The Confederacy needed Hadrian Wall...

While prepared fortifications properly manned and equipped would be a great boost to the south isn't the primary problem that both sides started the war pretty much from scratch. They were too busy getting basic armies together to wage the war to have spare capacity to do anything else. It really needs the south to start building such positions before the war starts which even apart from any economic or internal political questions would be difficult both because it would definitely raise questions in the north and because the early Confederacy grow seriously when four more states joined in it opposition to Lincoln's decision to use force. Not much good building defences on the southern borders of Virginia and Tennessee then suddenly finding them inside the rebellion. :wink:
 
While prepared fortifications properly manned and equipped would be a great boost to the south isn't the primary problem that both sides started the war pretty much from scratch.
Well, yes; that doesn't change that it would have helped to have them. Indeed, possessing Fort Monroe alone on top of what got built historically would have made the logistical and strategic picture in advancing on Richmond much harder.
 
I'm finishing a novel about the war in Louisiana from May '63 until April '64. I've read a lot of details about the war there by studying first person accounts of Confederate soldiers who labored for weeks along side impressed slaves from the region plantations, especially near Ft DeRussy and Simmesport. It became glaringly apparent how difficult it was to complete such a gargantuan chore and how useless a partly completed trench and breastworks could be. Obviously, Lee did better in Virginia, and dug defenses worked for a while at Vicksburg and Port Hudson in Louisiana and Mississippi, but in the end modern weapons, greater resources, and persistence prevailed. Defensive walls were for the ancients, not for the time of gunpowder and powerful mobile artillery.

I agree that the Confederacy's best hope lay in a better king-cotton foreign policy that would have nationalized cotton on the first day after secession, and used that wealth to essentially buy European allies.
 
It became glaringly apparent how difficult it was to complete such a gargantuan chore and how useless a partly completed trench and breastworks could be. Obviously, Lee did better in Virginia, and dug defenses worked for a while at Vicksburg and Port Hudson in Louisiana and Mississippi, but in the end modern weapons, greater resources, and persistence prevailed. Defensive walls were for the ancients, not for the time of gunpowder and powerful mobile artillery.
That doesn't follow.
In the first place, in Virginia the defences of Petersburg defeated essentially all direct assaults and only a siege (as in, cutting off resupply) ultimately worked - and that would have worked just as well if both sides had been armed with swords and shields.
In the second place, the idea that a defense needs to be impenetrable to be considered at all worthwhile is mythological (and I mean that literally, as in "Athena"). A defensive structure can be considered worthwhile if it causes the attacker to be inconvenienced to a degree commensurate with the cost to the defender.

Now, it happens that in the 1860s powerful rifled shell guns were coming in that were more effective at breaking down defensive positions than there had been before, but there are solutions for that if you know about it going in.

Certainly the Thiers Wall meant Paris couldn't be assaulted easily and meant that the French in the 1870-1 war had time to scrape together additional forces, and give the Prussians a hard time maintaining the siege of Paris (as they had to besiege it instead of march in or storm it). It opens up options; subsequently the French constructed the Séré de Rivières system which were still somewhat effective in WW1. In WW2 the Germans took forts like Eben-Emael and the Dutch Water Line with a coup de main involving an airborne assault and top secret weapons (and they did it that way because it was the only way to deal with them quickly or possibly at all), not something that the Confederacy would have to seriously consider until at least the 1930s unless technology's accelerated by more than a decade.
 
So the question is - would a wall have been worth the effort it took to build?

Probably not. Having one would be useful, but it's not worth building a wall from scratch compared to other options.



Would properly sited forts have been worth the effort?

Probably yes; the Confederacy can spend money in peacetime on forts and "save up" military potential for the war years that way, but it can't save up manpower - and for a manpower-poor state to rely on their army as the primary shield of the nation is an active detriment because it means they have to react quickly instead of picking their moment.
Even having a week to respond means being able to muster an army for a coordinated plan of attack, instead of having to rush to the area and attack as each corps arrives.
 
Disagree on Lee's Strategy. His strategy was right. Lee focused on attacking the mind of the Northern public to increase war weariness.

Also, we saw how fixed fortifications worked over the LONG TERM, not short term at Petersburg.

The only strategy better than Lee's would have been Jackson's strategy of a southern blitzkreig on the north.

Everyday the south grew weaker as the north grew stronger.
 
That doesn't follow.
In the first place, in Virginia the defences of Petersburg defeated essentially all direct assaults and only a siege (as in, cutting off resupply) ultimately worked - and that would have worked just as well if both sides had been armed with swords and shields.
In the second place, the idea that a defense needs to be impenetrable to be considered at all worthwhile is mythological (and I mean that literally, as in "Athena"). A defensive structure can be considered worthwhile if it causes the attacker to be inconvenienced to a degree commensurate with the cost to the defender.

Now, it happens that in the 1860s powerful rifled shell guns were coming in that were more effective at breaking down defensive positions than there had been before, but there are solutions for that if you know about it going in.

Certainly the Thiers Wall meant Paris couldn't be assaulted easily and meant that the French in the 1870-1 war had time to scrape together additional forces, and give the Prussians a hard time maintaining the siege of Paris (as they had to besiege it instead of march in or storm it). It opens up options; subsequently the French constructed the Séré de Rivières system which were still somewhat effective in WW1. In WW2 the Germans took forts like Eben-Emael and the Dutch Water Line with a coup de main involving an airborne assault and top secret weapons (and they did it that way because it was the only way to deal with them quickly or possibly at all), not something that the Confederacy would have to seriously consider until at least the 1930s unless technology's accelerated by more than a decade.

OK. You do know more military history than I do, for sure. But the first post referred to long walls across whole rural areas, not walls fortifying individual cities like Petersburg or Vicksburg or Paris. Those did work for a time. But I can't see a Hadrian or Chinese type wall as practical in 1861 in America.
 
Also, we saw how fixed fortifications worked over the LONG TERM, not short term at Petersburg.
In the long term everyone's dead anyway. But with more of an ability to sustain a defensive you free up more ability to go on the offensive - it acts as a force multiplier, and since the South will always have a smaller army than the North for demographic reasons it needs all the force multipliers it can get.

But I can't see a Hadrian or Chinese type wall as practical in 1861 in America.
If one existed already, it would have been useful because it would provide choke points - it would constrain the attacker's logistic options. Siege guns can pierce a wall anywhere, but they can't pierce it instantly, and you still need to clear out the rubble to make a route wheeled vehicles (i.e. artillery, logistics wagons) can go through. This means that the defender gets warning, and they also just need to seal up the breech in the wall to cut off the logistics route - the attacker can't shift their supply route two miles east or whatever.

I mean, heck, it took the Imperial Japanese Army seventy days (March 11 Japanese arrival, May 20 Chinese retreat) to entirely force the Great Wall in 1931 - and that was with the defenders armed largely with handguns and swords and outnumbered more than 2:1.
 
Fortunately for the Confederacy, logistics exists.
Forts defending the big navigable rivers is definitely an option, and quite frankly if a not-too-expensive set of forts in northern and tidewater Virginia means the only way to invade Virginia is from the south then it's a pretty good investment!

One could postulate a better set of forts blocking e.g. the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to prevent them from being used as logistics lines, too, which would make the campaigns in the West harder.

ED: as for the economy point, the only way for the CSA to prevent a blockade strangling their carrying trade in the medium term is to have a navy able to overcome (and not just force away) that part of the US Navy that can be used to blockade them.
Fortifications can make it easier to protect one's ports - and, incidentally, Sherman's March was dependent once it reached the sea on seaborne logistics, so if the CSA can block seaborne supply from reaching Sherman's army then it disintegrates and that's that - but a blockade can always hang out past the range of the fortifications, so the only solution is having a good navy.

This would probably mean fast light ships and fast heavy ships, sallying from protected ports to catch and sink blockading vessels - they need to be faster than the blockaders, or the blockaders will just withdraw out of range and wait for the sally to end, but they also need to be strong enough that the blockaders don't just accept the attack and sink them.
I definitely agree that the Confederacy was in desperate need of a proper Blue Water Navy.
The Confederacy did utilize forts at New Orleans and against Grant in Tennessee but that didn't work out very well.
Leftyhunter
 
The Confederacy did utilize forts at New Orleans and against Grant in Tennessee but that didn't work out very well.
And it utilized forts at Norfolk and Yorktown, and in the Richmond-Petersburg system, and at Charleston, and those did work out well; the problem is that forts are a defensive system. They can prevent or block an attack, but they can't reach further than their guns (though a good way to prevent a fort from being bypassed is to put a reasonably sized garrison in it - a fort at Fredericksburg with a brigade garrison and 100,000 rations can hold out for more than a month unless assaulted, and if you try to move past it and supply from Port Royal to the east then the fort garrison can sally at any time and wreck your rear areas.)

This doesn't mean that they're a bad investment, though, especially if you expect to be invaded.
 
And it utilized forts at Norfolk and Yorktown, and in the Richmond-Petersburg system, and at Charleston, and those did work out well; the problem is that forts are a defensive system. They can prevent or block an attack, but they can't reach further than their guns (though a good way to prevent a fort from being bypassed is to put a reasonably sized garrison in it - a fort at Fredericksburg with a brigade garrison and 100,000 rations can hold out for more than a month unless assaulted, and if you try to move past it and supply from Port Royal to the east then the fort garrison can sally at any time and wreck your rear areas.)

This doesn't mean that they're a bad investment, though, especially if you expect to be invaded.
Yes and no. McCellen did take out the first at Yorktown and as you know was within four miles of Richmond. Once the Union seized Battery Wagner , Charleston's usefulness as a port was curtailed.
Yes there were Confederate fortifications at Petersburg but they were overwhelmed and even if they weren't with Sherman's Army cutting off the rail lines and the fall of Wilmington Harbor the defenders and the people if Richmond were doomed to eventual starvation.
My main point is simply that conventional war's can only be won on the offensive. Nothing wrong with fortifications but their usefulness is limited.
Leftyhunter
 
Yes and no. McCellen did take out the first at Yorktown and as you know was within four miles of Richmond.
And the Yorktown line imposed a delay of a month; it would have been less if the Navy had been willing to run past and bombard it, but as it happened the simple fact of the Yorktown bastion existing reduced Union options.

Again, no defence system is perfect, but the Yorktown bastion was worthwhile.

Yes there were Confederate fortifications at Petersburg but they were overwhelmed
They weren't; Petersburg was taken when the Confederates abandoned it.

with Sherman's Army cutting off the rail lines and the fall of Wilmington Harbor the defenders and the people if Richmond were doomed to eventual starvation.
What you're describing is a siege, which would have worked just as well if the defenders had had an old style stone castle. There is no conceivable fortification system that can hold out forever cut off from the world unless it's big enough to be self-sufficient in food, population and weapons production, but if the only thing you can do to defeat a fort system is cut it off from the world it's actually a pretty successful one.

My main point is simply that conventional war's can only be won on the offensive.
So? It's a lot easier to go on the offensive, and stay there, if you have a solid set of fortifications to defend your homeland. If we imagine the hypothetical situation where any approach to Richmond involves going through a permanent fort network more than fifty miles from the Confederate capital (i.e. across all the good approaches) which must be fought through and which will take a month, then that means that the Confederate army can keep fighting in the north for at least a week or two after the main Union army has invaded the South.
Without the necessity to use the Army of Northern Virginia as the main shield of Richmond, the Union has to have an army up north sufficient to defeat the AoNV and an army going after Richmond sufficient to defeat the AoNV; it never managed this.


Let's say the Union has 150,000 men all told, and the Confederacy has 90,000 men, and that attacking a fort is three times harder than fighting in the open field.

The Confederacy has forts, and puts 30,000 men into the forts. That means they have 60,000 men left over.
The Union wants to attack the South; how many men do they use to make their offensive on Richmond?
If they use 90,000 men, then they've got just about enough to fight the forts - but up north there's 60,000 Confederates and 60,000 Union troops; it's an even fight. And if the Confederacy opts to fight in the south instead, it's an even fight in the open down there.

Now the Confederacy puts 40,000 men into the forts. How many men does the Union put into their offensive on Richmond?
They need at least 120,000 to fight the forts fairly, but that means they've lost the ability to effectively defend Washington...

Obviously this is a hypothetical, but it illustrates that defensive forts are an advantage for the defender because they allow force multiplication; a siege is always going to work, but it's a much slower way of losing than an army winning a pitched battle and then marching straight into your capital city.
 
Saphroneth

Isn't there a potential flaw here that those forces in those forts are tied down to an degree. Couldn't the union attack a fort in one location, getting the necessary 3-1 superiority and largely ignore the other garrisons? So that they might end up deploying no more and possibly less forces against that single fort than the south has in the entire fort system. Of course in that case the south can remove some of the other fort garrisons but that could leave them vulnerable to sudden attacks or raids.

I agree that overall a set of strategic forts would definitely be useful but think its a bit more complex.

Steve
 
Isn't there a potential flaw here that those forces in those forts are tied down to an degree. Couldn't the union attack a fort in one location, getting the necessary 3-1 superiority and largely ignore the other garrisons? So that they might end up deploying no more and possibly less forces against that single fort than the south has in the entire fort system. Of course in that case the south can remove some of the other fort garrisons but that could leave them vulnerable to sudden attacks or raids.

I agree that overall a set of strategic forts would definitely be useful but think its a bit more complex.
Yes, it's definitely a bit more complex, which is why 17th-20th century operational art and theatre strategy wasn't just "use forts". But if you didn't have the forts there you wouldn't have the option to begin with; Wellington's long campaign in Spain involved both sides making good use of fortified positions as strong points, delays to their enemies, and useful bases to act from.

If the attacker masses enough strength for a 3:1 advantage over the strength in one of your forts, you move your field army there to support the fort - stripping the garrisons down in the other forts to whatever's safe to avoid a coup-de-main.
If the attacker masses enough strength to overcome your entire field force (in field works) plus the garrision of the forts, and to do so quickly enough that you can't instead use your field force to strike at his logistical support line... well, to be honest, you were probably going to lose anyway. If the enemy field army outnumbers your own entire field army more than 2:1, then you're in a very difficult situation.
If the attacker has enough strength you need your entire field force concentrated to avoid them simply rolling over you, and he can spare enough force to mount a serious attack on another part of your fort line, then, again, you're in a difficult situation.

But not having forts would have left the situation worse - you'd have ended up trying to beat an enemy twice as strong as you in a pitched field battle!

Forts aren't exactly magic (though a well constructed fort is capable of some pretty impressive things - it's how the Maori did so well for starters) but they multiply force - and a force multiplier is what the South rather needed, given their demographic issues.
 
And the Yorktown line imposed a delay of a month; it would have been less if the Navy had been willing to run past and bombard it, but as it happened the simple fact of the Yorktown bastion existing reduced Union options.

Again, no defence system is perfect, but the Yorktown bastion was worthwhile.


They weren't; Petersburg was taken when the Confederates abandoned it.


What you're describing is a siege, which would have worked just as well if the defenders had had an old style stone castle. There is no conceivable fortification system that can hold out forever cut off from the world unless it's big enough to be self-sufficient in food, population and weapons production, but if the only thing you can do to defeat a fort system is cut it off from the world it's actually a pretty successful one.


So? It's a lot easier to go on the offensive, and stay there, if you have a solid set of fortifications to defend your homeland. If we imagine the hypothetical situation where any approach to Richmond involves going through a permanent fort network more than fifty miles from the Confederate capital (i.e. across all the good approaches) which must be fought through and which will take a month, then that means that the Confederate army can keep fighting in the north for at least a week or two after the main Union army has invaded the South.
Without the necessity to use the Army of Northern Virginia as the main shield of Richmond, the Union has to have an army up north sufficient to defeat the AoNV and an army going after Richmond sufficient to defeat the AoNV; it never managed this.


Let's say the Union has 150,000 men all told, and the Confederacy has 90,000 men, and that attacking a fort is three times harder than fighting in the open field.

The Confederacy has forts, and puts 30,000 men into the forts. That means they have 60,000 men left over.
The Union wants to attack the South; how many men do they use to make their offensive on Richmond?
If they use 90,000 men, then they've got just about enough to fight the forts - but up north there's 60,000 Confederates and 60,000 Union troops; it's an even fight. And if the Confederacy opts to fight in the south instead, it's an even fight in the open down there.

Now the Confederacy puts 40,000 men into the forts. How many men does the Union put into their offensive on Richmond?
They need at least 120,000 to fight the forts fairly, but that means they've lost the ability to effectively defend Washington...

Obviously this is a hypothetical, but it illustrates that defensive forts are an advantage for the defender because they allow force multiplication; a siege is always going to work, but it's a much slower way of losing than an army winning a pitched battle and then marching straight into your capital city.
Some good points. On the other hand if the Confederacy has its troops tied down in defensive fortifications in the vicinity of Richmond and Petersburg then by definition the Union can liberate the vast majority of slaves which pretty much ends the whole reason of Confederate Independence.
It is interesting to speculate that if the Confederacy did place the majority say seventy percent of it's army in defensive works the ACW might of turned out differently.
On the other hand the victors of conventional war don't win on the ability of who has the best defensive works but on what side can size and hold enemy territory.
I would argue that Lee had the best and only viable strategy to win Independence for the Confederacy with the caveat Lee didn't have enough troops and supplies.
Of course the Confederacy can't be viable by just maintaining control of Richmond and Petersburg . The Confederacy needed to keep all it's territory and that can't be done by fighting on the defensive.
Leftyhunter
 
Some good points. On the other hand if the Confederacy has its troops tied down in defensive fortifications in the vicinity of Richmond and Petersburg then by definition the Union can liberate the vast majority of slaves which pretty much ends the whole reason of Confederate Independence.
I'm not sure you're quite understanding the force distribution envisaged here. I'm talking about the land strategy in the East with the troops historically assigned to the east.

It is interesting to speculate that if the Confederacy did place the majority say seventy percent of it's army in defensive works the ACW might of turned out differently.
Where do you get seventy percent from? 90,000 troops PFD is the number of troops used against Grant in 1864, after considerable Confederate casualties.

On the other hand the victors of conventional war don't win on the ability of who has the best defensive works but on what side can size and hold enemy territory.
Really? Fortifications certainly play a part; one can't understand the Peninsular War without them, and that's just for starters. Without the Lines of Torres Vedras then it would have taken but one more French victory for Wellington to have been kicked off the Iberian Peninsula entirely.

Of course the Confederacy can't be viable by just maintaining control of Richmond and Petersburg . The Confederacy needed to keep all it's territory and that can't be done by fighting on the defensive.
Of course the Confederacy can keep all its territory fighting on the defensive if it fights on the defensive well enough. I've focused on the ability to keep southern Virginia secure from Confederate incursion because it's the easier theatre to describe, but if the Confederacy managed to maintain a network of fortifications along their whole border and moved their field armies to threatened posts that is perhaps the only way to keep all their territory; anything else means either trying to fight an offensive war with a major demogaphic disadvantage or being unable to react to an incursion before it's penetrated deep into the country.
 
Actually, not even that so much - the Germans dramatically overcommitted to an operational approach which happened to work. If it hadn't - which was a matter of luck - not only would the Germans have lost but they'd have looked really stupid.

Basically yes. Germans staked everything on a high-risk gamble, hoping that it would work. If it wouldn't - if French suspected such thing, and even marginally reinforced the Ardennes sector - all plan would be the end of German's armored divisions. They wouldn't be able neither to break through the prepared defenses, nor to retreat back; they would be trapped and systematically destroyed by superior French artillery.

And you absolutely correct that France actually have perfectly comparable - or even superior - weaponry to Germans. All French tanks have thick, shell-proof armor, for example, and French artillery was greatly superior to Germans in both quantity, quality and organization.
 
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