- Joined
- Jul 28, 2015
- Location
- New York City
In a certain way, I wonder whether Burnside was put in a difficult situation when he was given command of the AOTP in November 1862. Even though the summer campaigning season was pretty much over, Burnside understood that Lincoln and the administration would not wait until springtime for the AOTP to make a major move. So right away, rather than having time to train, rest, and renew the troops during the winter, Burnside was forced to undertake an immediate offensive going into winter weather. Second, Burnside objected to Lincoln and Halleck's preferred route south along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and in fact, Burnside's proposed dash to outrace and flank the ANV at Fredricksburg was well conceived. Finally, while Burnside must bear certain responsibility for not ensuring that the "critical path" was not disrupted (that is, that Halleck and the engineering staff did not mess the delivery of the pontoons), the primary fault for that fiasco must rest with the Washington crowd. That being said, there is no doubt that Burnside still had ultimate responsibility for the debacle at Fredricksburg.