The Army of the Potomac between Gettysburg and Grant

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Did Meade/Halleck/Lincoln have any strategy for the Army of the Potomac after Gettysburg in July 1863, but before the appointment of Grant as General-in-Chief the following March? The ANV invasion had been turned back, at great cost, but then what, sit tight?
 
The obvious reluctance of Meade to engage the ANV convinced Lincoln that Meade would, at least, be able to keep the AoP out of any real trouble, until Grant could tidy things up in the West.
 
Reading the regimental histories, it appears that the field officers were all convinced they were on the verge of a major engagement the moment when Meade was replaced -- and then everything changed.

jno
 
The AoP was pretty beat up after Gettysburg, so it took some time to get back to anything resembling respectable strength, in the eyes of Meade. The Mine Run and Bristoe Station campaigns involved both a Union forray to test Confederate strength, and a Confederate response in kind.

In September of 1863 Longstreet was sent to Chickamauga with two reinforced divisions resulting in the victory there and then Howard's corps was diverted from the AoP to support the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga (under Thomas at that point, Rosecrans having been relieved), and Sherman who was on his way from Mississipi. So aside from the Mine Run and Bristoe Station campaigns/battles, both Meade and Grant seemed content to settle into winter quarters, and await the consequences of the events in Chattanooga. Lee hoped to get Longstreet back, and Meade hoped for either Hooker's men or some substitute for them. But both Hooker and Longstreet were held up and unable to join their original forces for quite some time, Hooker was in Knoxville at Christmas 1863 before being relieved, and Longstreet went into winter quarters in N.E. Tennessee before re-joining Lee in the early spring.

Nothing was going to happen between December and early March anyway, the roads were in terrible shape due to alternate snow, rain, and thawing. So Grant wasn't needed until late March/early April, anyway.

Of course, just to make clear, Grant was in charge of all Union armies, not just the AoP. He had Lincoln's authority to remove Meade if he thought it advisable, but after meeting with Meade shortly after his arrival at AoP headquarters, Grant decided to keep him in command. He did, however, decide to place his headquarters with the AoP, where he could keep a close eye on Meede. If he replaced Meade, he would have had to put someone else in charge, which raised the ugly prospect of the Union army changing commanders after every major battle.
 
Very true that Meade's remaining in command had more to do with the internal politics of the AoP(no time for any more dissension within its ranks, than already existed) than any real confidence that he was the best available in Union armies(rather than the AoP, in which he was the best available).
It was generally recognized that Meade was competent enough within his very limited range, but realizing that range did include winning the war, by fighting Lee and the ANV, with any confidence he could actually win.
 
Jeff Hunt is running a series of books covering July 16 through December 31, 1863. The first volume has already been published

Bryce
 
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