Strategic value

MikeyB

Sergeant
Joined
Sep 13, 2018
Had two questions on Fort Sumter.
1) Was there any practical way the Union could have held the Fort if the will had been there? Or were the required men, ships, guns practically speaking not available to hold it?

2) If the Union had somehow been able to maintain control, does it have major strategic value to the Union war effort? Does it make launching an offensive through Charleston easier? Effectively shuts down a major CSA port? Or just a nuisance to the Confederacy and a symbol of Union power, but no real gain for the war effort?
 
Do not discount symbolism. It is a very active ingredient in the fighting and winning of wars.

The siege of Ft. Sumter(and by corollary Charleston and S.C.)could be seen as a symbol of the North's commitment to resisting and defeating Secession.
 
Without holding Fort Sumter, the Union blockade of Charleston went like this
https://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/blockade-running/

November 1861 to July 1863 - 20 months
Thirty-six steam-powered blockade-runners made 125 trips in and out of Charleston
6.25 runs per month

July 1863 to Fall 1864 the port was basically closed as a result of the active fighting.

Fall 1864 until February 1865 - 6 months or so
Twenty steamers completed ninety runs in and out of Charleston
15 runs a month

And then the city fell.
 
Lincoln addressed issue no. 1 in his annual Message to Congress July 4, 1861

"On the 5th of March, the present incumbent's first full day in office, a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was by that Department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer that reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for his relief rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made enclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the Army and the Navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the Government or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military point of view this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort."
 
To the first question, no there was no practical way to hold the fort. It was there to keep enemies out of the harbor but was relatively dominated by the land around it. So long as the Confederates held the area around Charleston, Ft. Sumter could not be practically held.

Strategically, it didn't serve as much beyond a symbol of the Union in the heart of the Confederacy. At best, it would have been a nuisance but having those guns out in the harbor would have made for some lively runs into the port for the blockade runners.

Ryan
 
Lincoln addressed issue no. 1 in his annual Message to Congress July 4, 1861

"On the 5th of March, the present incumbent's first full day in office, a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was by that Department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer that reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for his relief rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made enclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the Army and the Navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the Government or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military point of view this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort."

What are the group's thoughts on the 20,000 number? Seems to me the mix of force is more important than the size of the force. For example, I'd rather have 10 batteries of artillery (60 guns X 10 = 600 men?) + a couple of good supporting warships than 20,000 soldiers.

I guess the concern would be the force the Confederates could launch to seize the fort, but wouldn't proper Naval support make an amphibious landing near impossible?
 
I'm not sure what Lincoln and the military command had in mind when speculating about 20,000 reinforcements for Sumter. Obviously, the most practicable use of those men would be to capture and occupy the Confederate batteries targeting the fort. But that scenario being tantamount to a massive offensive operation against Charleston, would be a total political non-starter for the Lincoln administration. In the end, the most reasonable approach was the one that Lincoln chose; attempting a passive seaborne resupply of the garrison. Nevertheless, the fort would still have eventually succumbed to a vigorous and lengthy artillery bombardment, so the failure of the resupply mission did not detract from the Lincoln administration's main goal of standing its ground over protecting federal installations, and maneuvering the Confederacy into firing the first aggressive shot.
 
What are the group's thoughts on the 20,000 number? Seems to me the mix of force is more important than the size of the force. For example, I'd rather have 10 batteries of artillery (60 guns X 10 = 600 men?) + a couple of good supporting warships than 20,000 soldiers.

I guess the concern would be the force the Confederates could launch to seize the fort, but wouldn't proper Naval support make an amphibious landing near impossible?
The 20,000 number is a realistic number that could potentially secure Ft. Sumter by holding enough of the surrounding terrain to keep the fort outside of artillery range. That said, the entire Army of Northeastern Virginia numbered about 35,000 but I don't think anyone would characterize it as "disciplined". 20,000 is a good assessment but it simply was not practical for the US to deploy that many soldiers to South Carolina in order just to secure one fort.

The Confederates didn't need to physically assault Sumter; all they had to do was bombard it into submission. Without Federal infantry to hold Charleston and its environs, Ft. Sumter was simply untenable.

Ryan
 
Had two questions on Fort Sumter.
1) Was there any practical way the Union could have held the Fort if the will had been there? Or were the required men, ships, guns practically speaking not available to hold it?
If the Confederates are unwilling to go to war/reduce it by siege (bombardment or starvation), the US can hold it with a small force as long as the Confederates let them. They would need to re-supply on a regular basis and rotate troops over time.

If the Confederates are simply willing to blockade entry to US re-supply (wait until the US gives up, Anderson could have held out a few more days.

If the Confederates are willing to start a war (attack as they did), then Ft. Sumter will fall exactly when it did. The timing of the actual assault comes down to this: a train with gunpowder for the artillery arrived in Charleston in the evening and Beauregard opened fire the next morning.

It would have taken a much larger force to enter the harbor and save Ft. Sumter. The US could have sent in a few hundred soldiers (raw recruits) and sailors in boats. There were some 10,000 Confederate/South Carolina troops and militia in and around Charleston. Only about half the Confederate guns were trained on the fort -- the other half were positioned to defend the entrance to the harbor.

2) If the Union had somehow been able to maintain control, does it have major strategic value to the Union war effort? Does it make launching an offensive through Charleston easier? Effectively shuts down a major CSA port? Or just a nuisance to the Confederacy and a symbol of Union power, but no real gain for the war effort?

As long as Ft. Sumter is in US hands, it can command the harbor. No Confederate ships/boats would be able to survive within range of its' guns if the fort were fully manned and supplied (500 men instead of the less than 100 who were there). By the same measure, strong Confederate artillery mounted to hit Ft. Sumter from multiple angles will surely reduce it by bombardment, and without massive US strength re-supply of the fort cannot be long maintained through a gauntlet of Confederate guns.

If the Union really wanted to save Fort Sumter, they probably needed to land a strong force (many thousands of men, an army the US did not have in April of 1861) and clear the entrance to the harbor, probably to include all the gun positions used to bombard Ft. Sumter.
 
Finally have gotten around to reading Battles and Leaders and a lot of great material on Forts Sumter and Pickens.

In one of the entries, they talk about the defenses of Sumter and how they even had superiority for some time, at least regarding Moultrie, until the SC men rebuilt it.

If the USN had posted a couple of good warships next to Sumter, could those guns + Sumter have overwhelmed or even stalemated the shore batteries?
 
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