The Mine Run Campaign

Germanna Ford II

North bank of the Rapidan The 50th NY laid down two pontoon bridges about 50 yards to the east upriver.

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The south bank of the Rapidan. Note the steep banks that needed leveling. No that is not Brad Pitt but me to illustrate the bank exceeds my six feet height. Jacobs Ford was pretty much the same but a bit wider. It is private property so er couldn't enter.

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Jacob Ford

This is the road from the south bank of the Rapidan where French's Corps marched. By Civil War standards, this was a very good secondary road Some modern gravel marks the only difference since 1863.

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CWO3 demonstrates that the road is about eight feet wide. Wagons and artillery could only go single file.

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Locust Grove

Intersection of the Racoon Ford Road and the Orange Plank Road. Rodes was facing Warren about 100 yards to the east (right side where a historical marker can be seen) French was on the Racoon Ford Road about a half mile away and would have taken Rodes from his rear and maybe "bagged" the entire division.

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Notice the almost total absence of cars.
 
Johnson's assault on French

Johnson was going to Rodes support when he spotted French along the Racoon Ford Road maybe 100 yards from the Orange Plank Road. His division came out of the treeline on right and across the Fields of the Payne Farm. The treeline, fields and road are pretty much as they were in NOV 1863

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Left flank of Johnson's assault. The Orange Plank Road and Locust Grove is at the end of the treeline in the bright sunlight. Maybe 150 yards away. French came that close to bagging Rodes and maybe Johnson/Expired Image Removed

More T'mrrow
 
Thanks Pat! I hope that these pictures give the readers a better idea of what constraints there was to movement during thaat phase of the campaign.
Dan
 
Brad Pitt!!!

Pat,

Thanks for posting the pictures.

Just a reminder, in the U.S. Army its CW3 (Chief Warrant 3), I believe the USMC uses the full short title of CWO3 (Chief Warrant Officer 3). In my case, I retired as a CW3 and my last name begins with O, resulting in CW3O, vice CWO3.
 
Pat,

Thanks for posting the pictures.

Just a reminder, in the U.S. Army its CW3 (Chief Warrant 3), I believe the USMC uses the full short title of CWO3 (Chief Warrant Officer 3). In my case, I retired as a CW3 and my last name begins with O, resulting in CW3O, vice CWO3.

Roger that Chief
 
Great pictures. Hard to believe the roads were so narrow. Thanks for posting.

Lee
 
New Hope Church
On the far left of the Union move across the Rapidan River MG George Sykes experienced none of the problems that plagued French and Warren. His Corps was in place at Culpeper Mine Ford by 1030 and across by noon. He was then held up by Meade's order to await developments at Jacob's Ford. On the morning of the 27th he moved down the Orange Plank road with Gregg's cavalry division in the lead until they struck Confederate cavalry pickets in the vicinity of New Hope Church.

MG J. E. B. Stuart's plan to contest passage of the road got off to a disappointing start. Hampton's Brigade did not appear at the rally point until 0900 causing Stuart to remark in his report; "The enemy was enabled, therefore, to make much more progress than he could have done had we by prompt and vigorous move met him early on the 27th."

BG James Gordon's Brigade of North Carolina cavalry took the lead and advanced until it met Colonel John Taylor's pickets, comprised of two squadrons from the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry and one squadron from the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry. The meeting engagement evolved into what Stuart called "an unequal contest which was greatly aggravated by deficiency in ammunition for carbines and rifles." With both sides fighting on foot due to the "peculiar undergrowth" the Confederate troopers were driven back by the combined efforts of the growing Union strength. Elements of the 3rd PA, 1st PA, 1st MA, and 1st NJ regiments and two sections of guns combined to push Stuart's forces back about a mile. At about 1500 the engagement became "very warm" and the Union advance ran into MG Heth's Confederate infantry being brought up to support the hard pressed Southern troopers.

Heth's vanguard, BG H. H. Walker's Brigade of Virginians, threw out skirmishers in an effort to clear away Union skirmishers and enable the deployment of artillery. After "several unsuccessful attempts" Heth realized that the firepower advantage of the Federal carbines could not be overcome without an increased effort. Heth rode to the rear to seek approval from his Corps commander, Lt Gen A. P. Hill, for a general advance. Unable to locate Hill, Heth happened onto General Lee who approved an advance by the entire division. With that Heth arranged his men in a three brigade front. Walker's Brigade in the center flanked by Kirkland's Brigade of North Carolinians (under command of Colonel T. C. Singletary ) on the right and BG J. R. Davis' Brigade on the left. BG J. R. Cooke's Brigade of Tar Heels made up the reserve. While inspecting the disposition of his forces, Heth found Singletary a half mile too far to the right, but while correcting Singletary's position the other two brigades managed to accomplish the "original design" of the attack. Artillery was emplaced but the hour was growing late and Heth once again went to the rear to get guidance. He met with Hill and Lee and it was determined that no further advance would be made.

On the Federal side MG Sykes V Corps infantry relieved the Union cavalry and the "enemy became quiet and made no further demonstration." Sykes also sought guidance from his higher headquarters. Meade, concerned over the separation of his Corps, directed Sykes not to advance beyond the intersection of Raccoon Ford Road and the Orange Plank Road. With that the action here died down for the night.
 
New Hope Church

The modern church was built on the footprint of old church which was Sykes headquarters

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The Confederates broke out of the treeline on the left

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Parker's Store
The ever aggressive Southern cavalry commander MG J. E. B. Stuart was not content to wait out the developing stalemate between the infantry forces. He joined Rosser's Brigade of cavalry and circled the far left of the Union line looking for an opportunity to strike in the Federal rear. Near Parker's Store two regiments of Gregg's Union cavalry were located by a reconnaissance of the 4th Virginia Cavalry as they were being provisioned by the Union supply train. Stuart wasted no time moving on the plump target.

BG Thomas Rosser arrived with his brigade at noon "unobserved by the enemy." Captain Hatcher, commanding the advance of the 7th Virginia Cavalry, "dashed upon the pickets and killed or captured them all." The removal of the Union pickets gave some warning and the first attempt at attacking the camp failed. The lead units were "thrown into confusion" by sharpshooters placed in the thick underbrush. Undeterred Rosser mounted a heavier attack. The 35th Virginia and the 12th Virginia combined to overwhelm the Federal troopers who retreated into the Wilderness. Rosser reported that the attack "captured a good many arms and equipments, horses and mules, and three wagons."

BG David Gregg reacted swiftly to the news of the attack. He ordered three regiments from his 2nd Brigade along with a section of guns from the 4th US Battery to counter-attack. The Union reinforcements pushed Rosser back into a nearby railroad cut. The predicament grew serious for Rosser's men until Hampton arrived with Gordon's North Carolina Brigade and Young's South Carolina Brigade to stabilize the situation.
It was another clear display of Southern leadership acting on their own initiative to confound Union efforts. Hampton had been left by Stuart with no word about his intentions other than he planned on attacking the enemy with Rosser's troopers. He deemed it proper to follow Stuart's line of march without orders in the event that his assistance should be required. Hearing the gunfire at Parker's Store Hampton rushed to the aid of the beleaguered Rosser. The 2nd North Carolina supported by elements of the 5th North Carolina attacked the Federal left and the Cobb and Phillip's Legions of Young's brigade dismounted to attack the right. The accurate fire of a single gun from Hart's Battery, the only piece that could be advanced over a poor bridge helped disperse the Federals. Rosser's badly disorganized brigade was ordered into a small nearby field to reorganize and wait. A report of Union infantry advancing on the position caused Stuart to order a withdraw before any further action could be taken, however.

The small engagement at Parker's Store accounted for 106 Federal losses (8k, 43w, 55m) and approximately 25 Confederate losses (5k, 18w, 1m). Rosser's initial report included the destruction of 35-40 wagons (although most were probably burned by their teamster's to prevent use by the Confederates). Nevertheless, their loss was a significant blow to Meade's logistics.
 
Parker's Store
Sorry no pix. The store is still there in its isolated glory.

Is there an official policy somewhere about what is included in the Mine Run Campaign? I have seen this fight both as part of the campaign as as a seperate issue.
 
Pat
As far as I know there is no such policy. However since this action involved troops that were taking part in the overall movement to support Meade's campaign plan I chose to include it here.
Is there a possibilty that others actions in the area may be confused with this? The Overland Campaign went right through the same general area.
Dan
 
Pat
As far as I know there is no such policy. However since this action involved troops that were taking part in the overall movement to support Meade's campaign plan I chose to include it here.

I think that it was more or less unconnected with the main part of the campaign which causes the in or out. Since it was part of the movement, I think it should be included in the campaignn.

Was this the bulk of cavalry action in this campaign?
 
Pat
The majority of the Union cavalry was left at the river to check any possible counter strike there or to guard trains. (see Opord).
Stuart was fairly free to operate as he chose against a single division of Union cavalry. Seemingly another poor consideration on Meade's part. By this point in the war the superiority of Stuart's troopers was pretty much a given. Allowing him to run free seems an oversight.
Dan
 
Decision Day
When the sun set on the 27th a frustrated Meade altered his alignment to close the gaps created by the stalled III Corps. Sedgwick's VI Corps was moved around French and took up positions on the right of Warren who held the center. Newton's I Corps was brought forward from their reserve position behind Sykes and filled the gap on Warren's left. At first light the whole line moved forward to find the Confederate positions abandoned and the ANV occupying a new line on the west bank of Mine Run.

Reconnaissance of the new Confederate position revealed that it was well chosen. To attack the line would require crossing 1,000 yards of open terrain and scaling the banks of the heavily defended creek. Despite the obvious disadvantages Meade moved his army into position for a direct confrontation with Lee. Heavy rains and colder temperatures retarded the preparation as many men began to suffer the effects of hypothermia. The delays gave Warren a chance to prepare an alternate plan. Warren suggested that the AoP be shifted to the left to take advantage of terrain better suited to the attack.
Meade jumped at the proposal as the only viable option to frontal assault. He reinforced Warren with BG Henry Terry's division of VI Corps and ordered him to threaten Lee's right and find a point of attack that promised some chance of success. The other Corps commanders were instructed to look to their fronts for any weak points that could be successfully assaulted.

During the night V and VI Corps troops were shifted into position, marching ten miles through the forest to arrive on Lee's right. At a command conference held at 2200 Warren reported that Lee's right lay open and if he was further reinforced he could overrun the defenses there. Meade strengthened Warren again with two of Newton's divisions and ordered the assault to begin at 0800 with a one hour artillery barrage. Supporting attacks would be made by I Corps and the remainder of III Corps to hold Confederate forces in place. Warren returned to his command confident of success but leaving nothing to chance decided to conduct a last minute personal reconnaissance. Moving up to the Union picket line in the dark Warren found that the line he thought vulnerable had been transformed. The Confederate line now consisted of a formable set of trenches and breastworks fronted by an abatis, hastily constructed by Hill's Corps who had been shifted to counter the Union threat. By his estimation his troops would be exposed to eight minutes of artillery and rifle fire just to reach the enemy position. He decided to cancel the assault. Other commanders were reaching the same conclusion. One 1st Minnesota soldier told his division commander, BG Alexander Hays,
"...we can't get more than two thirds of the way up the hill."

Newton's troops had "very gallantly effected a lodgment on the other side, under sharp fire of the enemy, losing in killed and wounded about 40 men." With a crossing point secured Newton had four bridges constructed in anticipation of the attack. At 0300 the position was determined to be untenable and was withdrawn, destroying the bridges as they moved back.Warren called off the attack by his men but word of the decision did not reach Meade's headquarters before the artillery barrage commenced. The bombardment lasted 50 minutes before Meade was informed of Warren's decision. Explaining the courageous move to Meade, Warren stated "I would sooner sacrifice my commission" than proceed with the planned attack. The temperamental Meade's initial reaction was outrage and anger. He rode to Warren's headquarters and met with the Corps commander between 1000 and 1100. After looking at the situation for himself he was forced to conclude that Warren had made the correct decision and returned to his headquarters where French foolishly attempted to chastise Meade for having faith in Warren, who he called that "beardless boy". Although Meade's reaction to this taunting went unrecorded it can be easily assumed that French took the brunt of his legendary temper.

Meade had little choice but to order a retreat. Once again Halleck refused to allow him to move back towards Fredericksburg. He was given the option of a line at the Rappahannock or the Rapidan. Meade chose the Rapidan line so that any new opportunity that might afford itself could be more easily taken advantage of. By December 2 the Union Army was back where it started from, on the north bank of the Rapidan River. The campaign was over. The two armies went into winter camp and remained there until spring.
 
Mine Run Creek

Mine Run where the original road and and bridge stood. Note the Trace of the old road between the two trrs on left and along the fallen tree

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Looking over Mine Run towards ANV Position. These were prepared positions with trench lines easily followed in the woods. Much of this was open fields then

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Looking towards Vth Corps line on ridge. A Federal assault would mean traversing about a mile over open fields and fording the creek
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Looking again towardsConferate line, Can you spot old road trace on right? Hint: look between Mine Run sign and power lines.

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That's it for pix. These battlefield areas are virtually untouched. Not a monument, visitor center, tee shirt store within ten miles. Visit before "preservation" destroys the untouched area.
 
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