The Mine Run Campaign

Pat
The majority of the Union cavalry was left at the river to check any possible counter strike there or to guard trains. (see Opord).
Stuart was fairly free to operate as he chose against a single division of Union cavalry. Seemingly another poor consideration on Meade's part. By this point in the war the superiority of Stuart's troopers was pretty much a given. Allowing him to run free seems an oversight.
Dan
The obvious, beautifully stated. :wink:
 
Conclusion and Assessment
After seven days of ineffectual campaign the Army of the Potomac was withdrawn in failure. The decisive battle against Lee's forces, so sought after by the administration, was not to be. The closest thing to a set piece confrontation was a large meeting engagement fought at the Corps level at Payne's Farm. The combined losses for the campaign barely register in the human carnage that was the Civil War. This is not to say that the campaign did not have important consequences for the Union war effort. Three reasons why the failed campaign at Mine Run is important:

-Already disillusioned with the course of the war in the east Lincoln took the failure here as justification to bring in someone new to write the equation that would make the "horrible arithmetic" work. U. S. Grant was given overall command of the Union armies.

-Disgusted with the cumbersome command network, Meade led a reorganization of the Army of the Potomac that reduced the number of Corps from 5 to 3.

-Most important this campaign served as the model for the beginning of Grant's Overland Campaign that would eventually achieve the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia.

The reasons for the disappointing outcome are many but can be characterized in two categories. First is leadership. Meade made an interesting and as it turned out fatal choice to lead the most important portion of his movement. French was the least experienced Corps commander available, yet was given the lead of the column closest to the enemy. Everything depended on the success of his move and he failed miserably. Meade can also be held responsible to a certain extent for this failure. When French became moribund with indecision Meade made no effort to take personal control although he was only a short distance away. Second the Union leaders, particularly, French and Warren, failed to ensure that the most basic element of military operations was done effectively.

Reconnaissance is the foundation of all military movements, yet it went ignored by French. For his part Warren determined a course of action based on an incomplete set of information. A continued reconnaissance would have revealed Hill?s troops moving into the area of his proposed attack. He did manage to save himself from disaster with a last minute second look. It should not have taken a personal effort to learn of this development. While Lee never lacked for intelligence on the Union movements from the very beginning of the campaign everything he did seemed to surprise Meade. Failure here represented a misuse of his cavalry. Reorganization here would be high on the list of things to do when Grant took over.

Meade was not the only one disappointed in the outcome of the campaign. Despite foiling Meade's plan Lee was angry when his own plan for a flank attack on the AoP on December 1st found only empty trenches. Lee placed all the blame for the lost opportunity on himself stating; "I am too old to command this army. We should have never let those people get away!" The Battle of Mine Run turned out to be, as one commentator put it, the greatest battle never fought.
 
Bibliography
OR’s - Volume XXIX Chapter XLL
Meade, George; Lee, Robert E.; Newton, John; French, William; Sedgwick, John; Warren, Gouverneur; Sykes, George: Gregg, David; Stuart, J.E.B.; Lockwood, Jonathan; Sawyer, Franklin; Webb, Alexander; Carroll, Samuel; Hays, Harry; Early, Jubal; Stewart, Gordon; Daniel, Junius; Smith, T. McGehee; Brabble, Edmund; Owens, William; Smith Edward; Hampton, Wade; Gordon, James; Rosser, Thomas; Young, Pierce; Kester, John



The Mine Run Campaign – An Operational Analysis of MG George G. Meade, LTC Kavin L. Coughenour
Mine Run – A Fight of Courageous Choices, Daniel T. Kuehl, Washington Times, 01Nov2003
History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, Samuel P. Bates
The Longest Night, David Eicher
The Sword of Lincoln, Jeffery Wert
The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide, John S. Salmon

http://www.nps.gov/frsp/mine.htm
http://www.stonewallbrigade.com/paynesfarm_history.html
http://civilwarlandscapes.org/cwla/states/va/mrc/mrcf.htm
http://www.usa-civil-war.com/Mine_Run/mine_run.html
http://blueandgraytrail.com/event/Mine_Run_Campaign

Other internet resources used to verify biographical and other details.
 
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