The Battle of Belmont

At the time, each gun would have been accompanied by at least four ammo chests. My failing memory tells me that there were 65 6-pound rounds in each chest -- and somewhat less in the 12-pounder chests. So each 6-pounder may have had 260 rounds; the four may have had 1040 rounds with them.
 
Battle Ends
Having pushed aside the Confederate defenders the Union forces mad a break for their boats. In the confusion the 27th Illinois and a portion of the cavalry returned to the route they had taken in thus becoming seperated from the main body that was taking the more direct route on the main road. To accomplish the desired speed two of the captured artillery pieces were spiked and left behind. When they reached the landing site they found that the security detail (2 companies of the 7th Iowa and three companies of the 22nd Illinois) that had been placed at the site was also missing. As the troops were hustled on board messengers were sent to recover the absent men. After an hour the security detail was found guarding a road to the south. CPT Detrick, the detail commander, wrote that he had been ordered down the road by one of Grant's aides. They were put aboard as the enemy column closed on the landing site. The growing threat caused the boats to begin pulling away from the shore without the 27th Illinois. The last aboard was Grant who barely managed to get onto the boat as troops fired into the enemy from the railings.

The delay caused by the absent Union troops allowed time for the Confederates to regroup. They took good advantage of the opportunity granted them. The Confederates regathered themselves and took up the chase. Cheatham ordered COL Smith, arriving with the second wave of his brigade, "forward at double-quick, hoping to arrest the flying column of the enemy". They arrived shortly after the final Union troops had been loaded. polk ordered the 154th Tennessee "along the river bank" to deliver fire into the boats as they were casting off. The Union gunboats, Lexington and Tyler, returned and opened fire on the Confederates. Polk saw victory "in possession of the field" and determined that further efforts were worthless. At sunset he ordered his "troops to retire".

Meanwhile COL Napoleon Buford and the 27th Illinois remained stranded. Seeing the "steamboats were all in advance steaming towards Cairo" Buford sent his Adjutant, on a borrowed horse, to charge forward and attempt to signal the boats. The aide was able to reach the steamer "Chancellor". The boat was turned around and under guard of the two gunboats returned to pick up Buford's command. The men were loaded without further incident. The only thing left was to do at Belmont was gather the wounded and prisoners and bury the dead.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the Water

Because the Mississippi River seperated the opposing forces from the battlefield water transportation was critical. The Union forces needed to move troops across the river under the guns of the Confederate stronghold at Columbus. The threat of these guns forced Grant to make his landings several miles from his objective. The time taken to march that distance allowed the Confederate troops to gain warning of their approach and appeal for the help that eventually won back the lost camp. Under the protective umbrella of the big guns the Confederate reinforcements could make an uncontested trip across the river and be delivered to the exact point where they were needed.


The movement on the water began at 0300 when the Union gunboats Lexington and Tyler "started down the river for the purpose of engaging their batteries at Columbus." This foray was stopped short by a natural enemy. A dense fog that made navigation impossible and forced the two boats to turn around and return to the starting point. The two boats started out again at 0600 as escorts to the convoy of six steamers that were carrying Grants forces across the river. The landing were accomplished "just without...the range of their guns." After disembarking the troops the two gunboats, both converted timberclad sidewheelers, moved downriver to "engage their batteries". After an exchange of fire in which the Union boats fired "several rounds" they again backed away. The unexpected range of the batteries caused Captain Walke to move the boats and the now empty steamers further up the river.


As the sounds of battle grew Captain Walke decided to make another run at the batteries to divert any possible fire that might assist the Confederates fighting for their camp. At 1000 he steamed his boats down the river "this time going nearly a quarter mile nearer". His boldness was answered when a 24 lb shot from the enemy batteries passed through the Tyler obliquely taking off the head of Seaman Michael Adams and wounding two others. The boats beat a hasty retreat with Captain Walke noting that it was "providential that we escaped with so little damage."


After failing to make any headway against the batteries the two boats turned their firepower on to the Confederate infantry that was challenging the reembarkation of Grant's raiding force. As the convoy pulled away General McClernand was made aware of the missing soldiers and ordered their return. They managed to recover "seeming nearly all that was left behind." For their actions the local Naval commander CPT Andrew H. Foote noted that the two warships had "rendered the most effective service."

Union Naval Assets

Gunboats

Lexington (448 tons with 2-32lb and 4-8" guns)
Tyler (575 tons with 1-32 lb and 6-8" guns)



Transport Steamers

Aleck Scott

Chancellor

Keystone State

Belle Memphis

James Montgomery

Rob Roy



Confederate Naval Assets

Transport Steamers

Charm

Harry W. R. Hill

Ingomar

Kentucky

Prince
 
Conclusion and Assessment
The Battle of Belmont was a short vicious little fight that gained nothing for either side. Grant would later claim that this was a raid that accomplished all that he set out to do. The disruption caused to the Confederate activities was barely noticed. The only thing gained was an insight into a commander that would rise to power. Here Grant demonstrated all the traits that Lincoln found so wanting in his other senior leaders. He was tenaciously aggressive, decisive, and bold in the face of the enemy. He also displayed a real talent for tactical planning. This small battle included a diversionary column (although a rather weak effort by Smith), a secondary objective (Oglesby's column), interservice coordination, and the ability to alter his plans on the fly. It is no surprise that he would eventually gain command of all Union armies.

Polk, despite his reputation as a military lightweight, handled this affair quite well. At first notice of Grant's intentions he gathered troops (Pillow) for reinforcing the camp and did not hesitate to send them. He correctly evaluated threat (or lack of threat) posed by Smith's inland march and further reinforced his troops (Cheatham) to the point where they could counterattack and drive off the Union forces. The only real negative was the inability to close the trap on Grant's retreating forces. In the final analysis nothing was gained by either side but a enlarged casualty list and some experience for the green troops and leaders.
 
Bibliography

The War of the Rebellion: A Complilation of the Official Reports of the Union and Confederate Armies.
Volume III, Reports begin on Page 266

TheOfficial Records of the Union and Confederate Navies
Volume 22

Books
Army of the Heartland, The Army of Tennessee 1861-1862, Thomas Lawrence Connelly
Battle of Belmont: course in historical research, 1920-1921, Military History Pamphlet no. 4.
Nothing But Victory, The Army of the Tennessee 1861-1865, Steven E. Woodworth
The Army of Tennessee, Stanley F. Horn

Articles
Grant and the Belmont Campaign: A Study in Intelligence and Command, William B Feis, taken from The Art of Command in the Civil War, edited by Steven E. Woodworth
Battle of Belmont - Ulysses S. Grant takes Command, Max Epstein, taken from America's Civil War, July 1997 issue
The Battle of Belmont, Duan Marrs, Catlin Historical Soceity

Internet Resources
http://www.civilwar.org/hallowed-ground-magazine/spring-2010/civil-war-kentucky.html
Many other website used to verify biographical, technical, and other information presented in this series.
 
In the first year, it was a story of green troops led by mostly green, inexperienced officers. The real story was the unpreparedness for war. The inability of the Confederacy to adequately stop U.S. access to the Mississippi River, with a stopgap measure in Columbus, Kentucky. They never adequately answered the question. How do you protect seceding states along the Mississippi River? The Confederacy couldn't and didn't and lost the war.
The importance isn't what happened at Belmont, but in the end the futility of defending the Mississippi River at Columbus. Not having enough ironclads and steamboats brought down the Confederacy on the Mississippi River. Not having control of the Mississippi, above Columbus, meant the Confederacy could never control Kentucky. The Confederacy never controlled the Ohio River or the steamboat shipping on it. And the northern border of Kentucky was next to the Ohio River.

The toll of the story is whatever happened to Columbus, Kentucky. And why did historians forget it so soon?
 
The attempt to control waterways with land based firepower proved a failure highlighting the lack of Confederate naval forces. Your point about the rivers is well taken. The Mississippi was the grand prize but the others (Ohio, Cumberland...) gave the Federal forces nearly unfettered access into the theater of operations.
 
I just found this thread and appreciate it very much. Whenever there is a documentary on the beginnings of the war in the western theater, they always start with Forts Henry and Donelson, not mentioning the battle at Belmont at all. Very aggravating. It's a little out of the way, but the State of Kentucky has done a great job on the park and I recommend taking the time to see it.

My great-grandfather was the medical steward for the 13th Tennessee Inf at Belmont.
 
It's very wide there and swift. You'll be disappointed by the Missouri side.....the battlefield has been partly cut off by the river and mostly covered by layers of sediment, nothing looks as it did other than the land is flat. I might add it was very near where the Corps of Engineers blew the levy to relieve pressure from flooding. The Columbus side is beautiful and well preserved.
 
It's very wide there and swift. You'll be disappointed by the Missouri side.....the battlefield has been partly cut off by the river and mostly covered by layers of sediment, nothing looks as it did other than the land is flat. I might add it was very near where the Corps of Engineers blew the levy to relieve pressure from flooding. The Columbus side is beautiful and well preserved.

I once drove by there about eleven years ago, I thought that there was nothing there anymore.
 
At the time, each gun would have been accompanied by at least four ammo chests. My failing memory tells me that there were 65 6-pound rounds in each chest -- and somewhat less in the 12-pounder chests. So each 6-pounder may have had 260 rounds; the four may have had 1040 rounds with them.

The chests held 50 rounds and there was one chest on the limber and two on the caisson for a total of 150 rpg (of all natures). The 10 pdr rifles had the same, and the 12 pdrs 32 rounds per chest (96 rpg).
 
I think of the fight as a kind of western First Bull Run and that it taught the men of Illinois and Iowa that they could see the Rebels off--the western Rebels never had the bulge on the western Federals.

Oookay, ....Think those Ioway and Ill-e -noise Yanks along with some St Louis Dutch and some US Regulars got their own taste of "Bull Run" on August 10, 1861 at a little place called Oak Hill , you'd know it as Wilson Creek. McCullochs Army of the West and Prices MSG , dang sure had the bulge on Lyin' Segeal and the Yanks. At Carthage before that Jackson got the bulge on Seagal . At Lexington after Oak Hill, Price got the bulge on the Yanks again. J.O. Shelby got the Bulge on the Yanks a few times during bthe war as did Marmaduke. No sayin the Rebs never had the bulge on the yankees ....well it ain't so.
 
Oookay, ....

The s in Illinois is silent.

I didn't say the western Yankees were never whipped, I said the rebels never got the bulge on them. By that I mean the psychological advantage, the imposing of a feeling of inferiority and a lower morale on ones enemy. The western Yankees were confident and were sometimes downright cocky. Note how quickly the Army of the Cumberland recovered from Chickamauga, the only major defeat the Westerners suffered.
 
I think of the fight as a kind of western First Bull Run and that it taught the men of Illinois and Iowa that they could see the Rebels off--the western Rebels never had the bulge on the western Federals.

Since Grant was ignominiously defeated, and almost abandoned a thousand men to be captured (who were rescued by McClernand) I don't see how you can reach such a conclusion.
 
Since Grant was ignominiously defeated, and almost abandoned a thousand men to be captured (who were rescued by McClernand) I don't see how you can reach such a conclusion.

Here's how. The Federals drove the rebels on the way in and drove them on the way out. I'm under the impression that in the aftermath of the fight the Federals were pleased with their performance.
 
Here's how. The Federals drove the rebels on the way in and drove them on the way out. I'm under the impression that in the aftermath of the fight the Federals were pleased with their performance.
Their being pleased doesn't automatically mean it went well - Lincoln is on record as having quite approved of Fredericksburg!
 
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