January 8 and January 11, 1863 marked two key dates in the first of the great cavalry raids into Missouri. On January 8 one wing of the the raid under Marmaduke and including veterans under Shelby was repulsed by a hastily gathered force of Union soldiers, local militia, militia cavalry and convalescents at the Second Battle of Springfield, Missouri. On January 11, the other wing was heavily engaged at Hartville, Missouri with both sides claiming victory. With Union forces gathering, Marmaduke began an arduous retreat into Arkansas. Following the defeat of Hindman's forces in Northwest Arkansas in December 1862 at Prairie Grove, the Confederates fell back to winter quarters in Lewisburg, Arkansas leaving a small force in Van Buren. Hindman was soon surprised to find the Federals pushing toward Van Buren and Fort Smith. He assigned his cavalry division under Brig. Gen. John Sappington Marmaduke the task of relieving the pressure by striking the Federal supply line between Springfield and Rolla, Missouri (the railhead.) Marmaduke set out on December 31, 1862 from Lewisburg with 1600 troopers of Colonel J.O. Shelby's Iron Brigade, 270 men of Colonel Emmett MacDonald's regiment, and a section of artillery under Collins. The other prong of the attack was launched from Pocahontas, Arkansas consisting of Col. Joseph C. Porter's command of 825 men and a section of artillery. Porter's orders were to link up with Marmaduke in Hartville. As the mounted Confederates set out through northern Arkansas they swept up Unionist forces and guerrillas in their path. A number of small isolated garrisons and blockhouses were overwhelmed along the way, including at Lawrence Mill and Ozark. However, the big prize was the supply depot at Springfield, Missouri. This was the launching point for the projection of Federal control into southwest, Missouri and into northwest Arkansas. Unfortunately for the Trans-Mississippi Confederates, an accomplished 14th Missouri State Militia cavalry commander, Capt. Milton Burch, became aware of the raid, and began withdrawing, sending word back to the Federal district commander in Springfield that a large mounted army was on its way. The Second Battle of Springfield Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown (yes, that is really his name...see his picture, his head sort of resembles an egg) had to determine whether to meet the onslaught or withdraw his command while he still could, and destroy the depot. He chose to fight. Miscellaneous elements coalesced in the incomplete Springfield fortifications. The 72nd and 74th Enrolled Missouri Militia were ordered to report. And from the 1200 sick and wounded in the Union hospitals, 400 convalescents formed into four companies which they referred to as the "Quinine Brigade." These were armed from the arsenal. The more traditional forces consisted of the 3rd Missouri State Militia cavalry, a battalion of the 14th MSM cavalry, the 4th MSM cav, and several companies of the 18th Iowa infantry. In all Brown could muster 2099 men and five pieces of field artillery...three of them improvised. Several forts in various states of completion protected the town from attack primarily from the South. One of the convalescents, a Lt. Hoffman from Backoff's 1st Missouri Light Artillery supervised construction of a crude battery from two old iron howitzer tubes and one six-pounder gun. He then began training gun crews pulled primarily from the infantry to man the improvised pieces. Brown deployed his cavalry to the south of the town on the morning of January 8, awaiting the raiders. Shelby approached and deployed a dismounted battle line of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Missouri cavalry (500 men each) with the 100 men of Elliot's Scouts held in reserve. The section of Collin's artillery awaited in the center of the line. At 10 am MacDonald's command arrived and deployed on the left. Brown recognized that about a dozen homes south of Fort No. 4 could be used as outposts to sieze the fort, so he had them burned. By 1 pm firing was occurring across the line. MacDonald's forces pushed back some infantry from some homes and began applying pressure. Brown responded with mounted charges at various points on the line that pushed the rebels back briefly but were soon being repulsed. Realizing that his mounted force could not dislodge the rebels, Brown recalled them to take their places in the incomplete rifle pits and line. MacDonald's men had become disorganized from their own attack and were soon in trouble. Shelby sent two of his regiments (nearly two-thirds of his force) rushing to their aid at the same time Brown was withdrawing his cavalry. The momentum of the attack soon drew the antagonists in front of Fort No. 4 where some companies of the 18th Iowa and a single six pounder under Captain Landis awaited. The men of the 18th were soon dislodged and fled to the fort. But Landis and his crew remained until he was shot down by swarming Confederates, taking Confederate Major Bowman with him. The Rebels carried away the piece, minus the friction primers. The Confederates took several buildings around the fort, but could not take the fort. They shifted their attack and pressed ahead on the Union right. They took an old college that had been inexplicably left unmanned and used it as a strongpoint. The Quinine Brigade and the 72nd EMM advanced leaving their fortified brick buildings near the city square. They soon engaged Shelby's men and gave good account of themselves taking heavy casualties for a spirited stand. Eventually they fled to the rear with most of their field officers cut down, but amazingly they reformed and returned to the fight. Fighting now shifted to building-to-building exchanges and the rebel advance halted. At 3:30 pm with the situation critical Brown rode out in front of his men with his escort, brashly exposing himself to enemy fire before withdrawing. A short while later he was struck in the arm by fire from a building and dismounted. He turned over command to Col. Crabbe. Finally at 5 pm with nightfall approaching, Shelby attempted to break the stalemate by assaulting Fort No. 4 and along the entire line. The Federals wavered in several places, but at this moment, a portion of the 18th Iowa held in reserve in defense of the large "impregnable" Fort No. 1 to the northwest (where many of the stores had been moved) advanced and joined the fight at a yell. In the failing light the Confederates believed this might be a relief force, and their attack collapsed. As night set in firing diminished, the rebels withdrew from their advanced positions. Marmaduke now had reason to believe the enemy in his front had been reinforced, that a force marching from the Union Army of the Frontier might soon block his path south, and he had not yet heard from Porter's command. Early the next morning, Marmduke ordered a withdrawal to the northeast attempting to disrupt the telegraph and rail before moving toward Hartville to find Porter. Not all of his men got the message and several were captured in town, including a Lt. of Collins' battery. Brown had won an important victory with a scratchforce against seasoned veterans. The cost was 30 men killed or mortally wounded, 195 were wounded, 6 MIA. Uncharacteristcally, the 72nd EMM, a true part-time militia had suffered the most for its defiant stand, with 21% casualties. As was the norm, Confederate casualties are poorly documented. Marmaduke admitted incomplete records and 20 known killed, but various accounts of the dead and wounded left on the field show that to be only a fraction of the losses. Dr. Melcher stated that 80 rebels were eventually interred. ...next, to Hartville Source: Summarized version by myself of Frederick W. Goman's, Up from Arkansas, Marmaduke's First Missouri Raid Including the Battles of Springfield and Hartville, Wilson's Creek National Battlefield Foundation, 1999.