The Battle of Malvern Hill, Virginia (July 1st, 1862)

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I know! That was the biggest surprise when I visited the field, and why visits are so important to understand what happened. I had always thought it was akin to Little Round Top, but its more like a gentle rise. Not much of a hill at all.
You're right - and I'd add that its actual elevation/slope is pretty much irrelevant. A visit shows why a Federal gunner would see the topography as "designer" fields of observation and fire. As proved out. that's what it was. It is worth pointing out that there is some elevation on the extreme Federal left.
 
It's been a long time since I've read, Extraordinary Circumstances the Seven Days Battle' by Brian Burton. If I recall correctly, Lee saw the federal batteries being withdrawn and he thought they retreating or withdrawing from the hill and immediately attacked but the federal batteries only withdrew to replenish their ammunition then returned to their position. By this time, the confederate attack was already underway, therefore the federal guns were now ready for them.
 
Political satire always has political spin on it. No doubt it was created by republicans to damage his image.
It also usually has some basis in reality to make it effective. If McClellan hadn't spent time on the Galena on June 30 during Glendale and revisiting the Galena on July 1, the Republicans wouldn't have had much to work with.
 
It's been a long time since I've read, Extraordinary Circumstances the Seven Days Battle' by Brian Burton. If I recall correctly, Lee saw the federal batteries being withdrawn and he thought they retreating or withdrawing from the hill and immediately attacked but the federal batteries only withdrew to replenish their ammunition then returned to their position. By this time, the confederate attack was already underway, therefore the federal guns were now ready for them.
Lee never actually pulled the trigger on ordering an attack at Malvern himself. He set up a rough plan of attack whereby Armistead's brigade, which was best positioned to observe would kick things off once Confederate artillery softened the position up, and everyone else would charge when they heard the yells from Armistead's brigade. This plan ran smack into reality in a number of ways; first of all, the Confederates never got any significant volume of artillery into any kind of effectual action at Malvern Hill. Partly because there's a traffic jam and the artillery isn't close enough, and partly because no orders were sent to the artillery commander, Pendleton, and he didn't show any initiative aside from wandering around looking for Lee.

Relatedly, Lee can't be found because Lee, not seeing any real prospect for success on his front at that point in the afternoon/evening, has actually left that part of the field to scout for a way around the Federal right flank, so the battle starts and everyone's committed by the time he even gets back to see what's happening. But his plan, as far as everyone knows, is still in effect, so when Armistead's men get tangled with some Federal skirmishers, nearby units interpret that as the signal to attack and everything falls apart from there.

Lee's fairly new on the job so can perhaps be forgiven somewhat for delegating too far in giving authority to start the battle to a brigade commander and any division commander nearby who thought they heard something.
 
breckod, thank you for your report. It's been about a decade since I read Extraordinary Circumstances. Of course I forgive Lee for I could never hold or fault anything against him.
 
I visited this battleground once, about 25 years ago, having read about the fighting here nearly 20 years before. quite striking.

From General Lee's official report:

"Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests impeding necessary communication, and the extreme difficulty of the ground, the whole line was not formed until a late hour in the afternoon. The obstacles presented by the woods and swamp made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy, while the field itself afforded us few positions favorable for its use and none for its proper concentration.
[Note: At Gettysburg a year later, on July 3, Lee reported the ground and position allowed for an advantageous concentration of his artillery to oppose that of his opponents, and cover/support his assaulting column.]

Orders were issued for a general advance at a given signal, but the causes referred to prevented a proper concert of action among the troops. D.H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but a simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the overwhelming numbers and numerous batteries of the enemy. Jackson sent to his support his own division and that part of Ewell's which was in reserve, but owing to the increasing darkness and intricacy of the forest and swamp they did not arrive in time to render the desired assistance. Hill was therefore compelled to abandon part of the ground he had gained after suffering severe loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy.
On the right the attack was gallantly made by Huger's and Magruder's commands. Two brigades of the former commenced the action; the other two were subsequently sent to the support of Magruder and Hill. Several determined efforts were made to storm the hill at Crew's house. The brigades advanced bravely across the open field, raked by the fire of a hundred cannon and the musketry of large bodies of infantry. Some were broken and gave way, others approached close to the guns, driving back the infantry, compelling the advanced batteries to retire to escape capture, and mingling their dead with those of the enemy.
For want of concert among the attacking columns their assaults were too weak to break the Federal line, and after struggling gallantly, sustaining and inflicting great loss, they were compelled successively to retire. Night was approaching when the attack began, and it soon became difficult to distinguish friend from foe. The firing continued until after 9 p.m., but no decided result was gained. Part of the troops were withdrawn to their original positions, others remained on the open field, and some rested within a hundred yards of the batteries that had been so bravely but vainly assailed. The general conduct of the troops was excellent.-- in some instances heroic. The lateness of the hour at which the attack necessarily began gave the enemy the full advantage of his superior position and augmented the natural difficulties of our own."


Gen. Lee seems convinced that the failure of his assaults at Malvern Hill were the "lack of concert" of action (it not being possible to employ friendly artillery in force), etc.


Little Mac was of the opinion that NO TROOPS could have taken the position as defended. He reported the circumstances as follows:

"During the actions which ensued at Turkey Bridge, on the New Market road (Glendale),and at White Oak Swamp, changes were made in this disposition. The result of the various actions of the 30th, during which our whole line was attacked, was that the enemy was everywhere repulsed except in his attack upon McCall's division, which, hard pressed by greatly superior numbers, and having lost three of its general officers, broke and lost most of its artillery. The gallant conduct of their comrades near by, especially Hooker's division, retrieved that mishap, and rendered it impossible for the enemy to reap any advantages from it.
By this time the last of the trains had reached Haxall's Landing, and during the night the troops fell back to the vicinity of that place, all arriving in safety and unmolested at an early hour of the morning. They were promptly placed in position to offer battle to the enemy should he again attack, the left of the line resting on the admirable position of Malvern Hill, with a brigade in the low ground to the left watching the road to Richmond; the line then following a line of heights nearly parallel to the river and bending back through the woods nearly to the James River on our right. On the left we relied upon the natural advantages of the position. On the right, where the natural strength was less, some little cutting of timber was done and the roads blocked.
Although our force was small for so extensive a position it was necessary to hold it at any cost. When the battle commenced in the afternoon I saw that in the faces and bearing of the men which satisfied me that we were sure of victory. The attack was made upon our left and left center, and the brunt of it was borne by Porter's corps (including Hunt's reserve artillery and Tyler's heavy guns) and Couch's division, re-enforced by the brigades of Sickles and Meagher. It was desperate, brave, and determined, but so destructive was the fire of our numerous artillery, so heroic the conduct of our infantry, and so admirable the dispositions of Porter, that no troops could have carried the position. Late in the evening the enemy fell back, thoroughly beaten, with dreadful slaughter. So completely was he crushed and so great were his losses, that he has not since ventured to attack us."
 
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