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- Mar 31, 2012
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Sparked by a comment in http://civilwartalk.com/threads/why-the-south-lost.74029/ ...
I think it's fair to say that the effectiveness of the Union blockade has been debated since its very inception (and in fact, even earlier than that), so there are plenty of contrasting viewpoints.
To begin with, there was nothing particularly new nor revolutionary about a blockade. It was what navies did during a major land war, and the British were blockade's foremost practitioners. The US Navy had practical experience with blockades, both by being the blockadee (in the Revolution and War of 1812) and the blockader (in the Mexican War). Steamers both increased the effectiveness of the blockade (in terms of mobility) and added to its logistical complexity (in terms of coal supply).
Blockade had several different (although not necessarily mutually exclusive) forms according to the goals being supported. First and most importantly, they served to contain enemy naval activity, preventing warships from leaving port, preventing others from gaining access to ports and repair/replenishment, and generally hampering the enemy fleet. This sort of blockade could be close or distant; in a close blockade, the blockading vessels are right off the coast or harbor, while in a distant blockade (think of the Royal Navy containing the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea in World War I), the blockaders are based in a convenient location to intercept inbound or outbound enemy ships.
Second, they served to interdict enemy supply and commerce. This was not an automatic principal feature of a blockade; it served relatively little purpose in Europe, for example, but could be very effective when the coast being blockaded had no good source of internal or overland supply and communications.
Third, they served a diplomatic and international legal function. A formally-declared blockade gave certain rights and responsibilities to the blockading power, including a recognized right to stop and search neutral shipping on the high seas, and the right (and responsibility) to detain/impound suspect vessels and cargoes and submit them to a court's jurisdiction for determination of whether the ship and cargo should be released to their owner or seized in the name of the government.
So, when interpreting the effectiveness of the Union blockade, these goals and functions must be kept in mind. In the first case, there is no question of the blockade's effectiveness. Confederate naval forces were sharply restricted in their movements, privateering was virtually exterminated, and Confederate high seas cruisers were usually unable to access Southern harbors for repair and resupply (a notable exception being the CSS Florida at Mobile).
Likewise, in the third particular, the blockade was of undoubted effectiveness. Union warships demanded and received their right of search and seizure very frequently, and (despite some infractions and chafing all around), it was performed without sparking a foreign war. (This right of search was the ultimate reason for declaring a blockade rather than a closure of ports, as port closure was not internationally recognized as allowing the search of neutrals.)
Most of the debate about the blockade's effectiveness centers around the second element, the interdiction of supply and commerce. This is very tricky to determine and there is no clearly accepted answer. Craig L. Symonds highlighted the difficulty very succinctly when he stated, "Eighty percent of attempts to run the blockade were successful. Eighty percent of blockade runners were caught. Both of these figures are true statements." The apparent contradiction comes from the fact that a single runner could make multiple attempts before being caught (or not), and in the definition of what constituted a "successful attempt;" if a coastal schooner made it from Bull's Bay, South Carolina to Brunswick, Georgia, with a cargo of fish and salt, it was a successful attempt. Simple statistics of successful runs and runners caught tell only a fraction of the story.
The general consensus of historians appears to be this: The Confederacy had a relatively inadequate internal communications system (roads and railroads) and was relatively more dependent on waterborne communications along the coasts and rivers than were the Northern states. This was a weakness that could be multiplied and exploited by restricting coastal and riverine transportation. It is unquestioned that the Confederacy's rail network was in a shambles by the end of the war, and a lot of the damage was not from raiding and military action, but from simple overuse and lack of effective upkeep. The blockade was part of the reason. The Confederacy also had difficulty securing credit and financing overseas, and while this did not cause an immediate cessation of hostilities, it was increasingly hampering as the war continued. The constriction of cotton exports was a big part of the reason.
It is often cited that the Confederacy lost no major battle through lack of military supplies, and this does appear to be true on the face of it. In this sense, it could be said that the blockade was not successful in preventing munitions (principally small arms) from entering the Confederacy. But when looking at the big picture, it is difficult to conclude that the Union blockade as a whole was ineffective. The Union could have won the war without the blockade, but it would likely have been a longer, more protracted struggle, with consequently increased chances of foreign recognition and war weariness in the North; and again, it was what navies did in wartime, so I find it hard to believe that anyone, North or South, believed there wouldn't be a blockade.
I think it's fair to say that the effectiveness of the Union blockade has been debated since its very inception (and in fact, even earlier than that), so there are plenty of contrasting viewpoints.
To begin with, there was nothing particularly new nor revolutionary about a blockade. It was what navies did during a major land war, and the British were blockade's foremost practitioners. The US Navy had practical experience with blockades, both by being the blockadee (in the Revolution and War of 1812) and the blockader (in the Mexican War). Steamers both increased the effectiveness of the blockade (in terms of mobility) and added to its logistical complexity (in terms of coal supply).
Blockade had several different (although not necessarily mutually exclusive) forms according to the goals being supported. First and most importantly, they served to contain enemy naval activity, preventing warships from leaving port, preventing others from gaining access to ports and repair/replenishment, and generally hampering the enemy fleet. This sort of blockade could be close or distant; in a close blockade, the blockading vessels are right off the coast or harbor, while in a distant blockade (think of the Royal Navy containing the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea in World War I), the blockaders are based in a convenient location to intercept inbound or outbound enemy ships.
Second, they served to interdict enemy supply and commerce. This was not an automatic principal feature of a blockade; it served relatively little purpose in Europe, for example, but could be very effective when the coast being blockaded had no good source of internal or overland supply and communications.
Third, they served a diplomatic and international legal function. A formally-declared blockade gave certain rights and responsibilities to the blockading power, including a recognized right to stop and search neutral shipping on the high seas, and the right (and responsibility) to detain/impound suspect vessels and cargoes and submit them to a court's jurisdiction for determination of whether the ship and cargo should be released to their owner or seized in the name of the government.
So, when interpreting the effectiveness of the Union blockade, these goals and functions must be kept in mind. In the first case, there is no question of the blockade's effectiveness. Confederate naval forces were sharply restricted in their movements, privateering was virtually exterminated, and Confederate high seas cruisers were usually unable to access Southern harbors for repair and resupply (a notable exception being the CSS Florida at Mobile).
Likewise, in the third particular, the blockade was of undoubted effectiveness. Union warships demanded and received their right of search and seizure very frequently, and (despite some infractions and chafing all around), it was performed without sparking a foreign war. (This right of search was the ultimate reason for declaring a blockade rather than a closure of ports, as port closure was not internationally recognized as allowing the search of neutrals.)
Most of the debate about the blockade's effectiveness centers around the second element, the interdiction of supply and commerce. This is very tricky to determine and there is no clearly accepted answer. Craig L. Symonds highlighted the difficulty very succinctly when he stated, "Eighty percent of attempts to run the blockade were successful. Eighty percent of blockade runners were caught. Both of these figures are true statements." The apparent contradiction comes from the fact that a single runner could make multiple attempts before being caught (or not), and in the definition of what constituted a "successful attempt;" if a coastal schooner made it from Bull's Bay, South Carolina to Brunswick, Georgia, with a cargo of fish and salt, it was a successful attempt. Simple statistics of successful runs and runners caught tell only a fraction of the story.
The general consensus of historians appears to be this: The Confederacy had a relatively inadequate internal communications system (roads and railroads) and was relatively more dependent on waterborne communications along the coasts and rivers than were the Northern states. This was a weakness that could be multiplied and exploited by restricting coastal and riverine transportation. It is unquestioned that the Confederacy's rail network was in a shambles by the end of the war, and a lot of the damage was not from raiding and military action, but from simple overuse and lack of effective upkeep. The blockade was part of the reason. The Confederacy also had difficulty securing credit and financing overseas, and while this did not cause an immediate cessation of hostilities, it was increasingly hampering as the war continued. The constriction of cotton exports was a big part of the reason.
It is often cited that the Confederacy lost no major battle through lack of military supplies, and this does appear to be true on the face of it. In this sense, it could be said that the blockade was not successful in preventing munitions (principally small arms) from entering the Confederacy. But when looking at the big picture, it is difficult to conclude that the Union blockade as a whole was ineffective. The Union could have won the war without the blockade, but it would likely have been a longer, more protracted struggle, with consequently increased chances of foreign recognition and war weariness in the North; and again, it was what navies did in wartime, so I find it hard to believe that anyone, North or South, believed there wouldn't be a blockade.