Allow me to give you some idea of how William Hanchett “refutes” conspiracy theories he does not like in his book
The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies. Naturally, Hanchett had no choice but to spend a lot of pages dealing with the explosive notes that Dr. Ray Neff of Indiana State University discovered in the early 1960s, one of which was signed “Lafayette Baker” and the other of which was signed “L.C.B” (Baker’s initials). The two Baker notes were written in code and the signatures were not visible until a chemical was applied to them. Neff hired a code expert to decipher them and the translation was dramatic, the main points of which are as follows:
Baker admitted that Stanton and other Radicals had been behind Lincoln’s assassination. Baker admitted that he, too, had been involved in the plot. Baker wrote that he feared for his life, and he implied that Booth had been working for the Radicals.
The two Baker notes were found written on the pages of volume 2 of the 1864 edition of
Colburn’s United Service Magazine, a British magazine on U.S. military affairs. An inventory of Baker's possessions showed that he owned volumes of
Colburn's U.S. Magazine for the years 1860 to 1865.
Impressive credence was further established for the Baker notes by the discovery of the transcript of a two-day Philadelphia probate court hearing in 1872 on an addendum (codicil) to Baker’s will. The probate court transcript included a witness who reported seeing Baker writing notes in code in “an English military journal.”
Colburn’s United Service Magazine was published in England. Two of the witnesses at the hearing said Baker feared for his life. Baker’s doctor, Dr. William Richards, under questioning from the attorney for the heir named in the codicil, admitted that Baker’s symptoms closely resembled those of arsenic poisoning. Modern chemical testing has confirmed that Baker was in fact poisoned.
So how does Hanchett deal with all of this independent and mutually corroborating evidence? First, he briefly suggests that it was all fabricated, although he does not offer a theory as to how this was done (probably because he could not concoct a plausible theory given what we know about the years that Dr. Neff and his team spent researching the Philadelphia municipal archives to find the probate court transcript).
But Hanchett’s main argument is that “professional historians” have almost universally rejected the documents as unimportant or spurious because of their distrust of Baker and because of their rejection of the “revisionist interpretation” that Lincoln and the Radical Republicans were drastically at odds over Reconstruction (pp. 217-219)! Hanchett cites “professional historians” William Beringer, T. Harry Williams, and Mark Neely. According to Hanchett, by the time of Lincoln’s death, Lincoln and the Radicals were not very far apart on reconstruction terms!
This nonsensical howler is a perfect example of the often bogus, politically driven nature of “modern Civil War scholarship.” It is also an example of why so many serious students of history have come to distrust most “Civil War historians.”
Are these “historians” talking about the same Radicals who gathered in Washington just hours after Lincoln’s death and who agreed that Lincoln’s murder was a “godsend to the country”? Let me quote what Rep. George Julian, a leading Radical in the House, said about the meeting:
I spent most of the afternoon in a political caucus, held for the purpose of considering the necessity for a new Cabinet and a line of policy less conciliatory than that of Mr. Lincoln; and while everybody was shocked at his murder, the feeling was nearly universal that the accession of Johnson to the Presidency would prove a godsend to the country. Aside from Mr. Lincoln's known policy of tenderness to the Rebels, which now so jarred upon the feelings of the hour, his well-known views on the subject of reconstruction were as distasteful as possible to radical Republicans. In his last public utterance, only three days before his death, he had declared his adherence to the plan of reconstruction announced by him in December, 1863, which in the following year so stirred the ire of Wade and Winter Davis as an attempt of the Executive to usurp the powers of Congress. (Political Recollections 1840-1872, Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Company, 1884, pp. 255-256)
Historian Claude Bowers, who later served as President Roosevelt’s ambassador to Spain, discussed this meeting and how it was reported in the
New York Tribune at the time:
That afternoon, within eight hours of Lincoln's death, a caucus of the Radicals was conferring on plans to rid the Government of the Lincoln influence. One of the participants, “who liked the radical tone,” was "intolerably disgusted" with the "profanity and obscenity.” There, among others, sat Ben Wade, Zack Chandler, and Wilkeson, correspondent of the New York Tribune, who proposed to put Greeley “on the war path.” In the discussion as reported, “the hostility for Lincoln's policy of conciliation and contempt for his weakness" was “undisguised,” and “the universal sentiment among radical men” was that *his death is a Godsend to our cause.” Moving with revolutionary celerity, these practical men had agreed to urge on Johnson the reconstruction of his Cabinet “to get rid of the last vestige of Lincolnism,” and Ben Butler was chosen for Secretary of State! (The Tragic Era: The Revolution After Lincoln, Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1920, p. 6)
Are these “historians” talking about the same Radicals who published the Wade-Davis Manifesto in August 1864 after Lincoln vetoed the Wade-Davis reconstruction bill? Bowers on the Wade-Davis Manifesto:
It was this very policy [Lincoln's policy] of conciliation that so easily reconciled the party leaders in Washington to Lincoln's death. They had launched their fight against it long before; had sought to prevent his nomination in 1864; and it was just a little while before that the Wade-Davis Manifesto had shaken and shocked the nation with its brutal denunciation of Lincoln's reconstruction plan. At the moment of his death there was no lonelier man in public life than Lincoln.
This Manifesto was an accurate expression of the spirit of the congressional leadership of his party. It referred contemptuously to "the dictation of his political ambition"; denounced his action on the Wade-Davis reconstruction plan as "a stupid outrage on the legislative authority of the people"; warned that Lincoln had "presumed on the forbearance which the supporters of his Administration had so long practiced"; and demanded that he "confine himself to his executive duties." (The Tragic Era, pp. 4-5)
Are these “historians” talking about the same Radicals who excoriated Andrew Johnson for repeatedly vetoing their Reconstruction bills and for essentially following Lincoln’s version of Reconstruction?
Are these “historians” talking about the same Radicals who became so infuriated with Johnson for essentially following Lincoln’s reconstruction terms that they implied he had been complicit in Lincoln’s death?
Are these “historians” talking about the same Radicals who became so irate at Johnson over his efforts to soften the effects of Radical Reconstruction by removing Stanton and by appointing non-Radical generals in the South that they impeached him and almost succeeded in removing him from office?
Hanchett quotes one of these “historians” as saying that the Radicals could have much more easily overcome Lincoln’s opposition by overriding his vetoes! Oh really?! How long did it take the Radicals to finally override Johnson’s vetoes of Radical Reconstruction? Nearly two years. They could not make their version of Reconstruction the law of the land until 1867. So how long would it have taken the Radicals to override Lincoln’s vetoes? Lincoln was a far shrewder and more popular politician than Johnson was, and the Radicals knew it.
I will give Hanchett credit for one thing regarding the Baker notes: He does not make a big deal over the fact that Baker erred on the date of Lincoln’s order concerning the Virginia legislature in his second note, an error that Hanchett concedes is “easily attributable to fallible memory.” Baker was off by a few days, which is not bad given that Baker was apparently wring from memory without bothering to look it up.