Samuel Johnston - Did He Reach Little Round Top?

It's sure fun to keep talking about this! But for all the Longstreet lovers out there, where are the statues? I wish Monument Ave in Richmond had never been destroyed Edited. but there was NEVER a statue there of Longstreet. And if you go to the Gettysburg park, as I am going to do again next month, the only statue of Longstreet that you will see is hardly as large as a human being is today. "Pete" didn't like the way Lee fought a battle - any battle, and it clearly showed those 3 days.

It always amazes me how Lee continues to be second guessed by some people for being too aggressive and offensively minded. When you're "outgunned" in manpower and materials, as Lee and his army was, what the heck should you be trying to do? If you don't win the war quick, you don't win at all! Longstreet didn't agree, he was in favor of most always fighting on defense and again, being like his idol, Joe Johnston. It's all there for us to see and read about! Did Lee make a mistake when he promoted Ewell and Hill to corp command following Jackson's death? Hindsight says Ewell was not up to the job. Lee fired him later in the war. Anyone who has ever managed people knows it's impossible to know for sure what a person is capable of doing or not. You make a decision and hope it works out. What were his other options? Jeb Stuart would have been his best choice for an infantry command. Either Wade Hampton or Fitzhugh Lee could have taken over the cavalry. Stuart, so much like his close buddy, Jackson, would have fought a battle like Jackson and not been extra cautious and tentative. But Longstreet would not have liked that choice....
 
Last edited by a moderator:
During a Park Ranger program on
Little Round Top last year, a park ranger said that Johnston dressed in civilian clothes to blend in with locals who were fleeing the area. I have not read anything like this anywhere. Does anyone else have an insight on this?
 
During a Park Ranger program on
Little Round Top last year, a park ranger said that Johnston dressed in civilian clothes to blend in with locals who were fleeing the area. I have not read anything like this anywhere. Does anyone else have an insight on this?
As with almost all of his actions at Gettysburg, much can be interpreted within the limited evidence available. However, I am not aware of any documentation that suggests he did. There are also a considerable number of other documented recons Johnston performed, before and after, and I'm not aware of any evidence he dressed in civilian clothes then, either. He was a Captain in the Provisional Corps of Engineers assigned to Lee's staff, so he was a commissioned, uniformed officer.
 
I had never heard that before, but I'm certainly no expert. But I would think a Park Ranger would be an extremely knowledgeable source. Wouldn't he be subjecting himself to being shot as a spy if he were to be caught wearing civilian clothes?

John
 
I've always found it unbelievable that Longstreet's Corps didn't take the same detour as Alexander's artillery battalion. With all the horses and equipment, you would have thought it would have been obvious where they turned off of the road. If it was passable for artillery, it should be the same for infantry. It seems like if they had followed Alexander they would have been in position to attack sooner.
I've been trying to figure that one out, myself.
 
It's sure fun to keep talking about this! But for all the Longstreet lovers out there, where are the statues? I wish Monument Ave in Richmond had never been destroyed Edited. but there was NEVER a statue there of Longstreet. And if you go to the Gettysburg park, as I am going to do again next month, the only statue of Longstreet that you will see is hardly as large as a human being is today. "Pete" didn't like the way Lee fought a battle - any battle, and it clearly showed those 3 days.

It always amazes me how Lee continues to be second guessed by some people for being too aggressive and offensively minded. When you're "outgunned" in manpower and materials, as Lee and his army was, what the heck should you be trying to do? If you don't win the war quick, you don't win at all! Longstreet didn't agree, he was in favor of most always fighting on defense and again, being like his idol, Joe Johnston. It's all there for us to see and read about! Did Lee make a mistake when he promoted Ewell and Hill to corp command following Jackson's death? Hindsight says Ewell was not up to the job. Lee fired him later in the war. Anyone who has ever managed people knows it's impossible to know for sure what a person is capable of doing or not. You make a decision and hope it works out. What were his other options? Jeb Stuart would have been his best choice for an infantry command. Either Wade Hampton or Fitzhugh Lee could have taken over the cavalry. Stuart, so much like his close buddy, Jackson, would have fought a battle like Jackson and not been extra cautious and tentative. But Longstreet would not have liked that choice....
To my mind, you're being far too harsh on Longstreet. He and Lee did disagree about how to fight the battle at Gettysburg but they were on the same page more often than not.

Ewell did very well during the Gettysburg Campaign so he had that going for him. Not to mention that he was Jackson's picked successor.

The reason that Lee didn't keep Stuart in command of Jackson's Corps was that Lee didn't trust anyone but Stuart to command the cavalry effectively and just couldn't spare him. Plus, he had two outstanding division commanders in Richard Ewell and A.P. Hill who could make good corps commanders. It's unfortunate that Hill's health broke in the aftermath of his wounding at Chancellorsville but Ewell did well until Spotsylvania when he lost his cool.

Ryan
 
@rpkennedy I agree with you about Lee not trusting anyone but Stuart to command his Cavalry. In my case of course its just an opinion, so I am more than glad to hear someone much knowledgeable than myself agree with me.

John
 
Thank you Ryan. First off, I don't envy Lee with the choices he had to make once Jackson died. As I have said earlier, anyone who has been a manager can easily recognize how hard it is to find the right people and make that choice at the time you have to do it. It's not easy. I know Lee loved Jeb Stuart like a Father loves his son. They were that close. Many of us recognize Stuart as truly the best or near best cavalryman ever born in the US. Who could equal him? Lee knew it too! I just think Fitzhugh Lee or Wade Hampton could have done the job in replacing Stuart and done it well. Then best for Lee, the Army of Northern VA and the Confederate nation, Stuart, with his quick mind and terrific leadership skills, would have served Lee extraordinarily well as a corp commander and could have made a crucial difference at Gettysburg. Longstreet was almost insubordinate during the 3 day battle - and that's NOT just me saying it. Who else could Lee rely on for those 3 days? Ewell and Hill were too new to command and Lee had no one else (besides a disgruntled and tardy Longstreet) he could really talk to and rely on. Plus Lee himself was not well during the battle. Still, with a little luck here or there, the South could have won the battle. Alas, it wasn't meant to be.
 
Thank you Ryan. First off, I don't envy Lee with the choices he had to make once Jackson died. As I have said earlier, anyone who has been a manager can easily recognize how hard it is to find the right people and make that choice at the time you have to do it. It's not easy. I know Lee loved Jeb Stuart like a Father loves his son. They were that close. Many of us recognize Stuart as truly the best or near best cavalryman ever born in the US. Who could equal him? Lee knew it too! I just think Fitzhugh Lee or Wade Hampton could have done the job in replacing Stuart and done it well. Then best for Lee, the Army of Northern VA and the Confederate nation, Stuart, with his quick mind and terrific leadership skills, would have served Lee extraordinarily well as a corp commander and could have made a crucial difference at Gettysburg. Longstreet was almost insubordinate during the 3 day battle - and that's NOT just me saying it. Who else could Lee rely on for those 3 days? Ewell and Hill were too new to command and Lee had no one else (besides a disgruntled and tardy Longstreet) he could really talk to and rely on. Plus Lee himself was not well during the battle. Still, with a little luck here or there, the South could have won the battle. Alas, it wasn't meant to be.
I agree that Hampton or Fitz Lee could have done a reasonable job as cavalry commander but, to Lee's mind, they weren't Stutoart. Lee simply did not trust anyone in that role other than JEB Stuart and it wasn't until Stuart's death in May 1864 that Lee had to rely on someone else as his eyes and ears.

As for Longstreet being insubordinate, I would disagree. On July 2, he followed Lee's orders as well as anyone could be expected to, even following the letter of the order rather than its spirit. That said, Longstreet is not above criticism. His actions early on July 3 can hardly be justified since he knew what Lee intended and, while following the letter of the order, was clearly against what Lee wanted. And his actions during during the attack on July 3 were uninspiring at best.

Ryan
 
Tactical intelligence has a limited "shelf life;" it is extremely perishable. With each passing minute, and certainly hour, it diminishes in importance until it becomes worthless, or actually detrimental. Even if it is timely and accurate, it might be misleading. For instance, the Union signalmen on Little Round Top reported a large body of enemy infantry was marching away from the Confederate right - they must have been observing the countermarch of Hood and McLaws. Fortunately no action was taken by the Federal high command based on this one piece of information.
I agree with you on shelf life of intelligence. On your second point, covering the Signal Corps: I have struggled with linking their report of the large body of movement and Longstreet's counter-march. I am not sure the times line up. I don't claim to know for what other movement it could have been, but I've read the SC reports for that morning and seen what times they were logged. I've studied the counter-march and attempted to time that out as well. I can't make them lineup.
 
I agree with you on shelf life of intelligence. On your second point, covering the Signal Corps: I have struggled with linking their report of the large body of movement and Longstreet's counter-march. I am not sure the times line up. I don't claim to know for what other movement it could have been, but I've read the SC reports for that morning and seen what times they were logged. I've studied the counter-march and attempted to time that out as well. I can't make them lineup.
With the timeline, I think it depends on who you believe and how accurate you think each person recording the time is. Without linking watches to the atomic clock, there's a major issue with times on the battlefield, especially when you're looking at different sides. No one was necessarily writing down the times in a notebook during the battle, so it's all estimated anyway. My general rule has always been to give at least 15 minutes on either side as a default position (so a half hour margin of error). That increases the further away from the battle you get and if you have reason to believe the author is working from contemporary notes or not. For example, Alexander arrived on the field anywhere from 7 - "around" 9 am according to his various accounts. As with anything related to the countermarch and Johnston's recon, there's more than ample room for interpretation, but that's the answer that has let me get to sleep at night after comparing accounts!
 
With the timeline, I think it depends on who you believe and how accurate you think each person recording the time is. Without linking watches to the atomic clock, there's a major issue with times on the battlefield, especially when you're looking at different sides. No one was necessarily writing down the times in a notebook during the battle, so it's all estimated anyway. My general rule has always been to give at least 15 minutes on either side as a default position (so a half hour margin of error). That increases the further away from the battle you get and if you have reason to believe the author is working from contemporary notes or not. For example, Alexander arrived on the field anywhere from 7 - "around" 9 am according to his various accounts. As with anything related to the countermarch and Johnston's recon, there's more than ample room for interpretation, but that's the answer that has let me get to sleep at night after comparing accounts!
When I was researching the fighting on Horseshoe Ridge for my book I had to deal with many things that participants said happened around sunset or dusk. Many of them did not happen at that time, but many factors played into the inaccurate estimates. The biggest is the same you mention, those soldiers did not have time to look at someone's watch -- few people had them in those days and fewer still carried them into battle -- and write down what they happened to be doing at a certain time.
 
Back
Top