Union defended it so fiercely.
And author David G. Martin in his Gettysburg - July 1 makes it plain just how well-manned Cemetery Hill was by the end of the day, largely due to that otherwise lackluster general, Oliver Howard whose command post was there. As I recall, he puts no less than forty guns in position there just waiting to blast any Confederate effort to assault it!
 
My take on this discussion obviously revolves around my own interest and research on the 2nd Mississippi. I think the Union's success in blunting the attacks by both Archer and Davis at the opening of the battle were critical to the battle's final outcome. But I often wonder if the 11th Mississippi hadn't been guarding the division wagon train and had instead been with Davis, if that would have been enough to tip the balance at the Railroad Cut. Just one of a million "what ifs"...
 
My take on this discussion obviously revolves around my own interest and research on the 2nd Mississippi. I think the Union's success in blunting the attacks by both Archer and Davis at the opening of the battle were critical to the battle's final outcome. But I often wonder if the 11th Mississippi hadn't been guarding the division wagon train and had instead been with Davis, if that would have been enough to tip the balance at the Railroad Cut. Just one of a million "what ifs"...
I agree with you about how important the early action in McPhersons Woods & the Railroad Cut were. Without that early success, I don't think Gettysburg is more than a skirmish with the main battle fought somewhere closer to Meade's Pipe Creek line.
 
And author David G. Martin in his Gettysburg - July 1 makes it plain just how well-manned Cemetery Hill was by the end of the day, largely due to that otherwise lackluster general, Oliver Howard whose command post was there. As I recall, he puts no less than forty guns in position there just waiting to blast any Confederate effort to assault it!
I'm just reading Pula's account in Under the Crescent Moon now. Also some interesting information & conclusions there.
 
I'm just reading Pula's account in Under the Crescent Moon now. Also some interesting information & conclusions there.

Most people don't appreciate how hard the Eleventh Corps fought on July 1. There are an awful lot of missing on their casualty lists, many of whom have no records dating from after the battle which suggests that they died on the field. They were simply placed into a terrible position (thank you Francis Barlow) with no support.

Ryan
 
As far as the battle itself, I usually look to Gen. Reynolds' decision to engage Lee's invasion force at Gettysburg, and call for Meade to move the AoP up to Gettysburg to support his decision, rather than just reporting his contact and falling back to Meade's planned MLR at Pipe Creek.

He had no particular orders or instructions to involve the AoP in a major battle at Gettysburg, especially in light of Meade's recent call to concentrate his army at Pipe Creek.
 
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