"The Anaconda Plan is the strategy that won the Civil War."

:DUnless General McClellan was implementing the Anaconda plan, he is irrelevant to this topic. He did contribute to history by offering that General Scott was either a traitor or a dotard. That apparently got back to General Halleck and the army in general. It probably did not sit well with the naval commanders Farragut and Lee either.
There is not very much evidence that Lincoln thought that capturing Richmond without taking apart Lee's army would result in the end of hostilities. Lee might surrender, but many other Confederates would continue to fight in other ways. :nerd:
 
You're still setting up a false dichotomy.
Responsibility confers both ability and accountability.



So I decided to look into the numbers around the defending-Washington thing.



Strength required to defend Washington: 40,000 (per corps commanders), as:
15,000 in the forts, or enough to man them
25,000 covering force in Virginia (Manassas to Harpers Ferry)


27 March: Stanton determines that troops in the Shenandoah Valley do count as able to defend Washington.
By 4th April - Stanton argues that troops in the Shenandoah Valley do NOT count as able to defend Washington.



McClellan's plan was:


Baltimore - 7,388 after railroad guards

Washington - 10,600 manning the fortifications
11,400 disposable troops (i.e. a force surplus to the defences) of whom 4,000 ordered to Manassas (total 22,000)
4,000 new troops in NY ordered to Washington
3,500 new troops in Pa ordered to Manassas

Guarding the railroads in Md: 3,359, to be relieved and sent to Manassas

Abercrombie's force at Manassas including Geary and some cavalry: 7,780 (with 12 field guns)

In the Shenandoah was Banks' 5th Corps and Blenker's division of 2nd Corps: 29,715 (with 24 field guns)

And 3,652 cavalry and the railroad guards (2,100)

And "some regiment" plus 500 cavalry to be 1,350 men total on the lower Potomac.

Which McClellan presented as being desired as:

7,780 at Warrenton
10,859 at Manassas
35,467 in the Shenandoah Valley
and 1,350 on the lower Potomac
For 55,456 total
Plus 18,000 for "the garrisons and the front of Washington".
Or 73,456 (for which the 4,000 NY troops were extra and should go to Washington). Interestingly Baltimore is mentioned but the strength is not actually used anywhere in his listing.

The combined strength of Banks, Blenker and Abercrombie is 37,495, though his number for Abercrombie includes an unspecified amount of cavalry and Geary's Independent Brigade.







Actual strengths at these points, all Present, from 31 March report unless otherwise noted:

Washington district: 20,795 (McClellan overcount by 1,205)
5th Corps (exc. Blenker) 23,607.
Blenker as 1/3 of 2nd Corps: 9,302 (combined strength 32,909, McClellan overcount by about 4,500 minus however large Geary's Independent Brigade was)
Alexandria district: 1,404 (presumably included in the Washington count by McClellan? This negates that overcount entirely and turns it into an undercount by 199)
Railroad Brigade 4,993 (April, McClellan undercount by 1,600)
Baltimore 6,717 (30th May, McClellan overcount by 600 but not part of his direct scheme - probably the movement of regiments between 1 April and 30 May)

No known strengths for:
Shenandoah railroad guards, cavalry
Lower Potomac force

Total 60,101 as:
22,199 in or around Washington directly
Railroad Brigade and Banks as covering force: 37,902, plus Geary

plus 6,717 in Baltimore.

Add the troops en route and you're up to 74,318, plus Geary, or 67,601 + Geary without the Baltimore force.


So the amount of troops McClellan left defending Washington comes in the lowest possible calculation to 55,108. This calculation discounts some line-of-communication troops McClellan included and several new regiments which McClellan already had under orders (and included), and his ops plan included leaving a whole extra corps in the Manassas area until the situation around Washington was safe.

The document he wrote was outlining the situation as it would be when he had taken his whole army to the Peninsula, which had not yet taken place; it's not surprising that it included some troops who were still en route. What it looks like is that McClellan's numbers are probably correct apart from double counting a brigade somewhere and assuming the arrival of some new regiments which had not yet arrived, and perhaps being a little overzealous in identifying LoC troops to relieve by new troops and send to the front.

Either way, however, he has definitely exceeded the 40,000 considered to be the minimum required by the corps commanders - and not by a small amount, either.


The argument used against McClellan was actually that the defences of Washington were insufficiently garrisoned because Wadsworth didn't have enough men Present to do the tasks required, this number being reached by taking the 20,795 and discounting the troops sick or under arrest. This was presented as the entire defence of Washington and used to raise the alarm by Stanton, though in fact less than a week prior Stanton had concurred that troops in the Shenandoah did indeed count as available to defend Washington.

The ultimate fate of 1st Corps after it was witheld, furthermore, was not to be used in the Washington defences to show the men in the capital that they were being defended or to bolster the apparently flawed strength of those defences. Instead they were used to hold the line of the Rappahanock and swelled the covering force to an absurd degree - as of mid April it comprised six divisions, while McClellan's main force composed eight. (Total Present defending Washington at this point exclusive of Baltimore or line of communcation troops 91,000; total Present in McClellan's army at this point about 95,000.)



Of course, it's always going to be a bit absurd to simultaneously hold these views:

1) We need 35,000 more troops to defend the capital, let's take them from our main effort against the enemy.
2) I think our main effort against the enemy will win the war in a few weeks, let's not bother recruiting any more troops.
 
Responsibility confers both ability and accountability.



So I decided to look into the numbers around the defending-Washington thing.



Strength required to defend Washington: 40,000 (per corps commanders), as:
15,000 in the forts, or enough to man them
25,000 covering force in Virginia (Manassas to Harpers Ferry)


27 March: Stanton determines that troops in the Shenandoah Valley do count as able to defend Washington.
By 4th April - Stanton argues that troops in the Shenandoah Valley do NOT count as able to defend Washington.



McClellan's plan was:


Baltimore - 7,388 after railroad guards

Washington - 10,600 manning the fortifications
11,400 disposable troops (i.e. a force surplus to the defences) of whom 4,000 ordered to Manassas (total 22,000)
4,000 new troops in NY ordered to Washington
3,500 new troops in Pa ordered to Manassas

Guarding the railroads in Md: 3,359, to be relieved and sent to Manassas

Abercrombie's force at Manassas including Geary and some cavalry: 7,780 (with 12 field guns)

In the Shenandoah was Banks' 5th Corps and Blenker's division of 2nd Corps: 29,715 (with 24 field guns)

And 3,652 cavalry and the railroad guards (2,100)

And "some regiment" plus 500 cavalry to be 1,350 men total on the lower Potomac.

Which McClellan presented as being desired as:

7,780 at Warrenton
10,859 at Manassas
35,467 in the Shenandoah Valley
and 1,350 on the lower Potomac
For 55,456 total
Plus 18,000 for "the garrisons and the front of Washington".
Or 73,456 (for which the 4,000 NY troops were extra and should go to Washington). Interestingly Baltimore is mentioned but the strength is not actually used anywhere in his listing.

The combined strength of Banks, Blenker and Abercrombie is 37,495, though his number for Abercrombie includes an unspecified amount of cavalry and Geary's Independent Brigade.







Actual strengths at these points, all Present, from 31 March report unless otherwise noted:

Washington district: 20,795 (McClellan overcount by 1,205)
5th Corps (exc. Blenker) 23,607.
Blenker as 1/3 of 2nd Corps: 9,302 (combined strength 32,909, McClellan overcount by about 4,500 minus however large Geary's Independent Brigade was)
Alexandria district: 1,404 (presumably included in the Washington count by McClellan? This negates that overcount entirely and turns it into an undercount by 199)
Railroad Brigade 4,993 (April, McClellan undercount by 1,600)
Baltimore 6,717 (30th May, McClellan overcount by 600 but not part of his direct scheme - probably the movement of regiments between 1 April and 30 May)

No known strengths for:
Shenandoah railroad guards, cavalry
Lower Potomac force

Total 60,101 as:
22,199 in or around Washington directly
Railroad Brigade and Banks as covering force: 37,902, plus Geary

plus 6,717 in Baltimore.

Add the troops en route and you're up to 74,318, plus Geary, or 67,601 + Geary without the Baltimore force.


So the amount of troops McClellan left defending Washington comes in the lowest possible calculation to 55,108. This calculation discounts some line-of-communication troops McClellan included and several new regiments which McClellan already had under orders (and included), and his ops plan included leaving a whole extra corps in the Manassas area until the situation around Washington was safe.

The document he wrote was outlining the situation as it would be when he had taken his whole army to the Peninsula, which had not yet taken place; it's not surprising that it included some troops who were still en route. What it looks like is that McClellan's numbers are probably correct apart from double counting a brigade somewhere and assuming the arrival of some new regiments which had not yet arrived, and perhaps being a little overzealous in identifying LoC troops to relieve by new troops and send to the front.

Either way, however, he has definitely exceeded the 40,000 considered to be the minimum required by the corps commanders - and not by a small amount, either.


The argument used against McClellan was actually that the defences of Washington were insufficiently garrisoned because Wadsworth didn't have enough men Present to do the tasks required, this number being reached by taking the 20,795 and discounting the troops sick or under arrest. This was presented as the entire defence of Washington and used to raise the alarm by Stanton, though in fact less than a week prior Stanton had concurred that troops in the Shenandoah did indeed count as available to defend Washington.

The ultimate fate of 1st Corps after it was witheld, furthermore, was not to be used in the Washington defences to show the men in the capital that they were being defended or to bolster the apparently flawed strength of those defences. Instead they were used to hold the line of the Rappahanock and swelled the covering force to an absurd degree - as of mid April it comprised six divisions, while McClellan's main force composed eight. (Total Present defending Washington at this point exclusive of Baltimore or line of communcation troops 91,000; total Present in McClellan's army at this point about 95,000.)



Of course, it's always going to be a bit absurd to simultaneously hold these views:

1) We need 35,000 more troops to defend the capital, let's take them from our main effort against the enemy.
2) I think our main effort against the enemy will win the war in a few weeks, let's not bother recruiting any more troops.


Do all the figuring you want. It's irrelevant.

McClellan failed in his fundamental responsibility to convince his boss that his plan should be followed in full. It doesn't matter if his plan was the most perfect plan ever devised or if it wasn't fit to line the bottom of a bird cage. He didn't convince the Commander-in-Chief. Apparently you want to absolve him of that failure.
 
McClellan failed in his fundamental responsibility to convince his boss that his plan should be followed in full. It doesn't matter if his plan was the most perfect plan ever devised or if it wasn't fit to line the bottom of a bird cage. He didn't convince the Commander-in-Chief. Apparently you want to absolve him of that failure.
But he did - while he was there talking to Lincoln, Lincoln approved the plan and gave him assurances. Lincoln changed his mind only after McClellan left.

Should McClellan have remained in Washington instead, so as to ensure that he was always there to argue his case with Lincoln? Seems kind of hard to act as a field commander in that case...
Of course, if Lincoln never was convinced, he shouldn't have given those assurances (such as that no further troops would be detached from McClellan's command) in the first place.
 
Do all the figuring you want. It's irrelevant.

McClellan failed in his fundamental responsibility to convince his boss that his plan should be followed in full. It doesn't matter if his plan was the most perfect plan ever devised or if it wasn't fit to line the bottom of a bird cage. He didn't convince the Commander-in-Chief. Apparently you want to absolve him of that failure.

exactly - the best battleplan is for naught if you can't sell it to your boss
 
But he did - while he was there talking to Lincoln, Lincoln approved the plan and gave him assurances. Lincoln changed his mind only after McClellan left.

which means lincoln hadn't really bought it, has he? he got him to say yes but he did not persuade him.

Should McClellan have remained in Washington instead, so as to ensure that he was always there to argue his case with Lincoln? Seems kind of hard to act as a field commander in that case...

nope, he should have sold his plan in a way that nobody else (especially people he didn't agree with) could deviade it again. giving orders is relatively easy - little mac failed miserably where he couldn't do that. the moment he left his plan was taken apart.

Of course, if Lincoln never was convinced, he shouldn't have given those assurances (such as that no further troops would be detached from McClellan's command) in the first place.

amateurs are easily bullied into something when pressed hard by professionals. those 'convictions' are normally rather shallow and easily revoked, though.
 
(such as that no further troops would be detached from McClellan's command)
The actual assurance was no further troops would be detached from McClellan if Washington was adequately covered. And it was Lincoln who would decide the adequacy of that coverage and McClellan knew that and chose to play fast and loose with the president. This is the primary fault of McClellan - the complete inability to see the way Lincoln saw things. A blind man could see Lincoln was paranoid about the Capitol. A commander with better antennae would have made sure that Lincoln was 100% satisfied before moving south. Lincoln didn't ever change his mind. McClellan changed it for him. Even the most die-hard McClellan apologist must admit that the McClellan ego got in the way of his relationship with the president. My father once told me, "If you and your boss don't get along, no matter what, it is never your boss's fault." Meaning it is the subordinate's responsibility to get along, not the other way round.
 
But he did - while he was there talking to Lincoln, Lincoln approved the plan and gave him assurances. Lincoln changed his mind only after McClellan left.

Apparently he didn't, then.

Should McClellan have remained in Washington instead, so as to ensure that he was always there to argue his case with Lincoln? Seems kind of hard to act as a field commander in that case...
Of course, if Lincoln never was convinced, he shouldn't have given those assurances (such as that no further troops would be detached from McClellan's command) in the first place.

He should have done a better job to preclude second thoughts.
 
which means lincoln hadn't really bought it, has he? he got him to say yes but he did not persuade him.
So the very fact that Lincoln changed his mind demonstrates that McClellan failed?

I mean, it's quite possible that Lincoln was always devoted to the Overland approach (the alternative he preferred) but that was a militarily foolish plan which none of the corps commanders endorsed - and these are the corps commanders Lincoln picked specifically because they disagreed with McClellan over the Urbanna plan.

And it was Lincoln who would decide the adequacy of that coverage and McClellan knew that and chose to play fast and loose with the president.
That's an assertion, not fact. McClellan's documentation of the force to be placed upon the Rappahanock appears to contain one error (a double-counted brigade) and a number of clearly marked places where troops would be moved into position but were not yet. That's not "playing fast and loose" but a full accounting of the orders he has already given but which have not yet come to fruition.
To "play fast and loose" is to deliberately attempt to decieve or be irresponsible. Instead McClellan's plan outlined a minimum amount that would be present to defend Washington once his entire force had moved, and his operational order was phased so that there would be at least two additional divisions present until the enemy had materially withdrawn.

The people who convinced McClellan otherwise had access to him while McClellan did not, and they did play fast and loose - because they (specifically Stanton, IIRC) changed their definitions on what counted as defending Washington.

My father once told me, "If you and your boss don't get along, no matter what, it is never your boss's fault." Meaning it is the subordinate's responsibility to get along, not the other way round.
So your view is that, in any dispute between Lincoln and McClellan, it must be McClellan who is in the wrong because Lincoln is the boss?

Even the most die-hard McClellan apologist must admit that the McClellan ego got in the way of his relationship with the president.
Did this ego ever get displayed publicly? Indeed, did Lincoln ever mention it at the time?
(I'm aware of the "went to bed" snub, by the way, and there is circumstantial evidence that it never took place - it only appears in one source after all the other principals are dead. It certainly never appears in McClellan's letters to his wife.)

He should have done a better job to preclude second thoughts.
If Lincoln didn't agree with the plan McClellan proposed, he should have ordered McClellan to follow a different one. He declined to do so.
 
So the very fact that Lincoln changed his mind demonstrates that McClellan failed?

of course, he could not secure the troops and material for his plan to work. that he considered himself a military giant and everybody else a dwarf didn't help either.

if he doesn't get what he needs he can always resign but that would betray him of his 'well deserved' glory.

joseph heller invented the term catch 22 for that sort of a problem
 
To "play fast and loose" is to deliberately attempt to decieve or be irresponsible
Exactly. McClellan had to know how sensitive this subject was with the president. Therefore, anything but the strictest adherence to Lincoln's requirement, and McClellan's own assurances about the number of troops to cover Washington, is playing false or being irresponsible. Your choice.
 
Neither Anaconda or On to Richmond were sound strategic plans. The actual plan was to trap Lee near Richmond and let the swollen population of Richmond and the army, plus the horses and mules need to keep the city alive slowly consume the south's resources, while all other Confederate armies disintegrated, and the last two components of what began as Scott's plan were completed.
Thus it appears that McClellan's On to Richmond plan had two significant problems. The problems were Halleck's conservatism in the Corinth campaign and the lack of a unified command in the Shenandoah valley.
 
So your view is that, in any dispute between Lincoln and McClellan, it must be McClellan who is in the wrong because Lincoln is the boss?
No. Now you're being deliberately obtuse. In any dispute between Lincoln and McClellan, Mac must bow to the president, convince the president to change his mind, or resign. Full stop. The problem was that the Little Napoleon did not see himself as the subordinate. He was God's appointed savior of the nation and the rest were "baboons", "impudent little puppies", "traitors." There can be no doubt how McClellan felt. He bared his soul every night in a letter to his wife. Every single one of McClellan's "wounds" was self-inflicted, the result of his massively inflated sense of self-importance and the resulting low opinion he had of others.
 
That's an assertion, not fact. McClellan's documentation of the force to be placed upon the Rappahanock appears to contain one error (a double-counted brigade) and a number of clearly marked places where troops would be moved into position but were not yet
You still don't get it. When it came to troops to cover Washington, Lincoln's not McClellan's opinion was the only one that mattered. You suffer from the same delusion that McClellan did - that it only matters who's right. Who's right is the least important part of the equation when a subordinate is dealing with his boss. Unless the boss can be convinced that the subordinate is right, it simply doesn't matter. The problem Mac had was that one of them was president and the other wasn't. That simple.
 
The so called Anaconda plan was the not the plan that won the Civil War. But it was a plan. It inspired Lincoln to think strategically, which had excellent results. The plan that eventually won combined some parts of Scott's plan, some of Lincoln's desire for simultaneous movements, a railroad campaign into Georgia, but the attempt to take Richmond evolved into a holding action.
Lincoln's plans always had much more emphasis on the west, including Colorado, New Mexico, Ft. Smith and the Mississippi River.
 
I mean, it's quite possible that Lincoln was always devoted to the Overland approach
I think you are right there. Grant liked the Peninsula approaching. It wasn't his only idea on how to take Richmond/Petersburg, but the Overland was more or less forced on him.
 
The Anaconda description was not sufficient to win the Civil War. But the outcome of the war indicates that it was similar to what was necessary. The US did not prevail until it had full control of the Mississippi and had completed closure of all the major Confederate ports.
That's hard to say. Critical ports such has Wilmington were not captured untill January 1865. Mobile and Charleston not until the latter part of 1864.
Could the Union of won simply by siezing control of all Confederate ports and controling all navigable rivers? We simply can't know that. It is reasonable to conclude that if the Union did so the institution of slavery would collapse since their is no way to export products.
Leftyhunter
 
The Confederacy began without Richmond. After Richmond fell and the principal officers of the Confederacy surrendered, Confederate people, fighting from home, maintained a successful insurgency which targeted the African/Americans. After the violent part of that insurgency decreased they nonetheless fought a verbal insurgency, which still lives on the internet.
Thus Scott's suffocation plan was not enough, onto Richmond was not enough.
The Confederacy could have relocated its capital to Atlanta or Montgomery, or even Austin or Monterrey, Mexico. The insurgency functioned fine without artillery or naval vessels.
A low level terrorist insurgency is not relevant to a major conventional war. It's not even apples and oranges.
Leftyhunter
 
Here's the first 25 cities as computed from the 1860 census numbers, and published in 1866:
1579530675459.png
 
Here are is the list of state currency systems based in banks, as published in 1862. Note that there are no banks listed for Texas, Mississippi and Arkansas:
1579530909007.png
 
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