Lots of wishful thinking and double thinking here....
First, Mr. Brooks, you are a noted and harsh critic of Hood's performance as corps commander. The day's events started unraveling when the gap between Hardee and Cheatham was discovered, and the army started sidling to plug it. All things considered, there is no reason to believe Hood would have been any better placed than Cheatham
if you take a negative view of Hood's ability as a corps commander. One simply can't have it both ways there, but you do try!
You want Hood to be able when you need him to be, but not otherwise.
Second, the obvious solution for Peachtree Creek would either be to have Cheatham do the moving and let the attack go ahead as planned with no delay, or simply let the attack go ahead period. That is undoubtedly what a Lee or a Grant or a Jackson would have done, since none of them felt everything absolutely needed to be perfect before striking a blow. Johnston wasn't of that model. Finding that gap, Johnston would have done exactly what Hood did. Saying anything else breaks with Old Joe's style in the clearest way.
Third, although some historians cite Maney's performance as indecisive, most of them dwell on the difficult ground Hardee had sidled himself into. Castel, the current historian of record for this campaign, is quite clear that the two factors that did the attack in were the delay, and the shift in ground made during the delay that put Hardee's advance in a bad place.
So as I said before, if one is honest in their appraisal of the situation, you can't get to Johnston winning a victory here. If you think Johnston could -- as you do -- you invariably have a very negative opinion of Hood. That is fine, but for this to work, you either need to discard that negative opinion for Hood to do a good job, or you need Johnston to magically become Marse Robert.
As for your morale qualms, it's a good point, but ignores how well A.P. Stewart's Corps did that day.
I don't expect you to abandon your position, because you wrote a book about it. However, it's that kind of loose thinking that turned me off from the "Johnston wins at Atlanta scenario" years ago. It's like sending Stonewall Jackson to Gettysburg -- it always requires too much wishful or double thinking to make it work. Albert Sidney Johnston overwhelming Grant on the second day at Shiloh is even worse.
To make this willful and wishful point clearer, weren't you defending Hardee on another thread about Johnston's removal just a few days ago? But here he is in such a huge sulk he couldn't do his duty properly...
I would suggest a few factors that give credence to the idea that Johnston would have fought the battle more successfully than Hood did.
1. Johnston simply handled the army better than did Hood. During the retreat from Dalton to Atlanta, Johnston demonstrated repeatedly the effective control he had over the army. Clear orders were issued, marching timetables were generally kept, there was little confusion. Under Hood, orders were often confused, units took the wrong roads, proper reconnaissance was frequently not done. And so forth. The Confederate attack at Peachtree Creek was a fiasco of communication and army management, which was due both to Hood's style and the fact that he had only been in command for three days. With Johnston in command, the army simply would have been better handled.
2. One of the major factors in the failure of the Confederate attack at Peachtree Creek was the disappointing performance of George Maney's Tennessee division. Intended to serve as one of the main striking forces of Hardee's attack, Maney's men did little more than engage in a heavy skirmish with the Yankees opposite them and never mounted a serious attack. This can be mainly attributed to the fact that Maney had only been in command of the division for two days, since its former commander, Benjamin Cheatham, had taken command of Hood's corps upon Hood's elevation to army command. Had Cheatham been in command of his division, which he would have been had Hood replaced Johnston, we can assume that the aggressive Tennessean would have eagerly pitched into the Yankees arrayed against them. Hardee's feeble attack would, at least, have been considerably more forceful.
3. It is quite clear that Hardee was in a horrible funk in the days after Hood's elevation from command, insulted that the Texan had been elevated above him. This frankly showed in Hardee's performance at Peachtree Creek, which was one of the low points of his Civil War career. Had Hardee's performance even come close to that of, say, Murfreesboro, the Yankees would have been in serious trouble. Its debatable how much of Hardee's poor performance can be attributed to his funk and his disdain for Hood, but it's fair to say that at least some of it was.
4. Every soldier in the Army of Tennessee, from major generals down to privates, was still processing the fact that Johnston was gone and Hood was now in command. Everybody was thinking, "Does Hood know what he's doing?" That kind of doubt infects armies and has consequences.