Sorry about the brigade/regiment mistake. Lawton's Georgia Brigade had seen little action and was probably stronger per regiment than Whiting's. The Valley Army peaked at 17,000 I believe. Take away 2,000 casualties from the campaign and that leaves 15,000. Add at least 10,000 men from Lawton and Whiting and all that Jackson needed was maybe 15,000. Lee was supposed to have 92,000 men at the beginning of the Seven Days. That would leave him with 52,000 inside the fortifications.
Two notes.
1) Also subtract the sick and exhausted from the Valley Army.
2) "At least 10,000 men" is grossly off. (Edit: If Brett Schulte's page is correct, pretty close actually)
I believe the whole area would be in panic. I don't think Jackson's intention was for pitched battle. He would have problems with ammo resupply. From my understanding his plan was to wreck havoc on the infrastructure. He didn't want a battle at Richmond. He wanted it in Pennsylvania.
Easier to wish for than to create. The Federals were not likely to go into a wild panic just because Jackson is moving North - they didn't when Lee did later in the year with only a little more men.
I feel confident that Jackson would have made it into Maryland without heavy battle and possibly Pennsylvania. The increase in his command size would have required some changes in his command style.That is where I also have some doubts.
I have always wondered about the exhaustion claim as an excuse for his inactivity at Seven Days. I have a gut feeling he may have had a case of the Longstreet pouts because he didn't get his way.
And the basis for this csonfidence is what?
It would require more than changes in his command style.
As for "Longstreet pouts"...the idea that Longstreet "pouted' is quite possibly the most incredible myth of the war.
Nor is there any sign Jackson was doing so, going back on topic.
Jackson had just been through a hard and demanding campaign. If he wasn't running on too little sleep for his own good, I'd be more than amazed.
That was "with all due respect a cheapshot".I can see how you may think that, though. I've read Longstreet's: Manassas to Appamatox" and have to say I was nauseated at his self promotion and unwillingness to give Jackson hardly any credit. He gives S.D. Lee the credit for breaking the attack. Shumakers artillery had been firing on the Union formations prior to S.D. Lee. S.D. Lee broke the supports but Jackson broke the main attack. I've read much about Jackson and think he was a very strange person. He is not my favorite general by far.
I haven't read it (intending to), but Longstreet's record as Lee's "old warhorse" is much more sound than Jackson's as Lee's "right arm".
As for the fanboy comment, I do not withdraw it. Your comment on Second Manassas/Bull Run treats Longstreet's particiatpion as all but irrelevant. This is simply not true.
The whole point of Jackson's plan was to relieve Richmond and I don't see how McClellan could have maintained the siege of Richmond with the threats in the North. Lee with 52,000 of his finest would have been in the Richmond defenses. He had much better odds of maintaining his position than he did against Grant in 1864. If McClellan pulled back from Richmond to reinforce the North he would have been ripe for attack.
If I may reply - he could have done so very easily with the sixty thousand plus forces in the area to face Jackson, plus any necessary reinforcements from his army.
Lee could have withstood a siege for a time, but that is what it would be. A siege, with McClellan having his siege train ready for use.
It just seems to be a better idea than what Lee came up with. The end result of Lee's plan was that McClellan was still in Virginia as well as Pope. Not to mention the enormous casualties sustained by the AONV.(Lee's finest).
And if it wasn't doomed to failure on the counts of both leadership and army gathering, I would agree. The Seven Days were not an ideal affair. But Jackson being even able to assemble, organize, and manage an army of 40,000 is quite far fetched, if the Confederacy could somehow scrape it together.
Unless someone has a better source, I believe this page has reliable numbers:
http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/...al-level-orders-of-battle-the-seven-days-oob/
So let us see what Jackson would need (all numbers quoted from the above are rounded to the nearest hundred).
Whiting has 5,500 men.
Jackson's old division, including Lawton's brigade (and not counting the 47th or 48th Alabama has they have not yet arrived) appears to be about 8,700.
Ewell has 6,400.
Total: 20,600. Assuming all figures are correct.
Another 19,000 men are not available without stripping a fifth of the AoNVA's field strength, including men that are properly part of the department of North Carolina.
This does not sound good, given that McClellan is an immediate threat - even if he's incompetent in field battle, he does, as stated above, have a siege train to take care of whatever fortifications are in place..