Second in importance to none-the Grierson Raid

@steamman the reference accounted them as being new, both batches.
Lubliner.
IMHO Unless breach loading or repeating, they are obolete muzzle loading. They may be new used, but still obsolete. The South was dependent on capturing Yankee supplies of metallic cartridges meaning that these Southern rifles were most likely muzzle loaders. It would be interesting to figure out what cavalry units they were destined for.
 
I happened upon correspondence between Major-Generals' Dana and Halleck on page 999-1000, series 1 Volume 41, part 1 of the Official Records. This report states a summary of the immense destruction the Federal force inflicted upon the confederates in Mississippi between December 21, 1864 and January 5, 1865. I am calling attention to the summary, which I outline briefly below, because it shows a marked prosperity and industry occurring then in the south. At this point in time, Thomas had defeated Hood, and supplies were there in Mississippi for his troops. The confederates were once more in control of Corinth at this time. We are constantly assuming that the confederacy was on it's knees and in the throes of final doom. This expedition and raid was possibly one of the key factors in killing the southern ability to subsist and survive. I mainly wanted to highlight the industry and accomplishments up to this point in the south for making use with what means they had. Thank you.

CAVALRY EXPEDITION
Sent against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Memphis, Dec. 21, 1864 and returned to Vicksburg on Jan. 5, 1865, the force took 550 prisoners, 1,000 negroes, and 800 horses and mules.
Moving east toward Corinth to threaten it, detachments cut the telegraph lines from Grand Junction to Corinth, destroyed 4 bridges between Booneville and Guntown on the Ohio and Mobile Road. Moving rapidly onto Tupelo they captured and dispersed Forrest’s dismounted camp at Verona, made 6 officers and 20 men prisoners, destroyed two trains of sixteen cars, each loaded with new wagons, pontoons, supplies, &c., for Hood; burned 300 army wagons which had been captured from Sturgis, destroyed 4,000 new English carbines which were for Forrest’s command, large amounts of ordnance stores and ammunition, quartermaster stores, commissary stores for Hood’s army. The command then moved further south along the line of railroad, destroying it thoroughly to a point between Egypt and Prairie Stations.
The force attacked Egypt on the 28th​ capturing about 500 men and destroying another train of 14 cars. They then turned west toward Houston and Bellafontaine to the Mississippi Central Railroad, striking it at Winona and sending out detachments to Bankston and Grenada, destroying machine shops, valuable factories and large quantities of wool, cloth and leather. Another 35 miles of the road and telegraph were destroyed.

To sum it up, about 40 miles on each road was destroyed, a large number of bridges, telegraph depots, switches, turn-tables, and water-tanks, 4 serviceable locomotives, and 10 which were undergoing repairs, about 100 cars, a pile-driver and engine. Also 700 fat hogs, very large amounts of corn and wheat, 1,000 stand of new arms at Egypt, in addition to the 4,000 destroyed at Verona.

“I believe this expedition, in its damaging results to the enemy, is second in importance to none during the war.”
From Major-General N. J. T. Dana to Halleck January 8, 1865. page 999-1000, Series 1 Volume 41, part 1.
Lubliner.
This report had to influence Grant with respect to getting the larger Wilson raid equipped and started. It may explain in part General Grant becoming increasingly impatient with both George Thomas and General Butler.
It would fit with some tension between Stanton on the hard war end of the spectrum, and Grant, who probably could have negotiated a surrender earlier, with General Lee, if he had tried harder.
It must have been a valuable report confirming the perception that the Confederacy was an empty shell was rapidly becoming accurate.
 
I suspect (without checking) that it was fairly common to include verbatim portions of subsidiary reports in a commander's summary report. More efficient, and were not representing them as necessarily works of independent authorship such as a book. They were also likely group compilations by staff officers to an extent, though reading Grant's you do tend to hear his distinctive voice.

Lubliner, you have started a very interesting thread. I've read of this raid but tended to view it as late war so-what. This thread really brings out its significance. Thank you!

Concerning the "4000 new English carbines", I may be wrong but i think I've read somewhere within the last couple of years that that figure was an exaggeration or a typo, and that something like 400 was more likely. However, the comment above about this perhaps being six months' accumulation of supplies might support the larger figure. interesting. I will try later this afternoon after the hockey game to see if I can find what I was remembering.

It is well documented that Forrest's and indeed the AOT cavalry in general mostly carried muzzle-loading rifles for long arms. Breechloaders and even carbines in general were in short supply out there. While still insufficient, rifles were more readily available than carbines. The ORs have a few summaries that report far fewer long arms than men in the AOT cavalry, and that for a force that predominantly fought dismounted. (Western Union cavalry also carried muzzle-loading rifles (M. 1841 Mississippi's, M. 1855s, imports), when they had long arms at all, until breechloading carbines became more plentiful.)
 
4000 seems high. IMHO

Agreed. Edward Winslow, who led one of those brigades, in his post-war memoir (Story of a Cavalryman) said "about 900 American rifles and English carbines" and basically says Grierson's, Washburn's and Dana's reports were exaggerated to help Grierson get his overdue brevet of major general. (They also incorrectly reported Confederate Brigadier Gholson as having been killed or mortally wounded -- he survived.)

Interestingly, those three reports are in O.R. (Series I) vol. 41 (part 1) pages 998-1002 whereas all the more detailed reports are in an entirely different volume, vol. 47 (part I) at pp. 844-875. Unfortunately the seven Confederate reports do not itemize the materials destroyed, but Joseph Karge, who led the brigade that actually captured Forrest's camp near Verona, reported: "the following is an estimate, as near as I can judge: 450 English carbines; 500 Austrian rifles." (id., p. 848) His report also appends a Recapitulation which states: "a large number of new English carbines and Austrian rifles were also destroyed, but owing to the manner in which they were packed I am unable to give the exact amount." (p. 851)

Politics and advancement are never new!
 
Agreed. Edward Winslow, who led one of those brigades, in his post-war memoir (Story of a Cavalryman) said "about 900 American rifles and English carbines" and basically says Grierson's, Washburn's and Dana's reports were exaggerated to help Grierson get his overdue brevet of major general. (They also incorrectly reported Confederate Brigadier Gholson as having been killed or mortally wounded -- he survived.)

Interestingly, those three reports are in O.R. (Series I) vol. 41 (part 1) pages 998-1002 whereas all the more detailed reports are in an entirely different volume, vol. 47 (part I) at pp. 844-875. Unfortunately the seven Confederate reports do not itemize the materials destroyed, but Joseph Karge, who led the brigade that actually captured Forrest's camp near Verona, reported: "the following is an estimate, as near as I can judge: 450 English carbines; 500 Austrian rifles." (id., p. 848) His report also appends a Recapitulation which states: "a large number of new English carbines and Austrian rifles were also destroyed, but owing to the manner in which they were packed I am unable to give the exact amount." (p. 851)

Politics and advancement are never new!
That is an insightful statement making me wonder what purpose the exaggeration, if done judiciously, had in a political sense for extra support from Washington. I believe the incorporation of Dana's report into his own was possibly an oversight on Grant's part. Or possibly it may have been the mistake of the recorder. Thanks for joining into the discussion, especially with the helpful references.
Lubliner.
 
This report had to influence Grant with respect to getting the larger Wilson raid equipped and started. It may explain in part General Grant becoming increasingly impatient with both George Thomas and General Butler.
It would fit with some tension between Stanton on the hard war end of the spectrum, and Grant, who probably could have negotiated a surrender earlier, with General Lee, if he had tried harder.
It must have been a valuable report confirming the perception that the Confederacy was an empty shell was rapidly becoming accurate.
Grant had a lot of details for worry, as an example to his incessant whittling while with the AOP in 1864. The former gathering up of horses for the Stoneman raid was a costly expense to Thomas, who seemed to stay reserved in his demeanor. Also the Mobile Campaign was coming to fruition and Grant's attitude had to be in part due to Bank's. The politics of the situation were fraying the nerves of all leading commanders by the end of the war, IMO. By the closing months it is relevant that Stanton and Halleck were pushing hard for results, and Grant was the channel for every complaint or breakdown of operations. I guess that is like holding onto a hot metal cup; where the 'H' to set it down.
Lubliner.
 
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