Saphroneth
Lt. Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
It might be apropos to point out here that in a properly functioning corps the corps commander is at the nexus of information coming from his subordinates (brigade and division commanders). Sometimes getting an up close and personal view is necessary to do the job, of course, but it's an extremely poor use of a corps commander for him to go and find out whether a wood is occupied by seeing if he gets shot - that kind of up close and personal recce can be done by a cavalryman or staff officer, because, yes, they are less valuable than the general. Under normal operating circumstances in a properly functioning corps then the exposure involved by a recce should be minor because the enemy location should be known and they shouldn't go too close to it.
Similarly, if the corps general has to go up front himself and give a formation a good kicking to get them moving in the right direction, then that is a failure of command - either at the division and brigade level (who should have handled it first) or in the system of passing on orders from the corps commander (meaning the DCs haven't found out about the problem in the first place). The corps commander going up to sort it out himself is at best papering over the fact that there is a major failure going on, rather than being the right thing to do, and to make things worse if the CC then gets himself shot doing it then the most competent person in the corps (apparently...) has just taken himself out of the equation.
Leading the corps into battle in a do-or-die this-is-the-decisive-battle situation, where it could make the difference... is something which can make sense. But I don't think you can reasonably argue that the influence Reynolds was having on the 2nd Wisconsin by leading them (from the front, where he got hit) was decsive in the battle; the worst case if Buford is completely broken is that the Union line has to form on Seminary Ridge, which they did anyway.
Similarly, if the corps general has to go up front himself and give a formation a good kicking to get them moving in the right direction, then that is a failure of command - either at the division and brigade level (who should have handled it first) or in the system of passing on orders from the corps commander (meaning the DCs haven't found out about the problem in the first place). The corps commander going up to sort it out himself is at best papering over the fact that there is a major failure going on, rather than being the right thing to do, and to make things worse if the CC then gets himself shot doing it then the most competent person in the corps (apparently...) has just taken himself out of the equation.
Leading the corps into battle in a do-or-die this-is-the-decisive-battle situation, where it could make the difference... is something which can make sense. But I don't think you can reasonably argue that the influence Reynolds was having on the 2nd Wisconsin by leading them (from the front, where he got hit) was decsive in the battle; the worst case if Buford is completely broken is that the Union line has to form on Seminary Ridge, which they did anyway.