Should Thomas Have Been Given Command in the West in 1864, Rather Than Sherman?

Should Thomas Have Been Given Command in the West in 1864, Rather Than Sherman?

  • Yes, Thomas should have been given the command

    Votes: 16 44.4%
  • No, Sherman was the right choice

    Votes: 20 55.6%

  • Total voters
    36
I've only seen in the ORs where Thomas wrote to Sherman on 10/17/64 [OR 39:3:334] "Mower and Wilson have arrived and are on their way to join you. I hope you will adopt Grant's idea of turning Wilson loose rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as General Grant cannot co-operate with you as at first arranged."
This sounds like he was opposed to it -- "rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea"
 
Not only did Grant retract his commendations for the victory at the Battle of Iuka and gave them to Hamilton instead, he actually turned the battle into a defeat in his Personal Memoirs: "While still moving in column up the Jacinto road [Rosecrans] met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road. In this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him."
Perhaps by the time he wrote his own memoirs he was influenced by reading Maury's recollections in which he wrote "Rosecrantz had been beaten."
 
Tullahoma campaign was late June into early July. By no meaning of the word is that "spring"
I was thinking by mid-May Rosecrans was still complaining about horses and forage, and the crops unripe. But digressing here we have inadvertently hijacked the thread. I would like a new thread if you are willing.
From an early issue of CWTI (Civil War Times Illustrated) January 1963, "Wilson's Selma Raid' by Jerry Keenan states Grant had originally let Thomas begin with 5000 troopers for Wilson, who objected, and persuaded so strongly for a full division, that Grant acceded and gave him 15000. They were held up until mid-March due to rain and the swollen river.
Thanks,
Lubliner.
 
In a logistical sense there are certainly times when moving by forage is easier, and those times are when the food is available. You can do okay during spring/summer (because there is new growth for the horses, though you need to carry most of the food for the men) and you can do best during autumn, harvest-time (when there is food available in the fields).

Going outside those times, or with a force with a larger supply footprint than the geographical footprint it sweeps will allow for, you have to have a continuous supply line.
 
On the topic of promotion to Major-General; POTUS nominated 5 officers's to be promoted MG on 6th January 1865. The nomination was dated 12th December, and Thomas was a late addition. They were:

WT Sherman
Meade
Sheridan
Thomas (those nomination appears to be post-15th December and backdated to the 12th)
Hancock (was replaced by Thomas in the end)

There were, however, only four vacancies (5 slots with Halleck in one). The original draft nominated Sherman, Meade, Sheridan and Hancock, with Thomas added post-facto.

It was debated which four to confirm. On the 13th January they confirmed Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas. The final slot was to go to either Meade or Hancock, and on 1st February they confirmed Meade. Hancock's nomination was edited to be that of a BG, and he was then promoted to MG when the first vacancy arose (1866, when Grant is made GEN).

So, without Nashville it's safe to say that Thomas would not have been promoted, and Hancock would have been made a regular MG on 13th January, 1865
 
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Any objective evaluation (see Castel's book "Decision in the West" shows Sherman's numerous mistakes----that is what they were at Resaca most notably. He would have destroyed Joe Johnston's army quickly if he had had resources and the chance during the Atlanta campaign. Thomas on the other hand built an army from rejects, and destroyed John Bell Hood's army at Nashville.

Mr. Eisenberg:

You're correct on how Thomas had to build up his army using "rejects." James Wilson noted how Sherman "left Thomas to gather up the scattered detachments, garrisons, dismounted cavalry, recruits, and non-combatants of the Departments of the Ohio, Tennessee, and Cumberland, and weld them into an army with which to resist the march of Hood's veterans into middle Tennessee." Sherman told Grant that he would "take with me only the best fighting material." This was also true in Sherman's taking the pontoons and pontoniers and the best cavalry and its equipment, leaving behind dismounted cavalrymen. In Chattanooga, Cruft prepared units consisting of convalescents. Large numbers of raw recruits filled up IV and XXIII Corps.

My book has a large section devoted to Sherman's completely unnecessary blunders (founded in large part on his favoritism) in the Snake Creek Gap and Resaca operations. I contend that Thomas could have destroyed Johnston's army right near the start of the campaign.

Joe
 
When Grant was made general-in-chief my President Lincoln in early 1864, he appointed Sherman to the overall command the the armies in the Western Theater. I have always thought this was a mistake and that Thomas should have been given the command. I think Grant's decision was based on his personal dislike of Thomas, his friendship with Sherman, and the overall favoritism shown to the Army of the Tennessee vis-à-vis that of the Army of the Cumberland.

Thoughts?
Well I think they didn’t promote him due to their distrust of him being from Virginia. I think it’s unfair but he did say on his death bed that history would do him good. He is now considered one of the three of the best the union had. We will probably never know
 
No Thomas should not have been appointed in Sherman's place.
Sherman's brother was a US Senator from a critically important state. He was a Senator for a total of 32 years. And that was not William Sherman's only political support.
Halleck and Grant knew that fact at all times. Having Sherman in high command was part of maintaining support for the war in Ohio.
Thomas was from Virginia. Virginia was not going to vote in the 1864 general election.
On the other hand George Thomas was one of a small number of southerners who maintained their loyalty to the US. It was important that he and the other southerners be treated in a honorable manner.
The two men complemented each other well. Sherman became an expert on the business of war. Thomas was more or less a professor of 19th century tactics.
Sherman had to be in overall command of the campaign to capture Atlanta, and the March to the Sea. He could afford to take risks and suffer setbacks. Thomas would never have survived in command, if he had been seriously defeated.
The soldiers knew that Grant and Congress unconditionally backed Sherman. In addition, they knew that when Thomas was in command the tactical situation maximized the chance that the US force would win and minimized the chances that the soldiers would be killed.
 
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On May 20, 1864 while near Spotsylvania Court-House General Grant wrote Major-General Halleck this message;
" In a letter to the Secretary of War, written about one week ago, I recommended Generals Sherman and Meade for promotion to major-generals in the Regular Army, and Hancock for brigadier. I wish you would urge this again. The Secretary replied that there was but one vacancy for major-general. I think this must be a mistake. I was appointed before General Wool was retired, or at least was notified of the fact that an original vacancy existed before his retirement. General Wright is one of the most meritorious officers in the service, and with opportunity will demonstrate his fitness for any position; but at present I doubt whether Sheridan has not most entitled himself to the other vacant brigadier-generalcy. This, however, I would leave open for a time."
[O.R., Vol. 36, Pt. 3, pg. 4].
Lubliner.
 
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