Sherman Sherman's Folly at Shiloh

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BY THE TIME he reached Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River in March 1862, William Tecumseh Sherman was a changed man. That is, he wasn’t “insane” anymore, or a “nervous Nellie,” or “flighty,” which was how the press had portrayed him six months earlier when he lost command at Louisville for expressing fear he was going to be attacked and then having the gall to tell Washington that 200,000 Federal troops would be needed to subdue Rebels in the Mississippi River Valley. Instead, after a period of recuperation, Sherman (“Cump,” to his friends since West Point days) regained his confidence: A sharp, bristling personality, he began to channel the staunch singularity of purpose he would demonstrate for the remainder of the war.
For now, though, Sherman seemed to be overcompensating for the Louisville disgrace. From the time of his arrival at Pittsburg Landing he refused even to entertain the possibility of an attack by the large Rebel army known to be converging just 20 miles south at Corinth, Mississippi.
continued: https://www.historynet.com/shermans-folly-at-shiloh.htm


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This was one rare case where General Hurlbut was right.

In the evening of April 4, Hurlbut learned of a sharp skirmish between Union and Confederate cavalry in Sherman's front. Ordering the "long roll" of drums and preparation for imminent combat, Hurlbut, who feared that Sherman would shortly fall under attack, hurried infantry and artillery forward over a narrow and muddy road to his support. After advancing for three-quarters of a mile, Hurlbut received instructions from Sherman to return to camp. The sudden retrograde movement prompted derisive "jokes and retorts" among Hurlbut's weary and straggling troops: "The general himself did not escape being hallaoed(sic) at ever and anon by some graceless wag."
Thwarted in his efforts to attack Confederate skirmishers, Hurlbut concentrated on consolidating his Fourth Division, which consisted of three brigades totaling nearly fourteen thousand men....


Source: "A Politician Turned General; The Civil War Career of Stephen Augustus Hurlbut" by Jeffrey N. Lash

I believe the next day, another company(s) started out to look for Confederate skirmishers and they were also ordered back by their brigade commander. That is probably found in Sword's "Shiloh: Bloody April", but I will have to look for it.
 
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I tried to copy some of the events mentioned in Sword's book. This is the best that I could do---trying to type this from a book.

Col. James Clayton took his 1st Alabama Cavalry out on the afternoon of the 4th and discovered a lone company of Federal infantry. He surrounded the Federals when a second enemy detachment appeared in the rain and they too were attacked. He was about to charge when a strong column of Union cavalry appeared. The Confederate fled, losing many prisoners in a running fight. As the 5th Ohio topped the ridge in front of Hardee’s infantry, Cleburne’s infantry and artillery opened up on them.

On the following day, April 5, while the army was moving into position, cavalry units such as Avery’s Georgia Mountain Dragoons scouted the Union lines. By Hardee’s orders Avery’s company made a close reconnaissance of the Federal camps, getting to within two hundred yards of a column of infantry marching to their drill ground with drums beating. They they were shot at on several occasions by Federal pickets, the Georgia Dragoons returned to Hardee’s headquarters about dark and confirmed the location of the enemy camps. “
. . . After the heavy rain on the morning of the 5th many of the men in Hardee’s corps fired their muskets “to see if they would go off,” Later they sent up a lusty cheer as a frightened deer bolted from cover along the roadside.
. . .

Sherman’s midnight patrol on the evening of April 2 was staged for the purpose of taking prisoners from whom it was hoped some news could be learned. The only military prisoner taken, Private Lammon of the 1st Alabama Cavalry… was soon sent under guard to Grant for questioning. Grant, however, failed to learn much.
. . . . .
Sherman was a strong advocate of drill and instruction. Most of his men were recruits, new to Army ways and discipline. By Sherman’s order there was daily drill and fatigue duty.

On April 3 he issued permission for Buckland’s brigade to march 3 miles out the Corinth road for “drill and instructions.” One of the 70th Ohio’s soldiers remembered that the men regarded it as kind of a picnic excursion. …. The pickets were proceeding to their places when they were suddenly challenged: “Halt! Who comes here?” The officer in charge then yelled out, “It is the advance guard of the ---Army of the United States!” “The L you say!” came the reply, followed by a volley of gunfire.
Sherman regarded the affair as minor and apparently made no report to Grant. He knew that Confederate cavalry made patrols in the vicinity and attached little importance to their presence. Furthermore he was involved in the details of a widespread reorganization of the Army’s artillery and cavalry, and was then busy planning the transfer of men and material.
. . . .
On Friday, April 4, several incidents occurred that caused Sherman to doubt further the efficiency of his division. … Sgt. C. J. Eagler of the 77th Ohio was one of the outposts for Hildebrand’s brigade that morning. It had rained all night but the sun was now shining brightly and Eagler and his captain, W. B. Mason decided to take a walk to the edge of a “plantation” in their front. When they reached the wooden fence bordering Seay field, the say that along the far edge of timber, about a quarter-mile away, enemy troops were apparently eating breakfast.

Mason turned to Eagler and told him to report to regimental HQ “that the enemy was in our front in full force.”. … Eagler double-quicked to HQ and related to Major B. D. Fearing what he had seen. While Fearing promptly went to see Sherman, Eagler returned to his picket post.
About an hour later a detail of 10 men and a captain came out to the picket line and handed Captain Mason a paper. Mason rad it, then said he would take care of it himself. As Eagler later learned, the paper was an order for his arrest, signed by Sherman, for bringing a false alarm into camp. Mason promptly dropped the matter, knowing that he too would meet with Sherman’s ire.
. . . . .

((Sherman's reply to his officers after they reported hearing of several engagements with the enemy))

Sherman was found in his tent, and "in his quick, nervous manner" informed the officers that the enemy had been up three times on the right and had fired on McDowell’s pickets. He added, however, that his orders from Grant were to do nothing that would tend to “bring on a general engagement until Buell arrives.” As an after thought, he remarked that Buell’s troops should have arrived ten days ago, later repeating the statement several times as he pored over his maps.
 
I was just quoting what some historians have deduced from their research. Was Sherman blaming Grant for his lack of action? Or did they really believe their position was secure from any harassment by the Confederates? Did they have any intelligence on the movement of Johnson and even Van Dorn---who didn't make it there in time?
 
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