Books On Second Manassas
Tempest At Ox Hill: The Battle of Chantilly. David A. Welker. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press (2002). 279 pp. 11 maps.
This is a review and summary of David A. Welker's Tempest at Ox Hill: The Battle of Chantilly. Mr. Welker's book is one of three on the Battle of Chantilly that appeared from 2002-2003. The others include Paul Taylor's He Hath Loosed the Fateful Lightning: The Battle of Ox Hill and Charles V. Mauro's The Battle of Chantilly (Ox Hill: A Monumental Storm). After having read the books by Mr. Taylor and Mr. Welker (and after hearing that Mr. Mauro's book is less than 100 pages long), I have come to the conclusion that Welker's book comes the closest to being a definitive study of the battle. This is not to say that Paul Taylor's book is "bad" in any way. It is in fact a very solid tactical history of the battle. I just feel that Welker's study brings the most to the table, and that if you had to spend your hard-earned money on only one book, Welker's should be it. The Battle of Chantilly, contested on September 1, 1862 between the forces of Stonewall Jackson's Wing of the Army of Northern Virginia and the divisions of Isaac Stevens and Phil Kearny of the Army of the Potomac, was a battle that cost the Union the services of the aforementioned division commanders. In giving their lives, Kearny and Stevens had also prevented Robert E. Lee from interposing the Army of Northern Virginia between Pope's Union forces and the Union capital. This is a tactical level study of the battle, but it also contains an entire chapter dedicated to the lives of Kearny and Stevens before fate brought them together at Ox Hill. Welker succeeds admirably in presenting a readable and definitive work on the battle. The included maps are not the best that I've seen, but they do a good job in letting the reader understand the text. Welker finishes the book with a concluding chapter detailing the many different ways you can "win" a battle, focusing of course on Chantilly in this case. Anyone interested in the war in the east, especially the Second Manassas Campaign, will want to pick this one up.
In chapter one, Welker discusses the events leading up to the Battle of Chantilly. He starts in May 1862 by discussing Jackson's famous Valley Campaign. The troops which would eventually form Pope's Army of Virginia were the unwilling foils to Jackson's brilliant strategic maneuvers. It was Jackson's feats that caused Lincoln and his cabinet to decide to create a unified command to prevent another debacle from occurring in the Valley. This command went to John Pope in late June 1862. In addition, Henry Halleck was appointed General-in-Chief, thus demoting McClellan from his command of the Army of the Potomac. Needless to say, McClellan was less than thrilled with these events. He had wanted to use Pope's troops in his own Peninsula Campaign, and Halleck's appointment meant he was no longer General-in-Chief. Welker goes on to describe the Campaign of Second Manassas in surprising detail. The first chapter is 25 pages long, and due to a quirky page layout with skinny margins all around, that's a lot of material for background. As the chapter ends, the Union Army is licking its wounds at Centreville on the night of August 30, and Lee is already looking for ways around Pope.
Welker next details the lives of Philip Kearny and Isaac Stevens, the two promising Union commanders who lost their lives at Chantilly. Despite sharing little in common in their lives, both of these men were hard fighters with bright futures. Stevens had graduated first in his class at West Point, and Kearny, despite being prevented from attending West Point by his grandfather, eventually found himself a veteran of many fights, both foreign and domestic. Each man almost definitely knew of the other, but they might have only first met on the Union right at Second Bull Run. These men led from the front because they knew no other way to lead men than to literally LEAD them. This personal courage, some would say recklessness, caught up with both of them on September 1, 1862.
"Movements and Machinations" covers the first half of the day following the Battle of Second Bull Run. Pope's Army was at Centreville, Virginia, behind formidable fortifications. Most were miserable after their defeat of the day before. Welker stresses the importance of Pope's line, saying, "The size and flexibility of Pope's force would have made any army commander jealous. Indeed, he had two entire corps in his reserve and yet still had a solid defensive line." Lee sent Jackson on a flanking march first north up Gum Springs Road, and then ESE down the Little River Turnpike. This important road led to Fairfax Courthouse and an intersection with the Warrenton Turnpike. Pope would need to use the Warrenton Turnpike to retreat to Washington, and Lee hoped to get Jackson interspersed between the Federal Army and their Capital. Pope spent the first half of August 31st utterly oblivious to Jackson's march.
Stonewall Jackson and his vaunted Foot Cavalry began their flanking march from Sudley Church around noon on August 31. However, on this particular day, Jackson's men weren't marching at the usual rapid pace. The men had been marching for weeks and had just fought intense battles over the last three days. To make matters worse, food was scarce with no prospect for relief any time this day. And to add icing to the cake, it rained all day and turned the roads to quagmires. A.P. Hill's Light Division led the way, followed by Lawton's and Starke's Divisions. Fitz Lee's Cavalry Brigade was even ****her out front and protected Jackson's right flank once he turned to the southeast and marched down the Little River Turnpike. The Confederate Cavalry managed to capture parts of two Union Cavalry Regiments out guarding Pope's right flank that day, but enough men escaped to warn Pope later that night of the massive threat building on his flank. As Jackson began his march, Pope was detailing troops to guard his massive wagon train as it retreated east to Washington. Incredibly, he pulled two regiments and two guns from his defensive force under Torbert at Jermantown. Part of Marsena Patrick's Brigade was also sent with the train as it slowly made its way east along Warrenton Turnpike. Stuart and two other Cavalry Brigades joined Fitz Lee's men later that day and together they tested the Union defenses west of Jermantown along Difficult Run. Stuart believed this line too tough to crack with cavalry. Instead, he brought up some artillery and shelled the massive Union wagon train to the south on Warrenton Turnpike as night came on. Welker believes this was a major mistake.
Just after midnight, Pope was informed of the shelling of his wagon train. This attack came on one of only two available retreat routes, but Pope, following a typical pattern by not fully trusting cavalry reports, decided that surely other sightings would have come in if Lee were flanking him. Pope did send a reconnaissance north towards the Little River Turnpike on a fairly wide front, and he also reinforced Jermantown at this time. It had stopped raining on the morning of September 1, but the day was cloudy and it looked like more rain was on the way. Dana's Brigade (commanded by Edward Hinks) reached Jermantown, and Welker believes that Jermantown was finally able to be properly defended at this point. Just after dawn, Jackson began his own march down the Little River Turnpike. He reversed his marching order of the day before, allowing Starke to lead, and having Lawton and Hill follow. Jackson's men were hungry, the wet road was a mess, Longstreet was nowhere near, and Jackson was worried about what he might run into, so the march was very slow. Jackson also ordered Stuart to scout ahead. A fight developed along Stringfellow Road between Starke's Brigade and Howard's Brigade around 11:20 A.M. Howard, following orders not to bring on a general engagement, retreated. Through some mix-up, Beverly Robertson's Cavalry Brigade, thought to be scouting on Jackson's right front, stayed with Starke. This resulted in no cavalry screen for Jackson in that important area. Pope knew now that he had to retreat. He sent yet another dispatch to Halleck asking what he should do.
Before his reconnaissance patrols could even report back, Pope received word from tow cavalrymen that they had seen Confederate infantry at Chantilly, which placed them in his rear, even ****her east than his reconnaissance! Pope knew that if the Confederates reached Fairfax Courthouse (just east of Jermantown), his defenses at Centreville would be useless. Pope, still trying to save his career, did not want to retreat unless given an order from Halleck. Due to this, Pope played a dangerous game. He gambled that he could hold Lee at Jermantown while waiting for an order from Halleck to retreat. Welker points out that if Lee moved too fast or Halleck too slow, Pope could well have a disaster on his hands. Pope selected the III Corps of the Army of Virginia and the IX Corps to play his game. The III Corps would move to Jermantown to strengthen the forces there to the point of being able to hold off a potential attack by Lee, and the IX Corps would move to cover the Warrenton Turnpike east of Centreville in case the Confederates headed south to cut that route instead of attacking Jermantown. Pope actually visited Fitz-John Porter, commander of the Army of the Potomac's V Corps and good friend of McClellan, for advice at this time. Welker says that Pope hoped to get the McClellanites to agree to a retreat. When this tactic didn't work, Pope returned to his tent. Pope, reacting to the threat at Chantilly, ordered the III Corps to support Stevens in front of the force near Chantilly. However, Pope apparently never told Stevens of this support. In addition, Heintzelman apparently never told his division commanders where they were headed. Confusion reigned in high places, and this reflects poorly on Pope. Hooker, the temporary commander at Jermantown, received some reinforcements and decided to make his defense along Difficult Run, just west of the town. Jackson and Stuart probed this line and skirmishing broke out for a few hours. However, about this time, Jackson became aware of a threat to his right flank. It was Stevens, following orders to protect the Warrenton Turnpike from attack. Lee was near the battlefield that day, but he didn't participate. Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that both hands were still in splints. Regardless, this was Jackson's fight. To counter the threat from the Federals to his south, Jackson moved Branch's and Field's Brigades south of Little River Turnpike through some woods that fronted an open field on the east, and a corn field on the west.
Stevens moved east from Centreville around 3 P.M. with the IX Corps. Jesse Reno was sick, leaving Stevens in charge. He soon was led north on a country road by two Cavalrymen who had earlier seen Confederates in the vicinity of Chantilly. Leaving Ferrero's Brigade to guard the Warrenton Turnpike, Stevens moved north. Kearny's and Hooker's III Corps divisions left Centreville about an hour later, also traveling down Warrenton Turnpike in an easterly direction. Soon enough, Stevens came to the Unfinished Railroad (the same one which had figured so prominently in the Second Manassas fighting) and saw Confederate skirmishers to the north on Ox Hill. Stevens immediately ordered skirmishers to advance, and then formed his three-brigade Division into a column of Brigades. In other words, each brigade was in line, with succeeding brigades directly behind the first. Stevens launched his attack in an effort to prevent whatever offensive designs the Confederates had in mind, whether they were to the east and Jermantown or to the south and Warrenton Turnpike. At this point Jesse Reno arrived. Though he didn't necessarily have much hope for the success of Stevens's plan, he allowed it to proceed. As Stevens's Division moved forward around 4:30 P.M., Reno sent Ferrero's Brigade into some woods to the east of Ox Road to provide them with some support. Stevens's men, caught out in the open, suffered heavy casualties and started to waver. At this point, Stevens headed for the front. Ferrero's supporting brigade also ran into the Confederates. The 21st Massachusetts stumbled into an ambush and lost nearly 100 men from only one volley. This event would have dire consequences later in the day. After some widening of his front, he personally led a charge around 5 P.M. that broke Hays' Louisiana Brigade (led by Col. Henry Forno). At this point, Stevens was shot in the temple and killed instantly, wrapped in the flag of his 79th New York Highlanders. However, three regiments of Jubal Early's Brigade stopped the breakthrough and sent Stevens' now-leaderless division streaming for the rear. Throughout the fight it had been raining heavily. By this time it was approximately 5:30 P.M.
CONTINUED...
Tempest At Ox Hill: The Battle of Chantilly. David A. Welker. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press (2002). 279 pp. 11 maps.
This is a review and summary of David A. Welker's Tempest at Ox Hill: The Battle of Chantilly. Mr. Welker's book is one of three on the Battle of Chantilly that appeared from 2002-2003. The others include Paul Taylor's He Hath Loosed the Fateful Lightning: The Battle of Ox Hill and Charles V. Mauro's The Battle of Chantilly (Ox Hill: A Monumental Storm). After having read the books by Mr. Taylor and Mr. Welker (and after hearing that Mr. Mauro's book is less than 100 pages long), I have come to the conclusion that Welker's book comes the closest to being a definitive study of the battle. This is not to say that Paul Taylor's book is "bad" in any way. It is in fact a very solid tactical history of the battle. I just feel that Welker's study brings the most to the table, and that if you had to spend your hard-earned money on only one book, Welker's should be it. The Battle of Chantilly, contested on September 1, 1862 between the forces of Stonewall Jackson's Wing of the Army of Northern Virginia and the divisions of Isaac Stevens and Phil Kearny of the Army of the Potomac, was a battle that cost the Union the services of the aforementioned division commanders. In giving their lives, Kearny and Stevens had also prevented Robert E. Lee from interposing the Army of Northern Virginia between Pope's Union forces and the Union capital. This is a tactical level study of the battle, but it also contains an entire chapter dedicated to the lives of Kearny and Stevens before fate brought them together at Ox Hill. Welker succeeds admirably in presenting a readable and definitive work on the battle. The included maps are not the best that I've seen, but they do a good job in letting the reader understand the text. Welker finishes the book with a concluding chapter detailing the many different ways you can "win" a battle, focusing of course on Chantilly in this case. Anyone interested in the war in the east, especially the Second Manassas Campaign, will want to pick this one up.
In chapter one, Welker discusses the events leading up to the Battle of Chantilly. He starts in May 1862 by discussing Jackson's famous Valley Campaign. The troops which would eventually form Pope's Army of Virginia were the unwilling foils to Jackson's brilliant strategic maneuvers. It was Jackson's feats that caused Lincoln and his cabinet to decide to create a unified command to prevent another debacle from occurring in the Valley. This command went to John Pope in late June 1862. In addition, Henry Halleck was appointed General-in-Chief, thus demoting McClellan from his command of the Army of the Potomac. Needless to say, McClellan was less than thrilled with these events. He had wanted to use Pope's troops in his own Peninsula Campaign, and Halleck's appointment meant he was no longer General-in-Chief. Welker goes on to describe the Campaign of Second Manassas in surprising detail. The first chapter is 25 pages long, and due to a quirky page layout with skinny margins all around, that's a lot of material for background. As the chapter ends, the Union Army is licking its wounds at Centreville on the night of August 30, and Lee is already looking for ways around Pope.
Welker next details the lives of Philip Kearny and Isaac Stevens, the two promising Union commanders who lost their lives at Chantilly. Despite sharing little in common in their lives, both of these men were hard fighters with bright futures. Stevens had graduated first in his class at West Point, and Kearny, despite being prevented from attending West Point by his grandfather, eventually found himself a veteran of many fights, both foreign and domestic. Each man almost definitely knew of the other, but they might have only first met on the Union right at Second Bull Run. These men led from the front because they knew no other way to lead men than to literally LEAD them. This personal courage, some would say recklessness, caught up with both of them on September 1, 1862.
"Movements and Machinations" covers the first half of the day following the Battle of Second Bull Run. Pope's Army was at Centreville, Virginia, behind formidable fortifications. Most were miserable after their defeat of the day before. Welker stresses the importance of Pope's line, saying, "The size and flexibility of Pope's force would have made any army commander jealous. Indeed, he had two entire corps in his reserve and yet still had a solid defensive line." Lee sent Jackson on a flanking march first north up Gum Springs Road, and then ESE down the Little River Turnpike. This important road led to Fairfax Courthouse and an intersection with the Warrenton Turnpike. Pope would need to use the Warrenton Turnpike to retreat to Washington, and Lee hoped to get Jackson interspersed between the Federal Army and their Capital. Pope spent the first half of August 31st utterly oblivious to Jackson's march.
Stonewall Jackson and his vaunted Foot Cavalry began their flanking march from Sudley Church around noon on August 31. However, on this particular day, Jackson's men weren't marching at the usual rapid pace. The men had been marching for weeks and had just fought intense battles over the last three days. To make matters worse, food was scarce with no prospect for relief any time this day. And to add icing to the cake, it rained all day and turned the roads to quagmires. A.P. Hill's Light Division led the way, followed by Lawton's and Starke's Divisions. Fitz Lee's Cavalry Brigade was even ****her out front and protected Jackson's right flank once he turned to the southeast and marched down the Little River Turnpike. The Confederate Cavalry managed to capture parts of two Union Cavalry Regiments out guarding Pope's right flank that day, but enough men escaped to warn Pope later that night of the massive threat building on his flank. As Jackson began his march, Pope was detailing troops to guard his massive wagon train as it retreated east to Washington. Incredibly, he pulled two regiments and two guns from his defensive force under Torbert at Jermantown. Part of Marsena Patrick's Brigade was also sent with the train as it slowly made its way east along Warrenton Turnpike. Stuart and two other Cavalry Brigades joined Fitz Lee's men later that day and together they tested the Union defenses west of Jermantown along Difficult Run. Stuart believed this line too tough to crack with cavalry. Instead, he brought up some artillery and shelled the massive Union wagon train to the south on Warrenton Turnpike as night came on. Welker believes this was a major mistake.
Just after midnight, Pope was informed of the shelling of his wagon train. This attack came on one of only two available retreat routes, but Pope, following a typical pattern by not fully trusting cavalry reports, decided that surely other sightings would have come in if Lee were flanking him. Pope did send a reconnaissance north towards the Little River Turnpike on a fairly wide front, and he also reinforced Jermantown at this time. It had stopped raining on the morning of September 1, but the day was cloudy and it looked like more rain was on the way. Dana's Brigade (commanded by Edward Hinks) reached Jermantown, and Welker believes that Jermantown was finally able to be properly defended at this point. Just after dawn, Jackson began his own march down the Little River Turnpike. He reversed his marching order of the day before, allowing Starke to lead, and having Lawton and Hill follow. Jackson's men were hungry, the wet road was a mess, Longstreet was nowhere near, and Jackson was worried about what he might run into, so the march was very slow. Jackson also ordered Stuart to scout ahead. A fight developed along Stringfellow Road between Starke's Brigade and Howard's Brigade around 11:20 A.M. Howard, following orders not to bring on a general engagement, retreated. Through some mix-up, Beverly Robertson's Cavalry Brigade, thought to be scouting on Jackson's right front, stayed with Starke. This resulted in no cavalry screen for Jackson in that important area. Pope knew now that he had to retreat. He sent yet another dispatch to Halleck asking what he should do.
Before his reconnaissance patrols could even report back, Pope received word from tow cavalrymen that they had seen Confederate infantry at Chantilly, which placed them in his rear, even ****her east than his reconnaissance! Pope knew that if the Confederates reached Fairfax Courthouse (just east of Jermantown), his defenses at Centreville would be useless. Pope, still trying to save his career, did not want to retreat unless given an order from Halleck. Due to this, Pope played a dangerous game. He gambled that he could hold Lee at Jermantown while waiting for an order from Halleck to retreat. Welker points out that if Lee moved too fast or Halleck too slow, Pope could well have a disaster on his hands. Pope selected the III Corps of the Army of Virginia and the IX Corps to play his game. The III Corps would move to Jermantown to strengthen the forces there to the point of being able to hold off a potential attack by Lee, and the IX Corps would move to cover the Warrenton Turnpike east of Centreville in case the Confederates headed south to cut that route instead of attacking Jermantown. Pope actually visited Fitz-John Porter, commander of the Army of the Potomac's V Corps and good friend of McClellan, for advice at this time. Welker says that Pope hoped to get the McClellanites to agree to a retreat. When this tactic didn't work, Pope returned to his tent. Pope, reacting to the threat at Chantilly, ordered the III Corps to support Stevens in front of the force near Chantilly. However, Pope apparently never told Stevens of this support. In addition, Heintzelman apparently never told his division commanders where they were headed. Confusion reigned in high places, and this reflects poorly on Pope. Hooker, the temporary commander at Jermantown, received some reinforcements and decided to make his defense along Difficult Run, just west of the town. Jackson and Stuart probed this line and skirmishing broke out for a few hours. However, about this time, Jackson became aware of a threat to his right flank. It was Stevens, following orders to protect the Warrenton Turnpike from attack. Lee was near the battlefield that day, but he didn't participate. Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that both hands were still in splints. Regardless, this was Jackson's fight. To counter the threat from the Federals to his south, Jackson moved Branch's and Field's Brigades south of Little River Turnpike through some woods that fronted an open field on the east, and a corn field on the west.
Stevens moved east from Centreville around 3 P.M. with the IX Corps. Jesse Reno was sick, leaving Stevens in charge. He soon was led north on a country road by two Cavalrymen who had earlier seen Confederates in the vicinity of Chantilly. Leaving Ferrero's Brigade to guard the Warrenton Turnpike, Stevens moved north. Kearny's and Hooker's III Corps divisions left Centreville about an hour later, also traveling down Warrenton Turnpike in an easterly direction. Soon enough, Stevens came to the Unfinished Railroad (the same one which had figured so prominently in the Second Manassas fighting) and saw Confederate skirmishers to the north on Ox Hill. Stevens immediately ordered skirmishers to advance, and then formed his three-brigade Division into a column of Brigades. In other words, each brigade was in line, with succeeding brigades directly behind the first. Stevens launched his attack in an effort to prevent whatever offensive designs the Confederates had in mind, whether they were to the east and Jermantown or to the south and Warrenton Turnpike. At this point Jesse Reno arrived. Though he didn't necessarily have much hope for the success of Stevens's plan, he allowed it to proceed. As Stevens's Division moved forward around 4:30 P.M., Reno sent Ferrero's Brigade into some woods to the east of Ox Road to provide them with some support. Stevens's men, caught out in the open, suffered heavy casualties and started to waver. At this point, Stevens headed for the front. Ferrero's supporting brigade also ran into the Confederates. The 21st Massachusetts stumbled into an ambush and lost nearly 100 men from only one volley. This event would have dire consequences later in the day. After some widening of his front, he personally led a charge around 5 P.M. that broke Hays' Louisiana Brigade (led by Col. Henry Forno). At this point, Stevens was shot in the temple and killed instantly, wrapped in the flag of his 79th New York Highlanders. However, three regiments of Jubal Early's Brigade stopped the breakthrough and sent Stevens' now-leaderless division streaming for the rear. Throughout the fight it had been raining heavily. By this time it was approximately 5:30 P.M.
CONTINUED...