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Thomas was a Virginian had no supporters in Congress, which hurt his chance to gain rank.
You hit the nail on the head. Thanks,
Lubliner.
Using McClernand and Hooker as examples of an "enemy list" isn't a very persuasive indictment of Grant. The good old "too many more to list" is not a useful substitute for specific names - unless the (absurd) proposition is that there are 50 or 100.I don't quite follow your line of reasoning. Anybody worth his salt wanted to have McClernard relieved as soon as he could. It wasn't just Grant who wanted to see the back of him. Powell covers the reasons that Grant found Hooker annoying. His Missionary Ridge report was a work of fiction. As it was, Grant had nothing to do with Hooker's resignation.
glad to be of service
"Hooker played his cards wrong and did not understand how to play the old army game, despite having witnessed both McClernand and Rosecrans, (as well as McClellan and Buell) losing their commands"McClernand was an effective politician, but even Henry Halleck knew it was dangerous to the soldiers to allow McClernand to be in command.
Rosecrans was highly intelligent, but had problems dealing with authority, with respect to both McClellan, Grant and most importantly Stanton.
Thomas' tactical skill and devotion to his soldiers' welfare were unmatched.
Hooker played his cards wrong and did not understand how to play the old army game, despite having witnessed both McClernand and Rosecrans, (as well as McClellan and Buell) losing their commands.
Did he really have no supporters in Congress? And did it ever really matter he was from Virginia?Thomas was a Virginian had no supporters in Congress, which hurt his chance to gain rank.
For whatever reason, Maj Gen Schofield convinced Stanton & Grant to allow him to appoint Stoneman to lead the cavalry in the Department of the Ohio. The 2,000 mile December 1864 raid he led through six CSA states justified Schofield's faith in Stoneman's leadership. The Spencer carbines his 4,000 men carried surely helped.
He was unhappy that he got his Major General in the Regular Army so late in 1864. Those things mattered to those men. About the other issues, if you have other info I'd be glad to see it. But Sherman had a brother who was a Senator and Sheridan was an unusual Irish Republican.Did he really have no supporters in Congress? And did it ever really matter he was from Virginia?
Did he ever really lack in rank? By early 1862 he ranked in the top 24 and he ended the war in the top 6.
Just an opinion, @NedBaldwin , but I think if Thomas had not been a Virginian he could have been promoted after Chickamauga and Thomas could have managed the Chattanooga recovery. It seems that by October of 1863, Stanton and Seward were willing to build up Grant further, even if that endangered Lincoln.Did he really have no supporters in Congress? And did it ever really matter he was from Virginia?
Did he ever really lack in rank? By early 1862 he ranked in the top 24 and he ended the war in the top 6.
Just an opinion, @NedBaldwin , but I think if Thomas had not been a Virginian he could have been promoted after Chickamauga
Yes he was like that - felt he was entitledHe was unhappy that he got his Major General in the Regular Army so late in 1864.
Was there such a thing as a “usual Irish Republican”? Didn’t think Sheridan was politically involved, unlike the Sherman/Ewing clanAbout the other issues, if you have other info I'd be glad to see it. But Sherman had a brother who was a Senator and Sheridan was an usual Irish Republican.
In Don Piatts biography of Thomas he quotes a letter in 1861 from Congressman Randall of PA to the war department recommending Thomas be promoted to BGif you have other info I'd be glad to see it.
In comparison, S. Phillips Lee had a profitable post in the North Atlantic blockade squadron, and Admiral Farragut was becoming a New York hero. By late 1864 many of them could see the end of the war and the end of promotions coming. In an inflationary environment the economic squeeze was probably apparent.Yes he was like that - felt he was entitled
Was there such a thing as a “usual Irish Republican”? Didn’t think Sheridan was politically involved, unlike the Sherman/Ewing clan
Appreciated this book. Powell asserted few were as offensive minded as Grant and encouraged the offensive (p. 52).David Powell's newly published The Impulse of Victory, Ulysses S. Grant at Chattanooga has come at a perfect time for me personally. This summer, the Huntington Library made the logs of Charles Dana's dispatches from Chattanooga available online. About the only thing I knew about what Dana had actually reported to Stanton & Lincoln was a few catchy lines that everybody quotes followed by a paragraph of often snarky comments by various authors. Reading the original Dana log was, I suppose, a lot like reading the Book of Mathew in the original Greek. I had put together a lot of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, but was in need of pieces to fill in the voids so that I could understand what I had read. David Powell did that in spades. Until I read his book, for example, I did not know that Dana's messages were transmitted using a personal cipher. Pretty obvious when you think about it, but a bit of an ah-ha when encountered on the page.
One of the strengths of Powell's book is that he allows the narrative of events to flow. The digression into opinionating by the author that clunks up many accounts of the Battle of Chattanooga are missing. It is only when events such as Thomas being rude to Grant when he arrived that he takes issue with the usual depiction. Powell, using the words of men who were there, debunks that oft repeated tale.
Powell does a very good job of showing just how complex Grant's situation was. Holding Knoxville & East Tennessee was as much a part of his tactical thinking as was Lookout Mountain. Grant famously rode the truly awful sixty mile route that reeked of dead mules that the Army of the Cumberland's supplies had to traverse. What surprised me was that he also made a personal passage of the supply line to Knoxville. It is no wonder that Grant displayed a situational awareness that few, if any, of his opponents had.
As I write this, Powell's The Impulse of Victory is sitting atop Powell & Wittenberg's Tullahoma book. Reading both is a case of the result being greater than the sum of the parts. Underneath those new books is Connelly's classic Army of the Heartland that documents the Tullahoma Campaign & Chattanooga from the Confederate side & Cozzen's The Shipwreck of Their Hopes with emphasis on the tactical & printouts from Dana's message logs. On an easel behind the stack are American Battlefield Trust maps. It is a stratigraphy of my understanding of the six months of strategic victories here in Tennessee that destroyed the Confederacy.
I first read about the Battle of Chattanooga in Bruce Catton's Grant Takes Command. I read it by candlelight during the rainy season in a valley 9,000 feet up in the Andes. Powell's Impulse of Victory ties up all the threads from that day to this. I look forward to my next plate of BBQ & grilled okra on the porch at Sugar's on Missionary Ridge... it will be something to look out there & see all the pieces of the puzzle in place.
Powell wrote in a way to suggest that Grant seemed to be the "Force". How did he handle subordinates? According to Powell, with authority.I agree, it seems an ambiguous word for a title. So I looked Impulse up. 1. "a sudden strong & unreflective urge or desire to act." 2. "a driving or motivating force; an impetus." Make of that what we will.
Yes, Yes and Yes!Did he really have no supporters in Congress? And did it ever really matter he was from Virginia?
Did he ever really lack in rank? By early 1862 he ranked in the top 24 and he ended the war in the top 6.
If anybody knows his stuff about Chickamauga and Chattanooga, it's Dave Powell. It would be interesting to know how many miles he's logged walking those fields. If you see his name on a book, you won't go wrong buying it. And regarding Sherman, he touches on something that escapes a lot of people. If there's a Hall of Fame for mediocre tacticians, the two statues in it are Cump and Stonewall. Both were proficient at operational maneuver, but when it came time to execute on a battlefield, each would have done better delegating to a subordinate.I enjoyed Powells’s comments about Sherman’s lackluster performance at Tunnel Hill. Powell also challenges Grant for sticking to his story the Battle of Missionary Ridge was carried out just at Grant planned it. Powell confirmed that Grant was protecting Sherman for his lackluster performance. Giving credit to Sherman and not to the AOC for their Impulse of Victory. Good to see that in writing from an accomplished Historian. Powell has spent a lot of time on the battles around Chattanooga. Pretty much made it his second home. Told me if his wife would let him. He would buy a home in this area. Great Book, as usual.
My personal conclusion is that Grant was, quite naturally, favored the army he commanded. The Army of Tennessee was very much Grant’s creation. It was carrying out his plan. The man had a great deal invested. The Army of the Cumberland’s improbable blitz of Missionary Ridge just did not fit into the scheme. No argument there. Grant, Sherman & Thomas personally made the recon that left all three with a profound misunderstanding of the nature of the gully between Tunnel Hill & the ridge. To reduce all that to a simple personal preference for Sherman is, in my opinion, simplistic.I enjoyed Powells’s comments about Sherman’s lackluster performance at Tunnel Hill. Powell also challenges Grant for sticking to his story the Battle of Missionary Ridge was carried out just at Grant planned it. Powell confirmed that Grant was protecting Sherman for his lackluster performance. Giving credit to Sherman and not to the AOC for their Impulse of Victory. Good to see that in writing from an accomplished Historian. Powell has spent a lot of time on the battles around Chattanooga. Pretty much made it his second home. Told me if his wife would let him. He would buy a home in this area. Great Book, as usual.
Another subordinate who got short shrift from Grant was Joe Hooker. It's understandable that for many and various reasons Grant didn't like the bombastic, thrusting Hooker and likely resented getting stuck with him, but when I was researching my talk on the battle of Ringgold I came to appreciate that Fighting Joe had actually done very well in the campaign. The usual story I'd heard from sources like the NPS and Bruce Catton, no doubt based largely on Grant's memoirs, is that Hooker merely "occupied" Lookout Mountain - which was supposedly of no military significance - then got tangled up in Lookout Valley and made no further contribution to the action at Missionary Ridge. That turned out to be a gross exaggeration and far from the truth: forced by Grant to work with a scratch force made up of a division from each of the three Federal armies with commanders unknown to him, Hooker first stormed Lookout then successfully - albeit belatedly, due to a broken bridge - captured most of a small Confederate brigade in Rossville Gap, turning Bragg's southern flank in the process; and being the nearest and freshest force available led the next-day pursuit as far as Ringgold.My personal conclusion is that Grant was, quite naturally, favored the army he commanded. The Army of Tennessee was very much Grant’s creation. It was carrying out his plan. The man had a great deal invested. The Army of the Cumberland’s improbable blitz of Missionary Ridge just did not fit into the scheme. No argument there. Grant, Sherman & Thomas personally made the recon that left all three with a profound misunderstanding of the nature of the gully between Tunnel Hill & the ridge. To reduce all that to a simple personal preference for Sherman is, in my opinion, simplistic.