South of the James

atlantis

Sergeant Major
Joined
Nov 12, 2016
Instead of going up the peninsula should the US army in 1862 gone up the Norfolk and Petersburg railroad south of the James. Taking Petersburg then turning north toward Richmond while McDowell moves south from Fredericksburg.
 
Possible, but not probable, and I am not sure it would have made a huge difference. My making the choice McClellan did, he has the union navy to protect his flanks on the York River on the north, and the James on the south, until he gets to where the peninsula widens out past Williamsburg.

If you go by the route you suggest, the Union army's left flank is always going to be the focus on a possible flanking attack, and without a strong cavalry force to protect it, it could be pounced on.
 
My understanding of the reason why the US took the route it did, historically, is basically that there are these periods once Yorktown is abandoned.

Phase one: Norfolk is being abandoned but the Virginia is still in existence. (May 5-11)

During this period, crossing to south of the James is simply not viable owing to the existence of the Virginia. During this period McClellan's army is pushing up the Peninsula, with half of it going by sea to Eltham's Landing in an attempt to cut Johnston's retreating force off.

Phase two: The Virginia is scuttled, the Navy tries to go it alone. (May 12-16.)

During this period, McClellan is moving up the Peninsula and it's kind of a slog - the roads aren't good, partly because of the terrible weather that's been going on all spring. The Navy is heading up the James with the intent to basically win the war by themselves, until they run into Drewry's Bluff.
It's certainly possible at this point the Union could have shifted to south of the James, but there's no particular reason to do so. Either McClellan will have to basically pull his army off the Peninsula and ship it to south of the James (a process which must be done one division at a time as that's all the shipping that's available, and which would take over a week given the rate of movement to Eltham's Landing, but which might leave the Union army vulnerable to Johnston's army as it shrinks) or he'll march up the Peninsula to the point the Chickahominy is bridgeable, cross there and then he can move south to the James as a unit (and cross to right near Petersburg).
An additional problem here is that a lot of the port facilities at Norfolk got torched when the Confederates pulled out, so I'm not sure what the cargo handling capacity was like - basically you don't gain anything by basing out of Norfolk.
Of course, if there'd been the foresight to see the need for help against Drewry's Bluff, that's another matter, but you still need to get the army there.

Phase three: The Navy asks for McClellan's help neutralizing Drewry's Bluff. (May 17.)

This phase is so short I'm mostly including it for completeness, because...

Phase four: Stanton issues orders fixing McClellan's base at White House Landing, in order to make junction with McDowell. (May 18 onwards.)

This is the order which basically kills the idea of going south of the James. Stanton's order is not countermanded until JEB Stuart "countermands" it during the Seven Days, and even then just because McClellan was able to say it was impossible to follow now.



The thing which is so tricky about this is that the things which would make a south-of-the-James advance preferable are factors which were not actually caused by the Confederates. It's all the result of dysfunction in the Union high command at Washington, as if you have McClellan north of the James (based at either White House Landing or Harrisons Landing depending on the month) with the troops he had been promised (McDowell in late May and June, Burnside (+) in July) then you can get Richmond taken anyway.
 
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