NF Starving the South: How the North Won the Civil War

Non-Fiction

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Starving the South: How the North Won the Civil War, by Andrew F. Smith
New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011. Pp. vi, 296. Illus., notes, index. $27.99. ISBN: 031260181.

Starving the South is not a cheery work, for it portrays the hard choices people, South and North, had to make, and puts to bed the notion of a happy Confederate citizenry.
As do most wars, the Civil War fell hardest on the common Confederate soldiers, who were subject to the draft. As they were mostly food farmers, productivity declined. So they starved in the army, as did their families at home. As for the North, Smith poses the question: Is it more moral to reduce a people to hunger rather than death to subdue them? Both William T. Sherman and Philip Sheridan answered “Yes” to this question. However Smith fails to consider that in this, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee also bore responsibility. By the fall of 1864 it was clear the Confederacy was going to lose, in part because of hunger and mass desertion, yet Davis and Lee were undeterred in their quest for victory.
Although Smith covers many absorbing topics, one is of most importance: that food shortages often drove decision-making. She examines four particular cases:

  • The Union decision to operate against salt deposits
  • Confederate impressment of supplies, which caused disaffection among civilians, resulting in hoarding and land left fallow
  • The Union’s decision to trade cotton for food, which increased federal revenue through sales but prolonged the war, as the policy helped supply Confederate armies
  • Sherman’s conclusion that only broad scale deprivation of supplies would force Lee’s army in Virginia to surrender, leading to the march through Georgia and the Carolinas, and a 60-mile wide path of foraging and destruction.
In the end, of course, Lee surrendered because he had few troops left and no way to obtain food supplies, as every route had been closed off around him.

Beyond this, Smith covers a myriad of other topics: how cotton cultivation affected food production, the effects of the naval blockade, railroads, inflation, bread riots, “starvation parties,” the “first” Thanksgiving in 1864, labor shortages, and malnutrition among horses. His discussion of Sherman’s march is a bit shaky as he states Sherman’s orders were legal, but gives the impression of pure plunder.

Smith has made a very important contribution to Civil War literature by demonstrating that the issue of food and the Confederacy was not just one of how hungry the Southern troops were. He
demonstrates that, in a sense, one can argue the Civil War was one great siege operation of the whole South.

Our Reviewer: C. Kay Larson, is an independent scholar based in New York. She is the author of Great Necessities: The Life, Times and Writings of Anna Ella Carroll, 1815-1894 and the novel South Under a Prairie Sky: The Journal of Nell Churchill, US Army Nurse & Scout. A member of the board of the New York Military Affairs Symposium, she has contributed to MINERVA: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military, and is a reviewer for the H-CivWar List. She has contributed essays on "Monitor's Brave Fellow," "Women at War," "The Count and the Gymnasts," and "A Woman with Flare" to The New York Times Disunion blog series and is currently working on a revised and expanded edition of her 1995 book Til I Come Marching Home: A Brief History of American Women in World War II.
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Reviewer: C. Kay Larson

http://www.strategypage.com/bookreviews/881.asp
 
Hm. I've generally been of the opinion that the South died not of starvation, but by gangrene... food was plentiful in many areas but the distribution network was both under stress and under attack and broke down, so the food could not be gotten to many places that needed it. But from the review, it sounds that this aspect might be covered... I may have to put this one on the 'lower-priority-to-read' list. (Too many books already on that list for me not to do a triage...)
 
Why is it that I can find considerable amount of reports about the abundence of food found in private residences and very few about any families on the brink of starvation? How is that Sherman and 60,000 men were able to live off the land and eat very well if there was such a shortage of food? The images of Confederate pows also do not support the theory of a population and army that were starving..
 
I tried to read the book, but, despite intense interest in the subject because of the railroad transportation angle, I could not finish it. This is a superficial look at the subject -- the subject deserves a much better study.
 
I tried to read the book, but, despite intense interest in the subject because of the railroad transportation angle, I could not finish it. This is a superficial look at the subject -- the subject deserves a much better study.


The book just slipped a couple of priority notches lower on my list. :D
 
Another factor in the poor supply of food to the Confederate armies was its Commissary General, Lucius Northrop. Except perhaps for Leonidas Polk, he was the worst personnel appointment Jefferson Davis made.
 
Placing part of the blame on Lee for continuing the war ignores Lee's character and sense of duty. Lee believed strongly in civilian control of the military, and his duty obliged him to do his very best in his role (and make sure those under him did so as well) until ordered otherwise. As long as Davis ordered continued resistance, it was up to Lee to comply.

The only "out" for him was the point where it became impossible to follow the orders any further. This was a concept well engrained in trained military men, especially as Lee had in his pre-war postings had sat on more than his share of courts-martials. It was not enough to argue that following orders was a bad idea or not "feasable", it had to be impossible under the circumstances. Fitz-John Porter tried the same defense in his court-martial for failing to follow Pope's orders, and lost that defense the first time around, but only had the verdict vacated well after the war when Longstreet testified about his position and thereby proved that Pope's orders were impossible to obey. For Lee, he continued to try to find a route south which was not blocked by northern troops so he could join Johnston, but at Appomatox he found himself hemmed in at every direction (despite considerable efforts to find an alternative). It was only at that point that Lee was relieved of his duty to follow Davis' orders.

Note that Lee didn't eat much more than his men. VIP's visiting Lee commented on Lee splitting a hardtack or a bisquit with them when Lee invited them to join him in his meal. Gifts sent to Lee from admirers were routinely passed off to the hospitals, much to the dismay of his staff.

As for the civilians, there seemed to be considerable differences between where they were located and whether slaves were available to do the labor. Small farms where the men were needed to provide the labor suffered as fields went fallow for several years, and for those living in towns or cities inflation eventually put the basic kitchen items out of reach (cornmeal, salt, etc.).
 
Another factor in the poor supply of food to the Confederate armies was its Commissary General, Lucius Northrop. Except perhaps for Leonidas Polk, he was the worst personnel appointment Jefferson Davis made.

One of Lee's first acts upon being appointed as General-in-Chief of all Confederate armies (an action which occured far too late in the war to do any good) was to get Davis to sack Northrup. But I've always been curious about about how, specifically, Northrup erred. Certainly the Confederate armies had far less than they needed of selected items. But was it Northrup's fault? The entire Confederate system seemed to be designed to limit the resources available to the national government, in favor of the states. How could he have done better with what he had?
 
The entire Confederate system seemed to be designed to limit the resources available to the national government, in favor of the states. How could he have done better with what he had?

Not to mention that, at least in the West and on the coasts, Union strategy was pointed pretty directly at the Southern transportation network (railroads, rivers, and the littoral).
 
One of Lee's first acts upon being appointed as General-in-Chief of all Confederate armies (an action which occured far too late in the war to do any good) was to get Davis to sack Northrup.

It was also one of the conditions John C. Breckinridge insisted upon before taking the portfolio of Secretary of War.

But I've always been curious about about how, specifically, Northrup erred. Certainly the Confederate armies had far less than they needed of selected items. But was it Northrup's fault? The entire Confederate system seemed to be designed to limit the resources available to the national government, in favor of the states. How could he have done better with what he had?

Josiah Gorgas faced exactly the same logistical difficulties, yet the Confederate armies never lost a battle for lack of weapons and ammunition. Had Northrop done as good a job with food as Gorgas did with weapons, the South would have had a much better chance of winning the war.
 
True, the Confederacy had sufficient arms and ammunition throughout the war.

But it's also true that no Confederate army, to my knowledge, lost a battle directly because of hunger. But it would be fair to say it was a contributing factor to desertions, which substantially reduced the fighting strength of the armies, especialy in the final months of the war. Also, a notable exception may be found at Appomatox - Lee wasted more than a day trying to forage for food in areas already played out, and he desperately needed that time to get ahead of the AoP and across the Appomatox River.
 
NEAR APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
April 12, 1865.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS.
Mr. PRESIDENT:
It is with pain that I announce to Your Excellency the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.
The operations which preceded this result will be reported in full. I will therefore only now state that, upon arriving at Amelia Court-House on the morning of the 4th with the advance of the army, on the retreat from the lines in front of Richmond and Petersburg, and not finding the supplies ordered to be placed there, nearly twenty-four hours were lost in endeavoring to collect in the country subsistence for men and horses. This delay was fatal, and could not be retrieved.....

With great respect,
your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
Genl.
 
There was a severe drought (lasting approximately 15 years) which culminated during the war....in Texas, as well as across much of the South. This, coupled in other states with battles, losing the farmers to the army, etc....well, you get the picture. While the armies at least had some food coming to them most of the time, the civilians across much of the South were left to their own devices. It's no surprise the last vestiges of nutritional deficiencies were in the South. When molasses becomes your best source of iron, you have a problem.
 
There was a severe drought (lasting approximately 15 years) which culminated during the war....in Texas, as well as across much of the South. This, coupled in other states with battles, losing the farmers to the army, etc....well, you get the picture. While the armies at least had some food coming to them most of the time, the civilians across much of the South were left to their own devices. It's no surprise the last vestiges of nutritional deficiencies were in the South. When molasses becomes your best source of iron, you have a problem.
Which areas were hit the hardest? As there are countless accounts of the abundance of food on the farms and residences that the Union troops encountered that were enough to feed 60,000 men .I haven't run across any accounts of Union troops having a hard time finding food, (well as long as they were the first ones that got to the farms that is), and you would think that there would be accounts of the scarcty of food if there was a shortage going on among the civilian population before the troops arrived there..
 
Didn't Lee tell Grant that his men were starving, and Grant issued them all rations? It's 3:35 am, I should be in bed, and I don't have time to verify my memory of the fact, but I am pretty sure that it happened that way.
 
True, the Confederacy had sufficient arms and ammunition throughout the war.

But it's also true that no Confederate army, to my knowledge, lost a battle directly because of hunger.

IF Sam Watkins is to be taken at face value, Bragg's army at Chattanooga was in a physically weakened condition due to insufficient food and blankets.
 
I tried to read the book, but, despite intense interest in the subject because of the railroad transportation angle, I could not finish it. This is a superficial look at the subject -- the subject deserves a much better study.

I agree in the sense that the book is a topical survey.

Nonetheless, I found a nugget leading me down a fascinating path. Specifically, some Northern shippers would first transport their cargoes to Halifax where they would legally be - but superficially - transformed into "Canadian" cargoes and thence shipped to Bermuda or Nassau for loading onto blockade runners.

The Judge Advocate of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron wrote:

"We have been accustomed to berating...Great Britain for exporting goods to the Confederacy. But probably more goods were carried into the Confederate States by merchants of the United States than all [those] of Europe. The munitions of war were furnished in very large quantities to the enemies of the United States by the citizens of the United States."
 
IF Sam Watkins is to be taken at face value, Bragg's army at Chattanooga was in a physically weakened condition due to insufficient food and blankets.
Though Confederates did not literally starve, they were certainly malnourished throughout most of the war. The disparate diets of the two armies are no better illustrated than Foote's description of Jackson's men pouncing on Pope's supply base at Manassas Junction. "Some were satisfied with loaves of unfamiliar light-bread, which they ate like cake. Others, preferring a still rich diet, found pickled oysters and canned lobster more to their taste, spooning it up with grimy fingers and washing it down with bottles of Rhine wine."

A month later the same army marched into Maryland and Foote describes it this way: "A boy who stood on that opposite bank and watched the vermin-infested scarecrows come thronging past him, hairy and sun baked, with nothing bright about them but their weapons and their teeth, was impressed by them in much the same way as the Kentucky civilian, this same week, had been impressed by their western counterparts. They made him think of wolves. 'They were the dirtiest men I ever saw,' he afterwards recalled, 'a most ragged, lean, and hungry set of wolves.' Accustomed to the Federals he had seen marching in compact formations and neat blue uniforms he added: 'Yet there was a dash about them that the northern men lacked. They rode like circus riders. Many of them were from the far South and spoke a dialect I could scarcely understand. They were profane beyond belief and talked incessantly."

Very, very tough men indeed. That was why the war lasted as long as it did.
 
I agree in the sense that the book is a topical survey.

Nonetheless, I found a nugget leading me down a fascinating path. Specifically, some Northern shippers would first transport their cargoes to Halifax where they would legally be - but superficially - transformed into "Canadian" cargoes and thence shipped to Bermuda or Nassau for loading onto blockade runners.

The Judge Advocate of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron wrote:

"We have been accustomed to berating...Great Britain for exporting goods to the Confederacy. But probably more goods were carried into the Confederate States by merchants of the United States than all [those] of Europe. The munitions of war were furnished in very large quantities to the enemies of the United States by the citizens of the United States."


There's some commentary on this in Dispatches from Bermuda: The Civil War Letters of Charles Maxwell Allen, United States Consul at Bermuda, 1861-1888 (Glen N. Wich, editor; Kent State Univ. Press, 2008); it definitely exasperated Allen.

I wish I could remember where I read it, but there was a great phrase to the effect that 'before the war, the Southern states and the Northern states were each others' largest trading partners. That did not change merely because there was a war on.'
 
TThe disparate diets of the two armies are no better illustrated than Foote's description of Jackson's men pouncing on Pope's supply base at Manassas Junction. "Some were satisfied with loaves of unfamiliar light-bread, which they ate like cake. Others, preferring a still rich diet, found pickled oysters and canned lobster more to their taste, spooning it up with grimy fingers and washing it down with bottles of Rhine wine.".

The same phenomenon played a role in Early's defeat at Cedar Creek (after routing the Federals from their camps).
 
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