So Lee is soundly beaten at Antietam......

I do not refer to the mountain gaps but coordinated attacks on 9/17/62.

So was I. Remember the bridges and fords of the creek are defiles as well. It takes roughly an hour to get a division across a bridge. The question becomes how early can McClellan shuttle all his divisions into position for a coordinated attack?
 
Lee's ragged rebs altho the photos of the dead say otherwise. He has about 42,000 after second bull run.

Between 75,000 and 80,000 with DH Hill's arrival. Of course at 2nd Bull Run a third of his army were not present - they were marching towards it under DH Hill. This of course excludes the division Lee left at Richmond under GW Smith. Of course these straggle and hence the numbers on the field at Antietam are quite a bit lower.

He picks up the divisions of mclaws and iirc lawton.

McLaws is part of DH Hill's wing marching to Manassas. It consisted of:

DH Hill's division
McLaws's division
Walker's division
Hampton's cavalry brigade
Pendleton's artillery reserve

Lawton was the senior unwounded brigadier in Ewell's division, and took over when Ewell was wounded. He was at 2nd BR and Chantilly.

It gives him maybe 45,000. He also has a contingent of conscripts that are awaiting harpers ferry equipment. Mac has 65,000 gathered on the fly. Whatever the numbers lee looses.

I don't doubt McClellan had a moderate edge in numbers (overall 87,000 vs 76,000 or so), but it is not enough to overcome Lee's advantage of position.
 
N
Between 75,000 and 80,000 with DH Hill's arrival. Of course at 2nd Bull Run a third of his army were not present - they were marching towards it under DH Hill. This of course excludes the division Lee left at Richmond under GW Smith. Of course these straggle and hence the numbers on the field at Antietam are quite a bit lower.



McLaws is part of DH Hill's wing marching to Manassas. It consisted of:

DH Hill's division
McLaws's division
Walker's division
Hampton's cavalry brigade
Pendleton's artillery reserve

Lawton was the senior unwounded brigadier in Ewell's division, and took over when Ewell was wounded. He was at 2nd BR and Chantilly.



I don't doubt McClellan had a moderate edge in numbers (overall 87,000 vs 76,000 or so), but it is not enough to overcome Lee's advantage of position.
Not to argumentative but where do you get lee's numbers from?
 
N

Not to argumentative but where do you get lee's numbers from?

Harsh gives 75,528 PFD on appendix 5 H of Sounding the Shallows. This roughly jibes with adding back the known casualties to Lee's first complete post-Antietam return (10th October), as Gene Thorp did:

csArmyOct10-1862.jpg
 
We're g0ing to get into another numbers debate with Antietam I fear. AP hill did not show up on the field with anywhere near 8699 troops to stop burnside.
 
We're g0ing to get into another numbers debate with Antietam I fear. AP hill did not show up on the field with anywhere near 8699 troops to stop burnside.

He certainly didn't. However that is not the same as saying he didn't have 8,699 PFD or thereabouts.

Allen's study, which is quoted in Harsh (who supervised the MA thesis in question) is quoted down to brigade level in Hartwig's To Antietam Creek, and the state of AP Hill's division on 2nd September 1862 was:

Pender: 1,569 PFD
Archer: 1,149
Brockenborough: 1,336
Gregg: 984
Thomas: 1,205
Branch: 1,754
Artillery 540

Carman gives AP Hill's estimate of the three brigades he had engaged at Antietam numbered about 2,000 men. "The three brigades of my division actively engaged did not number over 2,000 men, and these, with the help of my splendid batteries, drove back Burnside's corps of 15,000 men." Hill wrote. These were Branch, Gregg and Archer, who had 3,887 PFD fifteen days earlier. Carman estimates this excluded officers (as was common) and added 231 officers. He noted this excluded the 4 batteries Hill had engaged (estimated at 223 offrs and men for 15 pieces) and added them on. The rest of the artillery also came up but were not engaged.

If we accept Carman's infantry strength then only 57% of those three brigades made it onto the field and were engaged. Much of the rest straggled on the forced march from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg. This seems perfectly in line with straggling in Jackson's and Ewell's divisions, but most of their stragglers came in during the rest of the day.

AP Hill also arrived with Brockenborough and Pender - 2,905 on the 2nd, and if the straggling was the same roughly 1,656 effectives that came up but were not engaged. Total infantry effectives = 3,887. I typically round this to 4,000 - AP Hill arrived with 4,000 infantry and 22 (21?) guns.

I always have some suspicions with estimates like Hill's, but this is mainly the other Hill (D.H.) getting caught trying to lowball his own division down to 3,000 when in reality he probably had 7,500 - 8,000 infantry in line. RH Anderson of course we have not a clue about. The only source of strength for RHA is DH Hill saying RHA brought 3-4,000 to support him (which didn't include Armistead's brigade BTW). If you take the 22nd September return and add back casualties you get 6,602 PFD (itself way down on the 11,024 he had 2nd Sept), and I think that is a fair statement.

In fact taking the 22nd September field return and adding back the casualties is a good method of estimating what Lee actually had on the field (noting Thomas's brigade and a few other regiments were detached). The result is:

antietam%2Badd-back%2Banv.png


Certainly Lee did not have all these on the field on the 17th, and as I've said, I personally reckon he had 35,000 infantry effectives on the field, excluding AP Hill and the stragglers which were reported coming in. Oddly, accounting for the detachment of Thomas etc. the numbers are pretty consistent therein.
 
He certainly didn't. However that is not the same as saying he didn't have 8,699 PFD or thereabouts.

Allen's study, which is quoted in Harsh (who supervised the MA thesis in question) is quoted down to brigade level in Hartwig's To Antietam Creek, and the state of AP Hill's division on 2nd September 1862 was:

Pender: 1,569 PFD
Archer: 1,149
Brockenborough: 1,336
Gregg: 984
Thomas: 1,205
Branch: 1,754
Artillery 540

Carman gives AP Hill's estimate of the three brigades he had engaged at Antietam numbered about 2,000 men. "The three brigades of my division actively engaged did not number over 2,000 men, and these, with the help of my splendid batteries, drove back Burnside's corps of 15,000 men." Hill wrote. These were Branch, Gregg and Archer, who had 3,887 PFD fifteen days earlier. Carman estimates this excluded officers (as was common) and added 231 officers. He noted this excluded the 4 batteries Hill had engaged (estimated at 223 offrs and men for 15 pieces) and added them on. The rest of the artillery also came up but were not engaged.

If we accept Carman's infantry strength then only 57% of those three brigades made it onto the field and were engaged. Much of the rest straggled on the forced march from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg. This seems perfectly in line with straggling in Jackson's and Ewell's divisions, but most of their stragglers came in during the rest of the day.

AP Hill also arrived with Brockenborough and Pender - 2,905 on the 2nd, and if the straggling was the same roughly 1,656 effectives that came up but were not engaged. Total infantry effectives = 3,887. I typically round this to 4,000 - AP Hill arrived with 4,000 infantry and 22 (21?) guns.

I always have some suspicions with estimates like Hill's, but this is mainly the other Hill (D.H.) getting caught trying to lowball his own division down to 3,000 when in reality he probably had 7,500 - 8,000 infantry in line. RH Anderson of course we have not a clue about. The only source of strength for RHA is DH Hill saying RHA brought 3-4,000 to support him (which didn't include Armistead's brigade BTW). If you take the 22nd September return and add back casualties you get 6,602 PFD (itself way down on the 11,024 he had 2nd Sept), and I think that is a fair statement.

In fact taking the 22nd September field return and adding back the casualties is a good method of estimating what Lee actually had on the field (noting Thomas's brigade and a few other regiments were detached). The result is:

antietam%2Badd-back%2Banv.png


Certainly Lee did not have all these on the field on the 17th, and as I've said, I personally reckon he had 35,000 infantry effectives on the field, excluding AP Hill and the stragglers which were reported coming in. Oddly, accounting for the detachment of Thomas etc. the numbers are pretty consistent therein.
That sounds about right...depending on the source of course, 35,000-45,000 effectives.
 
So was I. Remember the bridges and fords of the creek are defiles as well. It takes roughly an hour to get a division across a bridge. The question becomes how early can McClellan shuttle all his divisions into position for a coordinated attack?
Little Mac was always slow! Then Lee stared him down the following day.
 
Little Mac was always slow! Then Lee stared him down the following day.

The 18th? Of course McClellan had planned an attack for that day, but he decided to suspend it the next morning. I wrote a blog post about this a few years back which I'm reproduce:

Landscape.png


The above map is the positions (roughly) of the two armies at the end of the 17th. The only change Lee made on the night of the 18th was to pull back DH Hill's division and solidify his centre along the Hagerstown Road. Approximate effective infantry and cavalry strengths have been added using Carman's figures (with strengths filled in for units it is not reported) and an estimate of Federal straggling based upon observations of the First Army Corps. Confederate cavalry may be overestimated, but the 6,000 infantry stragglers who rejoined Lee on the night of the 17th-18th are not included.

McClellan shifted Morell to reinforce Burnside on the proviso this was a temporary reinforcement to support him if he were attacked. Burnside used the division to relieve his battleline, putting it west of the Antietam and thus stymieing any thoughts McClellan had about using them in the centre. Couch's division (maybe 5,000 effective infantry) arrived midmorning on the 18th, and was sent to Franklin, where two brigades formed left of Slocum, and another relieved Irwin's Brigade of Smith. Finally Humphreys arrived with his exhausted raw recruits (at most 5,000, and probably less) which McClellan used to try and wrestle Morell back from Burnside - and Burnside promptly put them into his reserve and didn't send Morell back!

With all this in mind, and with many of McClellan's Corps commanders objecting to renewing attack, especially Burnside and Sumner, what was McClellan supposed to do? The only option I can see, given his situation, is to launch an afternoon attack by Franklin on the Dunker Church again. If McClellan manages to get Morell back from Burnside (which might mean relieving Burnside of command) he might get 14,500 effective infantry from 5th, 6th and 12th Corps into action there. However that's essentially just a replay of the assault by 1st and 12th Corps and Sedgwick's Division (2nd Corps) assault of the late morning on the 17th, presumably with similar chances of success.

Campaign wise, if McClellan orders such an assault and it fails his army, and the Union, is in dire straits. Whilst Lee likely won't be able to counterattack, if he moves as he historically did then McClellan won't have fresh forces to block Lee's reentry into Maryland via Williamsport. The campaign may well continue with Lee conducting a turning movement and regaining the advantage, or maybe Lee's troops were too exhausted. Either way the risk must be weighed against the benefits.
 
Little Mac was always slow! Then Lee stared him down the following day.
I'm not sure how slow mac was. He had troops positioned the night before for a dawn attack. I dont know how much quicker he can be. on the other end Burnside was writing his own story.
 
The campaign may well continue with Lee conducting a turning movement and regaining the advantage, or maybe Lee's troops were too exhausted.
Lee has to regain the initiative. Sitting across from mac doing nothing means lee's campaign/invasion/raid is over and lee lost.
 
Lee has to regain the initiative. Sitting across from mac doing nothing means lee's campaign/invasion/raid is over and lee lost.

Lee had a plan to regain the initiative. He would cross the Potomac and head north to recross at Williamsport. This would get around McClellan's blockade, and during the 18th they are moving their wagons back across the river. Remember, it took Lee three days to cross the Potomac two weeks earlier, and it takes a similar amount of time at Sharpsburg.

McClellan for his part had anticipated the movement, and was picketing Williamsport. When Stuart's cavalry turned up he sent 6th Corps there to block Lee. He also sent 5th Corps across the river to strike Lee's rear, and 2nd and 12th Corps to the Maryland Heights to reoccupy Harper's Ferry and block Lee's retreat into the Shenandoah. McClellan's further plans were to hold the Potomac line with part of his army and bring the bulk into the Shenandoah to cut Lee off from Richmond, but Halleck refused permission for the movement.
 
Lee had a plan to regain the initiative. He would cross the Potomac and head north to recross at Williamsport. This would get around McClellan's blockade, and during the 18th they are moving their wagons back across the river. Remember, it took Lee three days to cross the Potomac two weeks earlier, and it takes a similar amount of time at Sharpsburg.

McClellan for his part had anticipated the movement, and was picketing Williamsport. When Stuart's cavalry turned up he sent 6th Corps there to block Lee. He also sent 5th Corps across the river to strike Lee's rear, and 2nd and 12th Corps to the Maryland Heights to reoccupy Harper's Ferry and block Lee's retreat into the Shenandoah. McClellan's further plans were to hold the Potomac line with part of his army and bring the bulk into the Shenandoah to cut Lee off from Richmond, but Halleck refused permission for the movement.
Is this culminative information and or a good source? I have read on antietam and been there but i see new to me material.
 
Is this culminative information and or a good source? I have read on antietam and been there but i see new to me material.

Harsh discusses Lee's post Antietam movements, from Taken at the Flood. This section describes the disengagement of the army and the beginning of the movement to Williamsport. I'm really looking forward to Vol 3 of Carman, due out originally six months back! We get a whole book on Williamsport, Shepherdstown, the reoccupation of Harper's Ferry and if memory serves the Loudoun Valley campaign as well.

Williamsport, the Last Gambit, September 18– 19

Even then, Lee did not abandon all hope for his campaign. It is a measure of his determination that he turned almost at once from the failed movement to crush the Federal right to implement a different stratagem to keep alive his offensive. If he must return to Virginia, he did not have to remain there. He would withdraw from Maryland but only to return by way of Williamsport to execute an even wider turning movement. 38 It is not unlikely that for some days he had held this option in reserve as a last resort. This would explain his concern in guarding Light’s Ford with a battalion of the Artillery Reserve even after that crossing was inaccessible to him from the Maryland side. No doubt concerned over the double passage of the Potomac, as well as over the unfortunate boost any return to Virginia might give to enemy morale, he had refused to exercise this option so long as any alternative remained. Now, however, he had accumulating evidence that the enemy was receiving heavy reenforcements and so, even continuing to stand on the defensive, had disappeared as an alternative. 39 It was the Williamsport maneuver or abject retreat.

By late morning or early afternoon of the 18th, Lee settled on the broad outlines of his plan. He would recross the Potomac at Boteler’s Ford and march west to Martinsburg and then north to Williamsport. It was a distance of some twenty-five miles, and the army ought to be back in Maryland by the 20th or the 21st at the latest. This would put him but six miles from Hagerstown and the rear of McClellan’s right flank. Because the Federals had a good view of movements behind Confederate lines from their signal station on Red Hill due east of the Lower Bridge, 40 it would be necessary to wait for darkness to start withdrawing the troops. True, it had taken three days to cross into Maryland, and there was but the single rocky ford for the recrossing. Still, the army was much smaller now, and its reserve ordnance wagons and much of the Reserve Artillery were already on the other side. By carefully preparing in advance and by starting the trains during daylight, he ought to be able to accomplish it in one night and the following morning.

A greater concern was that McClellan might take actions that would disrupt or even foil the plan. First, the enemy might pursue so closely that the tail of the Confederate army would be destroyed at Shepherdstown. Second, Lee might arrive at Williamsport only to find Light’s Ford held by a strong Federal force. The Confederate commander evolved a scheme to solve both problems at once. He would rush a force to Williamsport in advance to secure a foothold for reentry and at the same time divide the enemy’s attention to relieve pressure on the withdrawal of the main body. The advance force would have to be cavalry, and it would lessen the bottleneck at Boteler’s if a different ford could be found for its crossing the Potomac. If there was a danger in calling attention to Williamsport a day or so ahead of his intended recrossing there, Lee seems not to have worried about it.

Sometime around noon, Lee discussed his strategy with Jackson. Whether Stonewall agreed with the entire plan or not, he at least offered no objections to it. On the contrary, he sent orders to his topographical engineer, Jed. Hotchkiss, to reconnoiter the river in their rear for other fords that might be used. 41 At two o’clock Lee rode to Longstreet’s bivouac. He discovered that his old “war horse” had just taken the “liberty” of sending a note “suggesting a withdrawal to the south side of the Potomac.” How much of the pending plan Lee revealed to Longstreet is not clear, but the two did discuss the details of preparation for the retreat. 42 In addition, Lee held several meetings with Stuart during the afternoon. As a result, Jeb ordered his engineer, William Blackford, to examine the Potomac in their rear above Boteler’s to find a ford for cavalry. Blackford was not told the purpose of his mission, nor was he permitted to inquire among civilians for information. 43

An unforeseen and unwanted complication arose during the afternoon. Amidst the thunder of nature’s own cannonade, the skies opened to a torrential downpour and provided yet another example for those who believed the heavens wept over every major battlefield. The rain then settled into a light drizzle, which continued into the night, and turned the roads into slippery and treacherous quagmires. There was some little comfort in the thought these same roads would render pursuit more difficult, and the lowering clouds would bring on darkness sooner.

In spite of the weather, the preparations went forward and instructions were issued for a disciplined retreat. Orders were sent back to Pendleton at the ford to halt all traffic coming from Virginia and to prepare to assist the crossing. 44 All usable property of the army was to be secured, even to the extent of recovering guns abandoned between the lines. In some cases tubes were removed from damaged carriages and slung under wagons for removal. 45 Cannoneers were again admonished not to ride their guns, and all officers were adjured to be “occupied constantly in getting everything along.” 46 As many as possible of the wagons bearing supplies, ammunition, and wounded were to start for the river at once. 47 It was hoped that the roads would be clear by nine o’clock for the infantry and artillery.

Longstreet’s divisions in the center were to be the first to pull back, and, after crossing the river, they were to form line of battle on the south bank, joining Nelson’s battalion of the Artillery Reserve already in position there. Next to follow were Jackson’s divisions from the left, which were not to stop but continue on beyond Shepherdstown on the road to Martinsburg and eventually to Williamsport. Finally, A. P. Hill, with the freshest division in the army, was to cover the retreat, retiring slowly and presenting a fighting front toward the enemy until the river was reached. Last of all, Fitzhugh Lee with his own and Munford’s cavalry brigades and a single battery of long-range guns was to bring up the rear. 48

It soon became apparent there were too many vehicles with the army to withdraw in the time allotted; yet there were not enough wagons to carry all of the wounded who were unable to walk. As a result, there was a traffic jam that severely tested the thin Confederate logistical skills, and the army was compelled to abandon an unfortunately large number of its casualties. When word spread that many of the unfit were to be left behind, friends stopped at the hospitals to say goodbye, and all except those with the most desperate injuries tried to make private arrangements to get away and avoid becoming prisoners. 49 Almost at once, the roads, lanes, and cow paths leading to the ford were choked with wagons, ambulances, litters, and soldiers held on horseback and leaning on the shoulders of comrades. Horses with their riders slipped and fell and vehicles mired fast in the mud. 50

The creeping lines merged at the single passage of the Potomac only to enter the neck of a very narrow bottle. The refugees had first to cross a makeshift bridge over the canal and then slide down a steep bank to the river. The water was cold, waist deep, and a half-mile wide. The riverbed was stony and strewn with boulders. On the Virginia side loomed another high bank and a narrow road that wound along the base of a cliff. With the early twilight, fog descended on the Potomac valley. Bonfires were lighted on each bank to keep the crawling column from drifting into deeper water, while mounted horsemen bearing torches formed a chain of human buoys midst the huge rocks. 51

When nine o’clock arrived, Longstreet saw that the roads immediately in his rear were clear, and he pulled first Evans’s brigade and then D. R. Jones’s division from the line. At a prearranged signal the men rose silently from their bivouac and slipped to the rear, leaving their campfires blazing to deceive the enemy. Longstreet thus initiated the time-ordered, sequential withdrawal of the main body and added the press of infantry and artillery against the mouth of the bottle. Jackson’s men took their place in line, and by midnight A. P. Hill retired to form a defensive line on the high ground southwest of Sharpsburg. 52

The addition of the disciplined soldiers and officers of the line actually helped lessen the confusion and hasten the passage into Virginia. Lee took station on the Maryland bank, while Jackson spent most of the night on horseback in the middle of the river. The acclaimed master of the hour was Maj. John Harman, Jackson’s quartermaster and legendary mover of mules, who was credited with “cussin”‘ the army across that night. 53 The unsung heroes were the soldiers themselves. Constantly shouting out the numbers of their regiments or the names of their batteries, they kept their organizations intact. 54 Although several wagons were lost in the canal and a gun slipped into a ravine on the Virginia side, providentially there were no drownings reported. 55

Longstreet’s infantry started crossing at two o’clock and Jackson’s at daylight. 56 By then the skies had cleared, and the rising sun promised a bright, warm day. At 8: 00 the ford was almost clear of wagons, and the turn came for A. P. Hill and the rear guard. The brigades of Field and Pender crossed first, followed by Archer and Branch. Maxcy Gregg’s men maintained a battleline facing the enemy until the very last; and when his men entered the water, he left two companies of the 14th South Carolina behind as skirmishers. In the middle of the fog-enshrouded river, Gregg found a horseless wagon of wounded that had been abandoned by its teamsters. “My men,” he shouted, lifting his hat, “it is a shame to leave these poor fellows in the water! Can’t you take them over the river?” At once a dozen volunteers grabbed the ambulance and pulled it to the southern bank, while the rest of the brigade cheered and sang “Carry Me Back to Old Virginia.” 57

Far to the rear, on the hill a mile west of Sharpsburg where the commanding general had pitched his headquarters tent during the battle, Fitzhugh Lee waited with a squadron of cavalry and a 10-pounder Parrott under Lt. John Ramsay. Longstreet’s order requiring a battery to support the cavalry had passed down through Colonel Walton to Adjutant Owen of the Washington Artillery, who had selected Capt. James Reilly’s North Carolina battery; and thus the unwelcome task had finally descended upon the hapless lieutenant with his single piece. So far there had been no sign of enemy pursuit. When word arrived about 6: 30 that the Confederate rear guard had reached the river, Fitz Lee called in his pickets and ordered Ramsay to elevate his gun and lay his longest fuses. One, two, three farewell shells went hurtling toward the enemy. Before the third had exploded, the head of a column of Federal cavalry emerged from Sharpsburg. Lee’s troopers mounted, and Ramsay limbered his gun and ordered, “Trot, march!” But there was no trot left in the tired men and horses. The last Confederates walked away from Sharpsburg. 58

One unit that almost did not escape was the 2d Virginia Cavalry. When the orders for the withdrawal were issued, Munford’s brigade was scattered across the countryside. The 7th Virginia was on the left with Lee’s brigade, and the 12th Virginia, near Sharpsburg, had been selected by Stuart for the Williamsport expedition. The 2d Virginia, under Munford’s personal supervision, was skirmishing with the Federal cavalry on the extreme right, all the way down the Antietam to its mouth at the canal. Hence, the courier with notice of the withdrawal never found Munford, and it was nearly daylight when the colonel rode into Sharpsburg and discovered from Fitz Lee that the army had gone. Munford quickly returned, gathered up his scattered regiment, and hastened for Boteler’s. 59

Around ten o’clock, the last units of the Army of Northern Virginia— Fitz Lee and Ramsay, Munford and the 2d Virginia, and the two companies of the 14th South Carolina— converged on Boteler’s Ford. In midpassage they came under the fire of Federal skirmishers. Pendleton’s guns opened from the cliffs on the Virginia side and easily dissuaded the enemy from following. 60 According to army tradition, Robert E. Lee watched from the southern bank until the last soldier had crossed. 61 He and his army had pulled off a minor miracle of logistics. But his mind was not focused entirely on the safety of his army. As far as he was concerned, he was still in the midst of his Maryland campaign. He had merely completed a successful change of base.

While the Army of Northern Virginia successfully withdrew from the pen at Sharpsburg and entered into an open space for maneuver; Stuart’s expedition to Williamsport got off to an equally promising start, although not without confronting serious difficulties of its own. As bidden by his chief, Lt. William Blackford set out in the late afternoon with a party of twenty horsemen to find a crossing suitable for cavalry. The closest known opportunity was Shepherd’s Ford, which lay only four miles by road upriver from Shepherdstown on the Virginia side. Unfortunately, because the meandering Potomac ran almost due north to south at this point, Shepherd’s lay behind the Federal lines in Maryland.

Forbidden to seek help from local residents, Blackford had no recourse except to ride along the bank looking for places that appeared to be shallower than others. He then plunged into the river until the water became too deep. He was wet to the neck by the time he found a low dam of loose rocks that had been built as a fish trap. For ten or fifteen yards below the dam the water reached only to the horse’s girth, although beyond this narrow channel it dropped quickly to a depth that covered the saddle. Blackford crossed and recrossed several times to check for hidden pitfalls. Rocks and brush obstructed his way and the current was rapid; but it was getting dark, and it was the best he could do. Posting a trooper on the bank and dropping others off at intervals, he returned to report to Stuart. 62

Apparently, Stuart was not pleased by Blackford’s description of the crossing at the fish trap dam. Perhaps awaiting better news from Jed. Hotchkiss, the cavalry commander delayed his departure. Finally, at ten o’clock he detailed Blackford to lead Hampton’s brigade to the obscure ford, while he set out with the rest of his staff, the 12th Virginia of Munford’s brigade, and Pelham’s Horse Artillery for Boteler’s. If Jeb was attempting to spare himself a difficult journey, he was only partially successful. He soon became engulfed in the roiling wave of humanity converging on the ford. Stuart’s booming commands to clear the way were met with jeers and rude rejoinders from teamsters who had no idea who it was harassing them. Five times von Borcke went down in the mud with his horse, and once Stuart fell under a wagon and narrowly escaped serious injury. Along the way, the cavalry chief encountered Hotchkiss, who had just returned from Virginia and was looking for Jackson. Unwillingly, the engineer was turned back into the churning column as a guide. He was of no value until the river had finally been cleared, when he was able to take Stuart to the headquarters of General Pendleton. 63

Having been at Shepherdstown since the 15th and responsible for the defense of the Potomac fords, Pendleton should have given Stuart several pieces of information useful for the cavalry expedition. First, although Lee had repeatedly directed that Light’s Ford at Williamsport be guarded, Pendleton had found trouble keeping Col. J. Thompson Brown’s battalion of the Artillery Reserve at the crossing. Brown had withdrawn to Martinsburg on the 17th; and, although he had promised to return the same day, it seems clear that by the night of the 18th no Confederate force held the ford. Not only did Federal cavalry now occupy Williamsport, but Federal pickets had appeared opposite Shepherd’s Ford four miles above Shepherdstown. Pendleton had been compelled to remove Ancell’s Fluvanna Artillery of Nelson’s battalion from Boteler’s Ford to counter the latter threat. This meant that Stuart might have to fight his way back across the Potomac. On the positive side, Pendleton could report that Brown’s five batteries of twenty guns, as well as some 400 infantry, were in the Martinsburg area, and all could be employed to support the operation. Impressed with the growing dangers he faced, Stuart decided to press on through the night with the several hundred troopers of the 12th Virginia and Pelham’s guns. Following the River Road through the village of Hard Scrabble toward the mouth of the Opequon, he covered nearly half the distance to Williamsport before halting for an hour’s rest. 64

In the meanwhile, Lieutenant Blackford had easily followed his human chain of scouts and guided Hampton’s brigade to the fish trap on the Potomac. Thereafter, the crossing turned into a nightmare. Here there were no bonfires or torches, and in the heavy fog each horseman could only see and follow the man immediately in his front. The head of the column kept close to the dam and made it successfully through the narrow channel safely. The swift current irresistibly inched each rider downstream, however, and the trailing regiments found themselves in swimming water. Men and horses were lost. The experience was “even worse than fighting,” according to Capt. Rufus Barringer of the 1st North Carolina. Not privy to the grand strategy being pursued, Barringer assumed the enemy had cut the brigade off from the army, and they had been compelled to plunge blindly into the river to escape capture. Hampton, who presumably knew something of the objective of his mission, kept his men in the saddle all night. 65

In spite of taking an hour’s rest, it was Stuart who reached Williamsport first. Arriving around noon, he dashed across Light’s Ford with the 12th Virginia and chased a squadron of Federal cavalry from the town. Shortly thereafter reenforcements increased his strength to a respectable size. Not only did Hampton arrive with five regiments of cavalry by way of Mason’s Ford, but from Martinsburg came the 2d and 10th Virginia Infantries, a battalion of the 11th Georgia Infantry, a section of Hupp’s Salem Artillery, and a section of Watson’s Richmond Howitzers. In total, the expeditionary column included about 1,500 cavalry, 400 infantry, and up to fourteen guns. 66

Stuart spread his forces in a semicircle on the ridges outside Williamsport, and he pushed a reconnaissance under von Borcke to within two miles of Hagerstown before it encountered serious resistance. During the whole of the 19th, the Confederates had only to contend with a portion of the Federal cavalry that had escaped from Harpers Ferry and was operating out of Hagerstown. As night fell, it appeared that Lee had acquired his foothold for reentry into Maryland.

There was one rub. In zealous pursuit of creating a diversion, Stuart flaunted his numbers, fired artillery needlessly to disperse mere handfuls of enemy skirmishers, and spread widely the word that Lee was close behind with the entire Army of Northern Virginia. Lee had better not take too long in coming, or the diversion half of his plan might foil the turning movement half. Stuart nevertheless was pleased at a job well done, and he rewarded himself by throwing a party with music and dancing for the belles of Williamsport. 67

Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kindle Locations 8728-8883). Kent State University Press. Kindle Edition.
 
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