NF Stephen Sears' Gettysburg

Non-Fiction
I'm not through Chapter One, but I've read the Introduction, which in the second paragraph cherry picks a quotation and completely misrepresents Sir Aurthur Fremantle's journal, Three Months in the Southern States. To wit: "...the universal feeling in the (Confederate) Army was one of profound contempt for an enemy whom they have beaten so constantly..." I am well familiar with Fremantle's work and it is utterly disingenuous to take this quote out of context.

I don't understand what you mean when you say that Freemantle's quote was cherry picked or out of context. It was after the first day at Gettysburg and various staff members were discussing the day's events and what could happen the next day. Here is the whole quote:

At supper this evening, General Longstreet spoke of the enemy's position as being "very formidable." He also said that they would doubtless intrench themselves strongly during the night. The Staff officers spoke of the battle as a certainty, and the universal feeling in the army was one of profound contempt for an enemy whom they have beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages.

I'm certain that many southern commanders had this feeling and even Robert E Lee thought his boys were invincible. As Longstreet said about this battle Lee's 'blood was up" and try as he might he could not convince him to fight the battle as Lonstreet proposed.

Fremantle, Arthur James Lyon Three Months in the Southern States, April-June 1863 (Kindle Locations 2587-2588). . Kindle Edition.
 
Chancellorsville knocked the North onto its elbows, psychologically, and (perhaps!) brought overconfidence to the Confederacy. This "Pyrrhic" nonsense is re-writing history, exactly as was feared in the South. I see it in the first ten pages of Sears' book, but will take your advice. Thanks for posting.

I think you're not giving Sears enough credit and are being overly harsh. I found the book very even-handed and factually-based.

Regarding the aftermath of Chancellorsville, it did hit the northern public hard, but the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac came out of that fight with their morale remarkably intact. True, the Army had just been badly defeated, but many of the units never entered the fight and they felt they weren't defeated. They appeared to blame the leaders--Hooker especially--and the XI Corps under "Uh-Oh" Howard, much more than themselves. Hooker may have been whipped, but not the Army.

Lee fought his greatest battle at Chancellorsville, yet was not entirely happy with the outcome. Once he stopped Hooker's advance and had taken the initiative, he had hoped to trap the AotP below the Rappahannock and defeat it in detail. However, despite giving both Sedgwick's and Hooker's forces quite a beating, both portions were able to withdraw before being destroyed. This left the two armies--AotP and AoNV--facing off against each other across the Potomac just as they were before the battle, and at a heavy cost to Lee's army, which could not be as easily rebuilt as the Union's forces. That is why Sears described the victory as "pyrrhic." No denigration to Lee or his AoNV intended, and no rewrite of history.
 
I think you're not giving Sears enough credit and are being overly harsh. I found the book very even-handed and factually-based.

Fair enough. I was excited to start it and really dissapointed with the opening. I appreciate all of the feedback and will stick with the book. Cheers.
 
One thing to remember is that no matter how many books on the Civil War you read, the Confederacy always loses.
And we, no matter how important, have no influence on the outcome.
 
Sears account is widely considered, and justifiably so, one of the best single volume works ever produced on the battle of Gettysburg. To disregard it over disagreement with a single phrase or fact would say more about the reader than it would about the book.
 
"and have kindled fires at home with "books" more than once."

Book burning!!

If history has taught me anything it is that those that burn books usually have opinions that deserve the same fate.

Read the book and get your $18 dollars worth, critize and open debate on any of Sears facts you disagree with and then donate the book to a library, student, or someone without the $18 to spend.
 
I recently finished Sear's "Gettysburg" book and found it outstanding. I like his writing style as it makes the book flow smoothly.
 
Steve Sears is a friend of mine--he wrote the introduction to one of my books--but I will tell you what I tell everyone about his work: Steve does not get out and walk the ground. Having done this work for years, I can tell you that there is no way that you can write about these events and not understand the terrain and how it drove the action. That's my biggest complaint with his work.
 
I read the book including the intro and was very impressed with the overall product. I've been to Gettysburg many times but Sears' work enabled me to get a better idea of the ebb and flow of the battle. He wrote about the Federals's commanding field of fire during PPT's advance and I could see in my minds's eye the destruction of the CSA assault. Many of the authors I've read will "cherry pick" statements or things out of context to make their points, I think we all do that.

I recently finished reading "River Ran Red" about the battle of Ft. Pillow. Like you, something I read early on about Forrest really incensed me. I put the book down for a month but continued and was impressed with the author's use of eyewitness acounts. At the end, even though I'm a N B Forrest supporter, I was convinced that a masacre did indeed take place. Though not probably ordered by Forrest, he seemed to at least condone it early on.

Give Sears work a chance.
 
How does Sears' book compare to Trudeau's: style, content (although obviously difficult to be too different,) etc?

I read Sears a few years ago and just finished Trudeau last week.

I think Trudeau focuses a little more on human interest stories (including more about Gettysburg civilians) and in some ways is just a more entertaining writer than Sears (which is intended as a complement of Trudeau, not a criticism of Sears). Trudeau also seems very dedicated to chronological events which I like, but which can cause a little repetitiveness when he feels the need to remind the reader of things previously mentioned. I also think he makes some of the best and most numerous uses of maps among Civil War authors. I previously read his "Southern Storm" about Sherman's March and will definitely be reading his books on the Overland Campaign.

Sears remains probably my favorite Civil War author and his book on Gettysburg (combined with visiting the battlefield there and at Antietam) really sparked my interest in the Civil War (which had been sort of smoldering since I read Foote's trilogy in high school). From what I remember, he is more focused on the battle and leaders and less on the fluff; Sears doesn't get as bogged down in the battle details as some other authors do (ex: Peter Cozzens, who is otherwise a very good author too).

I think both books are worth reading if you can.
 
I've read Sears's Gettysburg, and found it a good book. I wish you luck in "debunking" it Drew, because you'll need it. I strongly suggest you go to the footnotes for any factual material you disagree with, for you will find that like that casualty rate you object to so much, Sears is on a very good footing in making the assertion he did. You might quibble with his interpretations, but you will have a very frustrating time playing fact checker against the man and his publishing house.

@ Dave -- I'm glad to see you found Hart's Sherman! Just keep in mind when you read it that Hart was a military theorist who, at the time, was very much engaged in a very real doctrinal struggle. He uses Sherman's career as a proxy to advance his strategy of the indirect approach, and in so doing he was working at getting his ideas adopted. I find the book more useful in reading the thoughts of one of the architects of mechanized warfare than as a strict biography of Sherman.
 
In re-reading Mr. Sears' book, a remark that had not penetrated my wall of ignorance the first time I had read it posed a question that I need help to resolve.

On the matter of the "strategic offensive-tactical defensive" claim and counter claim, Mr. Sears wrote: "No commanding general is obliged to promise a subordinate any future action, particularly anything like this that would tie his hands. Lee said as much when asked about it after the war. He "had never made any such promise and had never thought of doing any such thing," was his reply and he termed the idea "absurd" "

The quotes inside the section which I have quoted are in quotes in the book. The remarks attributed to General Lee are not footnoted. Did General Lee say that? If so, what is the source for his remarks?

Thanks in advance for any help.
 
In re-reading Mr. Sears' book, a remark that had not penetrated my wall of ignorance the first time I had read it posed a question that I need help to resolve.

On the matter of the "strategic offensive-tactical defensive" claim and counter claim, Mr. Sears wrote: "No commanding general is obliged to promise a subordinate any future action, particularly anything like this that would tie his hands. Lee said as much when asked about it after the war. He "had never made any such promise and had never thought of doing any such thing," was his reply and he termed the idea "absurd" "

The quotes inside the section which I have quoted are in quotes in the book. The remarks attributed to General Lee are not footnoted. Did General Lee say that? If so, what is the source for his remarks?

Thanks in advance for any help.

Wow, it's been five years. I can't help because I can't find the $18 book in my mess. Honestly, I don't remember ever finishing it, but not for lack of trying.

I agree with what others have said about Trudeau. He does a great job of telling a story while sticking to the facts.

Now, where Sears got this thing is going to have to wait until someone shows up who knows where to find it.
 
In re-reading Mr. Sears' book, a remark that had not penetrated my wall of ignorance the first time I had read it posed a question that I need help to resolve.

On the matter of the "strategic offensive-tactical defensive" claim and counter claim, Mr. Sears wrote: "No commanding general is obliged to promise a subordinate any future action, particularly anything like this that would tie his hands. Lee said as much when asked about it after the war. He "had never made any such promise and had never thought of doing any such thing," was his reply and he termed the idea "absurd" "

The quotes inside the section which I have quoted are in quotes in the book. The remarks attributed to General Lee are not footnoted. Did General Lee say that? If so, what is the source for his remarks?

Thanks in advance for any help.

I don't know if Lee said it, but he should have. Any commander worth his salt does not limit his tactical options before even seeing the situation.

Ryan
 
Thanks Drew and rpk ennedy for the responses. I am more confused than ever now, and that takes some doing. Later, Mr Sears quotes General Hooker from his testimony before the Joint Committee as saying," I felt it was for me to say when and where I should fight him that I could chose my position and compel him to attack me." The next sentence in the book is; "That, of course, was exactly the plan of maneuver Lee and Longstreet had agreed to pursue once the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac into Yankee territory." What am I missing? Does General Lee characterize such an agreement as "absurd" or was it exactly the plan of maneuver that was agreed to?

I am neither a scholar or a critic, just a confused reader. I am enjoying the book very much. The narrative is engaging and the maps are helpful.
 
Thanks Drew and rpk ennedy for the responses. I am more confused than ever now, and that takes some doing. Later, Mr Sears quotes General Hooker from his testimony before the Joint Committee as saying," I felt it was for me to say when and where I should fight him that I could chose my position and compel him to attack me." The next sentence in the book is; "That, of course, was exactly the plan of maneuver Lee and Longstreet had agreed to pursue once the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac into Yankee territory." What am I missing? Does General Lee characterize such an agreement as "absurd" or was it exactly the plan of maneuver that was agreed to?

I am neither a scholar or a critic, just a confused reader. I am enjoying the book very much. The narrative is engaging and the maps are helpful.

No, it's Hooker promoting himself after the fact. He got his butt kicked in the actual war.

This is my opinion.
 
In a democracy, where public opinion drives policy, the perception of heavy losses and continuing defeat on the battlefield (think Tet Offensive) can, indeed, determine the course and outcome of a war. If the Confederacy could continue to dominate on the battlefield, the North would do what Britain did in the War of the American Revolution, write off the war as too costly an endeavor. In this sense Chancellorsville was a winning strategy for the Confederacy. However for the Confederacy to parley this strategy into victory, it had to be able to do this repeatedly and ultimately the Confederacy would run out of troops to do it for a long enough period of time, thanks in part to Lincoln's fierce determination not to allow it to happen this way. Take a very close look at the actual casualty statistics of Chancellorsville. Simply in terms of the mathematics of combat, the Union Army could not be demolished no matter how many Chancellorsville's the ANV won. If the North remained resolute and determined to fight it out to the end, with the North being willing to accept any number of Chancellorsville's, the North would prevail. Perhaps Jefferson Davis and the Southern people in the Spring of 1863 did not see it this way but I suspect that Lee already did.
 
Later, Mr Sears quotes General Hooker from his testimony before the Joint Committee as saying," I felt it was for me to say when and where I should fight him that I could chose my position and compel him to attack me." The next sentence in the book is; "That, of course, was exactly the plan of maneuver Lee and Longstreet had agreed to pursue once the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac into Yankee territory." What am I missing? Does General Lee characterize such an agreement as "absurd" or was it exactly the plan of maneuver that was agreed to?

Prior to the campaign, Lee would have a plan of maneuver so he and his key subordinates would be on the same page regarding what to do, this way they weren't dependent on constant contact with each other. A plan can be changed depending on the circumstances.

What would be absurd would be Lee promising to do a particular thing no matter what the circumstances they faced.
 
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