The Line of Battle

AUG

Major
Retired Moderator
Joined
Nov 20, 2012
Location
Texas
Out of personal interest and to better visualize what battles looked like I have been collecting any accounts or excerpts I run across describing how an infantry line of battle actually fought - whether standing, kneeling, lying down, from behind cover (trees, rocks, etc., not counting when in fortifications or earthworks), in closed ranks or more spread out. Of course it often varied depending on the circumstances and the unit.

If anyone knows of any other accounts then feel free to add them.



Berry Benson, 1st South Carolina Infantry:

A battle is entered into, mostly, in as good order and with as close a drill front as the nature of the ground will permit, but at the first "pop! pop!" of the rifles there comes a sudden loosening of the ranks, a freeing of selves from impediment of contact, and every man goes to fighting on his own hook; firing as, and when he likes, and reloading as fast as he fires. He takes shelter wherever he can find it, so he does not get too far away from his Co., and his officers will call his attention to this should he move too far. He may stand up, he may kneel down, he may lie down, it is all right; — tho' mostly the men keep standing, except when silent under fire — then they lie down. . . .​
And a charge looks just as disorderly. With a burst of yells, a long, wavering, loose jointed line sweeps rapidly forward, only now and then one or two stopping to fire, while here and there drop the killed and wounded; the slightly wounded, some of them, giving no heed but rushing on, while others run hurriedly, half-bent, to the rear.​
- Berry Benson's Civil War Book: Memoirs of a Confederate Scout and Sharpshooter, p. 22-23



Allen C. Redwood, 55th Virginia Infantry:

Once engaged, the soldier’s attention is too much taken up with delivering his fire effectively to give heed to much else. . . . The line soon loses all semblance of regular formation; the companies have become merely groups of men, loading and firing and taking advantage of any accident of ground – natural depression, tree, rock, even a pile of fence rails that will give protection. But if the soldier is about where he belongs – to the right or left of the regimental colors, according to the normal place of his company in line – he feels reasonably sure of resuming formation whenever the command may come to “cease firing” and to “dress on colors” preparatory to an advance or charge. If the latter, though the move may begin in perfect order, it is almost immediately lost.​

- Photographic History of the Civil War, Vol. 8, p. 174-76



1st Missouri Infantry (CS) at Shiloh:

While the battle raged the thorough instructions was evident in an amusing manner. Many of the men were observed under a deadly fire standing bolt upright with every faculty devoted to loading and firing "by the numbers," tearing cartridges, drawing rammer, ramming cartridge, etc., precisely as if their captains were calling the numbers. Their thorough drill actually caused them to forget the dead and wound lying around. . . .​
A regiment next to us on our left broke front and "bunched up" behind trees at a critical time. The line could not continue the advance very well until this was remedied, and many of the officers of the First Missouri left their companies and hurried over to this regiment and assisted in re-forming it.​

- Captain Joseph Boyce and the 1st Missouri Infantry, C.S.A., p. 64-65



Granbury's Texas Brigade at Pickett's Mill:

The frolick opened in fine style as soon as we got back into our places—instead of two skirmish lines—the two lines of battle open to their fullest extent. No artillery in this fight—nothing but small arms. Our men have no protection, but they are lying flat on the ground, and shooting as fast as they can.​

- One of Cleburne's Command: The Civil War Reminiscences and Diary of Capt. Samuel T. Foster



Ambrose Bierce's account of Pickett's Mill:

Standing at the right of the line I had an unobstructed view of the narrow, open space across which the two lines fought. It was dim with smoke, but not greatly obscured: the smoke rose and spread in sheets among the branches of the trees. Most of our men fought kneeling as they fired, many of them behind trees, stones and whatever cover they could get, but there were considerable groups that stood.​
Occasionally one of these groups, which had endured the storm of missiles for moments without perceptible reduction, would push forward, moved by a common despair, and wholly detach itself from the line. In a second every man of the group would be down. There had been no visible movement of the enemy, no audible change in the awful, even roar of the firing—yet all were down. Frequently the dim figure of an individual soldier would be seen to spring away from his comrades, advancing alone toward that fateful interspace, with leveled bayonet. He got no farther than the farthest of his predecessors.​

- The Crime at Pickett's Mill by Ambrose Bierce



Pvt. J. P. Cook, 1st Texas Infantry in the Cornfield at Antietam:

We began firing at the men around the battery, and after we had given them a couple of rounds they abandoned their guns and took to flight. Just as they did so a body of Federals who lay behind a rock fence fifty yards away, and partly hidden from our view by the standing corn, poured a volley into us. Turning our eyes in this direction, we began firing at them, taking the precaution however, to lie down and do our shooting. You can imagine how brisk the firing was from both sides when I tell you that within five minutes not a stalk of corn was left standing between us and the rock fence.​

- San Antonio Daily Express, March 29, 1908



Robert Campbell, 5th Texas Infantry at Gaines' Mill:

With the gallant Hood at our head – we moved forward, a heavy fire, both from artillery and rifles being poured into us – we moved up to the brow of the hill, (before described) which confronted the Yankee breastworks on the opposite brow – The Virginians fell back. As soon as arriving at this hill, we were ordered to lay down, and commenced a brisk fire upon the enemy.​
- Lone Star Confederate: A Gallant and Good Soldier of the Fifth Texas Infantry



Pvt. William H. Moon, 13th Alabama Infantry, with Archer's Brigade at McPherson's Ridge, July 1 at Gettysburg:

While we were thus engaged, the Tennesseans on our left advanced through a copse which ran up a ravine, spreading out into a fan shape as it neared the top of the ridge. They were hotly engaged at close quarters, the Yanks charging them in column, the Tennesseans lying on their backs to load and whirling over to fire.​

- The Confederate Veteran 33, p. 449



John M. Berry, 8th Arkansas Infantry, at Stones River:

On we went, and in an open field we found ourselves face to face with the Federal force stationed behind a rail fence. I thought they would kill us all. We laid down upon our breasts, and, firing as best we could, we would roll over on our backs and load, then turn back and fire. I remember shooting right over Dick Jones's head. He looked back at me and said : "John, you'll shoot me." I said; "No, I'll not. You keep your head down." I loaded, and bang went my gun again, riglit at his ear. It so deafened and alarmed him that he turned again, used some very rough words, and declared I would kill him yet.​

- The Confederate Veteran 8, p. 73



Henry Morton Stanley with the 6th Arkansas Infantry at Shiloh:

After being exposed for a few seconds to this fearful downpour, we heard the order to 'Lie down, men, and continue your firing!' Before me was a prostrate tree, about fifteen inches in diameter, with a narrow strip of light between it and the ground. Behind this shelter a dozen of us flung ourselves. The security it appeared to offer restored me to my individuality. We could fight, and think, and observe, better than out in the open.​

- The Autobiography of Sir Henry Morton Stanley, p. 192



The official report of Capt. William H. Battey, 38th Georgia Infantry at Gaines' Mill:

In obedience to orders received from Captain Lawton I commanded my men to "Fire and load lying," which order they promptly executed until nearly all the cartridges were expended.​

- OR, vol. 11, pt. 2, p. 603



Official report of Col. Micah Jenkins, commanding the Palmetto Sharpshooters and a couple other regiments at Seven Pines:

In prompt obedience the two regiments rose from their knees, from whence they had been firing upon the enemy with decided effect, and resumed their old, steady advance, firing full in the face of the foe.​

- OR, vol. 11, pt 1, p. 947-50



Report of Capt. W. L. Duff, 17th Mississippi Infantry at Ball's Bluff:

I halted my company and ordered the enemy to halt five or six times. He responded each time, Friends, but continued to advance within 60 yards, when I ordered my men to kneel and fire, which they did with deadly effect, completely breaking his line.​

- OR, vol. 5, p. 363



Bvt. Major Charles D. Miller with the 76th Ohio Infantry at Arkansas Post:

We had arrived within 100 yards of the Rebel lines when Colonel Woods ordered us to halt, lie down and open fire. The men all dropped their faces in the grass and underbrush and commenced skimming the enemy's parapets with musket balls.​

- The Struggle for the Life of the Republic, p. 78



Report of Lt. Col. W. M. G. Torrence, 30th Iowa Infantry at Arkansas Post:

This being done, I instantly formed line of battle and moved forward through the timber, over logs and brush, as best I could, until within 150 or 175 yards of the enemy's breastworks, forming on his extreme left, we came to an open space of ground. Here I halted, giving instructions to fire, lie down and load, and fire lying down, which they did for the space of about three hours, during which time they did but little more than silence and keep silent some small artillery pieces planted by the enemy at that part of the breastworks, together with the musketry in the hands of the enemy in the rifle-pits.​

- OR, vol. 17, pt. 1, p. 770



Report of Col. John M. Thayer, 1st Nebraska Infantry at Shiloh:

I directed the men to lie down when not engaged, and to fire kneeling and lying down as much as possible, and also to take advantage of the ground whenever it could be done. By adopting this course and continuing it throughout the day I have no doubt but that the lives of hundreds of our men were saved.​

- OR, vol. 10, pt. 2, p. 195



Sgt. Ira Blanchard, Co. H, 20th Illinois Infantry at Raymond:

Our boys were suffering so badly that they crouched down to the ground to avoid the flying missiles of death which filled the air; loading and firing as rapidly as possible on the knee, and 'twas in this position that our Captain Victor H. Stevens was shot in the head and instantly killed.​

- I Marched With Sherman by Ira Blanchard



At the Battle of Wilson's Creek, the waist-high prairie grass, the soldiers' relative inexperience, and, above all, the scarcity of ammunition, slowed the pace of combat. Under these conditions, a large number of men eventually ended up firing and reloading while either kneeling or lying down, despite their lack of practice in such techniques and the extra time it took them to do so. This was true for both sides throughout the battle, particularly during the fighting that broke out as the Southerners made their third assault on Bloody Hill.​
As the Southerners approached, Major John Halderman of the First Kansas ordered his men "to lie down and fire from that position." A soldier in the Second Kansas recalled that they were "ordered to drop to our knees and keep close to the ground." Captain Gordon Granger of Lyon's staff moved from unit to unit across the hillcrest, instructing the soldiers to remain concealed in the grass and expose themselves only to shoot. Most obeyed. "Lying flat on their faces our men poured in their fire with telling effect," newspaperman Franc Wilkie reported. According to one Union officer, "Our men as a whole would rise enough to discharge their weapons and then lie down while loading up." One of Lyon's Regulars contrasted the reality of combat to his expectations from peacetime. He wrote: "The splendid motions we had been taught at drill and parade in anticipation of this bloody day were not practiced here. Each man assumed a position to his liking—most of them on their knees and leaning well forward." The advantages of crouching or lying down were obvious, for once the combatants came within range, the effects of their fire could be devastating even if it was not prolonged. "The bullets whistled, rattled, banged, [and] whirred over our heads," remembered one Kansan on the receiving end of a Missouri State Guard volley. "If our men had stood up, hardly a man would have been left," he concluded. Testimony on the Southern side was similar. As Private Ras Stirman of the Third Arkansas Infantry later described his encounter with the Federals: "They were lying down in the brush and grass until we were within one hundred yards of them, then they opened up on us bringing us down like Sheep but we never wavered. We did not wait for orders to fire but all of us cut loose at them like wild men, then we dropped to our knees and loaded and shot as fast as we could. We had to shoot by guess as they were upon the hill lying in the grass." Because the men kept so low to the ground, a disproportionate number of those killed or wounded were struck in the head.​

- Wilson's Creek by Piston and Hatcher, p. 280-81



37th and 59th Illinois in Morgan's woods at Pea Ridge:

Both Barnes and Frederick ordered their men to fight from a prone position. The Federals obeyed with alacrity; David Ash told his fiancee that "we fell down as flat as we could. . . . Another officer was convinced the men of his company "would have been utterly annihilated" had he not "fought them flat on their bellies on the ground."​

- Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West by Shea and Hess, p. 125-27



First day of the battle of Corinth:

The Soldiers of the Sixteenth Iowa stood their ground. At Shiloh they had ducked behind trees or rocks at the first fire. Crocker's incessant drilling and strict discipline since that battle had had an impact. Said Parkhurst, "A few men fought on one knee, but not a man lay down, and the great majority stood erect on the color line, and loaded and fired in drill-ground fashion."​
Matters were considerably more unsettled in the Fifteenth Iowa. The entire front line got down on one knee.​

- The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth by Peter Cozzens, p. 189



Period sketch by Henry Lovie of the 44th Indiana fighting while kneeling or lying down at Shiloh:

44th-indiana-shiloh-jpg.jpg

"The woods on fire. The 44th Regt. Ind. Voltr. Col. H.B. Reed commdg. Left Wing near the Peach Orchard."
 
Last edited:
Benning's Brigade at Chickamauga:

Loading and firing as rapidly as they could, the two had laid more than one enemy low, when, close on their right, a hundred or so Georgians appeared, and each from behind his own tree or rock, commenced firing. They were all that was left of Benning's Georgia Brigade of Hood's division, but the fight was not yet knocked out of them. They were busy loading and firing, when 'Old Rock,'— that was the pet name for General Benning — rode up behind them and shouted, 'G — d d — n you, men, get from behind those trees and rocks, and give 'em hell!' The words were hardly uttered before a shell came along, killed 'Old Rock's' horse, and tumbling the lionhearted rider sprawling on the ground, gave him an instant change of view. Springing to his feet unhurt, he shouted, 'G — d d — n you, men, stay behind those trees and give 'em hell!'​

- Hood's Texas Brigade, Its Marches, Its Battles, Its Achievements by J. B. Polley, p. 210-11
 
Horseshoe Ridge at Chickamauga:

For thirty minutes the two lines battled for the ridge. Fatigue was taking its toll on the Confederates. Individually at first, then by squads, the Tennesseans of Fulton and Sugg trickled down the slope and collapsed behind trees. Neither oaths nor blows from the swords of their officers could drive them back into the fight. To their left, the brigades of Deas and Manigault intermingled badly. "The different regiments became mixed with each other, and here and there the faint-hearted were stealing to safer positions in the rear," admitted Manigault. "Men fought from behind trees and coverts [sic], loading and firing while they dodged from point to point. . . . In short, the character of the battle at this juncture was that of skirmishing on a grand scale."​

- This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga by Peter Cozzens, p. 460.
 
Vermont Brigade at the Wilderness, May 5, 1864:

The first of Getty's troops to become engaged were the Vermonters. They had moved forward scarce three hundred yards, when they were received by a tremendous volley, bursting from the thickets but a few yards in front. They halted, returned the fire, and then dropped down, to get cover from the hail-storm of bullets. The enemy did the same. Again the lines were ordered to advance; but when the men rose, so many were at once shot down that it became plain that to advance was simply destruction. The men dropped again. They could not advance, but there was no thought of retreat. The second line closed up on the first, the Second regiment creeping forward through the bushes to a position nearly on a line with the Fourth, and both regiments kept up a destructive fire, under which the enemy was as powerless to advance as they. . . .​
The loss of field and line officers who were on their feet and moving along the lines, while the men hugged the ground, was especially severe. . . .​
The men's faces grew powder-grimed, and their mouths black from biting cartridges. The musketry silenced all other sounds; and the air in the woods was hot and heavy with sulphurous vapor. The tops of the bushes were cut away by the leaden showers which swept through them; and when the smoke lifted occasional glimpses could be got of gray forms crouching under the battle-cloud which hung low upon the slope in front. For two hours this went on, and the ammunition of the men was nearly exhausted, when General Birney, having got into position, sent a brigade (Owen's) to the support of the Vermont regiments.​

- Vermont in the Civil War by George G. Benedict, p. 424-45.



Perry's (or Law's) Alabama Brigade at the Wilderness, May 6:

The large 143rd Pennsylvania found itself involved in a firefight with William F. Perry’s “lost” 44th and 48th Alabama regiments. . . . The Pennsylvanians wounded Lieutenant Colonel John A. Jones, leaving the command of the 44th Alabama in the hands of Major George W. Carey. The very young officer with the regimental colors in his left hand and brandishing his large infantry sword in his right hand gallantly advanced to the front center of the line. The Alabamians behaved beautifully. Their ranks were well closed with every available man in his appointed place.​
It was a different story a short distance to the left where the smaller 48th Alabama was not doing as well. The regimental front gradually disintegrated as clusters of men abandoned their posts and cowered behind trees. They needlessly dodged the Federal bullets, most of which passed well over their heads.​

- Victory Without Triumph: The Wilderness May 6th and 7th, 1864 by John M. Priest.
 
I just recently finished reading Earl Hess’ Civil War Infantry Tactics, which is a study of dozens of engagements taken from primary sources. I don’t have it with me at the moment, so I can’t provide any quotes, but it was a bit of an eye opener for me.

I had always assumed battles look like the movies and reenactments I have seen, ie two lines in two ranks, lining up and blasting away at each other. Hess’ thesis was to examine the command and control involved in engaging in battle during the Civil War, and whether and to what extent commanders had control of their men.

He first talks about the history of linear tactics and their evolution (pun intended) from early days. Using multiple accounts, he demonstrates that while the stereotypical firefight was definitely commonplace, so were commanders who were able to employ a great degree of articulation with their men. Execution of maneuvers at the double quick was quite common, as was advancing in column, whether column of companies/regiments or marching columns, sometimes to within fewer than 200 yards of the opposing enemy line.

In addition, it was also common to see commanders changing front multiple times in one engagement, changing from column to line and back, deploying and withdrawing skirmishers, only to deploy them again in a different direction.

Multiple formations and combinations of formations were also very common within a command even down to the regimental level. For example there are multiple accounts of brigades with one or two regiments in line to the front, with the remainder of the brigade behind in column as a reserve. Another account describes two confederate brigades (if I remember correctly) advancing in successive lines of battle while a third brigade advanced by the flank, on the flank, in column of twos in order to be able to defend the flank by a simple right face.

Anyhow, I apologize for not providing direct quotes, but suffice it to say it is a must read for anyone interested in tactics or who would like a better idea of, as you say, how things may have actually looked on the field of battle.
 
Hess' book strongly seconded. Lots of reminders of how flexible and practical military formations were:

"Unit commanders also employed a variant on the movement by the flank to deal with tangled terrain features. Rather than move an entire regiment through the undergrowth by the flank, they moved each company marching by the flank, creating ten small formations that looked like columns. This movement more or less preserved the regimental frontage and allowed for each company to form line again as needed in relatively quick fashion. It placed a premium, however, on company officers and their ability to conduct a semi-independent movement through rough terrain. Evidence of this maneuver appears more often in the last half of the Civil War, suggesting it was resorted to only after experience had hardened commanders and men alike."
(from 7. Changing Front, p. 129)
 
Last edited:
I do have that book by Hess and it is very fascinating. I don't think he talks about precisely what I was pointing at in the above accounts, though he does a great job explaining all of the various drill formations and maneuvers in accordance to the manuals. I find it interesting to read about how commanders improvised depending on the scenario.

With the above accounts I was sort of trying to contemplate how a line of battle reacts under actual combat conditions. In most reenactments they tend to just stand there strait as an arrow and fire off volleys back and forth - and I understand part of that is probably due to safety precautions, as well as following the drill manuals word for word - but when reading the accounts of those who were actually there many speak of taking cover, kneeling or lying down, spreading out, etc. Though some do say they stood in perfect formation. It seems to have varied greatly given the situation and unit in question.

Drill formations were essential to moving troops around the battlefield, and practicing drill off the battlefield could improve discipline and unit cohesiveness, but once they were actually engaged in combat formations could break down momentarily or commanders might have to improvise.
 
These are very interesting accounts, and also eye opening...it would be nice to see a similar study that explores the extent to which this was common.

I also noticed that in these accounts, the narrative is (obviously) from the POV of the unit doing the fighting. I would be very interested also to see how effective the firing from prone positions actually was...perhaps studying casualty and primary accounts from the unit they were engaged with.

The account of individual companies finding cover and/or taking advantage of the terrain until ordered to cease fire or to the colors is interesting and pretty much supports Hess’ contention that commanders, particularly on the company and regimental level, were allowed to improvise with some degree of independence to protect their men.

Great thread.
 
I’m gonna revive this thread because I think it’s so wonderful.

Here is how I picture it based on all I have read. This is not the first-hand quote stipulated in the opening, but just my own imagination garnered from the books and diaries and quotes I have read.

When I think of a regiment moving into battle at a generic level I picture the men starting in a well-formed line. Then, as they advance, hunched over, the order would start to break down. A full regiment in line of battle takes up quite a bit of space, and a portion of the line could be in an open field and another contending with patches of woods or fences or rocks or a stream. Some pockets of soldiers would be slowed down or have to make a tiny detour and thereby break the overall cohesion of the line. If they were advancing over fought over ground, the soldiers would have to navigate around the wreckage of battle and wounded soldiers passing through their ranks on the way to the rear.

Perhaps a V shape is formed with the flag at the apex and the flank companies trailing back a little bit, as those closest to the colonel hear the command and step off first. Additionally, with each soldier occupying their own world and headspace, some distracted soldiers may wind up slightly in front of or behind the advancing line. During the making of a film once where I played a generic Union soldier, I kept winding up several paces ahead of the advancing line without realizing it because I was so immersed in my own world. The officers yelled at me to slow down! Additionally, without instructions to do so, our little line of battle formed a V shape with the flag in front and the flanks trailing back a little.

Those who could not bear the strain would duck out of the line and rush to safety in the rear. If they were under fire a steady stream of wounded men would start to make their way to the rear. This would further jostle up the line, as sometimes gaps were filled and sometimes they went unnoticed. If they were under a particularly heavy fire, the soldiers would duck especially low and make use of cover along the way, hiding for a moment and then rushing out to catch up, breaking up the line even more. The soldiers wouldn’t be under orders to fire, but some probably would anyways, firing and loading as they advanced because they could not bear the strain of taking fire and not returning it.

Then a command would come to halt and fire, and a ragged volley would ring out from a standing position, perhaps with some men unconsciously crouching to make themselves a smaller target or to take a more deliberate aim. More men would drop killed or wounded as more fire came in, and the survivors would crouch or lie down and return fire. At this point, everyone operated in their own world, standing or crouching or lying down, as they desired, unless some specific order had been given to crouch or lie down. Some soldiers would even unconsciously find themselves in advance of the line, not because they were especially brave or strong but because they unconsciously kept moving a little bit forward – a reality reported by men of the Iron Brigade at Antietam.

Officers would move up and down behind the line to encourage the soldiers and try to prevent soldiers from fleeing. All along, the steady stream of wounded making their way to the rear would persist. If they were successful, an order to advance may be sounded, and some effort would be made to dress the line, although most likely soldiers would just start creeping forward from wherever they were.

Sometimes the men would be asked to change front or formation, which I’m sure was a mess and looked more like little clumps of men moving around than a beautiful line.

If the fire became too much to bear, an order to retreat could be given, or more likely an ever increasing stream of soldiers would start to leave the ranks until a critical mass was reached and everyone turned and ran for the rear however fast their legs could take them. Some would retire more grudgingly, stopping to fire or trying to pull comrades back into formation, but they were likely swept up in the general pandemonium and made for the rear.

I always thought the illustrations from this little Paddy Griffith book I found at a museum library to capture it well. They show some men too far forward and lots of men running to the rear or struggling back wounded. Apologies for the battle quality - they're screenshots of photos I took on my phone four years ago or something like that:

Victorious Army.png

Assaulting fortifications.png
Troops moving to relieve a line.png
Ragged line.png
A broken down attack.png
Firefight.png


And, why not, a trailer for the film I was in. I can be seen quite a bit but I won't say who I am!
 
Back
Top