Prize Cases

I do have it listed. Problem is, I can't easily find it; it was in the section I call SocioPolitical and I stopped in the middle of reshuffling.

The search will have to be another day: taxes and balancing the checkbook and installing a new light fixture in Dear One's room will occupy the rest of today (and maybe tomorrow).

Ole
 
The President's response was to strike his best country-lawyer pose. "I'm a good enough lawyer in a Western law court, I suppose," he replied, "but we don't practice the law of nations up there, and I supposed [Secretary of State] Seward knew all about it, and I left it to him." It was a pity, he added, but "it's done now and can't be helped."


Lincoln surely had a difficult time saying this with tongue firmly implanted in cheek. Crafty dodger. And you know, that is what it takes, in many instances, to get the **** ball rolling.
 
Lincoln surely had a difficult time saying this with tongue firmly implanted in cheek. Crafty dodger. And you know, that is what it takes, in many instances, to get the **** ball rolling.
Don't know what you're saying here, hurry. Are you saying he was kidding? That he didn't leave it up to Seward?
 
The blockade did force Britain and France to develop new sources of cotton, I have always read they developed a cotton growing system in Egypt and their African colonies.
Close, coltshooter. Britain at least (don't know about France), had been for some years developing an alternative supply in Egypt and India. The blockade did apply a sense of urgency to that development.

But, and here's the kicker, there were (was) bumper crop(s) of cotton the year(s) before secession; England's warehouses (again, don't know about France) were bulging with an oversupply of cotton. Seems like the mills in England had a two-year supply (Don't quote me.) So the affect of the south's withholding of cotton was delayed. Meanwhile, most of Europe had a string of bum years in it's production of food crops. So, while the south was talking of withholding cotton, the north was desperately building the infrastructure needed to ship gazillions of bushels of northern and western grain to Europe -- very nearly all of which went through New York. Is that bad timing, or what?

Although there is considerable evidence that the blockade runners did manage to keep a stream of goods sailing into southern ports, it wasn't enough. In fact (another kicker), the Confederate Congress had eventually to specify that a given percentage of cargo had to be military supplies. Cigars, cognac, and silk was apparently preferred by the wealthy.

Back to prizes. I wasn't aware of these cases. Guess I'll have to start paying more attention to this thread.

Ole
 
The President's response was to strike his best country-lawyer pose. "I'm a good enough lawyer in a Western law court, I suppose," he replied, "but we don't practice the law of nations up there, and I supposed [Secretary of State] Seward knew all about it, and I left it to him." It was a pity, he added, but "it's done now and can't be helped."


Lincoln surely had a difficult time saying this with tongue firmly implanted in cheek. Crafty dodger. And you know, that is what it takes, in many instances, to get the **** ball rolling.

hurryuphill,

It's even craftier to use a person's negative views of you and your actions to get you to your ultimate goal. I'm sure Lincoln used the 'country bumpkin' or 'western frontiersman' perception folks had of him to get around many a confrontation.

But the point I think being made here in this thread concerning the Prize Cases is that Lincoln didn't have a free ride or the powers of an absolute dictator.

He had to consider the law and the Constitution when trying to conduct the war. He was not given a free hand, nor was he able to control the country, nor the government, to the degree some claim he did.

In this case alone, Lincoln faced the real prospect of losing. Taney had no love for Lincoln and the majority of the Justices were Southern-leaning or slaveholders, most of them States Rights men. If Lincoln had been the dictator he is viewed by some, why not arrest the Court, or simply ignore their ruling on the matter if it went against him and his administration?

Because he could not do so. The North would have turned utterly against him, with the Democratic party leading the way with a majority of the Northern public joining them. The press, which he did not control to the extent some give him credit for, would have come out howling at such a dictatorial act. He could not do so, because then the European powers would have taken notice and caused far more trouble than they were just by running the blockade.

Lincoln was restrained by the law, the Constitution, the Supreme Court, the press, and the people. This particular case, if you read about it in the books referenced here by the forum members, didn't even come close to having his own way.

Lincoln was a slick Western lawyer, a cunning politician, and a brillant man. The reason I admire him is for what he did, and did not do.

Sincerely,
Unionblue
 
Continued...

To All,

Continued from the post above, extracts from the book, Lincoln's Constitution, by Daniel Farber, chapter 6, Presidential Power, pp. 140-143:

"The Court also clarified a key question: Did recognizing a state of war implicitly concede the legitimacy of the Confederacy? The answer was no. "It is not the less a civil war, with belligerent parties in hostile array, because it may be called an 'insurrection' by one side, and the insurgents be considered as rebels or traitors." The independence of a rebelling province does not need to be recognized in order for it to qualify as a "party belligerent in a war according to the law of nations." Such a state of war had been recognized by England and other European states that had declared themselves neutral in the Civil War. The Court roundly rejected the argument that "insurgents who have risen in rebellion against their sovereign" are "not enemies because they are traitors." As a belligerent, the United States was entitled "not only to coerce the other by direct force, but also to cripple his resources by the seizure or destruction of his property." This applied to everyone living in Confederate territory. "They have cast off their allegiance and made war on their Government, and are none the less enemies because they are traitors."

The dissent agreed that if a civil war existed between the Confederacy and the United States, the blockade would be valid. They argued, however, that only an action by Congress can "change the legal status of the Government...from that of peace to a state of war." This did not mean, however, that the president was powerless to resist the rebellion until Congress met. Both under the Constitution and by statute, the dissenters agreed, he was entitled to call forth the militia to suppress insurrection and execute the laws. He therefore "can meet the adversary upon land and water with all the forces of the Government." But what he cannot do on his own is to invoke the laws of war, which "convert every citizen of the hostile State into a public enemy, and treat him accordingly, whatever may have been his previous conduct." For that purpose, "Congress alone can determine whether war exists or should be declared." Hence, according to the dissent, a formal state of war did not exist until July 13, when Congress passed legislation endorsing the president's activities.

Thus, the Court was unanimous in holding that the president had the right to mobilize the nation to do battle after Sumter, and that an actual state of war existed by mid-July at the latest. The only disagreement was whether a state of war existed earlier. The existence of a legal state of war did not determine the government's ability to use force, but it did change the legal rights of almost everyone connected with the war. A legal state of war would limit the rights of neutral nations to conduct trade with the South, end the ability of noncombatant Southerners to invoke their normal rights as American citizens, and allow combatant Southerners to be treated as prisoners of war rather than criminals or traitors. Even Chief Justice Taney, who joined the dissent, evidently agreed that such a legal transformation had taken place by July 13.

Except for the hapless owners of the few vessels captured by one side or another between mid-April and July 13, the exact date at which the Civil War became and official war was not a matter of great practical importance. What was important was Lincoln's power, without specific approval by Congress, to engage in what was in fact a war. The Court's unanimity on this point is supported both by history and by comon sense.

The Framers understood the president to have the power to make war in response to attack, though not necessarily to initiate it without authorization from Congress. Earlier drafts of the Constitution originally gave Congress the power to "make war." On August 17, [1787] this language was amended to read "declare war." Madison and Gerry, who made the motion, argued that the change would leave "to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." Sherman agreed that the president should "be able to repel and not to commence war."

The common sense of the matter is also clear. The president must have the power to respond to attacks and other urgent threats when advance authorization from Congress is impractical. Under Article I, section 10 of the Constitution, even the state governments have this power: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress...engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." Although similar language does not appear in Article II, there is no reason to believe that a different rule was meant to apply. Surely, the president of the nation should have at least as much discretion to take the country to war as is possessed by a state govenment.

Even under the most Congress-centered view of the war powers, the president has been accorded this power to defend the nation. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is a powerful statement of Congress's claim to control the initiation of hostilities. Even this resolution, however, recognizes the president's authority to introduce the military into hositilities in "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." The resolution calls for consulation with the congressional leadership and gives the president up to ninety days to get congressional authorization. Naturally, Lincoln did not comply to the letter with a statute that was not passed until over a centruy later. But he did in effect "comply" with the substance of the statute. He did receive full authorization from Congress by July 13, within ninety days after he called up the militia. Thus, even under a highly Congress-centered view of the war power, Lincoln acted appropriately. Indeed, given current laments about the ineffectiveness of the War Powers Resolution, it is somewhat ironic that Lincoln's record of "compliance" with the resolution is better than that of the modern presidents at whom it was aimed.

As to whether a formal state of war existed before Congress acted, the Pize Cases majority seems to have the better of the argument, given the agreement that a de facto war properly existed anyway. It would make little sense to say that, until Congress was able to act, the United States was entitled to fight but not to invoke its full rights under international law as a belligerent, while its enemy was free to do so. Nor would it make sense to say that until Congress acted, the United State was required to treat captured soldiers as criminals and captured sailors as pirates. Such actions would only have sparked dreprisals against Union prisoners. In short, since even the dissent conceded that Lincoln could engage in what was in reality a war without congressional approval, the majority seems right to take the logical next steop of saying that he could recognize the legal existence of a state of war when it was thrust upon him.

Thus, putting aside the issue of habeas corpus for now, the constitutional verdict on Lincoln's bold initial response to secession is almost entirely favorable. On the most important items--calling up the militia, deploying the military, and imposing a blockade--he was clearly acting within constitutional bounds. Only in two respects did he cross the line--in diverting funds to private parties to help pay for the early stages of the war and in expanding the regular military without prior congressional approval. On both points, as on the blockade, he was promptly supported by Congress after the fact. Whether he was justified in ignoring the Constitution's requirement of prior approval is a question to which we will return later. For now, it is enough to know that the Union marched to was in general compliance with the Consitution..."


The majority opinion of the Supreme Court as submitted by Justice Grier may be found here:

http://supreme.justia.com/us/67/635/case.html

Submitted for the forum members consideration.

Unionblue
 
...In this case alone, Lincoln faced the real prospect of losing. Taney had no love for Lincoln and the majority of the Justices were Southern-leaning or slaveholders, most of them States Rights men. If Lincoln had been the dictator he is viewed by some, why not arrest the Court, or simply ignore their ruling on the matter if it went against him and his administration?

Because he could not do so. The North would have turned utterly against him, with the Democratic party leading the way with a majority of the Northern public joining them. The press, which he did not control to the extent some give him credit for, would have come out howling at such a dictatorial act. He could not do so, because then the European powers would have taken notice and caused far more trouble than they were just by running the blockade.

Lincoln was restrained by the law, the Constitution, the Supreme Court, the press, and the people. This particular case, if you read about it in the books referenced here by the forum members, didn't even come close to having his own way.

Bingo, Blue (I like the alliteration in that). I also like the logic of it.

I believe you have quoted enough from Farber's book that I no longer feel compelled to get a copy. :smile:

Thanks much for the info. Keep it coming.
 
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