Saphroneth
Lt. Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
Intentions and possibilities for the Loudoun Valley campaign.
Lee
For Lee's part, the thing he was concerned about in this period was an amphibious threat to Richmond. By this time Lee cannot have failed to learn that the Union army has raised "new levies" in great numbers, and these new levies will lift much of the restrictions the Union previously had on force assignment. Lee meanwhile has most (though not quite all) of the brigades of the Confederate army east of the mountains and north of the Roanoke in his army, and so if there is an independent amphibious threat to Richmond (such as for example a corps or two being dispatched over sea up the James) Lee needs to be able to react to it as fast as possible. This (getting back to Richmond) is thus the main move he has prepared for in advance.
Longstreet's corps was at the start of the period largely concentrated at Martinsburg, while Jackson's corps was somewhat spread out. The Stonewall division and Ewell's division wre at Winchester, while AP Hill was to the east at about the same latitude and DH Hill's division (plus Walker's smaller division) were near Chester's Gap. (The position I have marked for them on the first few maps to follow is approximate; their orders to move to Upperville were dated on the 22nd).
It's my belief that this arrangement of forces is intended to defend Richmond in two ways. The first is an attempt to keep the Union army "pinned" defending Washington and the North in general (by threatening an invasion of the north with Longstreet's corps and with DH Hill's division posing threat towards Washington) and the second is to be able to move south to Richmond quickly if needed.
As it happens, Lee himself is in Richmond for part of this, and doesn't rejoin his army until about the 5th November. He does however command his army's movements by telegram.
A letter of the 24th sees Lee saying "General McClellan does not seem disposed, as yet, to move any portion of his army from this frontier, and, so long as this army retains its present position, I doubt whether he will materially diminish it. I think, though, that when he opens the campaign,it will be south of James River, and we ought to be prepared."
When McClellan starts moving, Lee begins moving as well. Looking at the movements it seems to be Burnside crossing south of the Potomac which is the trigger, though it could have been something else as well. During the movement Lee is alert for a situation where he could attack McClellan effectively, though he doesn't find one successfully.
McClellan
It is likely that McClellan did not seriously think he would be able to beat Lee to Richmond, because of all the obstacles in the way of being able to achieve this - in particular, Lee can route-march down to Culpeper while McClellan needs to guard his flank - but aside from this McClellan's concept of operations for the first stage is fairly simply stated.
McClellan would throw a pontoon bridge over the Potomac at Berlin (fortunately, this bridge was not destroyed by a freshet - the river did rise in this period, though it rose slowly rather than quickly as all the pontoon bridges survive) and cross 1st, 2nd and 9th Corps into the Loudoun Valley. If possible he would also cross 5th and 6th Corps, leaving just 12th Corps at Harpers Ferry and a small command under Morell ("Defences Upper Potomac", roughly two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade) to cover the fords into Maryland.
Meanwhile (assuming that nothing untoward happened at Washington) the divisions of 3rd Corps (Stoneman and the other one under Sickles - Stoneman would rise to command the 3rd Corps entire shortly and turn his division over to Birney) and of 11th Corps would move out of Washington to help cover an interim supply point at Gainesville.
McClellan's general objective for the first state of the movement was to capture the town of Warrenton, on a spur of the Orange and Alexandria, and to establish a crossing of the upper Rappahannock river. Once established at Warrenton and with a crossing of the Rappahannock he can form his next plans depending on enemy reactions.
The worst case here is that McClellan gives Lee an opening for a significant victory, such as covering his flank insufficiently; the next worst case is that the whole Confederate army moves south and is able to get between him and Richmond. This however would basically "reset" the situation to an early 1862 "Overland Campaign" scenario, except that most available Confederate reinforcements have already been tapped while the York is open to Union supply ships.
Lincoln
Lincoln appears to have believed that it was possible for McClellan to simply march down to Richmond faster than Lee could get there. It is not clear if he ever put in the next level of analysis, which is to ask why Lee would allow himself to be put in such a vulnerable position if that vulnerability actually existed - especially if it was so simple that you could spot it just by looking at a map.
Lee
For Lee's part, the thing he was concerned about in this period was an amphibious threat to Richmond. By this time Lee cannot have failed to learn that the Union army has raised "new levies" in great numbers, and these new levies will lift much of the restrictions the Union previously had on force assignment. Lee meanwhile has most (though not quite all) of the brigades of the Confederate army east of the mountains and north of the Roanoke in his army, and so if there is an independent amphibious threat to Richmond (such as for example a corps or two being dispatched over sea up the James) Lee needs to be able to react to it as fast as possible. This (getting back to Richmond) is thus the main move he has prepared for in advance.
Longstreet's corps was at the start of the period largely concentrated at Martinsburg, while Jackson's corps was somewhat spread out. The Stonewall division and Ewell's division wre at Winchester, while AP Hill was to the east at about the same latitude and DH Hill's division (plus Walker's smaller division) were near Chester's Gap. (The position I have marked for them on the first few maps to follow is approximate; their orders to move to Upperville were dated on the 22nd).
It's my belief that this arrangement of forces is intended to defend Richmond in two ways. The first is an attempt to keep the Union army "pinned" defending Washington and the North in general (by threatening an invasion of the north with Longstreet's corps and with DH Hill's division posing threat towards Washington) and the second is to be able to move south to Richmond quickly if needed.
As it happens, Lee himself is in Richmond for part of this, and doesn't rejoin his army until about the 5th November. He does however command his army's movements by telegram.
A letter of the 24th sees Lee saying "General McClellan does not seem disposed, as yet, to move any portion of his army from this frontier, and, so long as this army retains its present position, I doubt whether he will materially diminish it. I think, though, that when he opens the campaign,it will be south of James River, and we ought to be prepared."
When McClellan starts moving, Lee begins moving as well. Looking at the movements it seems to be Burnside crossing south of the Potomac which is the trigger, though it could have been something else as well. During the movement Lee is alert for a situation where he could attack McClellan effectively, though he doesn't find one successfully.
McClellan
It is likely that McClellan did not seriously think he would be able to beat Lee to Richmond, because of all the obstacles in the way of being able to achieve this - in particular, Lee can route-march down to Culpeper while McClellan needs to guard his flank - but aside from this McClellan's concept of operations for the first stage is fairly simply stated.
McClellan would throw a pontoon bridge over the Potomac at Berlin (fortunately, this bridge was not destroyed by a freshet - the river did rise in this period, though it rose slowly rather than quickly as all the pontoon bridges survive) and cross 1st, 2nd and 9th Corps into the Loudoun Valley. If possible he would also cross 5th and 6th Corps, leaving just 12th Corps at Harpers Ferry and a small command under Morell ("Defences Upper Potomac", roughly two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade) to cover the fords into Maryland.
Meanwhile (assuming that nothing untoward happened at Washington) the divisions of 3rd Corps (Stoneman and the other one under Sickles - Stoneman would rise to command the 3rd Corps entire shortly and turn his division over to Birney) and of 11th Corps would move out of Washington to help cover an interim supply point at Gainesville.
McClellan's general objective for the first state of the movement was to capture the town of Warrenton, on a spur of the Orange and Alexandria, and to establish a crossing of the upper Rappahannock river. Once established at Warrenton and with a crossing of the Rappahannock he can form his next plans depending on enemy reactions.
The worst case here is that McClellan gives Lee an opening for a significant victory, such as covering his flank insufficiently; the next worst case is that the whole Confederate army moves south and is able to get between him and Richmond. This however would basically "reset" the situation to an early 1862 "Overland Campaign" scenario, except that most available Confederate reinforcements have already been tapped while the York is open to Union supply ships.
Lincoln
Lincoln appears to have believed that it was possible for McClellan to simply march down to Richmond faster than Lee could get there. It is not clear if he ever put in the next level of analysis, which is to ask why Lee would allow himself to be put in such a vulnerable position if that vulnerability actually existed - especially if it was so simple that you could spot it just by looking at a map.