Question about McClellan the morning of the battle of Antietam

How is Ethan Rafuse's book on McClellan? That is one I have not yet read.

It's a good book, but not a perfect one.

I have a copy both of Rafuse's PhD thesis and the book made from it (McClellan's War). There is a clear difference IMHO in the parts from the thesis and the additions to make it a general military biography. Hence there are weaknesses in some parts, because to extend the work to make a book I think Rafuse largely used existing interpretations and tried to explain them rather than coming up with new ones.

For example, he completely misses the fact that McClellan on the evening of the 27th August 1862 boarded USS Ariel and went to go see Halleck and try and get an answer to the question he asked by telegram - effectively where to send 6th Corps. Whilst there he (or his staff) rounded up all the missing 6th Corps generals (including Franklin)*, and took them back to the Corps when the Ariel headed downriver the next morning (McClellan reached 6th Corps HQ about 1 pm, 28th). It's in McClellan's Own Story, it's in Hallecks report to Stanton, and it is discussed briefly in Cozzens' General John Pope: A Life for the Nation (originally published 2000, and well worth reading). However, it is not in Sears or most of the recent standards. With knowing that McClellan had gotten so frustrated he'd gone to Washington and confronted Halleck at his home in the middle of the night it's difficult to understand the situation.

So, read it, but bear in mind it is not perfect. There are a couple of bit where he doesn't engage in analysis of the "clobber arguments" at all.


* Franklin and both division commanders had given themselves leaves of absences and gone to Washington, leaving Hancock commanding 6th Corps.
 
Thanks for the reference, I didn't realize that there is a controversy about the timing on Burnside's orders too. My only point in sidetracking the OP was that McClellan was awake and issuing orders well before 7 a.m., but I relied on Cox receiving his warning order at 7 am in order to do this. According to the D'aoust article, the preponderance of evidence seems to support Cox's original report rather than his B&L article years later, so I guess I'm still on stable ground?

Dave
 
It almost sounds like mac was up in the pre dawn drafting orders and such, then crashed for a couple of hours. once the orders are sent there aint much to do. my hand ringing would have kept me up.
 
Thanks for the reference, I didn't realize that there is a controversy about the timing on Burnside's orders too. My only point in sidetracking the OP was that McClellan was awake and issuing orders well before 7 a.m., but I relied on Cox receiving his warning order at 7 am in order to do this. According to the D'aoust article, the preponderance of evidence seems to support Cox's original report rather than his B&L article years later, so I guess I'm still on stable ground?

Dave

I'd say yes, but let me play devils advocate for a minute.

McClellan visited Burnside at 1100 hrs on the 16th. As Harsh points out the only thing we know about the meeting is what Burnside told Cox (here and here), but we do know McClellan told Burnside the battleplan and his role in it. Cox says McClellan issued orders for a general attack the evening of the 16th (here).

One could construct an argument that Burnside was acting on orders received the previous day. I don't believe it to be the case in the light of additional evidence, but it could be done.

BTW, in a letter to McClellan, Colonel Sackett identifies himself as the officer who rode over to Burnside around 0900 (the bearer of the 0910 written order), and says that Burnside complained that this was the third or fourth order to assault the bridge he'd received.
 
You have provided a number of valuable references, thanks you. My initial thought is that McClellan could have saved himself a lot of heartburn by formally abolishing the "wings" and sending the commanders back to their original corps. Seems incredible that Burnside would have thought he still should be in command of a wing after Hooker was detached to operate on the extreme right. I also think Sackett adds to the weight of evidence indicating Burnside received the order to attack the bridge around 9 a.m.

Dave
 
Soon after the aide left, Hood's forces entered the fight and Hooker was in trouble. It was at this point that McClellan gave the 0720 order to Sumner to take two of his divisions across the Antietam.
I’ve heard this from several places, and it makes no sense to me. Why would McClellan send in Sumner in response to Hood’s counterattack? Did he forget about Mansfield’s corps? Did he not know that Sumner was 2 miles away from the action?
 
Perhaps to be more useful as a reserve to the 12th Corps, to either follow up any 12th Corps success or prevent Confederate gains in the case of 12th Corps' failure? Just speculating.
 
Perhaps to be more useful as a reserve to the 12th Corps, to either follow up any 12th Corps success or prevent Confederate gains in the case of 12th Corps' failure? Just speculating.

As discussed on another thread, all the subordinate reports that mention a time Sedgwick and French started moving say they started moving 0600-0630, and they formed in the Miller Woods west of Antietam between 0730 and 0800.

McClellan seems to have committed these two divisions at dawn, as he indicated he planned to in his orders the night before. It's just Sumner didn't join them until after 0700.
 
Perhaps to be more useful as a reserve to the 12th Corps, to either follow up any 12th Corps success or prevent Confederate gains in the case of 12th Corps' failure? Just speculating.
Yes, but I’m wondering, why was it the second counterattack (Hood’s) that sparked McClellan’s action? He sees the beginning of a 2,000 man confederate attack, so he feels the need to send in another 16,000 men, before Mansfield’s corps has even arrived?

Doesn’t it make infinitely more sense that he saw the failure of the first confederate counterattack (around
6:45 to 7:00), realized that the confederates were weak, and decided to send his whole army into the action?
 
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As discussed on another thread, all the subordinate reports that mention a time Sedgwick and French started moving say they started moving 0600-0630, and they formed in the Miller Woods west of Antietam between 0730 and 0800.

McClellan seems to have committed these two divisions at dawn, as he indicated he planned to in his orders the night before. It's just Sumner didn't join them until after 0700.

“My division, composed of Brig. Gen. Max Weber's and Kimball's brigades, and three regiments of new levies under the command of Col. Dwight Morris (Fourteenth Connecticut), having been in readiness since daybreak on the 17th instant, was put in motion by orders of the general commanding the corps at about 7.30 o'clock a.m.” —Battle Report of Brig. Gen. William French, 3rd Division of the 2nd Corps

The first of Sumner’s divisions, French’s division, crossed the creek at about 7:30. If you have information suggesting otherwise, then provide it. Otherwise, your claims are worthless.
 
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The first of Sumner’s divisions, French’s division, crossed the creek at about 7:30. If you have information suggesting otherwise, then provide it. Otherwise, your claims are worthless.

As I told you, everyone else says otherwise.

In sum, known timings are:

Sumner: says he didn't receive the order until 0720. A letter from his son clarifies that he'd sat on the steps of Hooker's old HQ for an hour waiting for someone to find him.

French's Division: French says he did receive an order from Sumner until 0730, however reports from Morris' and Kimball's brigades place the time they started marching at 0600, with them forming line of battle west of the Antietam at 0730-0800. They advanced towards the Sunken Road before 0900, as everyone agrees the assault began at 0900.

Sedgwick's Division: The brigadiers give the timings they started marching as 0630 (Dana), 0700 (Howard) and 0720-30 (Gorman and one of his COs). This fits with their forming line at 0800 (see Col Owen's report), and entering the West Woods at 0900 after conducting a recce. Williams report says Sumner reinforced him before 0900.

This would fit with McClellan carrying out his stated intent of having French and Sedgwick march at dawn. French's division marched off first at 0600. The brigades of Sedgwick went west instead of north and crossed the Antietam at 0630, 0700 and 0730 respectively. By 0800 both are formed west of the Antietam, and by 0900 both are attacking. Sumner of course has a missing hour during this, whilst he's sitting outside Hooker's old HQ. What we know is he wasn't handed the order until 0720. The order was likely issued

Reports you've not cited.

Gorman, commanding 1st Bde of Sedgwick's Division:

"On the morning of that day I received orders to march, and at about twenty minutes past 7 o'clock a. m. of that day we took up the line of march. After crossing the Antietam Creek and arriving at an open field about there-quarters of a mile from the enemy's position three lines of battle were formed, my brigade being in the advance and front."

Suitor of the 34th New York:

"In the evening of that day I received an order to be prepared to march at daylight on the morning of the 17th instant. In obedience to said order, I was under arms with my command, and so remained until the order was given to move, which
was about 7.30 o clock A.M.
We moved in a northwesterly direction."

Howard, commanding 2nd Bde of Sedgwick's Division:

"The division, consisting of General Gorman's, General Dana's, and General Burns' brigades, commanded by myself, left camp near Keedysville about 7 a.m., and proceeded in three lines, moving by the right flank in a westerly direction, forded the Antietam, ascended a gentle slope, continuing in the same direction for about a quarter of a mile beyond"

Dana, commanding 3rd Bde of Sedgwick's Division:

"The regiments were accordingly ready, but orders were not received to march till 6.30 o'clock a.m., when I proceeded, in company with the First and Second Brigades, on my left and right respectively, to the right wing of the Army, where Hooker's corps was already engaged with the enemy's left."


Kimball's Bde

Harrow of the 14th Indiana:

"On the morning of the 17th instant, in obedience to your order, my regiment moved forward on the right of the brigade, advancing rapidly toward the enemy, who were then engaging our line. We passed through an orchard, emerging into a plowed field, receiving during the execution of this movement a rapid fire from the enemy; this about 8 o'clock a. m. We ascended the hill in our front and occupied the crest, from which position we engaged the enemy, sheltered under ditches [the Sunken Road], rocks, and fences, with a large reserved force in a field of [Piper's] corn in their rear. The contest here continued for near four hours, during all which time the enemy poured upon us a terrific and murderous fire from infantry, also of grape and shell, thrown from a battery on our right and front. In our immediate front as many as eight stand of rebel colors were exhibited at a time."

Snider of the 7th Virginia:

"In obedience to your order on the morning of the 17th instant, we took our position in line of battle on the extreme left of your brigade, and, in further obedience of your orders, moved forward at 8 o'clock, at which time we engaged the enemy, who were drawn up in large force."

Wilcox of the 132nd Pennsylvania:

"We were ordered by you to take up the line of march about 6 o'clock a. m., and were formed in line of battle at 7 o'clock. We were brought under fire a little before 8 o'clock"

Morris's Bde

Palmer of the 108th New York:

"I have the honor to report that on the 17th instant my command left camp near Keedysville about 6 o'clock in the morning, and, after marching about 2 miles, having formed into line of battle, entered into action on the crest of the hill on the left of the brigade in the front line of battle, and in front of the [Roulette] corn-field and rifle-pits [Sunken Road] occupied by the rebels. The action commenced about 7.30 o'clock in the morning. My command remained in line, and continued in position, firing with great rapidity and energy, in the face of a deadly fire of the enemy, who were stationed in the corn-field and rifle-pits, not more than 20 or 30 rods distant, until about 12.30 o'clock in the afternoon."

Perkins of the 14th Connecticut wrote:

"We broke bivouac at camp near Keedysville, Md., on the morning of the 17th of September, taking position on the right of your command according to order, and marched about two hours by flank, when we formed line of battle and moved forward a distance of about one-half mile, where we became engaged, our position being in a corn-field west of William Roulette's farm-house, the enemy occupying a position on the summit of a hill to our front." - consistent with marching out at 0600 (see Palmer, his brigade mate) and forming before 0800

Zinn of the 130th Pennsylvania contradicted the other two:

"About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 17th instant we left our camp, on the south side of the Sharpsburg pike, and marched by a flank movement to a point about 1 1/2 miles north, where a line of battle was formed." - however, biring in a single sentence this may be the time of forming line. The others disambiguate.

(No timings for Weber's Bde)
 
As I told you, everyone else says otherwise.

In sum, known timings are:

Sumner: says he didn't receive the order until 0720. A letter from his son clarifies that he'd sat on the steps of Hooker's old HQ for an hour waiting for someone to find him.

French's Division: French says he did receive an order from Sumner until 0730, however reports from Morris' and Kimball's brigades place the time they started marching at 0600, with them forming line of battle west of the Antietam at 0730-0800. They advanced towards the Sunken Road before 0900, as everyone agrees the assault began at 0900.

Sedgwick's Division: The brigadiers give the timings they started marching as 0630 (Dana), 0700 (Howard) and 0720-30 (Gorman and one of his COs). This fits with their forming line at 0800 (see Col Owen's report), and entering the West Woods at 0900 after conducting a recce. Williams report says Sumner reinforced him before 0900.

This would fit with McClellan carrying out his stated intent of having French and Sedgwick march at dawn. French's division marched off first at 0600. The brigades of Sedgwick went west instead of north and crossed the Antietam at 0630, 0700 and 0730 respectively. By 0800 both are formed west of the Antietam, and by 0900 both are attacking. Sumner of course has a missing hour during this, whilst he's sitting outside Hooker's old HQ. What we know is he wasn't handed the order until 0720. The order was likely issued

Reports you've not cited.

Gorman, commanding 1st Bde of Sedgwick's Division:

"On the morning of that day I received orders to march, and at about twenty minutes past 7 o'clock a. m. of that day we took up the line of march. After crossing the Antietam Creek and arriving at an open field about there-quarters of a mile from the enemy's position three lines of battle were formed, my brigade being in the advance and front."

Suitor of the 34th New York:

"In the evening of that day I received an order to be prepared to march at daylight on the morning of the 17th instant. In obedience to said order, I was under arms with my command, and so remained until the order was given to move, which
was about 7.30 o clock A.M.
We moved in a northwesterly direction."

Howard, commanding 2nd Bde of Sedgwick's Division:

"The division, consisting of General Gorman's, General Dana's, and General Burns' brigades, commanded by myself, left camp near Keedysville about 7 a.m., and proceeded in three lines, moving by the right flank in a westerly direction, forded the Antietam, ascended a gentle slope, continuing in the same direction for about a quarter of a mile beyond"

Dana, commanding 3rd Bde of Sedgwick's Division:

"The regiments were accordingly ready, but orders were not received to march till 6.30 o'clock a.m., when I proceeded, in company with the First and Second Brigades, on my left and right respectively, to the right wing of the Army, where Hooker's corps was already engaged with the enemy's left."


Kimball's Bde

Harrow of the 14th Indiana:

"On the morning of the 17th instant, in obedience to your order, my regiment moved forward on the right of the brigade, advancing rapidly toward the enemy, who were then engaging our line. We passed through an orchard, emerging into a plowed field, receiving during the execution of this movement a rapid fire from the enemy; this about 8 o'clock a. m. We ascended the hill in our front and occupied the crest, from which position we engaged the enemy, sheltered under ditches [the Sunken Road], rocks, and fences, with a large reserved force in a field of [Piper's] corn in their rear. The contest here continued for near four hours, during all which time the enemy poured upon us a terrific and murderous fire from infantry, also of grape and shell, thrown from a battery on our right and front. In our immediate front as many as eight stand of rebel colors were exhibited at a time."

Snider of the 7th Virginia:

"In obedience to your order on the morning of the 17th instant, we took our position in line of battle on the extreme left of your brigade, and, in further obedience of your orders, moved forward at 8 o'clock, at which time we engaged the enemy, who were drawn up in large force."

Wilcox of the 132nd Pennsylvania:

"We were ordered by you to take up the line of march about 6 o'clock a. m., and were formed in line of battle at 7 o'clock. We were brought under fire a little before 8 o'clock"

Morris's Bde

Palmer of the 108th New York:

"I have the honor to report that on the 17th instant my command left camp near Keedysville about 6 o'clock in the morning, and, after marching about 2 miles, having formed into line of battle, entered into action on the crest of the hill on the left of the brigade in the front line of battle, and in front of the [Roulette] corn-field and rifle-pits [Sunken Road] occupied by the rebels. The action commenced about 7.30 o'clock in the morning. My command remained in line, and continued in position, firing with great rapidity and energy, in the face of a deadly fire of the enemy, who were stationed in the corn-field and rifle-pits, not more than 20 or 30 rods distant, until about 12.30 o'clock in the afternoon."

Perkins of the 14th Connecticut wrote:

"We broke bivouac at camp near Keedysville, Md., on the morning of the 17th of September, taking position on the right of your command according to order, and marched about two hours by flank, when we formed line of battle and moved forward a distance of about one-half mile, where we became engaged, our position being in a corn-field west of William Roulette's farm-house, the enemy occupying a position on the summit of a hill to our front." - consistent with marching out at 0600 (see Palmer, his brigade mate) and forming before 0800

Zinn of the 130th Pennsylvania contradicted the other two:

"About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 17th instant we left our camp, on the south side of the Sharpsburg pike, and marched by a flank movement to a point about 1 1/2 miles north, where a line of battle was formed." - however, biring in a single sentence this may be the time of forming line. The others disambiguate.

(No timings for Weber's Bde)
Most of those quotes you provided support a 7:00-7:30 crossing. Curious.

Your belief that McClellan bypassed Sumner and directly ordered the 2nd Corps over the creek before 7:00 comes only from a few people writing incorrect times in their reports? What a surprise.
 
Thanks for the reference, I didn't realize that there is a controversy about the timing on Burnside's orders too.
Yeah, there’s a “controversy” over the timing of Burnside’s orders, just like there’s a “controversy” over the cause of the Civil War, i.e. there are people who suppress evidence, manipulate evidence, and use dubious information to fabricate a fake controversy simply because they can’t accept reality.
 
Most of those quotes you provided support a 7:00-7:30 crossing. Curious.

Your belief that McClellan bypassed Sumner and directly ordered the 2nd Corps over the creek before 7:00 comes only from a few people writing incorrect times in their reports? What a surprise.

Some of them, which contradicts your claim that they didn't start moving until after 0730...
 
Yeah, there’s a “controversy” over the timing of Burnside’s orders, just like there’s a “controversy” over the cause of the Civil War, i.e. there are people who suppress evidence, manipulate evidence, and use dubious information to fabricate a fake controversy simply because they can’t accept reality.

... and their names where Jacob D. Cox and Ambrose Burnside.
 
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