Relative Calm Before the Storm at the Peach Orchard

Tom Elmore

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photo by @Buckeye Bill https://civilwartalk.com/threads/ge...itary-park-nps-tour-stops.101299/#post-901494


The 3rd Michigan deploys three companies that cross the Emmitsburg road and push back Kershaw’s skirmishers. Cabell’s artillery battalion occupies positions to the right of Kershaw’s brigade, while Alexander’s artillery battalion moves up quietly through the woods. Sickles has Clark’s battery fire on Hood’s men on the move to the south and orders Graham forward to the Emmitsburg road upon learning that Confederate artillery is massing in his left front. Meade is riding up to meet with Sickles. Map reflects the situation as of 3:20 p.m., July 2.

“[The Colonel] moved his regiment by the right flank to the left of the peach orchard, of which the enemy held a portion, where he deployed Companies I, F and K, deploying forward on the right of Company F. We drove the enemy’s skirmishers back” – Lieutenant Colonel Edwin S. Pierce, 3rd Michigan.

The skirmishers of both armies were actively engaged as we came into position – those of the enemy being some distance this side [of the Emmitsburg] road and making a determined stand to hold it” – Private Andrew W. Reese, Carlton’s Battery.

The enemy appeared [Hood’s division] … far to our left. Gen. Sickles ordered Capt. Clark to take position with his battery [B, 1st New Jersey] near Sherfy’s peach orchard. He opened fire, using shell and shrapnel, firing slowly and with good effect, about six rounds from each gun, at the enemy [Hood’s division], who were … crossing the Emmitsburg road 1,400 yards distant” – Member of Battery B, 1st New Jersey.

We moved up toward the Peach Orchard and were within 100 yards of it when Gen. Sickles gave orders to throw a few shot into a piece of woods to the left of what I think is known as the Rose farm. We fired three rounds from each gun, and getting no response drew up close to the peach trees” – Sergeant Ellis H. Timm, Battery B, 1st New Jersey.

Clark’s battery … delivered a few shots, receiving but little response” – Colonel Henry J. Madill, 141st Pennsylvania.

Capt. [Joseph C.] Briscoe [aide to Major General Birney] sent in word that the enemy were massing on our left and had already 11 guns [Cabell’s Battalion] in position … to our left and front … [General Sickles] then ordered Gen. Birney to place Graham’s brigade in the Peach Orchard” – Captain J. Barclay Fassitt, senior aide to Major General David B. Birney.

Suddenly the order came, ‘Attention!’ … order to advance given” – Sergeant J. D. Bloodgood, Company I, 141st Pennsylvania.

Our brigade moved out” – Private Ellis C. Strouss, Company K, 57th Pennsylvania.

The line was moved up to the brow of a hill” – Member of the 105th Pennsylvania.

Skirmishing commenced very heavily … I was then ordered by General Birney out of the woods on an open field” – Colonel George C. Burling.

We moved out of the grove about 100 yards to a corn-field and halted, regimental front, with the Sixth [New Jersey] Regiment in front; then General Sickles and staff halted in front of us” – Benjamin D. Cooley, Company K, 6th New Jersey.

I returned direct to the Peach Orchard … I was here met by Captain Randolph, the [Third] corps chief of artillery, who informed me that he had been ordered to place his batteries on the new line” – Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt.

Guns [E. Porter Alexander’s battalion] were unlimbered in the depression behind us and quietly rolled up by hand on our infantry line” – Member of Brigadier General William Barksdale’s brigade.

Gen’l. Meade, accompanied by his staff, rode by along our [Humphreys’] front from right to left. The men jumped to their feet and cheered lustily as he passed” – Captain Adolfo F. Cavada, Assistant Inspector General to Brigadier General Andrew A. Humphreys.

Sources:
-Official Reports of Lt. Col. Edwin S. Pierce, Col. Henry J. Madill, Col. George C. Burling.
-August 8, 1863 letter of Andrew W. Reese, Southern Banner, Athens, Georgia, August 26, 1863, p. 2.
-History of Battery B, First New Jersey Artillery, by Michael Hanifen, Ottawa, IL: Republican-Times, Printers, 1905, p. 68.
-Clark’s N. J. Battery, by Sergeant Ellis H. Timm, National Tribune, January 8, 1891, p. 4.
-141st Pennsylvania, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, by Samuel P. Bates, IV:439.
-June 12, 1886 letter of Capt. J. Barclay Fassitt, National Tribune, July 15, 1886, p. 1.
-Personal Reminiscences of the War, by Rev. J. D. Bloodgood, NY: Hunt & Eaton, 1893, p. 132.
-Address of E. C. Strouss, September 11, 1889, Dedication of Monument to the 57th Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania At Gettysburg, I:359.
-105th Pennsylvania, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, by Samuel P. Bates, III:785.
-January 18, 1888 letter of Benjamin D. Cooley, Company K, 6th New Jersey, Final Report of the Gettysburg Battle-field Commission of New Jersey, Trenton: John L. Murphy Publishing Company, 1891, p. 103.
-The Second Day at Gettysburg, by Henry J. Hunt, Brevet Major General, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, III:303.
-Barksdale’s Mississippi Brigade at Gettysburg, by J.S. McNeily, Mississippi Historical Society; reprint, Gaithersburg, MD: Olde Soldier Books, 1987, p. 236.
-Diary of A. F. Cavada, by Adolfo Fernandez de la Cavada, photocopy from Carolyn Hartman, Catlett Station Antiques, Catlett, Virginia, Ruth E. Lloyd Information Center, Bull Run Regional Library, Manassas, Virginia.
 

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What I found interesting is that Sickles did not commit his force fully to the advance line until an imminent threat was reported. In addition, the threat first emerged to his left front and then considerably further south. He had nothing to indicate that a large force lay just in front of him, although he could be criticized for not assuming such was the case. As it turned out, that looming threat did not materialize immediately and in the meantime the Federal batteries posted in the orchard and along the Wheatfield road had their way with the Confederate brigades that passed along their front for the next three hours. I would conclude that the Confederate plan of attack, advancing from right to left in echelon, played into Sickles' hands, at least for the first part of the afternoon.

Looking at it from the other side, in retrospect, had McLaws initiated the attack rather than Hood it seems he could have sent Graham reeling back rather quickly, and drove a wedge between Graham and Humphreys' brigades of Carr and Brewster, perhaps before any of the Federal artillery reserve batteries could have properly deployed, negating that big advantage. But all this is 20-20 hindsight, which is always clear and easy to see.
 
The map is intended to show that Graham's brigade was already on the way to the orchard before Meade rode up to Sickles, while Humphreys evidently was notified to advance just after Meade had passed his front. It should have taken Carr's brigade less than nine minutes at common time to reach the Emmitsburg road, and a participant noted that the Confederates opened fire almost immediately [at 3:30 p.m. by my estimate], so Carr would have started forward about the moment of this map - 3:20 p.m. That would give Meade no more than nine minutes of discussion with Sickles before Cabell's guns opened. There is just a little wiggle room in this particular instance as to when Graham advanced, given the clear chain linkage between 1) Cabell taking position, 2) Briscoe spotting or else being notified of this development, 3) reporting it to Sickles, 4) Sickles issuing orders to Birney, (5) who then informed Graham. Incidentally, it was reported that Sickles mentioned the Confederate guns in position to Meade, who "pooh-poohed" the notion. Regardless of the veracity of that particular recollection, the situation was crystal clear once the Confederate guns opened fire.
 
One important document that I should have paid more attention to before now is the "Historicus" account in Official Records:

Summarizing that account, if I may, Sickles is made aware of enemy activity to his south at the same moment he was summoned to meet with Meade at the Leister cottage. (The distance between Trostle's and the Leister cottage could theoretically be covered by a horse at a full gallop in five minutes.) Before Sickles reaches the cottage, artillery firing is heard to the south, behind him. (Henry's guns or perhaps Clark's New Jersey battery?). A few terse words are exchanged between Sickles and Meade, then "putting spurs to his horse, [Sickles] flew back" to Trostle's. Immediately, "finding that Graham's brigade was not advanced as far as [Sickles] desired, he was pushing that brigade and a battery forward ... when General Meade at length arrived on the field." (I doubt Meade was very far behind Sickles, my guess is around five minutes). Meade questioned Sickles about having pushed forward some of his troops (presumably Graham and Clark's battery). "The conference was then abruptly terminated by a heavy shower of shells" (Cabell's battalion I believe).

Bottom line is that while we might push or pull troops and guns a bit in one direction or another and bend the time a few minutes here and there, one thing we can say (with confidence I think) from this account is that Sickles advanced Graham to the Peach Orchard just minutes before Meade's arrival (in front of Burling's brigade), their meeting being cut short by Cabell's opening barrage.
 
I hadn't specifically thought of that, but it makes sense. Cooley of 6 NJ indicates Sickles was in front of Burling's brigade, then Meade arrived.

Drawing a line from the Leister cottage to the Trostle buildings also happens to mesh with Cavada's statement that Meade rode in front of Humphrey's division (Carr's brigade to be precise). So I put Meade along that path, coincidentally near Trostle's. Also, odds are that same direct path had just been followed by Sickles when he returned from his brief encounter with Meade at the Leister cottage.

Generals (or their fixed headquarters) were often reported with a standard bearer, and in fact a corps ensign was seen with Sickles when he arrived on the field on July 1. So it should have been easy for Meade and his staff to spot Sickles once they rode up to the Trostle buildings. Alternatively, a Third Corps staff officer there might simply have directed Meade's entourage to Sickles' known location.
 
The map is intended to show that Graham's brigade was already on the way to the orchard before Meade rode up to Sickles, while Humphreys evidently was notified to advance just after Meade had passed his front. It should have taken Carr's brigade less than nine minutes at common time to reach the Emmitsburg road, and a participant noted that the Confederates opened fire almost immediately [at 3:30 p.m. by my estimate], so Carr would have started forward about the moment of this map - 3:20 p.m. That would give Meade no more than nine minutes of discussion with Sickles before Cabell's guns opened. There is just a little wiggle room in this particular instance as to when Graham advanced, given the clear chain linkage between 1) Cabell taking position, 2) Briscoe spotting or else being notified of this development, 3) reporting it to Sickles, 4) Sickles issuing orders to Birney, (5) who then informed Graham. Incidentally, it was reported that Sickles mentioned the Confederate guns in position to Meade, who "pooh-poohed" the notion. Regardless of the veracity of that particular recollection, the situation was crystal clear once the Confederate guns opened fire.

At least according to Pfanz (p144) it was only after the meeting concluded with Meade and Sickles was given a "blank check" did Sickles order Humphrey's division (minus Burling's brigade) to Emmitsburg Road. Prior to this they were still 250-300 yards east of Emmitsburg Road. BUT, on their way to the Emmitsburg Road Humphrey was given the order by a member of Meade's staff to take his division to Little Round Top, which Humphrey started to do–His division was moving in that direction, i.e. Little Round Top. It was not long before Humphrey received new order through Meade's staff to return his division to its original assignment, i.e. moving to the Emmitsburg Road and Humphrey followed through.
 
Bottom line is that while we might push or pull troops and guns a bit in one direction or another and bend the time a few minutes here and there, one thing we can say (with confidence I think) from this account is that Sickles advanced Graham to the Peach Orchard just minutes before Meade's arrival (in front of Burling's brigade), their meeting being cut short by Cabell's opening barrage.

Exactly. And that is one reason why it would not have been an unreasonable move to vacate the Peach Orchard at the conclusion of the Meade's meeting with Sickles (if Meade wanted Sickles to give up the forward line including the Peach Orchard). It's not like Graham's brigade had either been there long or fully deployed (yet).
 
So, Meade was there before Graham advanced to the Pike and set up? I seem to remember Sickles asking Meade if he should withdrawal back to his original lines. Meade thought it was too late, although from this configuration it wouldn't have seemed to be that big of deal.

No it would not have been that big of a deal.
 
At least according to Pfanz (p144) it was only after the meeting concluded with Meade and Sickles was given a "blank check" did Sickles order Humphrey's division (minus Burling's brigade) to Emmitsburg Road. Prior to this they were still 250-300 yards east of Emmitsburg Road. BUT, on their way to the Emmitsburg Road Humphrey was given the order by a member of Meade's staff to take his division to Little Round Top, which Humphrey started to do–His division was moving in that direction, i.e. Little Round Top. It was not long before Humphrey received new order through Meade's staff to return his division to its original assignment, i.e. moving to the Emmitsburg Road and Humphrey followed through.
That's interesting, but I have found no source among regiments of Carr or Brewster that mentions any move toward Little Round Top, or any other direction other than toward the Emmitsburg road. In the next two maps (3:30 and 3:40), the linchpin tying the narrative together is the opening of the Confederate artillery against the Peach Orchard line. Actually, there are two distinct but related events that appear in a few sources - the opening barrage by Cabell's guns, followed a few minutes later by the opening of Alexander's guns (under Huger).
 
That's interesting, but I have found no source among regiments of Carr or Brewster that mentions any move toward Little Round Top, or any other direction other than toward the Emmitsburg road. In the next two maps (3:30 and 3:40), the linchpin tying the narrative together is the opening of the Confederate artillery against the Peach Orchard line. Actually, there are two distinct but related events that appear in a few sources - the opening barrage by Cabell's guns, followed a few minutes later by the opening of Alexander's guns (under Huger).
Tom, I believe the move was subtle... Meaning they did not travel that far before the order was rescinded. To them it was a "counter-march" which happened now & then and probably did not illicit much in the way of notice.
 
Humphrey was given the order by a member of Meade's staff to take his division to Little Round Top, which Humphrey started to do–His division was moving in that direction, i.e. Little Round Top. It was not long before Humphrey received new order through Meade's staff to return his division to its original assignment
That's interesting, but I have found no source among regiments of Carr or Brewster that mentions any move toward Little Round Top, or any other direction other than toward the Emmitsburg road.

The reference to this order is found in a letter Humphreys wrote to an admirer, John Watts DePeyster. As noted, there is no mention of such a movement by Humphreys' regimental commanders yet there did occur movements of other troops possibly connected to such a move.

In any case, I thought the the claim worth studying and almost thirty years ago wrote an article on the subject for The Gettysburg Magazine entitled, appropriately enough, "Humphreys' Division's Flank March To Little Round Top: A Closer Look". I wasn't happy with the map used to illustrate the article (the editor just plugging in one on hand without any reference to what the article was describing) so I have drawn up one to accompany the attached article.
 

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The reference to this order is found in a letter Humphreys wrote to an admirer, John Watts DePeyster. As noted, there is no mention of such a movement by Humphreys' regimental commanders yet there did occur movements of other troops possibly connected to such a move.

In any case, I thought the the claim worth studying and almost thirty years ago wrote an article on the subject for The Gettysburg Magazine entitled, appropriately enough, "Humphreys' Division's Flank March To Little Round Top: A Closer Look". I wasn't happy with the map used to illustrate the article (the editor just plugging in one on hand without any reference to what the article was describing) so I have drawn up one to accompany the attached article.

Great article James!
 
Regarding the left flank movement of Humphreys' division towards Little Round Top. It is very unlikely that anyone in Humphreys' division other than Humphreys himself and a few of his staff were ever away of such an order. Such a minor movement for such a short period of time would not have been an event later remembered unless something of significance had come of it. Humphreys certainly didn't think it a big deal other than the precision with which it was performed, later writing: "I did not mention in my official report my brief temporary movement by the flank in the direction of Round Top, when I moved forward at four o'clock to take position on the Emmitsburg road, since it resulted in nothing, and did not occupy more than from three to five minutes. It was an interesting incident of the battle, and was prettily done; it was part of a movement of my division, which Hancock and others who saw it from the Cemetery crest, describe as a beautiful sight, the opening of the enemy's artillery upon us adding to the effect. Hancock often spoke to me of it, and I believe Swinton mentions it." (H.H. Humphreys. Andrew Atkinson Humphreys - A Biography. P. 192-194)
Even so it is an important detail in that shows how important Meade thought it would be to have troops sent to Little Round Top as quick as possible.
 
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