Grant Rosecrans, Grant, & the Second Battle of Corinth

Joseph A. Rose

Sergeant
Joined
Jan 5, 2010
Another author who completely distorts the post-Corinth pursuit, and who is yet repeatedly referred to by David Moore as an authority on Grant, is Joseph Rose in his Grant Under Fire mess of a book. Rose writes...

"Grant's report for the Corinth battle introduced another falsehood with which he condemned Rosecrans. He supposedly directed his subordinate "to follow up the enemy the moment he begins to retreat," but "the enemy was repulsed at Corinth at 11 a.m. on the 4th and was not followed until next morning." Not only did retreat and repulse signify two separate concepts, the historical record contained no such orders. Numerous messages before combat began, during the battle, and in the immediate aftermath demonstrated that Grant had not specified when Rosecrans needed to commence pursuit."

So Grant is accused of lying, supposedly ordering Rosecrans to move immediately after the retreating confederates, according to Rose. Here is the communication from Grant on Oct 4th...

Headquarters Dept. of West Tenn.
Jackson Tenn. Oct. 4th 1862
MAJ GENL. ROSECRANS
If the enemy fall back push them with all force possible and
save Hurlbut who is now on the way to your relief. The Corinth
and Bolivar forces must act in concert.
Hurlbut is not strong enough alone to handle the rebels without
very good luck. Dont neglect this warning. I can reinforce
no more from this on—hence you will see the vital importance of
yours and Hurlbuts forces acting in conjunction and send forces
messag in.
U. S. GRANT.
Maj. Genl.

"Push them with all force possible and save Hurlbut." Grant was not only worried about bagging Van Dorn, but also worried that Hurlbut's smaller force would get overrun. There is no part of this message that comes across as lackadaisical "start after the enemy whenever you feel like it." No reasonable person is going to read this message and fail to recognize the urgency.

It is Rose who is guilty of the falsehood, but really his entire book is filled with falsehoods.

I don’t remember seeing this post before, but it accuses me of falsehood and then convicts me.

Yes, Grant imparted a definite sense of urgency at the Second Battle of Corinth, directing Rosecrans, “If the enemy fall back push them with all force possible and save Hurlbut who is now on the way to your relief. The Corinth and Bolivar forces must act in concert.”

The crux of the matter, however, is: Did General Ulysses S. Grant actually order General William Rosecrans “to follow up the enemy the moment he began to retreat” [DanSBHawk slightly misquoted Grant Under Fire], as Grant claimed in an October 30, 1862 report to Colonel John C. Kelton? Grant continued his assault on Rosecrans, writing: “As shown by the reports, the enemy was repulsed at Corinth at 11 A.M. on the 4th and not followed until next morning.”

Several things need to be considered:

Is there any order from Grant instructing Rosecrans to pursue the moment the enemy began to retreat or immediately or with some similar construction. I don’t think that there is, and I don’t think that anyone has ever advanced one. If there isn’t one, than Grant Under Fire is correct.

Even if Grant sent such an order, when was it received? Rosecrans didn’t help, starting two messages on October 4th​ to Grant and one on the 5th​, “Dispatch received,” with no other particulars. All communication between Rosecrans and Grant was necessarily delayed, going by courier from Bethel to Corinth. If Rosecrans did not receive it in time to act on it, that wouldn’t have been his fault.

As I had stated before, retreat and repulse signify two separate concepts, which Grant tried to conflate in his post-battle accusation. At the Battle for Chattanooga, William Sherman’s attack on Tunnel Hill was repulsed, but he didn’t retreat. It doesn’t matter if the enemy was repulsed about mid-day. The retreat was around 4 P.M.

Even if Grant did give such an order and it was received in time to be acted upon, Grant vindicated Rosecrans’ delay (“Two days hard fighting without rest, probably, had so fatigued the troops as to make earlier pursuit impracticable”), in the same message to Kelton.

General James McPherson was sent by Grant to Corinth to support Rosecrans. McPherson did not mention getting orders to pursue immediately upon the enemy’s retreat. Grant expected him to arrive by 7:00 A.M.; he arrived just before sunset. Thus, any order by Grant to pursue could have been based partly on McPherson’s earlier arrival, and McPherson’s delayed arrival would help justify a postponed pursuit. The next morning, McPherson was put in the lead of the pursuing column, but even then didn’t act in a pro-active manner.

In the days after the battle, when Grant knew the facts of the pursuit, he made no complaint about Rosecrans insubordinately delaying pursuit. Those allegations didn’t seem to begin until October 14th​, when a Grant-friendly reporter wrote, “Why Rosecrans did not push right on that afternoon I cannot conceive. It is certain that he had the most positive orders to do so.”

Grant’s Personal Memoirs continued the deceit of his post-battle report: “General Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated the order after the battle. In the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued.” As to his supposed pre-battle orders, Grant contradicted the assertion in the Memoirs by his October 4th​ message to Hurlbut: “I have instructed [Rosecrans] to follow up the Enemy should they turn to attack you.” That’s nothing like having Rosecrans “pursue the moment the enemy was repelled.”

Grant began to dislike Rosecrans after the plan to entrap Price in Iuka went awry and after insinuations of Grant having been drunk at the time were bruited about. Grant and his supporters disparaged Rosecrans in the wake of that, and Grant’s false accusations of an insubordinate Rosecrans at Corinth was probably part and parcel of that effort.
 
I don’t remember seeing this post before, but it accuses me of falsehood and then convicts me.

Yes, Grant imparted a definite sense of urgency at the Second Battle of Corinth, directing Rosecrans, “If the enemy fall back push them with all force possible and save Hurlbut who is now on the way to your relief. The Corinth and Bolivar forces must act in concert.”

The crux of the matter, however, is: Did General Ulysses S. Grant actually order General William Rosecrans “to follow up the enemy the moment he began to retreat” [DanSBHawk slightly misquoted Grant Under Fire], as Grant claimed in an October 30, 1862 report to Colonel John C. Kelton? Grant continued his assault on Rosecrans, writing: “As shown by the reports, the enemy was repulsed at Corinth at 11 A.M. on the 4th and not followed until next morning.”

Several things need to be considered:

Is there any order from Grant instructing Rosecrans to pursue the moment the enemy began to retreat or immediately or with some similar construction. I don’t think that there is, and I don’t think that anyone has ever advanced one. If there isn’t one, than Grant Under Fire is correct.

Even if Grant sent such an order, when was it received? Rosecrans didn’t help, starting two messages on October 4th​ to Grant and one on the 5th​, “Dispatch received,” with no other particulars. All communication between Rosecrans and Grant was necessarily delayed, going by courier from Bethel to Corinth. If Rosecrans did not receive it in time to act on it, that wouldn’t have been his fault.

As I had stated before, retreat and repulse signify two separate concepts, which Grant tried to conflate in his post-battle accusation. At the Battle for Chattanooga, William Sherman’s attack on Tunnel Hill was repulsed, but he didn’t retreat. It doesn’t matter if the enemy was repulsed about mid-day. The retreat was around 4 P.M.

Even if Grant did give such an order and it was received in time to be acted upon, Grant vindicated Rosecrans’ delay (“Two days hard fighting without rest, probably, had so fatigued the troops as to make earlier pursuit impracticable”), in the same message to Kelton.

General James McPherson was sent by Grant to Corinth to support Rosecrans. McPherson did not mention getting orders to pursue immediately upon the enemy’s retreat. Grant expected him to arrive by 7:00 A.M.; he arrived just before sunset. Thus, any order by Grant to pursue could have been based partly on McPherson’s earlier arrival, and McPherson’s delayed arrival would help justify a postponed pursuit. The next morning, McPherson was put in the lead of the pursuing column, but even then didn’t act in a pro-active manner.

In the days after the battle, when Grant knew the facts of the pursuit, he made no complaint about Rosecrans insubordinately delaying pursuit. Those allegations didn’t seem to begin until October 14th​, when a Grant-friendly reporter wrote, “Why Rosecrans did not push right on that afternoon I cannot conceive. It is certain that he had the most positive orders to do so.”

Grant’s Personal Memoirs continued the deceit of his post-battle report: “General Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated the order after the battle. In the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued.” As to his supposed pre-battle orders, Grant contradicted the assertion in the Memoirs by his October 4th​ message to Hurlbut: “I have instructed [Rosecrans] to follow up the Enemy should they turn to attack you.” That’s nothing like having Rosecrans “pursue the moment the enemy was repelled.”

Grant began to dislike Rosecrans after the plan to entrap Price in Iuka went awry and after insinuations of Grant having been drunk at the time were bruited about. Grant and his supporters disparaged Rosecrans in the wake of that, and Grant’s false accusations of an insubordinate Rosecrans at Corinth was probably part and parcel of that effort.
Your post, much like the argument in the book, is virtually all noise and not enough signal.

The telegram was the order. Orders do not come in one certain format. If you are in the military, and you receive a verbal order, and you reply that you need that order submitted in triplicate on the proper forms,... you're going to be in trouble.

Grant could not have made the order ANY more clear: Push them with all force possible and save Hurlbut.

McPherson doesn't matter. The definitions of repulse and retreat don't matter. All the speculation about who said what after the fact, doesn't matter. Grant's October 4th order was absolutely and explicitly clear that Rosecrans was to immediately follow Van Dorn.

It's true that I often accuse your book of dishonesty and falsehoods. But that is the type of accusation your book constantly levels on Grant, so I wouldn't expect it to be inappropriate in labeling the errors in your book the same way.
 
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I have no dog in this fight but would like to interject some stuff.
Anytime you don't like what I post, tell me and I will stop.


GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS, Jackson, Tenn., October 4, 1862.

The rebels are now massing on Corinth in the northwest angle of the railroad. There was some fighting yesterday. Rosecrans informs me that his troops occupy from College Hill to Pittsburg road on the enemy's old works. General McPherson has gone with a fine brigade, raised from troops here and Trenton, to his relief; probably reached Corinth by 7 this morning. Hurlbut is moving on the enemy's flank from Bolivar. I have given every aid possible.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

 
GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS,

Jackson, Tenn., October 5, 1862.

Yesterday the rebels, under Van Dorn, Price, and Lovell, were repulsed from their attack on Corinth with great slaughter. The enemy are in full retreat, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. Rosecrans telegraphs that the loss is serious on our side, particularly in officers, but bears no comparison with that of the enemy. General Hackleman fell while gallantly leading his brigade. General Oglesby is dangerously wounded. McPherson reached Corinth with his command yesterday. Rosecrans pursued the retreating enemy this morning, and should be attempt to reach Bolivar will follow him to that place. Hurlbut is at the Hatchie with 5,000 or 6,000 men, and is no doubt with the pursuing column. From 700 to 1,000 prisoners, besides wounded, are left in our hands.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General HALLECK.
 
HEADQUARTERS,

Jackson, Tenn., October 5, 1862.

General Ord, who followed Hurlbut and took command, met the enemy to-day on south side of Hatchie, as I understand from dispatch, and drove him across the stream and got possession of the heights with our troops. Ord took two batteries and about 200 prisoners. A large portion of Rosecrans' forces were at Chewalla. At this distance everything looks most favorable, and I cannot see how the enemy are to escape without losing everything but their small-arms. I have strained everything to take into the fight an adequate force and to get them to the right place.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

 
GENERAL GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS

Jackson, Tenn., October 6, 1862-12.3 p. m.

General Ord and Hurlbut came on the enemy yesterday, and Hurlbut, having driven small bodies the day before, after seven hours' fighting, drove the enemy 5 miles back across the Hatchie toward Corinth, capturing two batteries, about 300 prisoners, and many small-arms. I immediately apprised Rosecrans of these facts and directed him to urge on the good work.

Following dispatch just received from Chewalla, October 6:

[CHEWALLA, October 5.]

Major-General GRANT:

The enemy are totally routed, throwing away everything. We are following sharply.

W. S. ROSECRANS.

Under previous instructions Hurlbut is also following Mcpherson, in the lead of Rosecrans' column. Rebel General Martin said to be killed.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

 
There is more about this. I'll SWAG here saying just maybe Grant got messed up over this activity.
Seems like his plan is working good so far.


JACKSON, TENN., October 8, 1862-9 a. m.

Rosecrans has followed rebels to Ripley. Troops from Bolivar will occupy Grand Junction to-morrow, with re-enfocements rapidly sent of from the new levies. I can take everything on the Mississippi Central road. I ordered Rosecrans back last night, but he is so averse to returning that I have directed him to remain still until you can be heard from.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

 
JACKSON, TENN., October 8, 1862.

Before telegraphing you this morning for re-enforcements to follow up our victories I ordered General Rosecrans to return. He shouted such reluctance that I consented to allow him to remain until you could be heard from it further re-enforcements could be had. On reflection I deem it idle to pursue farther without more preparation, and have for the third time ordered his return.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, Commanding-in-Chief.

 
ACKSON, TENN., October 8, 1862-7.30 p. m.

An army cannot subsist itself on the country except in forage. They did not start out to follow for more than a few days, and are much worn out, and I have information not only that the enemy have reserves that are on their way to join their retreating columns, but they have fortifications to return to in case of need. The Mobile road is also open to the enemy to near Rienzi, and Corinth would be exposed by the advance. Although partial success might result from farther pursuit disaster would follow in the end. If you say so, however, it is not too late yet to go on, and I will join the moving column and go to the farthest extent possible. Rosecrans has been re-enforced with everything at hand, even at the risk of this road against raids.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

 
There is more about this. I'll SWAG here saying just maybe Grant got messed up over this activity.
Seems like his plan is working good so far.


JACKSON, TENN., October 8, 1862-9 a. m.

Rosecrans has followed rebels to Ripley. Troops from Bolivar will occupy Grand Junction to-morrow, with re-enfocements rapidly sent of from the new levies. I can take everything on the Mississippi Central road. I ordered Rosecrans back last night, but he is so averse to returning that I have directed him to remain still until you can be heard from.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

There are a couple ironic things about this whole episode:

1. If Rosecrans HAD immediately pursued Van Dorn, and Rosecrans and Hurlbut were able to hit Van Dorn from two sides at the Hatchie, then Van Dorn would have almost certainly been badly defeated and routed.

2. If Rosecrans HAD immediately pursued Van Dorn, and Rosecrans HAD showed up to support Hurlbut at Hatchie, then Hurbut's force would not have been hurt so bad, and Hurlbut would have been available to support Rosecrans jaunt across northern Mississippi.

Rosecrans' delay resulted in Van Dorn escaping, and Hurlbut sustaining heavy casualties. All because he failed to follow Grant's order.
 
I'll bow out here. As a reminder, if any reading is done beyond the above point, they are using Grants memoirs.

Thanks. Grant's messages immediately after the battle show no criticism of Rosecrans for not pursuing immediately. That concept was not introduced until well after the battle when Grant was looking to disparage Rosecrans.
 
Grant was willing to give Rosecrans the benefit of the doubt immediately after Corinth. But that went downhill fast in the following weeks.

Between failing to pursue immediately, then resisting to halt the pursuit when it became impracticable, then going around Grant to procure cavalry weapons, then leaked stories to the press coming out of Rosecrans' headquarters... Grant's formerly high opinion of Rosecrans fell dramatically in October 1862.
 
This was discussed in an earlier thread in some detail. Once Rosecrans reported Van Dorn had crossed the Hatchie, on his supply issues, and on the presence of Confederate reinforcements, Grant called him back. It was only then that Rosecrans spoke of moving on to Mobile and Jackson (but not Vicksburg.)
 
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