The Copse of Trees

Sometimes the simplest answer that is there and it has been recorded is the truest: the objective was not a landmark in the battlefield. The objective was the Federal Army. The orders were to hit the enemy line hard, with multiple waves and destroy them.

Too simple?
yes, way too simple, with 13,000 troops. Of the many possibilities I say that is the least likely.
 
One of the more compelling and enlightening accounts for this debate comes from Lt. G. W. Finley of Company K, 56th Virginia. His company was second or third from the left in the regiment, which was the left regiment of Garnett's brigade, so he was only about 50 feet away from the far left of the division. He writes, "we were moved up to the edge of the woods and just behind our artillery. In my immediate front we were so close to the guns that I had to 'break to the rear' my little company to give the men at the limber chest room to handle the ammunition. The caisson, with its horses and drivers, was just in my rear." One might infer (as I did) that Finley was in the woods, but he adds that they were lying in the sun, so that would place him just beyond the woodline. Woolfolk's battery happens to have been posted near the edge of the woods, most likely using a slight rise at that location as cover. Finley continues, "the orders to us were to advance slowly, with arms 'at will,' no cheering, no firing, no breaking from 'common' to 'quick,' or 'changing' step, and to 'dress on the center.'" But when the Federal artillery opened on them from the far right (about 1/3 of the way across?), "we changed the point of direction from the center to the left while on the march ..." I interpret this remark to mean they began dressing on the left. Regardless of where you place the left of the division on a map prior to the charge, I think if the division was not facing in a direction a few degrees to the left (north) of due east, they never would have been able to connect with Fry, if the commands were issued as Finley described.

A word about Fry's alignment. If he had marched straight forward from Seminary Ridge, which runs NNE-SSW, Fry's right would have reached near where the Pennsylvania monument now stands. But knowing they wound up at the Angle must mean Fry traveled nearly due east, and one cannot help consider that a fence that ran nearly due east from Seminary Ridge toward the Angle made a perfect guide for the center of Fry's line.
 
One of the more compelling and enlightening accounts for this debate comes from Lt. G. W. Finley of Company K, 56th Virginia. His company was second or third from the left in the regiment, which was the left regiment of Garnett's brigade, so he was only about 50 feet away from the far left of the division. He writes, "we were moved up to the edge of the woods and just behind our artillery. In my immediate front we were so close to the guns that I had to 'break to the rear' my little company to give the men at the limber chest room to handle the ammunition. The caisson, with its horses and drivers, was just in my rear." One might infer (as I did) that Finley was in the woods, but he adds that they were lying in the sun, so that would place him just beyond the woodline. Woolfolk's battery happens to have been posted near the edge of the woods, most likely using a slight rise at that location as cover. Finley continues, "the orders to us were to advance slowly, with arms 'at will,' no cheering, no firing, no breaking from 'common' to 'quick,' or 'changing' step, and to 'dress on the center.'" But when the Federal artillery opened on them from the far right (about 1/3 of the way across?), "we changed the point of direction from the center to the left while on the march ..." I interpret this remark to mean they began dressing on the left. Regardless of where you place the left of the division on a map prior to the charge, I think if the division was not facing in a direction a few degrees to the left (north) of due east, they never would have been able to connect with Fry, if the commands were issued as Finley described.

A word about Fry's alignment. If he had marched straight forward from Seminary Ridge, which runs NNE-SSW, Fry's right would have reached near where the Pennsylvania monument now stands. But knowing they wound up at the Angle must mean Fry traveled nearly due east, and one cannot help consider that a fence that ran nearly due east from Seminary Ridge toward the Angle made a perfect guide for the center of Fry's line.

There is a catch. Pretty big one:

The good Reverent George Williamson Finley mentioned the above in a letter to Rev. CH. Dobbs, dated August 1908, a full 45 years after the battle. Finley was one of the Confederates who crossed the wall and was captured by the Federals. He spent the rest of the war in Federal prisons. Not sure that I will give his memory 45 years after the fact too much credence.
 
Im reminded of the image of an hourglass, just as it nears its' end- the Angle and virtually ALL of the rock wall, functioned as a funnel for combattants. Distance was compressed, both in actuality and perception. To all witnesses we must allow for this.
 
this area is soo confusing..spiritually speaking, it is an incredibly powerful place. For years Ive said and felt that: "If you cant feel spirits there. then you are spiritually dead". I still hold to that truth.
 
We will disagree on the separation distance and type of movement needed to bring them together. From my point of view, Garnett and Fry would have come together just west of the Emmitsburg Road without any need for an oblique movement. Garnett's dressing on Fry avoided any overlap and bunching together of the two commands. By dressing on Fry, Garnett's left actually has to redirect itself slightly to the right, because absent Fry's command, Garnett's far left would pass just a few yards to the left of the Angle, based on what I believe to have been their orientation.
"There was no distinct change of front;but "Close up and Dress to the Left" was the command,and this gave us an OBLIQUE MOVEMENT TO THE LEFT as we pressed ranks in that direction." Captain John H. Smith 11th Virginia,Kemper's brigade.
 
"There was no distinct change of front;but "Close up and Dress to the Left" was the command,and this gave us an OBLIQUE MOVEMENT TO THE LEFT as we pressed ranks in that direction." Captain John H. Smith 11th Virginia,Kemper's brigade.

According to something that was publishing in the Southern Historical Society Papers in 1904...

Here is the official report dated July 25, 1863 from Col. Joseph Mayo the eventual commanding officer of Kemper's (and thus Smith's brigade) :

Slowly, steadily and in perfect order, over the hill and across the plain which separated us from the enemy [...] the Brigade moved forward to storm the heights beyond. Receiving their fire until they have approached within 100 yards of the works, our men poured into the enemy one well directed volley and then at the command of Gen. Kemper rushed with a cheer upon the works.

No obliques, no lefts, just forward.

I tend to believe the contemporary official report of the commanding officer regarding the orders and what happened more than something that was written 41 years after the fact...

There is lots of fiction and lots of gaps (that usually get closed by fiction and assumptions) out there regading Pickett's Charge. It is amazing how much we really do not know regarding how and what happened at the micro level.
 
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I have to admit an error with regard to the "left oblique" question. It's always better to check the sources first. It does appear that dressing left accomplished the purpose in some regiments as the above posts describe, particularly FZ11's quote from Capt. John H. Smith of the 11th Virginia. Major Berkeley of the 8th Virginia also stated that prior to moving forward the order was changed from "dress right" to "dress left on Pettigrew." On the other hand, two officers of the 18th Virginia, Capt. Robert McCulloch of B and Capt. H. T. Owen of C, separately reported receiving orders when half-way across the field to "left oblique." Like Lt. Finley, Capt. Owen also indicated that the command, "Forward, Guide Center, March" was given at the outset.

The half-way point I presume is the elevated ridge on which was posted most of the Confederate batteries supporting the charge, where the Federal artillery would finally get a clear view of their opponents. From the above, that would appear to be the moment when the Confederate line switched from a forward movement to a leftward one. Then figuring Garnett closed with Fry just west of the Emmitsburg Road, one can work backwards to deduce that Garnett's and Kemper's initial alignment was rather close to a North-South axis, and the left of Garnett was near the jutting corner of Spangler's Woods.

If instead as some maintain, Garnett and Kemper started out much closer behind Dearing's guns, Garnett's half-way point would be on or east of the Emmitsburg Road, and their initial alignment axis would have had to be NNE-SSW to conform with the direction of the artillery line. Moving straight forward on that alignment for half the distance to Cemetery Ridge, they could never meet Fry with a left oblique, but only by a full left face march.
 
, one can work backwards to deduce that Garnett's and Kemper's initial alignment was rather close to a North-South axis, and the left of Garnett was near the jutting corner of Spangler's Woods..

This is my take as well, with the Right of Garnett and the Left of Kemper around Spangler's driveway (simple, easy dividing point: Garnett to the left, Kemper to the right. Got to keep it simple.) The thing is, that if you account for 1845 folks in Garnett's brigade, with a 13% off (total 1600) to account for officers and pickets, in a double line that measures 22 inches a pop, the left end of Garnett's brigade ends up about 80-100 paces on the other side of the fence that runs pretty much as a continuation to the jutting corner of the woods.

About that orientation. Again. Got to keep it simple. They could not see the enemy line for where they were. They could see their ridge and psychologically makes sense for the formation to be parallel to the Seminary Ridge, so they are grounded and oriented to a reference point they know. Plus that runs parallel to the fences there, esp. the one protecting Spankler's orchard, right in front of which Garnett's brigade likely aligned.

Simple.

Garnett's brigade: Line up in front of the fence and to the left of the dirt road. Kemper's line up to the right of the road and continue the line.

Simple orders that anyone could understood and not screw up. We are not talking about brain surgeons...
 
I'm with you E_just_E except for the strength of Garnett's brigade. Busey and Martin says they had 177 officers and 1508 men on June 30, and had 172 officers and 1287 engaged - the difference is close to the typical 15 percent that are assigned to non-combat duties. Since we have more specific figures from participants, I calculate the line was formed with just over 1200 men (about 1100 feet), and the skirmishers went forward from there. The line would further shrink when the men prepared to advance, to close the gaps left by artillery losses, skirmishers and heat prostration cases.
 
I'm with you E_just_E except for the strength of Garnett's brigade. Busey and Martin says they had 177 officers and 1508 men on June 30, and had 172 officers and 1287 engaged - the difference is close to the typical 15 percent that are assigned to non-combat duties. Since we have more specific figures from participants, I calculate the line was formed with just over 1200 men (about 1100 feet), and the skirmishers went forward from there. The line would further shrink when the men prepared to advance, to close the gaps left by artillery losses, skirmishers and heat prostration cases.

There are a couple things in play here (and Busey and Martin are not paying too much attention to the details, FWIW.) :

On June 30 (and had to double check that) Garnett's Brigade was in Chambersburg. So the amount of people non-engaged was due to activities related to being in a non-combat zone and in a territory ripe for foraging (and/or other extracurricular activities.) 3 days fast-forward, the situation was very different, and there was no reason not to be engaged (other than death, injury, or sickness.)
 
I have to admit an error with regard to the "left oblique" question. It's always better to check the sources first. It does appear that dressing left accomplished the purpose in some regiments as the above posts describe, particularly FZ11's quote from Capt. John H. Smith of the 11th Virginia. Major Berkeley of the 8th Virginia also stated that prior to moving forward the order was changed from "dress right" to "dress left on Pettigrew." On the other hand, two officers of the 18th Virginia, Capt. Robert McCulloch of B and Capt. H. T. Owen of C, separately reported receiving orders when half-way across the field to "left oblique." Like Lt. Finley, Capt. Owen also indicated that the command, "Forward, Guide Center, March" was given at the outset.

The half-way point I presume is the elevated ridge on which was posted most of the Confederate batteries supporting the charge, where the Federal artillery would finally get a clear view of their opponents. From the above, that would appear to be the moment when the Confederate line switched from a forward movement to a leftward one. Then figuring Garnett closed with Fry just west of the Emmitsburg Road, one can work backwards to deduce that Garnett's and Kemper's initial alignment was rather close to a North-South axis, and the left of Garnett was near the jutting corner of Spangler's Woods.

If instead as some maintain, Garnett and Kemper started out much closer behind Dearing's guns, Garnett's half-way point would be on or east of the Emmitsburg Road, and their initial alignment axis would have had to be NNE-SSW to conform with the direction of the artillery line. Moving straight forward on that alignment for half the distance to Cemetery Ridge, they could never meet Fry with a left oblique, but only by a full left face march.
"Soon after clearing our batteries it was found NECESSARY TO CHANGE DIRECTION TO THE LEFT....I saw a small body of men MOVING SWIFTLY TO THE LEFT OBLIQUE.....THEY WERE ARMISTEAD'S PEOPLE." Lt. Colonel Joseph Mayo.
 
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Here are some non-combat duties that collectively always took up about 15 percent of a unit's strength in the field: teamsters, ambulance corps, pioneers, bridge corps, engineers, signal corps, commissary, forage master, quartermaster sergeant, musician, blacksmith, provost guard, clerk, hospital steward, medical knapsack carrier, courier, beef driver, butcher, ordnance sergeant, guard, mail carrier, aide, orderly.
 
"Soon after clearing our batteries it was found NECESSARY TO CHANGE DIRECTION TO THE LEFT....I saw a small body of men MOVING SWIFTLY TO THE LEFT OBLIQUE.....THEY WERE ARMISTEAD'S PEOPLE." Lt. Colonel Joseph Mayo.

In a 1903 article for the SHSP...

That contradicts what he wrote in 1863. Post #63 above.

Wonder if he remembered what happened better 40 years after the fact, or his "memory" was influenced by mythology :wink:
 
Don't tell John Bachelder that.:sneaky:

I have walked the ground extensively, and I know that you can't see the copse from the edge of the Spangler woods, thanks to the swales. Even taking into consideration that, thanks to the various WWI installations on the Pickett-Pettigrew field, the field has changed since 1863, you are correct that the trees we consider the copse were saplings during the battle, and that the wood lot of Ziegler's Grove was much more visible from Seminary Ridge. The notion of the High Water Mark--and the fact that it was at the copse--was mostly Bachelder's.

As for the "genius" of Lee's plan--there's been much debate about that over the last 153 years, too. That's a whole other thread.
Honestly there is nothing like the truth to mess up a good story, next you'll be saying Chamberlain didn't save the union single-handedly.
 
So, which is, please? The battle walk I watched one day had me very convinced there was no copse of trees. He also stated ( not me ) Zeigler's Grove was the objective. The thing is, would not Zeigler's Grove be seen from the other side as a ' copse of trees ' in 1863? No one had the faintest idea of stating " Objective is Zeigler's Grove ", the whole Confederate army would not have recognized it by that name.
I think the initial guiding point for Pickett's men was the Cordori farm buildings. From the Cordori buildings area they then move farther left(north/north east) with the Emmitsburg Road to connect with Fry. Once connecting with Fry,Garnett changes direction to the East to directly assault the Federal center with Fry. Hence Garnett's comment to Fry..."I(Garnett) am dressing on you". The "Copse of trees" and "the Angle" is where the concentrated Confederate attack struck...... So I gotta say they got where they were going I.E. the Center of the Union line/Copse of Trees/The Angle and attacked into History..
 
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I'm reading this thread with great interest. There is a story handed down in the family that "Uncle Charles" PVT in the 11th VA; Company C; fought his way up the hill, mounted a stone wall and held up the Confederate flag, and rallied his company momentarily before he was killed. It sounded like the stuff legends were made out of- not to mention a very fool-crazy thing to do. I never gave the story much credence until about 10 years ago when I discovered that his 2 year old daughter and only child had died just prior to Gettysburg. Then I found more several other references citing "the wall" or the "breastworks," one, possibly two, at least from a contemporary source.

From MY REBELLION IN THE WAR OF 1861-5 IN CAMP—EN BIVOUAC—ON THE MARCH—ON PICKET—ON THE SKIRMISH LINE—ON THE BATTLEFIELD—AND IN PRISON BY W. H. MORGAN - "I was told by some of the company that when the command came to charge, after the heavy cannonading had ceased, Charles Jones was among the first on his feet, and although only a private, called out, “Come on, boys, let’s go and drive away those infernal Yankees.” He died game."

A note written on LVA service records say, he was killed atop the breast works during the charge on Cemetery Hill. And another has him "righting" the flag, flank on both sides which made me wonder if he and his brother died in the Angle.

Although his family no doubt had the money to bring him back to Lynchburg, he was probably buried in mass and his grave never identified. He also had a younger brother Walker who was listed as missing/killed. I have suspected they died in that big pile. Two other brothers survived but if there were ever written accounts by them, I do not know.
 
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