Stonewall Stonewall Jackson's Plan of Northern Invasion

dvrmte

Major
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Sep 3, 2009
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South Carolina
Greetings,

What are your opinions of Jackson's early war proposals of invading the North? This includes his 1861 plan to invade all the way to Canada and split the east from the west and his 1862 plan that called for carrying the war to the Susquehanna sweeping behind Washington and evicting the Lincoln Administration to bring a quick end to the war.
It is plain to see that Jackson knew the South couldn't stand a prolonged war and wanted to use fast moving columns and attack all over the North to show the ease that it might be invaded. It seems politics stopped his plans but were they not sound military ideas?
 
Perhaps a simplistic answer: the South never had the resources to carry out offensives in any real appreciative way.

To that end, any offensive maneuvers on the part of the South are simply going to exhaust their resources at a much faster rate than expending them defensively. When you think about the fact that (to some degree, at least) the resource-advantage that the North had was largely mitigated by the fact that their 'default' position was offensive (overall), you get some idea of how extraordinarily demanding offensives can be. Moreover, the supply issue would seem to be a problem. The South had difficulty with transporting their supplies inside the South; try transporting your supplies in enemy territory...not very easy (you need a lot of manpower to do that). Add to this that fighting in enemy territory (i.e., you don't know the place, roads, etc.,) and you've compounded your difficulties yet again.

IMHO, offensives on the part of the South are not militarily sound at all - the primary reason (IMHO) they simply don't have the manpower to conduct an invasion(s) properly (i.e., enough to babysit supply lines, reconnaissance, and attack positions). In addition to that, the South suffered significant logistics problems just being on defensive. I can't see how they could pull off any real success (i.e., sustained...because once you capture something, you need to hold on to it...more manpower...again) on the offensive.

Just my $0.02 - fighting on offensive in enemy territory is a lot harder than fighting on defensive with home-court advantage. To that end, successes in the latter don't necessarily translate to successes in the former.







CC
 
In a word, no.

The Confederacy did not have the forces to make such an operation work in 1861, in 1862 they were technically available but tied up fighting the main Union armies (and scattered raiders are easier to round up when it comes time for the Maryland Campaign), and 1863 needs something more decisive than they can achieve.

I do think going on the offense as Lee did in May of 1863 was a good idea, but as a way to draw the fighting off Virginia soil and focus Union attention on the defense of Washington, rather than victories on Northern soil.

Logistics is also a pain. Supplying those columns would be immensely difficult - foraging takes care of some items but not all.

Finally, it is more likely that the North would howl with outrage to see burning and razing. Same with the South at the same point, but that's not the topic at hand.

As a specific example - Jackson wanted to press - somehow - an attack to the Susquehanna at the end of the Valley Campaign. Manpower wise, there is no possible way Jackson could have been reinforced to 30,000 men at that time. That alone dooms the idea.


My best interpetation and presentaton of the facts, but not to be confused with absolute truth.
 
Sound idea in and of itself, but as has been said, logistics and manpower problems made it a disaster.

There is a good book by Michael Palmer called Lee Moves North that explains well why these little northern trips tended to end badly, even when their goals were more modest than invading all the way to Canada or physically kicking Lincoln out of the White House.
 
What I have read was that when Jackson proposed following the defeated Federals after Bull Run, his idea was rejected. It was rejected on a basis of Jackson's prestige. At Bull Run, he wasn't the great "Stonewall" Jackson. He was only Thomas Jackson of VMI. I wonder, if Jackson had been allowed to persue the Federals, would it have changed anything?
 
After 1st Manassas, the Confederate army was awfully disorganized and underequipped. I don't know that they could have gotten it together enough to pursue as far as Washington.

(Stuart pursued, but he finally ran out of men to guard each new batch of prisoners... which might be a little metaphor for the army as a whole.)
 
A "Sherman-esqe" invasion where the force lives off the land and doesn't worry about supply lines is technically feasible early in the war but realistically; not so much lol..The men weren't truly hardened yet and the threat of invasion might have pulled in the thousands of northerners into the militia and army that were sitting on the wayside..Then the thought occurs what happens then, when they have reached the Canadian border, what do they do..Do they lay siege to the cities or bypass them blitzkrieg style, and during this whole time you have the problem of replenishing your ammo and taking care of your wounded..
 
It seems to me the sort of thing for which there ought to have been a plan, a plan developed with the understanding that it almost certainly would not have been implemented.

However, in 1862 or 1863 when crossing the Potomac for real, R.E. would have had something to draw on. Some of the rough work of logistics would already have been sorted out, and possibly some little thing that hadn't occurred to him. Maybe the use of some set of roads for a diversion, maybe some understanding of terrain and cover... that sort of thing.
 
The armies of 1861 were rag tag forces and not the professional armies they were from 1863 onwards. To expect them to be able to pull off an invasion all the way to Canada is beyond a pipe dream. It would have been the equivalent of invading Normandy in 1942 instead of 1944: the Allies probably would have been slaughtered as they were at Dieppe.
 
This is an excerpt from Lost Victories:The Military Genius of Stonewall Jackson.


While Boteler listened, Jackson began: “I want you to go to Richmond for me. I must have reinforcements. You can explain to them down there what the situation is here. Get as many men as can be spared and I’d like you, if you please, to go as soon as you can.”
Jackson then disclosed his plan: if his command were raised to forty thousand men, he would cross into Maryland, “raise the siege of Richmond and transfer this campaign from the banks of the Potomac to those of the Susquehanna.”
Here, like the similar plan Jackson had proposed the previous October, was a strategic concept with war-winning possibilities. Even if Jackson retreated far up the valley, he could still rush back and strike behind Washington before any Northern army could stop him. Although there were more than sixty thousand Union troops arrayed against Jackson, they were scattered—Banks at Williamsport, Rufus Saxton at Harpers Ferry, McDowell between Fredericksburg and the [Shenandoah] valley, and Frémont approaching from the Alleghenies. They could not concentrate against him, for McDowell had to shield Washington and the other forces in the valley. Jackson could slip between them and burst across the Potomac.
Jackson’s greatest advantage, however, was that McClellan had isolated by far the largest Union army on the [ Virginia] peninsula [between the York and James rivers]. His was the only force that could defeat Jackson. Even if Lincoln ordered McClellan to move at once, it would take at least a week and probably much longer to assemble a superior army in Maryland. Only ten thousand men at a time could be carried by transports up Chesapeake Bay, necessitating numerous trips to and from Fort Monroe [on the tip of the peninsula].
In a week or two Jackson could transform the military situation—possibly cutting off Washington’s rail communications and food supply, seizing Baltimore and perhaps other cities, and spreading panic. If Washington were isolated, there would be intense pressure to evacuate the government for fear that its members would be captured. A government that could not secure the capital would raise grave doubts among the Northern people as to its capability and would indicate to Britain and France that it was on the verge of defeat. This might lead to their recognition of the Confederacy and a forced end of the war.



I did some web searching and found this. At first I didn't take it as much because it came from a "what if" book. I thought about it and parts of this plan seem practicle. Jackson had just been reinforced with Lawton's six Brigades and Whiting's eight. He would have only needed ten or fifteen thousand more men to get the 40,000 he wanted. I don't see 60,000 Union troops scattered all over the countryside stopping him. What would McClellan do stuck in front of Richmond? Would he attack Richmond or pull back and send reinforcements North? I doubt McClellan could have broke through the fortifications of Richmond quickly, if at all. If he pulled back I doubt Lee would have let him go peacefully.
 
Jackson then disclosed his plan: if his command were raised to forty thousand men,

Considering that Johnston had to fight tooth and nail to get any kinds of reinforcements I don't see where Davis would have found enough men to give Jackson a 40,000 man army.

Even if Jackson retreated far up the valley, he could still rush back and strike behind Washington before any Northern army could stop him. Although there were more than sixty thousand Union troops arrayed against Jackson, they were scattered—Banks at Williamsport, Rufus Saxton at Harpers Ferry, McDowell between Fredericksburg and the [Shenandoah] valley, and Frémont approaching from the Alleghenies. They could not concentrate against him, for McDowell had to shield Washington and the other forces in the valley. Jackson could slip between them and burst across the Potomac.

The author seems to believe that the Federals were so dumb that they would have sat around doing nothing while Jackson is tearing up their rear.

Even if Lincoln ordered McClellan to move at once, it would take at least a week and probably much longer to assemble a superior army in Maryland. Only ten thousand men at a time could be carried by transports up Chesapeake Bay, necessitating numerous trips to and from Fort Monroe [on the tip of the peninsula].

If Jackson had somehow managed to get into Maryland, that would have negated the purpose of having generals like McDowell "shielding" Washington in the first place. They would have been free to maneuver since their original mission was a failure.

Lincoln could have done what he did in reality: keep McClellan near Richmond and gather together the scattered Valley forces and place it under the command of Pope.

And when Jackson did go up against Pope's men he did get into trouble: he barely survived at Cedar Mountain, did poorly at Brawner's Farm, and took a pounding at Second Manassas.

In a week or two Jackson could transform the military situation—possibly cutting off Washington’s rail communications and food supply, seizing Baltimore and perhaps other cities, and spreading panic.

How would Jackson be able to cut off the food supply much less seize and garrison major Northern cities?
 
Considering that Johnston had to fight tooth and nail to get any kinds of reinforcements I don't see where Davis would have found enough men to give Jackson a 40,000 man army.

Johnston was wounded. Davis had already reinforced Lee. Jackson only needed ten to fifteen thousand men for his army to reach 40,000 men.


The author seems to believe that the Federals were so dumb that they would have sat around doing nothing while Jackson is tearing up their rear.

McDowell had to protect Washington. So he was east of the Valley. The other forces were spread out all over. Jackson would have been in Pennsylvania before they could have united. Would McDowell leave Washington unprotected to chase Jackson?


If Jackson had somehow managed to get into Maryland, that would have negated the purpose of having generals like McDowell "shielding" Washington in the first place. They would have been free to maneuver since their original mission was a failure.

Maryland is the backdoor to Washington. Again would McDowell leave Washington unprotected to chase Jackson?

Lincoln could have done what he did in reality: keep McClellan near Richmond and gather together the scattered Valley forces and place it under the command of Pope.

60,000 scattered forces coming after Jackson with their communications interrupted doesn't sound to promising. I think Lincoln might have been packing his bags.

And when Jackson did go up against Pope's men he did get into trouble: he barely survived at Cedar Mountain, did poorly at Brawner's Farm, and took a pounding at Second Manassas.

Cedar Mountain- The Confederate counterattack crushed the Union lines and sent them running. Banks and Pope were nearly captured by the 7th Virginia Cavalry. Who barely survived?

Brawner's Farm- The battle did just what Jackson desired. It drew Pope into battle.

2nd Manassas- Pope's army beat itself to death on Jackson's line. Longstreet deserves credit for mopping up but Jackson broke the attacks.



How would Jackson be able to cut off the food supply much less seize and garrison major Northern cities?


That gets harder to imagine. I could see Jackson taking Washington but not holding it. Cutting rail connections takes away the food supply. All of this is to prevent a battle before Richmond. I think McClellan would have to call off his plans for Richmond.
 
I'm tempted to dismiss the possibility. However, the fact that Early got within the limits later on implies it may have been possible.

The basic problem with "what ifs" is that we are forced to assume the people involved behave competently but no more than that. Jackson has never been accused of being merely "competent" there were flashes of brilliance here and there.

I sort of think it might have been possible.

Thanks, dvrmte. (Would it kill you to put some vowels in that name? :wink: )
 
No, Jackson defenately wasn't a siege minded person. He was a straight forward attack, no questions asked kind of guy. Of courese that could have made him even more of a threat to Washington.
 
I did some web searching and found this. At first I didn't take it as much because it came from a "what if" book. I thought about it and parts of this plan seem practicle. Jackson had just been reinforced with Lawton's six Brigades and Whiting's eight. He would have only needed ten or fifteen thousand more men to get the 40,000 he wanted. I don't see 60,000 Union troops scattered all over the countryside stopping him. What would McClellan do stuck in front of Richmond? Would he attack Richmond or pull back and send reinforcements North? I doubt McClellan could have broke through the fortifications of Richmond quickly, if at all. If he pulled back I doubt Lee would have let him go peacefully.

Six (Lawton) and eight (Whiting) regiments, not brigades.

Assuming the Valley Army is roughly 10,000 men, Lawton's brigade is roughly 3,000 and Whiting is five to six thousand.

Johnston was wounded. Davis had already reinforced Lee. Jackson only needed ten to fifteen thousand men for his army to reach 40,000 men.

See above. Also, the Confederacy doesn't have ten thousand men to spare.

McDowell had to protect Washington. So he was east of the Valley. The other forces were spread out all over. Jackson would have been in Pennsylvania before they could have united. Would McDowell leave Washington unprotected to chase Jackson?

They could certainly have united at Washington, which must be noted as already having a garrison of some size.

Maryland is the backdoor to Washington. Again would McDowell leave Washington unprotected to chase Jackson?


Washington is protected to some extent already. And McDowell would not have to take his entire force to chase Jackson if we assume Fremont and the rest are concentrated - so its not as bad as it sounds.

60,000 scattered forces coming after Jackson with their communications interrupted doesn't sound to promising. I think Lincoln might have been packing his bags.

Now we're assuming he's successful before he even gets going. Jackson going from command of at most 17,000 men to 40,000 would be a jump that quite frankly I think would be beyond him - laying aside the fact that this is at a time he's exhausted.

Cedar Mountain- The Confederate counterattack crushed the Union lines and sent them running. Banks and Pope were nearly captured by the 7th Virginia Cavalry. Who barely survived?

Brawner's Farm- The battle did just what Jackson desired. It drew Pope into battle.


2nd Manassas- Pope's army beat itself to death on Jackson's line. Longstreet deserves credit for mopping up but Jackson broke the attacks.


Cedar Mountain was a miserably conducted battle on Jackson's part. Keep in mind that prior to the counterattack the Stonewall Brigade - indeed, Jackson's old division - is a-running.

Brawner's Farm: Too costly in men and officers. It may have met Jackson's objectives, but it was not a battle that inspires confidence in Jacksons' generalship.

2nd Manassas/Bull Run: Longstreet did much more than "mopping up". That reads like something by a fanboy, with all due respect.

Back on topic we go:

I see two glaring problems with this what if.

1) Jackson is not fit - and certainly not fit at this particular moment after a long and arduous campaign - to command 40,000 men. Assuming that somehow that kind of force could be organized and supplied and so on.

2) There's no way short of all but sacrificing Richmond to get him reinforced up to that point. There just aren't that many troops available. If you subtract Jackson, Whiting, and Lawton from the AoNVA as of the Seven Days, you get <75,000 men to face McClellan. This force has to both cover Richmond so that McClellan sees something holding Richmond and make up fhe force attacking him - Lee had none too many troops with Jackson (including the three brigades mentioned). If you detach another twenty thousand men, Lee might as well abandon Richmond.

Unless and until these two points are somehow resolved, this what if is a flight of fantasy, just like the issue of holding North Carolina and Richmond has to be addresed prior to any contemplation of Lee's second invasion.

Only more so, as Richmond is under siege in 1862.
 
Johnston was wounded. Davis had already reinforced Lee. Jackson only needed ten to fifteen thousand men for his army to reach 40,000 men.

Where is Davis going to find those men?

McDowell had to protect Washington. So he was east of the Valley. The other forces were spread out all over. Jackson would have been in Pennsylvania before they could have united. Would McDowell leave Washington unprotected to chase Jackson?

McDowell's purpose of "shielding" Washington would have forced him to move north and cover the approaches to DC. McDowell wouldn't have just sat around Fredericksburg doing nothing.

Maryland is the backdoor to Washington. Again would McDowell leave Washington unprotected to chase Jackson?

If McDowell is chasing after Jackson he is protecting Washington. Abandoning Fredericksburg would have caused no serious strategic consequence.

60,000 scattered forces coming after Jackson with their communications interrupted doesn't sound to promising. I think Lincoln might have been packing his bags.

When did Lincoln ever throw up his hands and call it quits? He had enough guts to go out to Fort Stevens during Early's 1864 attack and almost got shot.

Cedar Mountain- The Confederate counterattack crushed the Union lines and sent them running. Banks and Pope were nearly captured by the 7th Virginia Cavalry. Who barely survived?

Jackson's tactics were poor and only a last minute rally saved him from destruction. Plus, wasting time personally sighting cannons instead of managing your corps is not necessarily a good thing.

Brawner's Farm- The battle did just what Jackson desired. It drew Pope into battle.

Jackson's purpose was to beat two Federal brigades and he failed miserably.

2nd Manassas- Pope's army beat itself to death on Jackson's line. Longstreet deserves credit for mopping up but Jackson broke the attacks.

Jackson's lines were broken multiple times. He managed to close the gaps but Jackson once again showed he was only a mediocre tactician. The same thing would happen later at Fredericksburg.

It was Longstreet's artillery under SD Lee and then his attack that broke Pope's forces. And the fight for Henry House Hill was no skirmish. Forgive my bluntness, but describing Longstreet's role as "mopping up" is a cheap shot.
 
Elennsar wrote:
Six (Lawton) and eight (Whiting) regiments, not brigades.

Assuming the Valley Army is roughly 10,000 men, Lawton's brigade is roughly 3,000 and Whiting is five to six thousand.


Sorry about the brigade/regiment mistake. Lawton's Georgia Brigade had seen little action and was probably stronger per regiment than Whiting's. The Valley Army peaked at 17,000 I believe. Take away 2,000 casualties from the campaign and that leaves 15,000. Add at least 10,000 men from Lawton and Whiting and all that Jackson needed was maybe 15,000. Lee was supposed to have 92,000 men at the beginning of the Seven Days. That would leave him with 52,000 inside the fortifications.


They could certainly have united at Washington, which must be noted as already having a garrison of some size.
Washington is protected to some extent already. And McDowell would not have to take his entire force to chase Jackson if we assume Fremont and the rest are concentrated - so its not as bad as it sounds.

I believe the whole area would be in panic. I don't think Jackson's intention was for pitched battle. He would have problems with ammo resupply. From my understanding his plan was to wreck havoc on the infrastructure. He didn't want a battle at Richmond. He wanted it in Pennsylvania.

Now we're assuming he's successful before he even gets going. Jackson going from command of at most 17,000 men to 40,000 would be a jump that quite frankly I think would be beyond him - laying aside the fact that this is at a time he's exhausted.

I feel confident that Jackson would have made it into Maryland without heavy battle and possibly Pennsylvania. The increase in his command size would have required some changes in his command style.That is where I also have some doubts.
I have always wondered about the exhaustion claim as an excuse for his inactivity at Seven Days. I have a gut feeling he may have had a case of the Longstreet pouts because he didn't get his way.


Cedar Mountain was a miserably conducted battle on Jackson's part. Keep in mind that prior to the counterattack the Stonewall Brigade - indeed, Jackson's old division - is a-running.

I agree but the end result was what Jackson wanted. His style of fast moving and keeping the enemy guessing gave him the initiative to give battle when he wanted.

Brawner's Farm: Too costly in men and officers. It may have met Jackson's objectives, but it was not a battle that inspires confidence in Jacksons' generalship.

I agree again. I think the battle became more than he thought it would be.

2nd Manassas/Bull Run: Longstreet did much more than "mopping up". That reads like something by a fanboy, with all due respect.

That was "with all due respect a cheapshot".I can see how you may think that, though. I've read Longstreet's: Manassas to Appamatox" and have to say I was nauseated at his self promotion and unwillingness to give Jackson hardly any credit. He gives S.D. Lee the credit for breaking the attack. Shumakers artillery had been firing on the Union formations prior to S.D. Lee. S.D. Lee broke the supports but Jackson broke the main attack. I've read much about Jackson and think he was a very strange person. He is not my favorite general by far.

Iron Duke I believe the above replies are to you as well since you posted similiar thoughts as Elennsar. The whole point of Jackson's plan was to relieve Richmond and I don't see how McClellan could have maintained the siege of Richmond with the threats in the North. Lee with 52,000 of his finest would have been in the Richmond defenses. He had much better odds of maintaining his position than he did against Grant in 1864. If McClellan pulled back from Richmond to reinforce the North he would have been ripe for attack.

It just seems to be a better idea than what Lee came up with. The end result of Lee's plan was that McClellan was still in Virginia as well as Pope. Not to mention the enormous casualties sustained by the AONV.(Lee's finest).
 
Sorry about the brigade/regiment mistake. Lawton's Georgia Brigade had seen little action and was probably stronger per regiment than Whiting's. The Valley Army peaked at 17,000 I believe. Take away 2,000 casualties from the campaign and that leaves 15,000. Add at least 10,000 men from Lawton and Whiting and all that Jackson needed was maybe 15,000. Lee was supposed to have 92,000 men at the beginning of the Seven Days. That would leave him with 52,000 inside the fortifications.


Two notes.

1) Also subtract the sick and exhausted from the Valley Army.

2) "At least 10,000 men" is grossly off. (Edit: If Brett Schulte's page is correct, pretty close actually)

I believe the whole area would be in panic. I don't think Jackson's intention was for pitched battle. He would have problems with ammo resupply. From my understanding his plan was to wreck havoc on the infrastructure. He didn't want a battle at Richmond. He wanted it in Pennsylvania.


Easier to wish for than to create. The Federals were not likely to go into a wild panic just because Jackson is moving North - they didn't when Lee did later in the year with only a little more men.

I feel confident that Jackson would have made it into Maryland without heavy battle and possibly Pennsylvania. The increase in his command size would have required some changes in his command style.That is where I also have some doubts.
I have always wondered about the exhaustion claim as an excuse for his inactivity at Seven Days. I have a gut feeling he may have had a case of the Longstreet pouts because he didn't get his way.


And the basis for this csonfidence is what?

It would require more than changes in his command style.

As for "Longstreet pouts"...the idea that Longstreet "pouted' is quite possibly the most incredible myth of the war.

Nor is there any sign Jackson was doing so, going back on topic.

Jackson had just been through a hard and demanding campaign. If he wasn't running on too little sleep for his own good, I'd be more than amazed.

That was "with all due respect a cheapshot".I can see how you may think that, though. I've read Longstreet's: Manassas to Appamatox" and have to say I was nauseated at his self promotion and unwillingness to give Jackson hardly any credit. He gives S.D. Lee the credit for breaking the attack. Shumakers artillery had been firing on the Union formations prior to S.D. Lee. S.D. Lee broke the supports but Jackson broke the main attack. I've read much about Jackson and think he was a very strange person. He is not my favorite general by far.

I haven't read it (intending to), but Longstreet's record as Lee's "old warhorse" is much more sound than Jackson's as Lee's "right arm".

As for the fanboy comment, I do not withdraw it. Your comment on Second Manassas/Bull Run treats Longstreet's particiatpion as all but irrelevant. This is simply not true.

The whole point of Jackson's plan was to relieve Richmond and I don't see how McClellan could have maintained the siege of Richmond with the threats in the North. Lee with 52,000 of his finest would have been in the Richmond defenses. He had much better odds of maintaining his position than he did against Grant in 1864. If McClellan pulled back from Richmond to reinforce the North he would have been ripe for attack.


If I may reply - he could have done so very easily with the sixty thousand plus forces in the area to face Jackson, plus any necessary reinforcements from his army.

Lee could have withstood a siege for a time, but that is what it would be. A siege, with McClellan having his siege train ready for use.

It just seems to be a better idea than what Lee came up with. The end result of Lee's plan was that McClellan was still in Virginia as well as Pope. Not to mention the enormous casualties sustained by the AONV.(Lee's finest).

And if it wasn't doomed to failure on the counts of both leadership and army gathering, I would agree. The Seven Days were not an ideal affair. But Jackson being even able to assemble, organize, and manage an army of 40,000 is quite far fetched, if the Confederacy could somehow scrape it together.

Unless someone has a better source, I believe this page has reliable numbers:

http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/...al-level-orders-of-battle-the-seven-days-oob/

So let us see what Jackson would need (all numbers quoted from the above are rounded to the nearest hundred).

Whiting has 5,500 men.
Jackson's old division, including Lawton's brigade (and not counting the 47th or 48th Alabama has they have not yet arrived) appears to be about 8,700.
Ewell has 6,400.

Total: 20,600. Assuming all figures are correct.

Another 19,000 men are not available without stripping a fifth of the AoNVA's field strength, including men that are properly part of the department of North Carolina.

This does not sound good, given that McClellan is an immediate threat - even if he's incompetent in field battle, he does, as stated above, have a siege train to take care of whatever fortifications are in place..
 
Elennsar,
Brett Schulte's page shows the Confederate totals before Seven Days at 110,000. Subtract 40,000 and that leaves 70,000 to protect Richmond. With those kind of figures, I think Lee could go on the offensive as well.

As far as panic in the North, Google " Northern panic Confederate invasion".

Jackson would have been in the Valley ahead of McDowell. McDowell could only hope to get between Washington and Jackson as McClellan did when Lee invaded. Jackson already proved to be more than a match for the rest of the Union troops in the area. Getting into Maryland or Pennsylvania had never been a problem for the Confederates.

As for the "fanboy" comment, I won't lower the standards of this forum to get into a name calling contest with you.
 
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