Sharpsburg. Was a Confederate Victory Possible?

Yes, I think a more significant Confederate tactical victory was possible in the Northern-Central sector of the battlefield. The Union command structure was breaking down to an extent with Hooker, Mansfield, Sedgwick, Ricketts, Crawford, Richardson among others wounded or killed. If the attacks became more disorganized or McClellan had of overcommited his forces, the Confederates might have had an opportunity. Lee still had Armistead's brigade in reserve waiting for such an occurrence.

@67th Tigers could probably give a better reply then me on this.
 
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Given the infantry and artillery numbers on each side, along with McClellan's careful generalship (his critics are quick to mention that when he erred, it was on the side of "not losing"), I think the best that the Confederates could have hoped for was a tactical stalemate. Perhaps, as General Butterfield mentioned above, the fighting in the northern sector could have gone more in their favor. In that case, they could have made their way north on Hagerstown Pike to continue Lee's MD campaign. That could have been considered a strategic victory, and may in fact have been the outcome Lee hoped for.
 
Asking for opinions is always fun. lol

IMO, I think that the rebs got the best they could out of the situation. A tactical stalemate was a God-send.

Honestly, we are talking about Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet. Not to mention Hood, Stuart, A.P. Hill, etc.
If there was any possibility of a victory, those guys would have seen it, and seized it.

The fact is they were so gassed and taxed that Hood was manning a straggler line and netting as many stragglers and lightly wounded men as possible into an impromtu reserve division (ignoring all unit designation) that came close to 4,000 men by nightfall. A.P. Hill's worn out 3,000 men were all that saved the day on the right. Longstreet's staff was manning a battery that had been shot to bits in the center to hold back the yankees. The Army of Northern VA was as close to a route as it probably could be. I think it was the 48th Alabama.... My ancestors regiment, that had 17 men under the command of a SGT the next morning.

Lee was very fortunate that he was not facing Grant or Sheridan that day. Guys like them would not have let off the gas pedal. They would likely have driven them into the river.

Lee was bold. He held that field all the next day. That kind of boldness borders on crazy sometimes. I would have taken the easy route and slipped across the river that night. But I am a coward.
 
Possibly a defensive victory like Fredericksburg but I think the Union artillery and the numbers would have made an offensive victory almost impossible.

Jackson did a poor job in preparing his lines for the Union assault. I don't think he even tried to dig in. And why was he even trying to defend the East Woods and the Cornfield? His "flexible defense" forced Lee to strip his entire line to save the left. Jackson ended up using 25,000 men to stop about the same number of Union troops, with casualties roughly even. He wasted a lot of good men.

Had Jackson done a better job on the left and achieved a higher ratio of casualties, Lee might have been able to maintain more reserves to help hold his center and right.

I love Jackson on the march, but he was an average tactician.
 
I lean in the direction that Lee got all he could out of the battle. What more could the AoNV done. If Hill exploited more of their right, they were still looking down guns from across Antietam creek. I don't believe Lee would have tried to cross Antietam creek to get at the rest of the AoP. I think he did well enough ( with McClellans help) not to get destroyed.
 
I don't think so. I think the Confederate Army was done at the end of the day. They were fought out. I'm not saying they could have done more, but the odds were high, they were done. It was not a very well fought battle y Lee, or any other of his generals. They did the best they could. It wasn't their day.
 
Possibly a defensive victory like Fredericksburg but I think the Union artillery and the numbers would have made an offensive victory almost impossible.

Jackson did a poor job in preparing his lines for the Union assault. I don't think he even tried to dig in. And why was he even trying to defend the East Woods and the Cornfield? His "flexible defense" forced Lee to strip his entire line to save the left. Jackson ended up using 25,000 men to stop about the same number of Union troops, with casualties roughly even. He wasted a lot of good men.

I agree on your first point. As far as digging in, I don't believe that was a standard tactic yet in the war, so Jackson probably should not be blamed for that.

What I am most curious about is what you think were better options for Jackson as far as preparing his lines?
 
Unless they achieved an Austerlitz-style decisive victory, we would still end up with two battered, exhausted armies on the field. The ANV would probably be as beaten up by its victory as it was historically. I expect both sides would withdraw to their respective bases, as happened after most of their battles.
 
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While I agree that digging in was not common at that time, I think the Union forces at both Fair Oaks and Gaines Mill built some protective wooden palisades. I would have aligned along the northern and eastern edges of the West Wood, with my right at the Dunker Church with plenty of artillery. I realize his troops were exhausted when they arrived and he didn't know exactly where the blow would land, so I can somewhat excuse his deployment, but once the battle was joined there was no reason to fight to hold the Cornfield. (IMHO)
 
Lee's thing was always offer battle even if not wise---he hated leaving a battlefield to "those people". I believe he stayed an extra day to show he did not have withdraw---A.P. Hill coming up saved his bacon.
 
The fact that at the end of the day the ANV maintained their positions and were ready for further battle seems to be tactical victory enough. That accomplishment is even more significant given that it was nip and tuck that Lee was able to gather the disparate parts of the ANV together at Sharpsburg, while McClellan had the advantage of numbers and intelligence (Lost Order).
 
The rebels at several times during the battle came close to launching significant counterattacks, but prudence on the part of the Federals prevented it.

Now had McClellan gone "all in" as some suggest he should the balance of probabilities is that this last attack would be repulsed too, and the Federals might not have enough left to repel a planned rebel movement around their right.

Had this happened and then the rebels counterattacked (as planned for 18th September) and crushed the residue of the Federal 1st Corps then things would be very bad for the Federals and Lee might have been able to move north as he intended.
 
I seem to recall there was a planned cavalry attack by Stuart? Confederate cavalry was already psychologically intimidating to Union troops at the best of times, and over 4,000 sabres descending on disorganized and demoralized troops would be devastating.
 
Given the tactical options existing was a Confederate victory possible?

To answer this, one needs to answer first the questions of: a. what a Tactical Confederate victory would look like? And b. Are we 100% sure that Antietam was not a Tactical Confederate victory? One also needs to remember that in the Fall of 1862 the ANV was about 1/3 the size of the AoP.
 
One also needs to remember that in the Fall of 1862 the ANV was about 1/3 the size of the AoP.
By what measures, and where did the Army of Northern Virginia go between the Peninsula and Antietam?

The numbers I've seen suggest that both sides straggled very heavily before Antietam, but that functionally the Federal army did not have a great superiority over the Rebel one - especially when one factors in that McClellan's army had been thrown together in a tearing hurry and included a fair number of totally green troops. (At least one regiment hadn't even noticed yet that their weapons wouldn't fire, and would discover this at Shepherdstown).
 
a. what a Tactical Confederate victory would look like? And b. Are we 100% sure that Antietam was not a Tactical Confederate victory? One also needs to remember that in the Fall of 1862 the ANV was about 1/3 the size of the AoP.

a) I think a tactical Confederate victory would see the Union forces in north-center pushed back and broken. A flanking maneuver perhaps or a major breakthrough that forces the Union to retire towards the upper and middle bridges similar to situation on southern end of the battlefield. b) I don't think it could be considered a tactical victory because the Union gained ground, inconclusive is probably the best description.
 
By what measures, and where did the Army of Northern Virginia go between the Peninsula and Antietam?

The numbers I've seen suggest that both sides straggled very heavily before Antietam, but that functionally the Federal army did not have a great superiority over the Rebel one - especially when one factors in that McClellan's army had been thrown together in a tearing hurry and included a fair number of totally green troops. (At least one regiment hadn't even noticed yet that their weapons wouldn't fire, and would discover this at Shepherdstown).

Priest (Antietam: The Soldiers' Battle) counts the AoP at Antietam at ~87K and the ANV at ~30K.

This does not account for lack of engagement (ie. McClellan not sending enough troops in), lack of resources etc.
 
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