Stuarts fault at Gettysburg?

sean_harris

Cadet
Joined
Feb 20, 2005
Without getting into particulars (wife cooking supper) I was wondering why people tend to blame Stuart for Gettysburg. Though his unit was a seasoned,compact,well-trained unit they were not the only cavalry in the AoNV.

Lee in fact had roughly 8000 under his direct command at that time minus Stuart. Several cavalry units did report Union Corps locations 5 days before Gettysburg. Lee relied heavily on Stuart however, Lee was the commanding general and did have screeners and recon available. Could it be Lee was so caught up in relying on his favorite son he forgot the rest of the Cavalry he commanded and could have used. He could not find Stuart however, he new the locations of his other forces.

Whats your ideas?
Expired Image Removed
 
Well, people blame Stuart, they blame Longstreet, they blame Ewell, etc.
I think a lot of that is they can't bring themselves to blame Lee.
I am reminded, too, that, after the war, George Pickett was asked what caused the loss at Gettysburg. His reply was, 'I thought the Yankees had something to do with it.'
 
I agree Jack, I think Lee made a lot of very poor command decisions at Gettysburg, and also his method of command left a lot to be desired.
 
Wasn't Lee suffering a bit from some medical concerns during Gettysburg? Could this have been some of the reason for some of his bad desecions? Wasn't it at one point that Longstreet said Lee's "blood was up" meaning something other than just excited or anxious to attack?

Just curious,
Unionblue
 
I'm under the impression Lee's blood being up meant he was going to fight no matter what.
As to being sick, thats true, and probably did have some effect on his decisions. However, I think there were too many major faults in his 'planning' during the battle. Look at day 2. Has a recon early morning, finally gets a attack plan in place and the attack starts late afternoon, with no further efforts at a new recon. Did Lee really think that Meade was going to sit and let Lee attack anywhere he pleased, then start moving his forces around? I think not. Lee relied too much on the 'history' of the AoP having the slows. Lee knew that he who moves first and hardest would have the advantage, so why not strike quickly.
Day 3, he had hit both flanks, and done some damage, but now he decides that Meade would have to be weak in the center. Why would this Have to be true. Didn't he consider that Meade might think the same thing, which in fact, happened. At the war council held on the evening of day 2, he predicted Lee would attack at the center, if he did attack. Having the interior lines was a huge benefit to Meade, he could, and did, shift forces very quickly that afternoon, and mostly during the cannonade and after, up to the end of the attack.
There is also some evidence of Lee wanting a 2nd line, in place and ready to go, If a breakthru was achieved, to finish breaking the line. Well, this is one place where Lee's command method failed him. Some effort was made to decided who would be in the 2nd line, but those troops commanders were not informed, IIRC. After Lee had decided the 1st line he stepped back to let Longstreet to do his job, and never checked to see how things were. If he had, then no 2nd line being formed would have been discovered. Also the issue of cannon following held on the evening of day 2, he predicted Lee would attack at the center, if he did attack. Having the interior lines was a huge benefit to Meade, he could, and did, shift forces very quickly that afternoon, and mostly during the cannonade and after, up to the end of the attack.
There is also some evidence of Lee wanting a 2nd line, in place and ready to go, If a breakthru was achieved, to finish breaking the line. Well, this is one place where Lee's command method failed him. Some effort was made to decided who would be in the 2nd line, but those troops commanders were not informed, IIRC. After Lee had decided the 1st line he stepped back to let Longstreet to do his job, and never checked to see how things were. If he had, then no 2nd line being formed would have been discovered. Also the issue of Cannon following the 1 line to assist in the attack. If his chief of Art. had been informed of the use of these batteries, then he would not have moved them off, with no one, not even his boss, knowing where they were.
Chuck in Il.
 
I just reread this whole thread....
Gettysburg discussions have always been framed as 'How could Lee lose?' ..
Maybe it should be, 'What did Meade do to win'. The AOP was fighting on home ground, with interior lines- big advantage.
And, if you look at some of the subordinate commanders on both sides, often the Union officers performed better than the CSA officers. Buford, Reynolds, Hancock, Vincent, Chamberlain, O'Rourke, George Sears Greene, and a bunch more that I can't recall.
How did Lee lose at Gettysburg? Because the AOP outfought him and beat him, that's how.
Now, let the flames begin!
 
Lee who manly consider a 1st rate general was arrogant at Gettysburg.The result he was defeated by a 2nd rate General.
I don't know if it is true but I read somewhere long time ago Lee was having heart problems prior to Gettysburg.
Stuart did not help matters when he reported to Lee what he done and not why he did not do what he was supposed to of been doing,being the eyes and ears.
Brian
 
No flames! I just wanted to agree with some of the people that have contributed to this thread that, many times, people just cannot bring themselves to blame Lee. I believe in what Jac posted. The AOP had Lee beat at Gettysburg, and perhaps it was not all his fault, but it wasn't all Stuart's fault either. The Confederacy's lose was a team effort.
 
Jack is right Brian, Lee lost to better generalship. He did make bad military decisions but I wouldn't necessarily call Lee arrogant. He WAS a first rate general but even first rate generals can make mistakes and have bad days.

Stuart did what he was ordered to do (march to meet Ewell near York and capture supplies for the ANV). An understanding of the terrain in the march from Virginia, the valley of the Shenandoah to the fords and rivers on the way to Gettysburg will help in understanding why Stuart chose the route he did to follow his orders.

There WAS cavalry present at Gettysburg prior to any action (Jenkins), two other brigades of cavalry were AVAILABLE if needed to scout and screen (Jones and Robertson) and who were ordered to screen the march by Stuart after the cavalry battles fought at Aldie, Middleburg and Upperville.

Sometimes armies just run out of luck. Loyal staff officers feel the need to protect their generals by passing on the responsibility for the failure to others. Thus the "blame" continues unabated depending on what expert opinion you read.

Linneus Ahearn
www.9thvirginia.com
 
Mr. Ahearn, I tend to agree with you and feel that Lee was never arrogant, but he did have a bad couple of days at Gettysburg. I feel, IMHO, that Meade doesn't get enough credit for winning that one. He was thrust into command just a short while before the battle and had to contend with AOP morale and other factors before crossing swords with one of the best generals in the world at that time.

Some days the bear just turns around and eats you. Lee just had a number of things and situations rise up and bite him. Just like Grant at Cold Harbor, Petersburg, etc.

Until next time,
Unionblue
 
General Lee, did make some bad decisions at Gettysburg. It's also true that he wasn't the only one. I don't think that the loss at Gettysburg, would be Stuart's fault. Lee, might have received better information, about the enemy, if Stuart, had been there, at the start, but it seemed, that Lee was dead set, on fighting there. I know, there's been alot written, about Lee, being ill with a possible heart problem, which might be correct. But it is known that, he had a case of diarrhea, which certainly would have interfered with directing the battle, as well as he could have.

Gunsmoke
 
I have often thought that Lee's way of giving commands had a lot to do with the battles. Some of the things Jackson, Hill,Forrest and Stuart accomplished owes more to their own ingenuity than any orders given by Lee in the strictest sense. They innately knew what he wanted to accomplish.

Stuart does catch a lot of flak about "Where were you?" and I have a tendency to believe he was arrogant. Too bad this time it worked against so many courageous men in the field at Gettysburg.

Lee seems to me to have been "up against it" so to speak at Gettysburg. I think he felt this was a "do or die" situation. And clearly Pickett's Charge proves this was not Lee's finest hour. Whether he had some affliction or not during this period that would have impaired his judgement I do not know.

But the more I read of Gettysburg, the more I come back to one nagging problem: Why didn't Meade pursue? If he had, can we agree that the war would have been over sooner and many generations would not have been left to weep and wail?

The more I read about these generals the more I see men cast as heroes, who either rose in stature, or in many cases, revealed their feet of clay. It is not ours to judge them, but it is interesting to try to get inside their heads and figure out what they were thinking!
 
Stuart had a rough deal at Gettysburg, there were IIRC four or five regiments of Cav available to Lee on the first day... Lee was not w/out cav. Add to that that Stuart brought 150 odd wagonloads of much needed captured supplies.

Why Meade didn't pursue has been a question repeatedly brought up since July of 63. There are a variety of reasons prime perhaps being the fact that he had three seperate Corps that had been heavily engaged and had suffered badly. 1st Corps was a wreck and would in fact never again take the field as it's own entity. The majority of his Arty was VERY short of ammunition and it took time to rearm them. While it's true he had a powerful artillery force in the Artillery reserve of the AoP many of his freshest troops were quite green. He had been a Corps commander and some have said he was still getting into the groove of being an Army commander, that may very well be true. But keep in mind that he still beat Lee and quite handsomely at that.

There was a comment earlier in the thread that Meade was a second rate General... no he wasn't. He proved to be an excellent Corps commander, good enough that Grant felt it prudent to keep him on.

It can be argued that Meade didn't push his army hard enough after Lee withdrew... Meade could see how worn down his men were and knew that even when down the ANV was NEVER out and would be capable of putting up a stiff and bloody fight.

Both sides should be commended for their efforts at Gettysburg, there were increadibly brave moments for both armies.
 
Before I begin my Monday Night Generalship, let me acknowledge that I could not have done better than either Lee or Meade or any of their soldiers. I would have ran away as far as I could as fast as I could. Does Oh Canada strike a familiar cord?

In my uneducated opinion, Stuart may only be blamed for the first day. Lee could have disengaged and choose a more favorable place but yet he stayed and fought on.

Longstreet's perspective (as reflected in the flick Gettysburg) is that the Confederates should have fought defensively and compelled the Union to attack them. While Longstreet did discuss this with Lee prior to the campaign, Lee never agreed. He only acknowledged hearing what Longstreet suggested (See Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants). When Longstreet criticized Lee after Lee's death, he ignited a controversy and Lee's supporters blamed Longstreet's tardiness for the loss of the battle. (Col. John Haskell makes an interesting point in that the Confederates could have easily captured Little Round Top had they moved faster. Haskell and a few others rode up there hours earlier and there was nobody there.)

Hancock's injury had a role in Meade's failure to pursue Lee when Lee retreated. Attack immediately after the 3rd day could have spelled failure since the defender generally has the advantage. Lee may have redeemed himself if the ANV could inflict heavy losses on The Army of the Potomac. The opportunity to attack was after Lee initiated his retreat. While Meade's army was badly mauled, so was Lee's and Lee had the disadvantage of a very long and slow ambulance train. A vigorous effort against Lee's army may have resulted in a spectacular victory and had Hancock not been injured, Meade may have been emboldened to a more aggressive course of action (Recall that Hancock urged an attack as he was taken away).
 
Let me say that first that I agree with some of the previous points. I think that Lee was just whipped by Meade. Really for the first time, Lee had been beaten by better leadership. Meade did a great job of orchestrating the AOP during the battle. But I think that beyond that, some of his other Generals stepped up to the plate. We think of Reynolds on the first day, Warren, Chamberlain, Vincent on the second day and Hancock, Webb on the third. I think that the strength of leadership for the union had finally come together at Gettysburg.
As we look at the ANV, there was a let down in leadership for the first time since Lee had taken over. Stuart, Heath, and Ewell on the first day; Longstreet and Ewell on the second and I believe Longstreet and Lee himself on the third. In my opinion, leadership played a key role in the AOP victory at Gettysburg.

Have a great day!
wavey.gif
 
No flames! I just wanted to agree with some of the people that have contributed to this thread that, many times, people just cannot bring themselves to blame Lee. I believe in what Jac posted. The AOP had Lee beat at Gettysburg, and perhaps it was not all his fault, but it wasn't all Stuart's fault either. The Confederacy's lose was a team effort.
I agre that it was a team effort on behalf of the Confederacy. Nothing new here, but if Ewell does what was indeed practicable... I tend to agree with Dowdey that Lee was still under the impetus of his relationship with Jackson and expected his corps commanders to act on their own to exploit situations, and they did not act as agressively as he would have liked. Units weren't used that could have exploited situations on Culps Hill and at Picketts Charge. And I guess that comes down to Lee and the new structure of The CSA. Yes, the CSA was defeated at Gburg, but when one considers the terrain of the 2nd & 3rd day attacks, and the casualty stats, and the facts that the CSA did top Cemetery Hill without support, came close to breaking through the left center near LRT, and made a fight at the wall on Cemetery Ridge, that the soldiers of the CSA weren't out fought. The casualties they inflicted on an enemy on high ground is astounding, and is what caused Meade not to pursue in any strength after Pickett's Charge.With respect,IMHO. Thank You PS: I don't blame Stuart at all.Longstreet was very obstinate and slow, and I think this hurt the effort much more than Stuart.
 
Before I begin my Monday Night Generalship, let me acknowledge that I could not have done better than either Lee or Meade or any of their soldiers. I would have ran away as far as I could as fast as I could. Does Oh Canada strike a familiar cord?

In my uneducated opinion, Stuart may only be blamed for the first day. Lee could have disengaged and choose a more favorable place but yet he stayed and fought on.

Longstreet's perspective (as reflected in the flick Gettysburg) is that the Confederates should have fought defensively and compelled the Union to attack them. While Longstreet did discuss this with Lee prior to the campaign, Lee never agreed. He only acknowledged hearing what Longstreet suggested (See Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants). When Longstreet criticized Lee after Lee's death, he ignited a controversy and Lee's supporters blamed Longstreet's tardiness for the loss of the battle. (Col. John Haskell makes an interesting point in that the Confederates could have easily captured Little Round Top had they moved faster. Haskell and a few others rode up there hours earlier and there was nobody there.)

Hancock's injury had a role in Meade's failure to pursue Lee when Lee retreated. Attack immediately after the 3rd day could have spelled failure since the defender generally has the advantage. Lee may have redeemed himself if the ANV could inflict heavy losses on The Army of the Potomac. The opportunity to attack was after Lee initiated his retreat. While Meade's army was badly mauled, so was Lee's and Lee had the disadvantage of a very long and slow ambulance train. A vigorous effort against Lee's army may have resulted in a spectacular victory and had Hancock not been injured, Meade may have been emboldened to a more aggressive course of action (Recall that Hancock urged an attack as he was taken away).
I find it hard to reconcile my opinions. When one walks the field, one says that Lee must have been ill to order two days of attacks on hills and ridges! On the other hand, as a general of an army that had just won a complete victory on the first day, it had to be hard to think of giving an order to re deploy. Then you have the problem of longer logistical lines, and logistics in general in hostile territory. And you may not get another such chance to thoroughly defeat the enemy. Hindsight is grand, but after the 1st day, it seemed victory could be had. Yes, even after Pickett's the CSA could've put up a stout defense, and Im sure Meade knew this; and after losing 26,000 I don't think he was in the mood to risk more-my opinion. Thank You
 
I agre that it was a team effort on behalf of the Confederacy. Nothing new here, but if Ewell does what was indeed practicable... I tend to agree with Dowdey that Lee was still under the impetus of his relationship with Jackson and expected his corps commanders to act on their own to exploit situations, and they did not act as agressively as he would have liked. Units weren't used that could have exploited situations on Culps Hill and at Picketts Charge. And I guess that comes down to Lee and the new structure of The CSA. Yes, the CSA was defeated at Gburg, but when one considers the terrain of the 2nd & 3rd day attacks, and the casualty stats, and the facts that the CSA did top Cemetery Hill without support, came close to breaking through the left center near LRT, and made a fight at the wall on Cemetery Ridge, that the soldiers of the CSA weren't out fought. The casualties they inflicted on an enemy on high ground is astounding, and is what caused Meade not to pursue in any strength after Pickett's Charge.With respect,IMHO. Thank You PS: I don't blame Stuart at all.Longstreet was very obstinate and slow, and I think this hurt the effort much more than Stuart.


When you look at the terrain the Union commanded it has to included in the reasoning behind the Union victory.
Having been forced into attacking an entrenhced enemy acorss those open fields would have been enough to defeat any General. In my humble opinion it was foolhardy despite Lee's former success on the battlefield.

Mulejack
 
Stuart had a rough deal at Gettysburg, there were IIRC four or five regiments of Cav available to Lee on the first day... Lee was not w/out cav. Add to that that Stuart brought 150 odd wagonloads of much needed captured supplies.

Why Meade didn't pursue has been a question repeatedly brought up since July of 63. There are a variety of reasons prime perhaps being the fact that he had three seperate Corps that had been heavily engaged and had suffered badly. 1st Corps was a wreck and would in fact never again take the field as it's own entity. The majority of his Arty was VERY short of ammunition and it took time to rearm them. While it's true he had a powerful artillery force in the Artillery reserve of the AoP many of his freshest troops were quite green. He had been a Corps commander and some have said he was still getting into the groove of being an Army commander, that may very well be true. But keep in mind that he still beat Lee and quite handsomely at that.

There was a comment earlier in the thread that Meade was a second rate General... no he wasn't. He proved to be an excellent Corps commander, good enough that Grant felt it prudent to keep him on.

It can be argued that Meade didn't push his army hard enough after Lee withdrew... Meade could see how worn down his men were and knew that even when down the ANV was NEVER out and would be capable of putting up a stiff and bloody fight.

Both sides should be commended for their efforts at Gettysburg, there were increadibly brave moments for both armies.
 
Back
Top