Say What Shiloh Special: " I would fight them if they were a million."

16thAL

Sergeant
Asst. Regtl. Quartermaster Shiloh 2020
Member of the Month
Joined
Oct 17, 2019
Location
Corinth MS
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Late in the afternoon of April 5, 1862, with the rain still falling, General Albert Sidney Johnston was tired, frustrated and eager for a fight was in no mood to listen to cautious advice. General P.G.T. Beauregard’s suggestion they cancel the proposed attack on the Union army camped on the Shiloh plateau for the next day was answered with the statement "I would fight them if they were a million."

Johnston had been steadily losing ground since he had assumed command of Department 2 in September of 1861. He was unable to hold this extended line of battle and the loses of Forts Henry and Donaldson had forced him to retreat to defend the vital railroad junction. Aware that General Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Army of the Ohio, was on the march to join Grant’s forces at Pittsburg Landing, Johnston was anxious to engage the enemy and fight them separately.
Upon hearing the guns early Sunday morning he climbed in the saddle , laid spur to ole Fire Eater and announced " Gentlemen we will water our horses tonight in the Tennessee River "
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@16thAL
You mentioned how much pressure Johnston was under to attack and stop the Union advance across Tennessee and protect the vital crossroads at Corinth. In my opinion, after gathering his forces Johnston seemed to be unsure of his ability to lead the Army of Mississippi even to the point of offering command to General P.G.T. Beauregard who declined due to health concerns. Johnston’s modesty or ambivalence lead to allowing Beauregard to reorganize the quickly gathering army. With Johnston’s permission, Colonel Thomas Jordan, Beauregard’s Chief of Staff, drew up the orders of assault for the Army of Mississippi to attack Grant’s army, all the while with a copy of Napoleon’s orders for the battle of Waterloo in front of him.

Beuregard's complicated marching plan along 2 rain soaked roads was a disaster from the beginning. General Hardee's Corps took most of the day to get out of Corinth and that was just the beginning of a circus of errors and misfortune for the Confederates. Beauregard's plan for the 4 individual corps to attack in a stacked fashion was both impractical and unwieldy.

All of these comments are my opinions and expect others to comment. There is one aspect of this discussion that is irrefutable: the effect of the terrain on this battle. The Shiloh Plateau is the shape of an inverted pyramid with Corinth being the tip and Pittsburg Landing the base. Attempting to turn the Union left and push Grant away from the landing was beyond the abilities of the Confederates with Johnston acting as a regimental commander and Beauregard behind the lines not in touch with him. Rebel staff officers took it upon themselves to issue orders to regiments on their own and generals telling other commands where to attack and when. It was chaos as all battles are after the first shots are fired. The command and control function of the Confederates was not up to the task.

Looking forward to further discussion on this topic.
Regards
David
 
@16thAL
You mentioned how much pressure Johnston was under to attack and stop the Union advance across Tennessee and protect the vital crossroads at Corinth. In my opinion, after gathering his forces Johnston seemed to be unsure of his ability to lead the Army of Mississippi even to the point of offering command to General P.G.T. Beauregard who declined due to health concerns. Johnston’s modesty or ambivalence lead to allowing Beauregard to reorganize the quickly gathering army. With Johnston’s permission, Colonel Thomas Jordan, Beauregard’s Chief of Staff, drew up the orders of assault for the Army of Mississippi to attack Grant’s army, all the while with a copy of Napoleon’s orders for the battle of Waterloo in front of him.

Beuregard's complicated marching plan along 2 rain soaked roads was a disaster from the beginning. General Hardee's Corps took most of the day to get out of Corinth and that was just the beginning of a circus of errors and misfortune for the Confederates. Beauregard's plan for the 4 individual corps to attack in a stacked fashion was both impractical and unwieldy.

All of these comments are my opinions and expect others to comment. There is one aspect of this discussion that is irrefutable: the effect of the terrain on this battle. The Shiloh Plateau is the shape of an inverted pyramid with Corinth being the tip and Pittsburg Landing the base. Attempting to turn the Union left and push Grant away from the landing was beyond the abilities of the Confederates with Johnston acting as a regimental commander and Beauregard behind the lines not in touch with him. Rebel staff officers took it upon themselves to issue orders to regiments on their own and generals telling other commands where to attack and when. It was chaos as all battles are after the first shots are fired. The command and control function of the Confederates was not up to the task.

Looking forward to further discussion on this topic.
Regards
David
Also the weather playing a part at the battlefield itself . The rain , the flooded streams , the effects of no food and sleep on the men . There are so many factors . That's what makes this March and advance so breathtaking .
 
@16thAL you mentioned that Braxton Bragg had a large impact on the Confederate assault and you are absolutely correct. Bragg's fixation on using Napoleonic tactics of direct assaults on the "Hornet's Nest" wasted troops and nearly decimated Colonel Randall Gibson's Brigade. Instead of bypassing the commands of Prentiss and Wallace, Bragg's insistance on frontal assault gave Grant the time needed to consolidate and establish his Last Line.

Had Johnston lived will always be a focus of the "What Ifs" of a misunderstood and underappreciated titanic struggle of the Western Theater.
Regards
David
 
@16thAL you mentioned that Braxton Bragg had a large impact on the Confederate assault and you are absolutely correct. Bragg's fixation on using Napoleonic tactics of direct assaults on the "Hornet's Nest" wasted troops and nearly decimated Colonel Randall Gibson's Brigade. Instead of bypassing the commands of Prentiss and Wallace, Bragg's insistance on frontal assault gave Grant the time needed to consolidate and establish his Last Line.

Had Johnston lived will always be a focus of the "What Ifs" of a misunderstood and underappreciated titanic struggle of the Western Theater.
Regards
David
So true . I believe things would have been a lot different . The tactics of Sunday , replenishment overnight as should have been and Monday tactics would have been different . Johnston knew he was against a formittable foe in Grant . He knew he needed that knockout punch not elaborate tactics like Napoleon's experienced troops could pull off .
 
Hopefully in the spirit of the thread....

Was Beauregard's plan to attack with each corps in successive, parallel lines the biggest Confederate error at Shiloh? I believe Johnston conceived a plan that was different, packing the weight of his intended punch on his right (Union left) to try to separate Grant from the Tennessee. If so, Johnston's allowing this to happen is one of my biggest questions about his Generalship.
 
Hopefully in the spirit of the thread....

Was Beauregard's plan to attack with each corps in successive, parallel lines the biggest Confederate error at Shiloh? I believe Johnston conceived a plan that was different, packing the weight of his intended punch on his right (Union left) to try to separate Grant from the Tennessee. If so, Johnston's allowing this to happen is one of my biggest questions about his Generalship.
I believe they argued with him so much about not wanting to fight and knowing how desperate the situation was he made the tactical error of personally going to the front and leading his men . His plan was solid but I believe he lost confidence in his commanders and decided to put the weight of the battle on his shoulders .
 
@Andy Cardinal I believe we are forgetting the part played by the terrain. Coming through Farley Field at the opening of the battle in line of corps precluded the Confederates to flow to the right. Beauregard’s plan forced the Rebs to hit a Sherman’s and Prentiss’ divisions in the Federal right flank driving them back to the landing.
Grant’s left flank was protected by Lick Creek and ravines. The Eastern end of the Hornet’s Nest was about as far the Confederates reach and advancing from here just pushed Grant back to the Landing
Johnston and Beauregard had incorrect maps and a dearth of knowledgeable guides
Great discussion
Regards
David
 
Thanks David. That is an important point -- the more I learn about different battles, the more I learn that terrain is probably the most important factor in the course those battles take. Hopefully, someday when I get to visit Shiloh in person, I will see the terraim for myself.
 
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