Question about Lee's strategy/tactics

JRJ

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Well we finally reached the Civil War in my HIS101 class. Didn't get as deep as I would have liked for a 3-hour lecture class (he only used 2 hours of it, pfft!).

Anyway. My instructor proposed that you could sum up General Lee's tactics as this

"He would wait for the enemy to screw up, and then (and I quote verbatum) pound them in the flank"

Was this the reality of Lee's strategy?
 
But wasn't part of Lee's plan for Day 3 of G'burg to punch a hole in the center of Cemetary(sp) Ridge, driving a wedge between two halves of the Union forces and then using his Cav. and Ewell(I believe, he was attacking the top of the hook correct) rain down terror upon the rear and right respectively?

(Note I said plan, not execution. I know how that day turned out :wink: )
 
Well we finally reached the Civil War in my HIS101 class. Didn't get as deep as I would have liked for a 3-hour lecture class (he only used 2 hours of it, pfft!).

Anyway. My instructor proposed that you could sum up General Lee's tactics as this

"He would wait for the enemy to screw up, and then (and I quote verbatum) pound them in the flank"

Was this the reality of Lee's strategy?
While one can certianly see where an idea such as this comes from, IMHO
it would be an unfair chacterization based on the fact , that Robert E Lee was very well prepared in every aspect of the war. Would love to hear what others have to say in regard to this.
 
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He made a lot of blanket statements today, I assume in the effort to appease the masses (the whole 5 other people in the room) who couldn't seem to careless, so this could just be an example of that, but I would love to flush out y'all's expertise!
 
Well in that case, doesnt every commander use the same strategy, from company sized up to grand armies? I think the only battle Lee fought that had no flank movement intended was malvern hill.
 
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He made a lot of blanket statements today, I assume in the effort to appease the masses (the whole 5 other people in the room) who couldn't seem to careless, so this could just be an example of that, but I would love to flush out y'all's expertise!
Hey Smokey.. lets just have a class on Robert E Lee right here.
 
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Well in that case, doesnt every commander use the same strategy, from company sized up to grand armies? I think the only battle Lee fought that had no flank movement intended was malvern hill.
You are correct sir!
 
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Well we finally reached the Civil War in my HIS101 class. Didn't get as deep as I would have liked for a 3-hour lecture class (he only used 2 hours of it, pfft!).

Anyway. My instructor proposed that you could sum up General Lee's tactics as this

"He would wait for the enemy to screw up, and then (and I quote verbatum) pound them in the flank"

Was this the reality of Lee's strategy?
From what i have read, and what i understand of my own research I could sum up lee like this:

Lee fought mostly on the defensive, but strove to maintain what is called the "tactical offensive". That is that he would try to stun his opposing commanders and attack with as much vigor as possible. He often threw his forces against Union armies that outnumbered it, but as he attacked and made good use of terrain and flanking manuevers usually the union commander would be forced onto the defensive, or in the case of burnside make a disastarous frontal attack on fortified positions.

On the offensive, where he was without the "home field advantage" Lee encountered many of the same issues that Union commanders did in Virginia. At Antietam he rallied a situation that could have been a disaster for his army into what amounted to a retreat back to friendly territory, however he gave Lincoln the ammunition he needed to issue the emancipation proclamation.

His most glaring example of offensive ineptitude though comes at Gettysburg. Now the tables had turned and it was fredericksburg Union style. (I Believe) Lee's overconfidence and his wish to break the AoP overreached his force projection power in this respect. It was an unmitigated DISASTER in the truest sense of the word. Only through inaction on the part of the AoP did the ANV escape true and real destruction. Contrary to the popular movie belief that the ANV was still strong and ready at the end of the battle, I have read that the men were disordered and broken and needed time to recuperate (I can't imagine them not being in this state ofter what had happened). Moreover, Lee had essentially decimated the leadership of Pickett's Division, and had lost many MANY veterans that he could not replace. Whereas the union, though still smarting from the mauling that they were given (and it was a pretty bad mauling) they were receiving reinforcements that the south could not provide to Lee. Lee's tactics, and the lossof life involved, may have brought short term success, but in the end they bled the south of the manpower it needed to win the war. Just my opinion though.
 
Lee's strategy was Napoleionic, in that his goal was always a battle of annihilation. As the force with inferior manpower and resources, a long war for Lee was an anathema. Unfortunately, the changes in weapons made such battles impossible, with the Napoleionic tactics.


P.S. Lee rejected Longstreets plan to repeat the tactics of Chancellorsville, at Gettysburg because he did not know the precise location and disposition of the AoP, due to the absence of Stuart(and Lee's mishandling of the cavalry he did have).
 
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There is an element of truth to the professor's statement, but of course it is an over-broad generality. Always outnumbered, Lee had to be able to hold a good part of the Union army in place while he concentrated a "locally superior" force which was mobile and could hit the enemy hard on the flank. Lee would rely upon entrenchemnts when he could to hold the attention of the major portion of the Union army in check in order to create a large mobile force - an application of the "economy of force" principle as found in today's military teachings.

There are plenty of such examples in Lee's battles, such as Lee's first victory outside Richmond in the first of the Seven Days battles, and of course Chancellorsville, where Lee divided his force three times in order to protect his back from the Union advance from Fredericksburg, another portion to hold Hooker's army in place in the Wilderness, and then sending Jackson off on his famous "left hook" which left Siegel's forces reeling in panic and threatened to collapse the entire Union line.

Of course, this wasn't particularly original military thinking. When attacking the enemy, you have three choices - go around them to the left, go around them to the right, or try to go right through them. The hard part is in the application - at no point can you rely upon the enemy to do what you hope them to do, and any mistakes they make might be remedied quicker than you can take advantage of them. Even Bragg was able to give Rosecran's army at Stones River a good spanking by attacking the Union left flank and rolling it up.

An example of the "mistakes" Lee might have taken advantage of include Chancellorsville (Hooker's left flank was "in the air"), or along the N. Anna line during Grant's Overland Campaign. But this wasn't pure luck - Lee had examined the Union's choices carefully, like a chess player looking at the board from both sides, and already knew well what choices the Union commander would have to make and which of those choices made at least a portion of his army vulnerable. At Chancellorsville Lee knew which routes Hooker would have to take to ford the Rapidan, and sent Stuart's cavalry to watch closely for where Hooker's flanks were anchored. When they reported back that Hooker's left flank was in the air, he immediatly moved to take advantage of it before Hooker could correct the problem. In a sense, he made his own luck.

At the N. Anna, however, the opportunity was a fleeting one caused by the geographics of the river forks which left one portion of Grant's forces isolated. Lee had already anticipated the problem , and when he saw it develope he tried to take advantage of the situation. But Lee was in poor health and unable to supervise the action himself, and Longstreet was still recovering from his wounds. Less capable junior officers were left to conduct the movement, and they encountered vigerous opposition from Union cavalry using repeating rifles. Before the Confederates could correct their problems, Grant saw through Lee's plans and removed the exposed portions of his army to beyond Lee's reach.

On the defensive, such as at Fredericksburg and Anteitam, that's another matter altogether - Lee shuffled forces as needed between threatened positions to avoid being overcome at any given point.
 
Napoleon revolutionized warfare with speed. Rushing towards the enemies formations before the enemy could fully merge. Thusly destroying opposing parts with superior force before they could form a force superior to Napoleon's army.

Lee again revolutionized warfare by going against the textbooks.
He was constantly in numerical inferiority (often 2:1 or even 3:1), yet defying all the circumstances. Splitting his troops was one of his most successful tactics, like at Second Manassas or Chancelloresville. Splitting his troops granted him more tactical options which he brilliantly exploited.
I believe that if Lee had let Longstreet take a force around Meade's left at Gettysburg and set up a position behind them, that plan could have worked, but for some reason Lee disagreed with Longstreet's idea.
Hm, I thought it was Longstreet who differentiated from Lee's plan?
 
Hm, I thought it was Longstreet who differentiated from Lee's plan?
I believe you are correct. But I don't believe that would have turned the battle around. The Union had already fortified the hills, and if it were before the second day, I think Lee would not have been confident enough to make the assault as he did not have most of his forces the first day. The union was entrenched on the high ground, with superior firepower and interior lines, Longstreet's flanking attack (IMO) wouldn't have negated all those advantages. I believe the union would hve simply closed up tighter and fought it out with similar results.
 
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In Lee's master plan I believe there was 4 components: Ewell's assault on Meade's left. Cav attack from the rear. Main assault. Secondary assault. The secondary assault never came, which, would have ended exactly like the first, in my opinion.
 
This is only conjecture, but I suspect one reason Lee rejected Longstreet's proposal at Gettysburg is that he was wanting to end the war in one blow. He'd won victories with flank attacks, but he'd never accomplished the destruction of the Union army. I believe Lee thought if the center was as thin as he thought, then he could smash the army in two and at least destroy or capture half of it, then pursue the remnant. Occurring on northern soil, the aftershock on the populace might have been catastrophic and led to peace.
 
i have a crazy theory i've been building on for a few weeks, like i said its crazy but bear with me. In my theory Picketts charge was just a bait. He knew it would fail and he thought that the union would counter attack, which would get them off the ridges and hills. Lee massed alot of artillery but only advanced the 8 howitzers to support the infantry attack. that leaves alot of guns on seminary ridge to repulse the counter attack. The reason i think this is because Lee had Andersons division to supposedly support the attack but never sent it in. Like i said its crazy lol.
 
i have a crazy theory i've been building on for a few weeks, like i said its crazy but bear with me. In my theory Picketts charge was just a bait. He knew it would fail and he thought that the union would counter attack, which would get them off the ridges and hills. Lee massed alot of artillery but only advanced the 8 howitzers to support the infantry attack. that leaves alot of guns on seminary ridge to repulse the counter attack. The reason i think this is because Lee had Andersons division to supposedly support the attack but never sent it in. Like i said its crazy lol.
Hmm, I had been taught it that it was Longstreet's call whether or not to send in Anderson's division. When the first assault was so badly obliterated Longstreet decided not to send the second wave in.
 
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