Member Review The Impulse of Victory, Ulysses S. Grant at Chattanooga

Ill try and find the letters pertinent to the Baltimore convention. It may take me a few days.
(I do have other things to do)
Dont bother.

As far as whether Rosecrans would have been acceptable to Lincoln Im not expert in the process of the VP nomination but I think Lincoln had little say.
so are you now agreeing that the opinion "Surely Rosecrans was as acceptable to Lincoln as Johnson." doesnt really tell us anything about whether Rosecrans could have become VP or not.

He was certainly more well known and popular than Johnson.
Popular with whom? Convention delegates? What is the basis for saying that he was more popular with Convention Delegates than Johnson was?
 
Cox was an eyewitness to the events. And he had both complimentary, and critical, things to say about Rosecrans:

"In a few moments an orderly came in some haste, saying the general desired to see me at his tent. As I walked over to his quarters, another shot was heard. As I approached, I saw [Rosecrans] standing in front of his tent door, evidently much excited, and when I came up to him, he said in the rapid, half-stammering way peculiar to him at such times: “The enemy has got a battery on Cotton Mountain opposite our post, and is shelling it! What d'ye think of that?” The post at the bridge and his headquarters were connected by telegraph, and the operator below had reported the fact of the opening of the cannonade from the mountain side above him, and added that his office was so directly under fire that he must move out of it. Indeed he was gone and communication broken before orders could be sent to him or to the post.​
The fact of the cannonade did not disturb me so much as the way in which it affected Rosecrans. He had been expecting to be attacked by Lee in front, and knew that McCook was exchanging shots across the river with some force of the enemy at Miller's Ferry; but that the attack should come two miles or more in our rear, from a point where artillery had a plunging fire directly into our depot of supplies and commanded our only road for a half-mile where it ran on a narrow bench along New River under Gauley Mountain cliffs, had been so startling as to throw him decidedly off his balance. The error in not occupying Cotton Mountain himself was now not only made plain, but the consequences were not pleasant to contemplate.​
I saw that the best service I could render him for the moment was to help him back into a frame of mind in which cool reasoning on the situation would be possible. I have already stated the contrast between my own sense of care when in sole command and the comparative freedom from it when a senior officer came upon the field; and I now realized how much easier it was for a subordinate to take things coolly. I therefore purposely entered into a discussion of the probabilities of the situation, and drew it out at length enough to assist the general in recovering full control of himself and of his own faculties."​
...​
"An hour or two passed and the detachment from Benham's brigade approached. It was the Thirteenth Ohio, led by one of its field officers , who halted the column and rode up to General Rosecrans for orders. The general's manner was still an excited one, and in the rapidity with which his directions were given the officer did not seem to get a clear idea of what was required of him. He made some effort to get the orders explained, but his failure to comprehend seemed to irritate Rosecrans, and he therefore bowed and rode back to his men with a blank look which did not promise well for intelligent action."​


And again, I didn't ask anything about Iuka.
Cox’s book was published decades after the facts and when most of the participants were dead.
Of interest but not in the same way something written closer in time to the events would be. Attached is a comment by Cox about Rosecrans’ role in West Virginia. Rosecrans did well and the WV campaign had positive far reaching consequences. Perhaps that is why he was replaced by the original
Republican presidential nominee - and emancipationist- John Fremont. If it were to be a short war he would be well positioned to replace Lincoln in 1864.

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No. I've only read why the Shiloh camps were laid out as they were. I don't recall reading any proposals on how they should have been placed for defense.

Maybe James N. can since he was the one criticizing the camp layout at Shiloh.
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Briefly and well-illustrated by this map scanned from one I received from the CW Trust, the layout is spread out atop the ridges. The terrain is not unlike the wrinkled skin of an orange (or if you're familiar with them, more like the "fruit" of an Osage Orange) with many little (and not-so-little) ravines separating them; many were deep, overgrown, filled with water from the heavy spring rains, and so largely impassable. There was no connection between many of the camps other than the few roads and country lanes so they were not in effective supporting distance either. The whole thing had been improvised with no thought for defense other than possibly Sherman sending Stuart's brigade of his division to more or less cover Spain Branch. (The three regiments by themselves on the Union far left.) Pickets were at least posted but proved inadequate; there were NO earthworks whatsoever.
 
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Johnson was chosen specifically because he was a Southern Unionist and War Democrat.

Rosecrans was from Ohio thus a Midwesterner like Lincoln. That's not good for balancing the ticket.

Wasn't Rosecrans also a devout Catholic? I can't imagine either party nominating a Catholic back then.
Rosecrans was a Democrat so that would have provided the party balance. The South didn’t participate in the electoral vote tally so the real battleground was in the north Being from the north would have been an asset for Rosecrans.
As it turned out Lincoln carried almost all the northern states.
His Catholicism is an interesting question but much to my surprise it didn’t seem to affect most people’s opinion of him. Certainly not Greeley or Garfield who was a lay minister in his Protestant church. I think much of the anti-Catholicism was about immigrants and political power. William Kurtz’s Rosecrans bio due out next year will discuss his religion in greater detail than I do in my book.
im not an expert on the election of 1864. All I’m saying is that Garfield sought him out for VP and that indicates at a minimum Rosecrans was not seen as a failed person or political kryptonite
( not a 19th century term of course)
 
The Stanley map doesn't show McClernand camped in the gap, akthough he could conceivably reach it. Picking Sherman and Prentiss might have made more sense if their field officers and troops had ever been in combat. Prentiss's prior experience was actually not much - as a company officer in a volunteer regiment at Buena Vista. W.H.L. Wallace served as a company officer in the same regiment at the same battle. So if you're really expecting an attack put Wallace and his experienced division at the front. But all of this ducks the main point - Grant unquestionably was surprised by the attack. That's why he was having breakfast down river when it started...
It all boils down to the simple fact that Wallace's was the last division to arrive, after all the other campsites had already been taken, pushing his farther north to the area that is now Hagy's Landing. That pretty much sums up the Federal response to the situation. The idea that Grant et al. were somehow hoping and wishing the Confederates would attack them there is based far too much on hindsight.
 
My personal conclusion is that Grant was, quite naturally, favored the army he commanded. The Army of Tennessee was very much Grant’s creation. It was carrying out his plan. The man had a great deal invested. The Army of the Cumberland’s improbable blitz of Missionary Ridge just did not fit into the scheme. No argument there. Grant, Sherman & Thomas personally made the recon that left all three with a profound misunderstanding of the nature of the gully between Tunnel Hill & the ridge. To reduce all that to a simple personal preference for Sherman is, in my opinion, simplistic.
Well, if you read Powells’s book, all of it, I don’t think you understand what happened. Sherman’s tardy approach allowed Bragg to send Cleuburne to tunnel hill. There were no Confederates that far north on the morning Sherman approached. Sherman and Grant rode to the River opposite south Chickamauga Creek several days prior. From that vantage point they could see Tunnel Hill and Billy Goat Hill. From that vantage point it was difficult to discern the 2. 1 give away to Tunnel Hill is, drum roll, a RR Tunnel. So during the day he approached, he could of scouted the area, maybe enlisted a guide. One such guide might of been Tom Crutchfield who owned a large farm there called Amnicola. But Tom wasn’t available. He was a well know Unionist in Chattanooga who tried to whip Jeff Davis’s butt during a visit to Chattanooga during the secessionist crisis. He was in a Yankee prison but had been released. Not in Chattanooga but his family was. So, Sherman assaults Billy Goat and not Tunnel Hill. He digs in at Billy Goat. Assaults Tunnel Hill the next day.

Sherman, if he had situational awareness, could of attacked Tunnel Hill from the East. Cutting off the Confederates from Tyner Station and seizing the RR. He never figured that one out. During the night, Bragg sends Stevenson’s Division to Tunnel Hill from Lookout Mountain. They are still moving across Missionary Ridge during the day of the battle. These are troops Grant thinks are coming from Bragg’s center. Why Grant orders the Demonstration on the Rifle pits to support Sherman. Grant knows the truth about all this post battle but lies about it. Then again in is Memoirs.

Anyhow, it is a good book. I’ve studied this, glade Powell wrote it all down so the Sherman and Grant apologist can’t boo hoo about it. Maybe you should re-read it?
 
Rosecrans was a Democrat so that would have provided the party balance.
The South didn’t participate in the electoral vote tally so the real battleground was in the north Being from the north would have been an asset for Rosecrans.
Rosecrans had never held elective office, so his party affiliation and policy stances were not well known; Johnson had been a congressman (10 years), governor (4 years), senator (4 years) and military governor (2 years) by the time of the convention; he was also famous for his anti-secession speeches.

In 1864 party balance was less important that sectional balance -- Johnson was a symbol that the war wasnt just a sectional fight. Lincoln was from the North; all the other major leaders of the party were from the North. In 1864 the Republicans referred to the ticket as the "National Union Party" as an effort to show it was not just a North vs South thing. The idea of a pro-war southerner was too appealing.

Also, the Baltimore convention included delegates from Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee and there was hope at the time of the convention that some of these states would participate in the election. In Louisiana and Tennessee voting did take place, though with very small number of voters, and the validity of the result was questioned in Congress, resulting in the votes not being counted with an attitude that it didnt matter for the outcome anyway.
 
Well, if you read Powells’s book, all of it, I don’t think you understand what happened. Sherman’s tardy approach allowed Bragg to send Cleuburne to tunnel hill. There were no Confederates that far north on the morning Sherman approached.
That morning Sherman had to build a bridge over a 1/4 mile wide rain-swollen river. He wasnt tardy at all; he was busy.That morning Walker's division was south of the tunnel on the next big hill and along the railroad. Cleburne was sent once Sherman's threat materialized to extend the Confederate position further.

Sherman, if he had situational awareness, could of attacked Tunnel Hill from the East.
Umm no.
First, his orders from Grant were to attack down the ridge, not head east.
Second, Cleburne/Hardee had troops in a strong defensive alignment from the Tunnel to the creek (Lewis, Govan, Lowrey) blocking any approach between the east side of the hill and the west of the creek. They also had brigades in reserve (Polk, Wright) who were positioned to protect any approach from east of the Chickamauga and/or defend the route to Tyner's station (which wasnt that important to the Confederates anyway -- Chickamauga station was the important one to bragg).
 
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Well, if you read Powells’s book, all of it, I don’t think you understand what happened. Sherman’s tardy approach allowed Bragg to send Cleuburne to tunnel hill. There were no Confederates that far north on the morning Sherman approached. Sherman and Grant rode to the River opposite south Chickamauga Creek several days prior. From that vantage point they could see Tunnel Hill and Billy Goat Hill. From that vantage point it was difficult to discern the 2. 1 give away to Tunnel Hill is, drum roll, a RR Tunnel. So during the day he approached, he could of scouted the area, maybe enlisted a guide. One such guide might of been Tom Crutchfield who owned a large farm there called Amnicola. But Tom wasn’t available. He was a well know Unionist in Chattanooga who tried to whip Jeff Davis’s butt during a visit to Chattanooga during the secessionist crisis. He was in a Yankee prison but had been released. Not in Chattanooga but his family was. So, Sherman assaults Billy Goat and not Tunnel Hill. He digs in at Billy Goat. Assaults Tunnel Hill the next day.

Sherman, if he had situational awareness, could of attacked Tunnel Hill from the East. Cutting off the Confederates from Tyner Station and seizing the RR. He never figured that one out. During the night, Bragg sends Stevenson’s Division to Tunnel Hill from Lookout Mountain. They are still moving across Missionary Ridge during the day of the battle. These are troops Grant thinks are coming from Bragg’s center. Why Grant orders the Demonstration on the Rifle pits to support Sherman. Grant knows the truth about all this post battle but lies about it. Then again in is Memoirs.

Anyhow, it is a good book. I’ve studied this, glade Powell wrote it all down so the Sherman and Grant apologist can’t boo hoo about it. Maybe you should re-read it?
What happened, happened. The question was why Grant gave Sherman & the Army of Tennessee a Mulligan. This morning I discussed a memorable near disaster on a construction site with a friend. Everybody involved knew what they were doing, in fact had built the same apartment until a dozen times. One whole framed & sheeted wall came off the second floor & landed on the ground without killing anybody. No matter how well prepared & experienced you are, wired stuff happens.

I suggest standing on Orchard Knob while taking a good hard look at Lookout Mountain & Missionary Ridge. It is a daunting prospect. If it hadn’t been done, it would be absurd to say that Bragg was routed from that position. Grant didn’t have the luxury of second guessing Sherman. He was too busy packing him off to Knoxville.
 
Briefly and well-illustrated by this map scanned from one I received from the CW Trust, the layout is spread out atop the ridges. The terrain is not unlike the wrinkled skin of an orange (or if you're familiar with them, more like the "fruit" of an Osage Orange) with many little (and not-so-little) ravines separating them; many were deep, overgrown, filled with water from the heavy spring rains, and so largely impassable. There was no connection between many of the camps other than the few roads and country lanes so they were not in effective supporting distance either. The whole thing had been improvised with no thought for defense other than possibly Sherman sending Stuart's brigade of his division to more or less cover Spain Branch. (The three regiments by themselves on the Union far left.) Pickets were at least posted but proved inadequate; there were NO earthworks whatsoever.
The US position was basically facing along the roads to Corinth, with the Tennessee river in the rear, Owl Creek along the right flank, Spain Branch along the left flank. The front line was behind creeks that curved in from the flanks. Starting on the US right was Sherman (McDowell-Buckland-Hildebrand) lined up behind the creek. The one problem is the 53 Ohio is too far forward. Extending Sherman's line is McClernand's 3rd Brigade which is the 4 tent symbols south of the Hamburg-Purdy road by where Waterhouse's battery is shown. Becuase of the way the creek ravine curved, they were sort set back a little. Then comes Prentiss. The problem with Prentiss's position is that Peabody is too far forward. Miller is perfectly positioned on an elevation behind the creek. Wallace was the last to arrive and was positioned as a reserve who could move to aid whichever point needed it -- he was even told to communicate with Lew Wallace before the battle about coming to his aid if needed. Stuart was detached to watch the left flank

While there were no earthworks, when Hardee and Cleburne attacked Sherman's center they reported " bales of hay, logs, and other defenses" and "breastwork of logs and bales of hay". So somebody had prepared something.
 
What happened, happened. The question was why Grant gave Sherman & the Army of Tennessee a Mulligan. This morning I discussed a memorable near disaster on a construction site with a friend. Everybody involved knew what they were doing, in fact had built the same apartment until a dozen times. One whole framed & sheeted wall came off the second floor & landed on the ground without killing anybody. No matter how well prepared & experienced you are, wired stuff happens.

Sherman went to Knoxville days latter.

Didn’t know Grant was in the Construction business?

I suggest standing on Orchard Knob while taking a good hard look at Lookout Mountain & Missionary Ridge. It is a daunting prospect. If it hadn’t been done, it would be absurd to say that Bragg was routed from that position. Grant didn’t have the luxury of second guessing Sherman. He was too busy packing him off to Knoxville.
 
The US position was basically facing along the roads to Corinth, with the Tennessee river in the rear, Owl Creek along the right flank, Spain Branch along the left flank. The front line was behind creeks that curved in from the flanks. Starting on the US right was Sherman (McDowell-Buckland-Hildebrand) lined up behind the creek. The one problem is the 53 Ohio is too far forward. Extending Sherman's line is McClernand's 3rd Brigade which is the 4 tent symbols south of the Hamburg-Purdy road by where Waterhouse's battery is shown. Becuase of the way the creek ravine curved, they were sort set back a little. Then comes Prentiss. The problem with Prentiss's position is that Peabody is too far forward. Miller is perfectly positioned on an elevation behind the creek. Wallace was the last to arrive and was positioned as a reserve who could move to aid whichever point needed it -- he was even told to communicate with Lew Wallace before the battle about coming to his aid if needed. Stuart was detached to watch the left flank

While there were no earthworks, when Hardee and Cleburne attacked Sherman's center they reported " bales of hay, logs, and other defenses" and "breastwork of logs and bales of hay". So somebody had prepared something.

Situational Awareness. He could of informed Grant that evening he was in Billy Goat instead of Tunnel Hill. Problem was, he didn’t know where he was.

Grant didn’t Order Sherman to assault Billy Goat Hill either.
 
I don’t know much about the vice presidential selection process of 1864. Im sure there’s a fair amount written about it and I’d be interested in seeing it. I do know Rosecrans was a possibility. I’ll try and get the letters I’ve seen on the subject posted within a few days.
Rosecrans had been sought out by Greeley in 1863 as a possible presidential candidate so he was seen as being politically valuable
His anti-slavery position was known.
I think Rosecrans saved himself a lot of trouble by not being a candidate.
Of course politics did provide a steady income so that would have helped his family financially.
 
Situational Awareness. He could of informed Grant that evening he was in Billy Goat instead of Tunnel Hill. Problem was, he didn’t know where he was.

Grant didn’t Order Sherman to assault Billy Goat Hill either.
Grant ordered him to "carry the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel". Billy Goat hill was the northern extremity. he was ordered to carry it and he did.

Cleburne referred to Billy Goat as " high detached ridge, which in a military point of view dominated over every point within cannon range". Sounds like a good place to capture.

He did not get to the tunnel that day, but i dont think he told Grant that he had.
 
Stevenson’s was not transferred the day before. He and Cheatham were withdrawn from Lookout the day before but Steveson did not get to Cleburne/Hardee until the morning 25th and Cheatham followed. That’s movement along the ridge by 2/5ths of the divisions that had been fronting Thomas at the end of the 24th.

There was also a general shift northward of Anderson and Bate - prior to the 25th Bate’s brigades had been south of Braggs HQ; at the time of the charge on the ridge the next afternoon. they were north of it. The result was the Stewart was even more stretched out trying to over the length of ridge from Braggs HQ to Roseville
 
If you don’t get it, you don’t get it. I take it you have never been in charge of a large enterprise.
The debate is that Grant’s original plan was for Sherman to get on the north end of Missionary Ridge and push Bragg South. Clearing the way to Knoxville. Sherman is repulsed. Grant can see Sherman being repulsed from Orchard Knob. This is when he orders Thomas to advance to the Rifle pits. Make a demonstration and stop at the rifle pits to take pressure off of Sherman. Prior to Sherman’s repulse he had no plan to use the AOC. He thought they were demoralized since Chickamauga and would not fight,

Post war, Grant says that his plan all along was for Sherman to assault Braggs flank to weaken Braggs middle so Thomas could do the main assault. So, he covered Sherman’s failures and gave credit of the Victory to Sherman. Powell throughly explains this. Grant never admits he had to alter his plan and never gives Thomas credit for the victory. By about 2:30 Sherman is finished. He sends Bairds Division back to Grant and tells him he don’t need him. Sherman is a whipped puppy, he isn’t going to make another assault. He only used a Brigade at the time and most of his force never say action. Sherman stayed on Billy Goat Hill. Sherman blames it all for him grieving about the loss of Willy. Meigs turned to Grant, seeing Sherman’s final repulse about 2:30 and says they sure are driving us. Sherman demolishes Meigs and says that never happened. Long story short, Grant and Sherman lied about the whole thing.

So yes things happen in business and on the battlefield and adjustments have to be made. Unfortunately some Lie about it.
 
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Well there are plenty of citations in my book. I’m not going to rewrite my book on this site. As I said if you had written a book about these topics I would read it and check the sourcing.
Ill try and find the letters pertinent to the Baltimore convention. It may take me a few days.
(I do have other things to do)
As far as whether Rosecrans would have been acceptable to Lincoln Im not expert in the process of the VP nomination but I think Lincoln had little say. He was certainly more well known and popular than Johnson. Perhaps others know more and will post relative information not just opinion.
However the bigger point is Rosecrans remained very popular after Chickamauga and the War. He could have had the Democratic nomination for Ohio governor.
If he was that popular, why didn't he seek the gubernatorial nomination and win the election? That is what popular politicians do. So your suggestion is mere speculation.
 
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