rhp6033
Sergeant Major
- Joined
- Aug 4, 2011
- Location
- Everett, Washington
I did this series of articles on the Red River campaign several years ago, which I posted at the time on the THC forum. I thought I would re-post them here. I apologize in advance for the number of articles and the length of some of them, I will try to post about one a day to keep it manageable. My primary source is Johnson, Ludwell H., Politics and Cotton in the Civil War., Kent State University Press (1993), but I will have other citations listed at the end of the articles.
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Red River Campaign – Part 1 - Prequel
The genesis of the Red River Campaign began not so much in Washington D.C., or in Richmond, Virginia, but in the textile plants of Massachusetts, the political ambitions of at least one Union commander, the greed of a lot of cotton speculators, and the Imperial Court of Napoleon III of France.
Texas had been a political hot potato since annexation had upset the delicate balance of political interests in the U.S. between slave and free states. The border dispute which grew into the Mexican-American war multiplied the problem with the addition of vast territories ceded by Mexico.
Abolitionists pointed to the German and Polish settlers in west Texas who managed to grow cotton with hired labor, rather than slaves. Those abolitionists spent most of the 1950’s attempting to get New England settlers to relocate there so they could overwhelm Texas politics with their numbers, thereby ending slavery by popular referendum. After Texas seceded from the Union, west Texas “Union sympathizers” made regular appeals to Washington D.C. to “send an army” to protect them, after which they promised thousands of loyal recruits would, if properly armed and supplied, help recover Texas into the fold of the Union.
Others, including Union political generals Banks and Butler, saw Texas as a path to rise to the highest political office. The sparse population of the state made it look like it might be “easy pickings” compared with other Confederate strongholds, and a few strategists thought that by seizing a few vital strongholds, they could achieve glory as the “Liberator of Texas”, and ride that mantel all the way to the White House.
Cotton speculators and New England textile mills all called for a quick campaign to conquer Texas in order to seize Texas cotton there for their own use. By the third year of the war, only one-fourth of the New England textile looms were still working due to the cotton shortage, and northern cotton traders worried about Britain’s plans to use Egyptian and Indian cotton as a permanent replacement for the “less reliable” sources in North America.
But none of this matured into a significant priority in Washington, D.C. for the first half of the war. To all who begged him to send troops to Texas, Lincoln replied that he simply had none he could spare. Benjamin Butler had offered to raise troops in New England (where he was a Department Commander during the first year of the war), and promised Halleck and Lincoln he could use those troops to first free Texas, and then settle it with his troops as Union-loyal citizens. But Halleck had adopted Winfield Scotts’ Anaconda plan, and insisted that the first priority be the seizure of the Mississippi. So Butler’s troops were sent to seize New Orleans first. This was quite a surprise to many, including a contingent of cotton speculators and Union officials who were expecting set up a Union rump government in Texas. These passengers who accompanied Butler’s army were outraged to find themselves in New Orleans, instead of Texas. It’s a good thing for Butler that he didn’t have to fight his way into New Orleans, because the troops he had with him had received only minimal training, on the assumption that they would primarily become settlers after arriving in Texas.
In the meantime, Halleck insisted that control of the Mississippi was the first priority. All other major campaigns, except those in Northern Virginia, were put on the back-burner. Texas would have to wait.
Later, Banks was sent to be the department head over Butler, because Butler had insulted some European diplomats who thereafter made life miserable for Stanton and Lincoln in Washington with their protests. Upon his arrival, Banks and his staff were astonished at the pervasiveness of the corruption in New Orleans under Butler – even Butler’s brother was involved in schemes to buy cotton from Confederate government agents and re-sold the cotton to agents sending the product to northern mills. Of course, the money received was being used by the Confederates to pay for arms, supplies, and medicine.
Banks was supposed to cooperate with Grant in seizing control of the Mississippi. Grant’s role by late 1862 was to find a way to seize Vicksburg, and Banks was to seize Port Hudson, located on the west bank of the Mississippi between New Orleans and Vicksburg. While it made sense to consolidate forces to take each objective in turn, Grant didn’t want to go to join with Banks (Banks would have out-ranked him and been entitled to overall command), and Banks wasn’t about to send forces to aid Grant without accompanying them. In the end, the Port Hudson garrison surrendered to Banks in July of 1863, shortly after learning of the Vicksburg surrender. Banks was quite upset that Grant got all the good press for seizing Vicksburg, yet Banks got virtually no mention for seizing Port Hudson, which Banks considered to be an equivalent feat.
With the Mississippi running unimpeded in Union-held territory from it’s source to the Delta in July 1863, now Lincoln and Halleck had to decide on priorities in the far West. Competing for attention were the persistent calls for Texas cotton and protection of Unionists in Texas, versus Grant’s insistence that the next priority should be the capture of the port city of Mobile, Alabama. But other events outside of either of these interests had more to say on the matter.
(Next Up: Part 2 – Napoleon III, Texas, and Union Strategy)
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Red River Campaign – Part 1 - Prequel
The genesis of the Red River Campaign began not so much in Washington D.C., or in Richmond, Virginia, but in the textile plants of Massachusetts, the political ambitions of at least one Union commander, the greed of a lot of cotton speculators, and the Imperial Court of Napoleon III of France.
Texas had been a political hot potato since annexation had upset the delicate balance of political interests in the U.S. between slave and free states. The border dispute which grew into the Mexican-American war multiplied the problem with the addition of vast territories ceded by Mexico.
Abolitionists pointed to the German and Polish settlers in west Texas who managed to grow cotton with hired labor, rather than slaves. Those abolitionists spent most of the 1950’s attempting to get New England settlers to relocate there so they could overwhelm Texas politics with their numbers, thereby ending slavery by popular referendum. After Texas seceded from the Union, west Texas “Union sympathizers” made regular appeals to Washington D.C. to “send an army” to protect them, after which they promised thousands of loyal recruits would, if properly armed and supplied, help recover Texas into the fold of the Union.
Others, including Union political generals Banks and Butler, saw Texas as a path to rise to the highest political office. The sparse population of the state made it look like it might be “easy pickings” compared with other Confederate strongholds, and a few strategists thought that by seizing a few vital strongholds, they could achieve glory as the “Liberator of Texas”, and ride that mantel all the way to the White House.
Cotton speculators and New England textile mills all called for a quick campaign to conquer Texas in order to seize Texas cotton there for their own use. By the third year of the war, only one-fourth of the New England textile looms were still working due to the cotton shortage, and northern cotton traders worried about Britain’s plans to use Egyptian and Indian cotton as a permanent replacement for the “less reliable” sources in North America.
But none of this matured into a significant priority in Washington, D.C. for the first half of the war. To all who begged him to send troops to Texas, Lincoln replied that he simply had none he could spare. Benjamin Butler had offered to raise troops in New England (where he was a Department Commander during the first year of the war), and promised Halleck and Lincoln he could use those troops to first free Texas, and then settle it with his troops as Union-loyal citizens. But Halleck had adopted Winfield Scotts’ Anaconda plan, and insisted that the first priority be the seizure of the Mississippi. So Butler’s troops were sent to seize New Orleans first. This was quite a surprise to many, including a contingent of cotton speculators and Union officials who were expecting set up a Union rump government in Texas. These passengers who accompanied Butler’s army were outraged to find themselves in New Orleans, instead of Texas. It’s a good thing for Butler that he didn’t have to fight his way into New Orleans, because the troops he had with him had received only minimal training, on the assumption that they would primarily become settlers after arriving in Texas.
In the meantime, Halleck insisted that control of the Mississippi was the first priority. All other major campaigns, except those in Northern Virginia, were put on the back-burner. Texas would have to wait.
Later, Banks was sent to be the department head over Butler, because Butler had insulted some European diplomats who thereafter made life miserable for Stanton and Lincoln in Washington with their protests. Upon his arrival, Banks and his staff were astonished at the pervasiveness of the corruption in New Orleans under Butler – even Butler’s brother was involved in schemes to buy cotton from Confederate government agents and re-sold the cotton to agents sending the product to northern mills. Of course, the money received was being used by the Confederates to pay for arms, supplies, and medicine.
Banks was supposed to cooperate with Grant in seizing control of the Mississippi. Grant’s role by late 1862 was to find a way to seize Vicksburg, and Banks was to seize Port Hudson, located on the west bank of the Mississippi between New Orleans and Vicksburg. While it made sense to consolidate forces to take each objective in turn, Grant didn’t want to go to join with Banks (Banks would have out-ranked him and been entitled to overall command), and Banks wasn’t about to send forces to aid Grant without accompanying them. In the end, the Port Hudson garrison surrendered to Banks in July of 1863, shortly after learning of the Vicksburg surrender. Banks was quite upset that Grant got all the good press for seizing Vicksburg, yet Banks got virtually no mention for seizing Port Hudson, which Banks considered to be an equivalent feat.
With the Mississippi running unimpeded in Union-held territory from it’s source to the Delta in July 1863, now Lincoln and Halleck had to decide on priorities in the far West. Competing for attention were the persistent calls for Texas cotton and protection of Unionists in Texas, versus Grant’s insistence that the next priority should be the capture of the port city of Mobile, Alabama. But other events outside of either of these interests had more to say on the matter.
(Next Up: Part 2 – Napoleon III, Texas, and Union Strategy)