Joseph A. Rose
Sergeant
- Joined
- Jan 5, 2010
Another author who completely distorts the post-Corinth pursuit, and who is yet repeatedly referred to by David Moore as an authority on Grant, is Joseph Rose in his Grant Under Fire mess of a book. Rose writes...
"Grant's report for the Corinth battle introduced another falsehood with which he condemned Rosecrans. He supposedly directed his subordinate "to follow up the enemy the moment he begins to retreat," but "the enemy was repulsed at Corinth at 11 a.m. on the 4th and was not followed until next morning." Not only did retreat and repulse signify two separate concepts, the historical record contained no such orders. Numerous messages before combat began, during the battle, and in the immediate aftermath demonstrated that Grant had not specified when Rosecrans needed to commence pursuit."
So Grant is accused of lying, supposedly ordering Rosecrans to move immediately after the retreating confederates, according to Rose. Here is the communication from Grant on Oct 4th...
Headquarters Dept. of West Tenn.
Jackson Tenn. Oct. 4th 1862
MAJ GENL. ROSECRANS
If the enemy fall back push them with all force possible and
save Hurlbut who is now on the way to your relief. The Corinth
and Bolivar forces must act in concert.
Hurlbut is not strong enough alone to handle the rebels without
very good luck. Dont neglect this warning. I can reinforce
no more from this on—hence you will see the vital importance of
yours and Hurlbuts forces acting in conjunction and send forces
messag in.
U. S. GRANT.
Maj. Genl.
"Push them with all force possible and save Hurlbut." Grant was not only worried about bagging Van Dorn, but also worried that Hurlbut's smaller force would get overrun. There is no part of this message that comes across as lackadaisical "start after the enemy whenever you feel like it." No reasonable person is going to read this message and fail to recognize the urgency.
It is Rose who is guilty of the falsehood, but really his entire book is filled with falsehoods.
I don’t remember seeing this post before, but it accuses me of falsehood and then convicts me.
Yes, Grant imparted a definite sense of urgency at the Second Battle of Corinth, directing Rosecrans, “If the enemy fall back push them with all force possible and save Hurlbut who is now on the way to your relief. The Corinth and Bolivar forces must act in concert.”
The crux of the matter, however, is: Did General Ulysses S. Grant actually order General William Rosecrans “to follow up the enemy the moment he began to retreat” [DanSBHawk slightly misquoted Grant Under Fire], as Grant claimed in an October 30, 1862 report to Colonel John C. Kelton? Grant continued his assault on Rosecrans, writing: “As shown by the reports, the enemy was repulsed at Corinth at 11 A.M. on the 4th and not followed until next morning.”
Several things need to be considered:
Is there any order from Grant instructing Rosecrans to pursue the moment the enemy began to retreat or immediately or with some similar construction. I don’t think that there is, and I don’t think that anyone has ever advanced one. If there isn’t one, than Grant Under Fire is correct.
Even if Grant sent such an order, when was it received? Rosecrans didn’t help, starting two messages on October 4th to Grant and one on the 5th, “Dispatch received,” with no other particulars. All communication between Rosecrans and Grant was necessarily delayed, going by courier from Bethel to Corinth. If Rosecrans did not receive it in time to act on it, that wouldn’t have been his fault.
As I had stated before, retreat and repulse signify two separate concepts, which Grant tried to conflate in his post-battle accusation. At the Battle for Chattanooga, William Sherman’s attack on Tunnel Hill was repulsed, but he didn’t retreat. It doesn’t matter if the enemy was repulsed about mid-day. The retreat was around 4 P.M.
Even if Grant did give such an order and it was received in time to be acted upon, Grant vindicated Rosecrans’ delay (“Two days hard fighting without rest, probably, had so fatigued the troops as to make earlier pursuit impracticable”), in the same message to Kelton.
General James McPherson was sent by Grant to Corinth to support Rosecrans. McPherson did not mention getting orders to pursue immediately upon the enemy’s retreat. Grant expected him to arrive by 7:00 A.M.; he arrived just before sunset. Thus, any order by Grant to pursue could have been based partly on McPherson’s earlier arrival, and McPherson’s delayed arrival would help justify a postponed pursuit. The next morning, McPherson was put in the lead of the pursuing column, but even then didn’t act in a pro-active manner.
In the days after the battle, when Grant knew the facts of the pursuit, he made no complaint about Rosecrans insubordinately delaying pursuit. Those allegations didn’t seem to begin until October 14th, when a Grant-friendly reporter wrote, “Why Rosecrans did not push right on that afternoon I cannot conceive. It is certain that he had the most positive orders to do so.”
Grant’s Personal Memoirs continued the deceit of his post-battle report: “General Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated the order after the battle. In the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued.” As to his supposed pre-battle orders, Grant contradicted the assertion in the Memoirs by his October 4th message to Hurlbut: “I have instructed [Rosecrans] to follow up the Enemy should they turn to attack you.” That’s nothing like having Rosecrans “pursue the moment the enemy was repelled.”
Grant began to dislike Rosecrans after the plan to entrap Price in Iuka went awry and after insinuations of Grant having been drunk at the time were bruited about. Grant and his supporters disparaged Rosecrans in the wake of that, and Grant’s false accusations of an insubordinate Rosecrans at Corinth was probably part and parcel of that effort.